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A Thesis Abstract 
 
Augustinian interiority is a way of deifying ourselves in order to attain true happiness 
(i.e., teleology). Augustine approaches deification chiefly in terms of the ‘image of 
God’, from the perspectives of ontology and teleology. Ontologically, we are created in 
the image of God and this image is indestructible as long as God sustains our life. 
Teleologically, the image has been deformed (and true happiness has become a remote 
reality for us) due to the Fall. Humanity therefore needs to be restored. How, then, can 
we renew the image? Augustine observes that the more we know and love God, the 
more we become like Him. How, then, can we get to know who/what God really is? 
This is what Augustinian interiority concerns: its intellectual dimension (i.e., knowing 
God) cannot be separated from its ethical dimension (i.e., loving God).  
 
The desire for true happiness, which is God, is universal among us. Since we cannot 
strive for what we do not know, we must know something about happiness before we 
pursue it, and the knowledge must be innate in our memory. In addition, 
learning/knowing a thing is refreshing our latent memory of that thing. Eventually, our 
endeavour to understand God is, in fact, an attempt to recall wholly what we have 
already known about Him. Why, then, do we remember so little about God – especially 
His immaterial nature? This is because we are preoccupied with material and worldly 
things. Thus, passing beyond the world of senses, we must make an effort to grasp the 
reality of the soul, which is, like God, incorporeal and rational: the soul is the best clue 
to knowledge of God. Then, we will be able to perceive correctly God’s immanence, 
omnipresence, and transcendence. Faith is crucial for making progress in our 
intellectual and ethical ascent to God. However, it is not enough just to believe revealed 
truths, but we must try to understand them by all means possible. In this way, we can 
cling to God with our mind and heart, be deified, and move closer to true happiness. 
Yet, we need to bear two things in mind. One is that without divine grace nothing is 
possible for us. The other is that, although we cannot know God completely in this life, 
we must hope for it and love to increase our theological knowledge.
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Introduction 
 
Augustine did not use an exact Latin equivalent of the English word ‘interiority’.7 
Nonetheless, there are texts that scholars feel confident to associate with the idea of 
interiority. For instance, Madec8 and Antoni9 refer to ‘Tu (i.e., Deus) autem eras interior 
intimo meo et superior summo meo’10 (Confessiones 3.6.11), while Turner refers to ‘et 
ecce intus eras et ego foris et ibi te quaerebam’11 (Confessiones 10.27.38). Antoni12 and 
Taylor13 point to another passage in De vera religione 39.72: ‘Noli foras ire, in teipsum 
redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas’14. The common feature of all these examples is 
that God/Truth is immanent in each one of us. Why, then, did Augustine encourage his 
readers to return to the self and search for God/Truth there? In order to find the answers, 
we need to have recourse to his thought concerning teleology15 and deification. 
 
In Augustine’s thoughts teleology, deification, and interiority overlap considerably 
with each other. Teleology concerns true happiness: this is a Greek idea that Augustine 
encountered through reading the Hortensius at the age of nineteen.16 As a consequence 
of this reading achieving true happiness became a lifelong preoccupation.17 Deification 
is about personal transformation. Now, Augustine says in In euangelium Ioannis 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
7
 See André Antoni, ‘La quête de Dieu à travers l’intériorité’, Itinéraires Augustiniens 2 (1989), 5-6: ‘La 
quête de Dieu à travers l’intériorité’, Itinéraires Augustiniens, No. 2 Juillet 1989, 5-6: ‘Si Augustin a pu 
être considéré comme le maître de l’intériorité, il n’en a jamais écrit de traité, et le concept n’existe pas 
comme tel dans son oeuvre.’ 
8
 Cf., Goulven Madec, Petites études augustiniennes (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1994), 97. 
9
 Cf., Antoni, ‘La quête de Dieu à travers l’intériorité’, 5. 
10
 ‘you (i.e., God) were more inward than my inward part and higher than the highest element within me’ 
(Chadwick’s translation). 
11
 ‘but see, you were within (me) and I was outside (myself); it was there that I sought you’ quoted in 
Denys Turner, The Darkness of God: Negativity in Christian mysticism, (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1995), 53. 
12
 Cf., Antoni, ‘La quête de Dieu à travers l’intériorité’, 5. 
13
 Cf., Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity (Massachusetts: Harvard 
University Press, 1989), 129. 
14
 ‘Do not go outward; return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth’ cited in Taylor, Sources of 
the Self, 129.  
15
 Refer to the beginning of Part I ‘The foundations of Augustinian interiority’. 
16
 Holte maintains that Augustine had already read another book of Cicero De finibus (bonorum et 
malorum) and Varro’s De philosophia, both of which concern teleology, by the time he started to 
compose his first book: see!Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse. Saint Augustine et le problème de la fin 
de l’homme dans la philosophie ancienne (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 17-18. 
17
 See Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1961), 3-10.  
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tractatus 23.5, ‘it (i.e., the soul) is made blessed by participation in God’18. Here, as I 
shall explain later, ‘participation’ is actually the language of deification among the 
Church Fathers. Thus, the passage means that, by ‘participating’ in God, the soul 
becomes deified and attains happiness. Interiority is also a way of ‘participating’ in 
God. Yet, Augustine insists that we must, beforehand, know where to find God. As 
mentioned, God is within us, not ‘out there’, hence interiority is crucial. In summary, 
we can truly be happy by becoming deified through interiority. In other words, the 
purpose of interiority is to render ourselves (or to be rendered) similar to God so that we 
find true happiness, which is God.19 
 
Now, scholars generally, and rather oddly, tend to disapprove of the claim that 
deification is integral to Augustine’s thought.20 (Some scholars, especially Christians, 
feel uncomfortable with Augustine’s notion of ‘deification’;21 since for them the notion, 
which is of pagan origin, is blasphemous.) As a matter of fact, the word ‘deification’ in 
its various Latin forms rarely appears in Augustine’s entire works.22 However, Bonner 
is absolutely right to insist that that by no means implies that deification is insignificant. 
Thus, in line with Bonner, Folliet23, and Casiday24, I shall explain why deification 
matters in relation to interiority (and teleology). 
 
The idea of deification originates in Graeco-Roman paganism, in which the 
distinction between humans and deities is not as sharp as the Christian distinction 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
18
 In euangelium Ioannis tractatus 23.5 (‘Participatione Dei fit beata’) quoted in Gerald Bonner, 
‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986), 373. 
19
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.3 (‘Deus beatitudo’) and Confessiones 10.23.33 (‘gaudium de veritate’). Also, see 
Sermnes 150.3.4: ‘Listen first to the common aim of all philosophers.... It is characteristic of all 
philosophers that, through their study, inquiry, discussion, their very life, they have sought to possess a 
happy life. This alone was the cause of philosophising (Haec una fuit causa philosophandi). Furthermore, 
I think that the philosophers even have this search in common with us. For, if I should ask you why you 
believe in Christ, and why you have become Christians, every man will answer truthfully by saying: for 
the sake of a happy life. The pursuit of a happy life is common to philosophers and to Christians’ quoted 
in Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s love of wisdom: an introspective philosophy (West Lafayette: Purdue 
University Press, 1992), 44. 
20
 Cf., Augustine Casiday, ‘St. Augustine on deification: his homily on Psalm 81’, Sobernost 23 (2001), 
23–44. 
21
 Cf., Gerald Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, Journal of Theological Studies 37 (1986), 
369-372. Also, see, by the same author, ‘Deification, Divinization’, in Allan D. Fitzgerald, OSA (ed.), 
Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 265-
266. 
22
 Cf., Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 369. 
23
 Georges Folliet, ‘Deificari in otio. Augustin, Epistula 10. 2’, Recherches Augustiniennes 2 (1962), 225-
236. 
24
 Cf., Casiday, ‘St. Augustine on deification: his homily on Psalm 81’, 23–44. 
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between the Creator God and His creation.25 Such an idea contributed significantly to 
shaping the philosophical-religious dimension of society as well as individuals. On a 
national level, the imperial cult of deifying and worshipping both deceased26 and 
reigning27 Roman emperors was practised: it was a crucial means for unifying society.28 
At an individual level, it was arguably a way for personal religious development, and its 
chief representatives are Orphism (i.e., a mystery religion) and the Platonic 
philosophical tradition.29 Plato and the self-professed heirs of his philosophical legacy 
held that there is in each one of us a divine part, which is to be discovered and 
‘actualized’30.31  
 
We do not know what motivated the Christians to initiate, in the 2nd century, their 
serious consideration of deification, which is based on Psalm 82:6 (‘I said, you are gods 
and all of you sons of the Most High’).32 Nonetheless, in the course of its development 
many Christian intellectuals felt free to appropriate the Platonic idea of deification, 
though Church Fathers were ‘careful to maintain the absolute ontological distinction 
between God and his creation’33. (Regarding the imperial cult, Christians rejected it in 
the time of persecution, otherwise they became tolerant of it.34) Eventually, ‘until the 
end of the fourth century’, as Russell summarises the systematisation of Christian 
deification,  
 
‘the metaphor of deification develops along two distinct lines: on the one hand, 
the transformation of humanity in principle as a consequence of the Incarnation; 
on the other, the ascent of the soul through the practice of virtue. The former, 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
25
 Cf., Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 370. Also, see Norman Russell, The doctrine of 
deification in the Greek patristic tradition (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004), 16: for a summary of 
the origin and the development deification, refer to ibid., 1-25. 
26
 from the time of Augustus (63 BC –AD 14). 
27
 since Domitian (AD 51 – 96) 
28
 Russell, The doctrine of deification in the Greek patristic tradition, 9-10. Also, see Ibid., 16: in the 
Graeco-Roman world ‘the divine and human worlds were not separated by an impenetrable barrier.’ 
29
 Russell, 10. 
30
 Cf., Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 14-15: ‘L’ est l’état de l’homme où l’élément divin n’est ni 
affaibli ni étouffé, mais se trouve au contraire actualisé avec son maximum de plénitude et de force’. 
31
 Russell says in his book The doctrine of deification in the Greek patristic tradition, ‘Philosophical 
religion was based on the conviction that the attainment of the divine was fundamentally the realization of 
something within oneself’ (p. 10). But the ‘something’ is the divine part of the human person. 
32
 Cf., Russell, 12; and Norman, Keith E., Early Christian Deification, 
http://www.lightplanet.com/mormons/basic/godhead/Deification_EOM.htm, cited from ‘Deification, 
Early Christian’, in Encyclopedia of Mormonism, Vol.1, (Macmillan Publishing Company, 1992). 
33
 Bonner, ‘Deification, Divinization’, 265. 
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broadly characteristic of Justin, Irenaeus, Origen, and Athanasius, is based on St 
Paul’s teaching on incorporation into Christ through baptism and implies a 
realistic approach to deification. The latter, typical of Clement and the 
Cappadocians, is fundamentally Platonic and implies a philosophical or ethical 
approach. By the end of the fourth century the realistic and philosophical strands 
begin to converge.’ 35 
 
Russell explains further how the Christian ‘metaphor of deification’ was influenced and 
shaped by Greek ideas. The ethical transformation was regarded as restoring the 
‘likeness (homoiosis) to God’. The ‘realistic approach’, on the other hand, was 
developed on the basis of the concept ‘participation (methexis) in God’. Both 
‘homoiosis’ and ‘methexis’ are Plato’s vocabulary, and are important elements of the 
subsequent Platonic tradition. The two terms are distinct from one another. Yet, they are 
commonly applied to describe the relationship between supreme (or absolute) being and 
contingent being. In a nutshell, a contingent being is a ‘likeness’ (or 
‘imitation’/‘copy’)36 of, and also ‘participates’ in, Being. 37 
 
The mature Augustine’s theory of deification, too, has both the ‘realistic’ dimension 
and the ‘ethical’ dimension. The best way to identify the similarities and to get a general 
idea concerning the theory is to understand his use of the terms ‘participation’ and 
‘image/likeness (of God)’38 in two different ways. One is ontological: ‘He makes you a 
partaker of His immortality’39. The other is teleological: ‘It (i.e., the soul) is made 
blessed by participation in God.’40 ‘Image/likeness (of God)’ is employed in De 
Trinitate 14.2.6 in both senses:  
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34
 Cf., Russell, 9-10. 
35
 Russell, 14-15. 
36
 Cf., Nicholas White, ‘9 Plato's metaphysical epistemology’, in Richard Kraut (ed.), The Cambridge 
Companion to Plato (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992), 289, 293, 295, 299 & 301; and 
John Edward Sullivan, The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its influence (Dubuque: 
Priory Press, 1963), 8. 
37
 Cf., Russell, 2. For more explanation see White, ‘9 Plato's metaphysical epistemology’, 289, 293, 295, 
299 & 301. 
38
 Soliloquia 1.1.4 & De Trinitate 1.7.14. 
39
 Sermones 166.4.4. 
40
 In euangelium Ioannis tractatus 23.5 (‘Participatione Dei fit beata’) quoted in Bonner, ‘Augustine’s 
Conception of Deification’, 373. 
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(1) We talk about the soul’s immortality, of course, with certain qualifications; 
the soul does have its own kind of death, when it lacks the happy life which 
ought truly to be regarded as the soul’s life; but (1a) it is called immortal because 
it never ceases to live with some sort of life even when it is at its unhappiest. In 
the same sort of way, (2) though the reason or understanding in it may appear at 
one moment to be in a coma, at another to be small, at another to be great, the 
human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual. And therefore (2a) if it 
is with reference to its capacity to use reason and understanding in order to 
understand and gaze upon God that it was made to the image of God, it follows 
that from the moment this great and wonderful nature begins to be, this image is 
always there, whether it is so worn away as to be almost nothing, or faint and 
distorted, or clear and beautiful. (3) Divine scripture indeed bewails the distortion 
of its true worth by saying, Although man walks in the image, yet he is troubled 
in vain; he treasures up and does not know for whom he gathers them (Ps 39:6). 
(3a) It would not have ascribed vanity to the image of God unless it had observed 
that it had been distorted. (3b) But it shows clearly enough that this distortion 
cannot stop its being image by saying, Although man walks in the image. So this 
sentence can be true whichever way round you put it; as well as saying (3c) 
Although man walks in the image, yet he is troubled in vain, you could also say 
(3d) “Although man is troubled in vain, yet he walks in the image.” (3e) 
Although it is a great nature, it could be spoiled because it is not the greatest; and 
(3f) although it could be spoiled because it is not the greatest, yet because it is 
capable of the greatest nature and can share in it, it is a great nature still.41 [De 
Trinitate 14.2.6] 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
41
 Hill’s translation: ‘Nam sicut ipsa immortalitas animae secundum quemdam modum dicitur; habet 
quippe et anima mortem suam, cum vita beata caret, quae vera animae vita dicenda est; sed immortalis 
ideo nuncupatur, quoniam qualicumque vita, etiam cum miserrima est, numquam desinit vivere: ita 
quamvis ratio vel intellectus nunc in ea sit sopitus, nunc parvus, nunc magnus appareat, numquam nisi 
rationalis et intellectualis est anima humana; ac per hoc si secundum hoc facta est ad imaginem Dei quod 
uti ratione atque intellectu ad intellegendum et conspiciendum Deum potest, profecto ab initio quo esse 
coepit ista tam magna et mira natura, sive ita obsoleta sit haec imago, ut pene nulla sit, sive obscura atque 
deformis, sive clara et pulchra sit, semper est. Denique deformitatem dignitatis eius miserans divina 
Scriptura: Quamquam, inquit, in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur: thesaurizat, et nescit 
cui congregabit ea. Non itaque vanitatem imagini Dei tribueret, nisi deformem cerneret factam. Nec 
tantum valere illam deformitatem, ut auferat quod imago est, satis ostendit, dicendo: Quamquam in 
imagine ambulat homo. Quapropter ex utraque parte veraciter pronuntiari potest ista sententia, ut 
quemadmodum dictum est: Quamquam in imagine ambulat homo, tamen vane conturbatur; ita dicatur, 
Quamquam vane conturbatur homo, tamen in imagine ambulat. Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen 
! *"
In this text there are basically three ontological statements, which are:  
 
(1) the soul’s immortality, (1a) it never ceases to live (i.e., the soul never ceases 
to be);  
 
(2) the human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual, (2a) this image 
[of Reason42/God] is always there, whether it is … distorted (thus becoming 
rational is becoming like Reason/God);  
 
(3b) this distortion cannot stop its being image.  
 
These phrases imply that the soul’s existence and its (state of) being the image of 
God/Reason cannot be separated from one another. Consequently, since God has made 
us partake in His immortality;43 God does not allow His image in us to perish. 
Regarding the teleological aspect (or life/death) of ‘image of God’, the relevant 
passages are:  
 
(1) the soul does have its own kind of death, when it lacks the happy life which 
ought truly to be regarded as the soul’s life,  
 
(1a) [it never ceases to live … even when] it is at its unhappiest (i.e., [the soul is 
ontologically immortal though] it is teleologically perishable); 
 
(2) [though] the reason or understanding [i.e., the image of Reason/God] in it 
may appear at one moment to be in a coma, at another to be small, at another to 
be great, [the human soul is never anything but rational and intellectual] (i.e., [the 
soul is by nature rational though] the degree of its rationality varies); 
 
(2a) [this image is always there, whether] it is so worn away as to be almost 
nothing, or faint and distorted, or clear and beautiful; 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!
vitiari41 potuit, quia summa non est: et quamquam vitiari potuerit, quia summa non est, tamen quia 
summae naturae capax est, et esse particeps potest, magna natura est.’  
42
 Cf.,!De ordine 1.8.25; Confessiones 3.6.10, 3.7.12, 13.9.10 & 11.8.10. 
43
 Cf., Sermones 166.4.4. 
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(3b) this distortion [i.e., of the image of God] cannot stop its [i.e., the soul’s] 
being image (i.e., [the soul is ontologically the imperishable image of God 
though] the image can be teleologically distorted).  
 
The teleological mutability of the image is also expressed in terms of ‘troubled’ (3c & 
3d) and ‘spoiled’ (3e & 3f). Similarly, De Trinitate 14.4.18 is another instance of the 
twofold meaning of the term ‘image’:  
 
For now it (i.e., the mind) loves itself with a straight, not a twisted love, now that 
it loves God; for sharing in him results not merely in its being that image, but in 
its being made new and fresh and happy after being old and worn and 
miserable.44 
 
Here, Augustine says that renewing (‘renovatur’) the image of God and making 
oneself happy (‘beatificatur’) go hand in hand. (Notice that ‘sharing 
[participatione]’ in God in the above text is used in both ontological [i.e., ‘being 
that image’] and teleological sense [i.e., ‘its being made new and fresh’].) What, 
then, makes the image deformed or reformed? That depends on our ethical life: 
 
See to what extent you are unlike. You assuredly displease because of that 
unlikeness, since you have been made in the image of God; but by a perverse and 
evil life you are troubled in yourself and have destroyed in you the image of your 
founder. Being thus made unlike, look to yourself and be displeased with 
yourself; and from that very moment you will have begun to be made like, since 
that thing displeases you which also displeases God.45 (Enarrationes in Psalmos 
75.3)  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
44
 Hill’s translation: ‘Iam enim se non diligit perverse, sed recte, cum Deum diligit, cuius participatione 
imago illa non solum est, verum etiam ex vetustate44 renovatur, ex deformitate reformatur, ex infelicitate 
beatificatur.’ 
45
 (411-412 AD) quoted in Gerald Bonner, ‘III. Augustine’s Doctrine of Man. Image of God and Sinner’ 
in God’s Decree and man’s Destiny (London: Variorum, 1987), 502: also, see footnote no. ‘30 Enar. in 
Ps. 75,3: “Quod est, Incipite Domino in confessione? Incipite adiungi Deo. Quomodo? Ut hoc vobis 
displiceat quod et illi displicet. Displicet illi vita tua mala: si placeat tibi, disiungeris ab illo ; si displiceat 
tibi, per confessionem ill coniungeris. Vide ex quanta parte dissimilis es, quando utique propter [ipsam] 
dissimilitudinem displices. Factus enim es, o homo, ad imaginem Dei; per vitam vero perversam et 
! *$
Consequently, both the Greek Fathers’ doctrine of deification and Augustine’s 
understanding of deification consist of a ‘realistic’ (or ontological) dimension and an 
‘ethical’ (or teleological) dimension: ethics is an integral constituent of teleology. (In 
fact, the level of the image’s perfection is determined not only by the ethicality of our 
way of life, but also by our understanding of God. Furthermore, the latter is a more 
critical factor than the former: I shall explain this later.) 
 
Note Bonner argues that Augustine mentions the complete obliteration of the image 
of God by sin in a number of places;46 for example,  
 
By sin Adam lost this image imprinted in the spirit of the mind which we receive 
by the grace of righteousness47,  
 
Are they not worthy to suffer such things, that God should bring their image to 
nothing in His City, because they themselves have likewise brought the image of 
God to nothing in the Earthly City? 48  
 
Bonner suggests some possible reasons for such a ‘strange aberration’ in Augustine as 
follows; 
 
we cannot ignore the influence of Neo-Platonism. According to Plotinus, an 
image can only obtain a true likeness to its model if it is turned to it in 
contemplation. … Again, Augustine regards the image of God in man as being 
found in the mens, the highest part of the soul, which is capable of supernatural 
life. If that supernatural life were brought to an end by sin, God’s image would 
perish … Finally, account should be taken of the parallel in Augustine’s mind 
between man’s creation in Adam and his recreation in Christ by reform and 
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malam perturbasti in te, et exterminasti in te imaginem Conditoris tui. Factus dissimilis, adtendis in te, et 
displices tibi: iam ex eo coepisti similis fieri, quia hoc displicet quod displicet et Deo.”’ 
46
 Cf., Bonner, ‘III. Augustine’s Doctrine of Man. Image of God and Sinner’, 504-506. 
47
 De Genesi ad Litteram 6.27.38 quoted in Bonner, 504: footnote no. ‘38 De Gen. ad lit. VI,27,38: “Hanc 
imaginem in spiritu mentis impressam perdidit Adam per peccatum ; quam recipimus per gratiam iustitiae 
; non spirituale atque immortale corpus, in quo ille nondum fuit, et in quo erunt omnes sancti resurgentes 
a mortuis : hoc enim praemium47 est illius meriti47, quod amisit.”’  
48
 Enarrationes in Psalmos 72.26 quoted in Bonner, 504-505: footnote no. ‘40 Enar. in Ps. 72,26: 
“Domine, in civitate tua imaginem illorum ad nihilum rediges48. Nonne digni sunt haec pati, ut Deus in 
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renewal. As G. B. Ladner has expressed it: ‘ … Reformation-renovation, then, is 
a second turning to God from nothingness, starting with a new conversion, a 
renewal this time to the creational condition of formation’.49 
 
Here, Bonner is not aware that, while being mistakenly convinced that the ‘loss’ of the 
image (or the image’s being reduced to ‘nothing’) must mean an ontological demise, he 
is correctly attempting to make sense of the ‘loss’ from the perspective of teleology: 
‘sin’ is, above all, an ethical language. Let us turn to the Confessions 13.21.29 for 
further clarification:  
 
It is profitable only for already baptized believers to keep them from love of this 
world (Jas. 1: 27) that their soul may live to you (2 Cor. 5: 15). It was dead when 
it was living in pleasures (I Tim. 5: 6), pleasures, Lord, which bring death.50  
 
What the ‘death’ of the soul means, I think, is very clear: it cannot be construed literally 
as meaning the termination of the soul’s existence. Therefore, we must not interpret, in 
an ontological sense, any Augustinian text concerning the annihilation of the image: in 
this life, the soul always remains as an image of Being. 
 
I have so far demonstrated that the idea of deification similar to Greek Fathers’ is an 
integral element of Augustine’s thoughts. Also, I have briefly explained that the 
teleological part of Augustinian deification can be designated as ‘interiority’. Yet, this 
assertion of mine needs a further justification, and the best way to start it is to highlight 
in more detail how the two constituent parts of deification differ from one another: it 
will also lead to a correct definition of the term ‘Augustinian deification’.  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!
civitate sua imaginem illorum ad nihilum redigat ; quia et ipsi in civitate terrena imaginem Dei ad nihilum 
redegerunt? In civitate tua imaginem eorum ad nihilum rediges.”’  
49
 Bonner, 505-506. Also, see Bourke, 123-124: ‘Difficulty arises from the fact that Augustine used the 
term “immortality” in a different sense when discussing the effect of sin upon the soul (City 12.4). Thus, a 
soul that has sinned seriously is called “dead” in the sight of God. This does not mean that a sinner ceases 
to exist; rather, Augustine thought that all human souls are undying. They live on to a future life of 
happiness or punishment. In the Incomplete Work against Julian (6.30), he acknowledges that there are 
two meanings of immortality, and the more important meaning is the religious one.’ 
50
 Chadwick’s translation: ‘non prodest nisi iam fidelibus continere se ab amore huius saeculi, ut anima 
eorum tibi vivat, quae mortua erat in deliciis vivens, deliciis, Domine, mortiferis’ 
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God, first of all, has made us ontologically ‘participate’ in Him by ‘adopting’ us as 
His sons through the Son’s incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection, and our baptism: 
 
If we are made sons of God, we are also made gods; but this is done by grace of 
adoption, and not by generation;51 
 
(incarnation) God wishes to make you a god, not by nature, like Him (i.e., Christ) 
whom He begot, but by His gift and adoption. For just as He through His 
humanity was made a partaker of your mortality, so He makes you a partaker of 
His immortality by exaltation;52  
 
the Son of God came … and was made the Son of Man, in order to reform us to 
the image of God;53  
 
(crucifixion) for if He (i.e., the Son) had not willed to be deformed, you would 
not have recovered the form which you lost. He, therefore, hung upon the cross, 
deformed; but His deformity was our beauty. In this life, therefore, let us hold the 
deformed Christ. What is the deformed Christ? Far be it from me to glory, save 
in the cross of our Lord Jesus Christ, through which the world hath been 
crucified unto me and I unto the world. This is the deformity of Christ;54 
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51
 quoted in Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 378: footnote no. ‘39 Enar. in Ps. 49. i. 2: 
“Ego dixi: Dii estis, et filii Excelsi omnes; vos autem ut homines moriemini, et sicut unus ex principibus 
cadetis. Manifestum est ergo, quia homines dixit deos, ex gratia sua deificatos, non de substantia sua 
natos. IIle enim iustificat, qui per semetipsum non ex alio iustus est; et ille deificat, qui per seipsum non 
alterius participatione Deus est. Qui autem iustificat, ip9e deificat, quia iustificando, filios Dei facit. Dedit 
enim eis potestatem filios Dei fieri. Si filii Dei facti sumus, et dii facti sumus; sed hoc gratiae est 
adoptantis non naturae generantis.” CCSI, xxxviii. 575-6.’ 
52
 Sermones 166.4.4. Also, see!ibid., (‘if He Himself is the Selfsame and cannot in any way be changed, 
by participating in His divinity we too shall be made immortal in eternal life; and this pledge has been 
given to us by the Son of God ... that before we should be made partakers of His immortality, He should 
Himself first be made a partaker of our mortality. For just as He was mortal, not of His substance but of 
ours, so we shall be immortal, not of our substance but of His’) quoted in Bonner, 378: footnote no. ‘40 
Serm. 166. iv. 4: ‘Deus enim deum to vult facere: non natura, sicut est ille quem genuit; sed dono suo et 
adoptione. Sicut enim ille per humanitatem facts est particeps mortalitatis tuae; sic to per exaltationem 
facit participem immortalitatis suae.’ PL. xxxviii. 909.’ 
53
 De Trinitate 4.4.7 (McKenna’s translation). 
54
 quoted in Bonner, Gerald, ‘III. Augustine’s Doctrine of Man. Image of God and Sinner’, 509: footnote 
no. ‘60 Serm. 27,6,6:54 “Deformitas Christi to format. Ille enim si deformis esse noluisset, to formam 
quam perdidisti non recepisses. Pendebat ergo in cruce deformis ; sed deformitas illius pulchritudo nostra 
erat. In hac ergo vita deformem Christum teneamus. Quid est, deformem Christus? Absit mihi gloriari nisi 
in cruce domini nostri Iesu Christi, per quem mihi mundus cruci f ixus est, et ego mundo. Haec est 
deformitas Christi.”’ 
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(resurrection) because that flesh (i.e., of Christ’s) has received resurrection and 
eternal life, which arose and being made alive ascended into heaven, this has 
been promised to us also. For we expect the inheritance itself, eternal life;55 
 
(baptism) Behold, a man has received the Sacrament of that birth, being baptized; 
he hath the Sacrament, and a great Sacrament, divine, holy, ineffable. Consider 
what a Sacrament! To make him a new man by remission of all sins! 56 
 
Note that in De Trinitate 14.17.23 Augustine clarifies the role of baptism, which I take 
as a preparation for our teleological participation. In other words, baptism does not 
renew the image of God, but prepares for it: 
 
To be sure, this renewal (i.e., of the image of God) does not happen in one 
moment of conversion, as the baptismal renewal by the forgiveness of all sins 
happens in a moment, so that not even one tiny sin remains unforgiven. But it is 
one thing to throw off a fever, another to recover from the weakness which the 
fever leaves behind it; it is one thing to remove from the body a missile stuck in 
it, another to heal the wound it made with a complete cure. The first stage of the 
cure is to remove the cause of the debility, and this is done by pardoning all sins; 
the second stage is curing the debility itself, and this is done gradually by making 
steady progress in the renewal of this image. These two stages are pointed out in 
the psalm where we read, He is gracious to all your iniquities, which happens in 
baptism, and heals all your infirmities (Ps 103:3), which happens by daily 
advances while the image is being renewed.57 
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55
 quote in Bonner, Gerald, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 375: footnote no. ‘28 Serm. 22. x. 
10. CCSL xli. 300-1.’ 
56
 Tractatus in epistolam Ioannis ad Parthos 5.6 quoted in Bonner, ‘III. Augustine’s Doctrine of Man. 
Image of God and Sinner’, 510: footnote. no. ‘66 In Ep. Iohan. Tr. 5,6: “Ecce accepit sacramentum 
nativitatis homo baptizatus. Sacramentum habet et magnum sacramentum, divinum, sanctum, ineffabile. 
Considerate56 quale : ut novum faciat hominem dimissione omnium peccatorum.”’ 
57
 Hill’s translation: ‘Sane ista renovatio non momento uno fit ipsius conversionis, sicut momento uno fit 
illa in baptismo renovatio remissione omnium peccatorum, neque enim vel unum quantulumcumque 
remanet quod non remittatur. Sed quemadmodum aliud est carere febribus, aliud ab infirmitate, quae 
febribus facta est, revalescere; itemque aliud est infixum telum de corpore demere, aliud vulnus quod eo 
factum est secunda curatione sanare : ita prima curatio est causam removere languoris, quod per omnium 
fit indulgentiam peccatorum ; secunda ipsum sanare languorem, quod fit paulatim proficiendo in 
renovatione huius imaginis’ quoted in Bonner, ‘III. Augustine’s Doctrine of Man. Image of God and 
Sinner’, 511: footnote no. 66. 
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In summary, we are constantly in the state of being invited to renew the image of God 
through the Son’s participation in our life and through our baptism: the latter is the 
culmination of God’s invitatory act. 
 
As for the teleological side of our participation in God, it is changeable in terms of 
degree throughout our life. In other words, one’s level of participation is subject to 
change, and differs from another’s. Hence, Augustine describes it in quantitative 
language, often in conjunction with ‘image/likeness (of God)’: the more we participate 
in God, the more we become like Him (‘… while the inner man is being renewed more 
and more’58). Note that in De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo 
parvulorum 2.8.10 Augustine says that ‘full adoption and deification, however, only 
take place after death, at the resurrection’59: it goes without saying that ‘full’ is 
quantitative language. 
 
What, then, does Augustine mean by ‘participation’ on our part in the teleological 
sense? In De Trinitate 7.6.12 Augustine says, ‘One does not approach God by moving 
across intervals of place, but by likeness or similarity, and one moves away from him by 
dissimilarity or unlikeness.’60 So, we can put the same question in the following way 
without detriment to its meaning: ‘How can we render ourselves similar to God?’, or 
‘How can we move closer to God?’ 
 
The answer is twofold and can be found in the Augustinian texts cited above. One is 
by means of loving God or maintaining an ethically upright lifestyle (cf., De Trinitate 
14.4.18 and Enarrationes in Psalmos 75.3): our way of life become truly ethical if we 
love God more than His creation.61 The other is our reason’s action of ‘understanding 
and gazing upon God’ (De Trinitate 14.2.6). These two are inseparable from one 
another, but there is a logical precedence as well as superiority between them. Since 
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 De Trinitate 4.3.5 (McKenna’s translation): ‘… cum magis magisque renovatur interior homo’. Also, 
see De Trinitate 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation): ‘we are like God inasmuch as we know Him (Quocirca 
in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus)’. 
59
 quoted in Bonner, ‘Deification, Divinization’, 266. 
60
 Hill’s translation: ‘Non enim locorum intervallis sed similitudine acceditur ad Deum, et dissimilitudine 
receditur ab eo.’ 
61
 Cf., De Trinitate 12.11.16:!(Hill’s translation) ‘For man’s true honor is God’s image and likeness in 
him, but it can only be preserved when facing him from whom its impression is received. And so the less 
love he has for what is his very own the more closely can he cling to God. (Honor enim hominis verus est 
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Augustine stresses in a number of places that we cannot love what we do not know,62 
gaining knowledge of God is logically (not temporally) prior to loving God and so the 
former is a more decisive factor than the latter. Consequently, Augustine says in De 
Trinitate 9.11.16, ‘we are like God in as much as we know Him’63, and this is based on 
two premises. One is that ‘all knowledge concerning the species of a thing is similar to 
that thing which it knows’64 (De Trinitate 9.11.16): I shall explain what the Augustinian 
term ‘species (species)’ means in the following paragraph. The other is that, when we 
love such knowledge, our mind ontologically becomes similar to that species.65 Yet, 
‘(we are) never like him (i.e., God) to the point of equality, since we never know him as 
much as he himself is.’66  
 
Note that Augustine frequently uses the Latin word ‘species’ – as well as ‘genus’ – 
primarily as collective nouns in all cases: the Oxford Latin Dictionary defines ‘species’ 
as ‘a subdivision of any class or kind, a sort, species, etc.’, and ‘genus’ as ‘a class 
containing in itself a number of subordinate kinds or variety’. These are a pair of 
correlative terms, just like ‘left’ and ‘right’, ‘high’ and ‘low’. Hence, ‘(human) person’, 
for example, is a species of the generic term ‘animal’, but simultaneously is a genus 
with respect to ‘man’ and ‘woman’. Augustine maintains that a definition of a thing 
becomes truthful when that definition refers to the species of that thing; for instance,  
 
(each individual man) defines the human mind by a special and general 
knowledge. … when he speaks the truth about the human mind, either specially 
or generally.67  
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imago et similitudo Dei, quae non custoditur nisi ad ipsum a quo imprimitur. Tanto magis itaque 
inhaeretur Deo, quanto minus diligitur proprium.)’  
62
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.1: (McKenna’s translation) ‘no one can in any way love a thing that is wholly 
unknown’. De libero arbitrio 2.15.40: ‘wisdom … in the knowledge of which you found delight’. 
63
 (McKenna’s translation) ‘Quocirca in quantum Deum novimus, similes sumus’. 
64
 This is my own translation of ‘omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei quam novit’: (Hill’s 
translation) ‘all positive knowledge of quality is like the thing which it knows’: (McKenna’s translation) 
‘all knowledge according to the species is similar to that which it knows’. 
65
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16: (McKenna’s translation) ‘The mind, therefore, possesses a certain likeness of 
the species known to it, whether we are pleased with the species or displeased with its privation (Habet 
ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae similitudinem …)’: (Hill’s translation) ‘So the consciousness has 
some kind of likeness to the positive quality known, either when it takes pleasure in it or when it is 
displeased with the lack of it.’ McKenna’s translation is better than Hill’s. 
66
 De Trinitate 9.11.16 (Hill’s translation). 
67
 De Trinitate 9.6.9 (McKenna’s translation): ‘humanam mentem speciali aut generali cognitione definit. 
… de humana specialiter aut generaliter verum dicit’. There is a similar passage in De ordine 2.11.31: 
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the definition of a generic term itself must include all the species.68  
 
Therefore, ‘knowledge according to the species’69 means ‘a definition of a (generic) 
term according to its species’: ‘defining’ a thing perfectly is the same as ‘understanding’ 
that thing perfectly; for instance, 
 
it is not by seeing many minds with our bodily eyes that we gather, by way of 
analogy, a general or special knowledge of the human mind; but we contemplate 
(intuemur) the inviolable truth, whence we can as perfectly as possible define, not 
what each man’s mind is, but what it ought to be in the light of the eternal 
types.70 (‘Contemplate’, ‘understand’, ‘see’ and ‘know’ are synonymous with 
each other in Augustine’s language.71) 
 
I would have you define what sensation itself is, so that all these may be included 
in one simple definition, and nothing else that is not sensation may be understood 
(intellegeretur) under it.72 
 
Based on Epistulae ad Galatas expositio 30 (394/395 AD), Bonner defines 
Augustinian deification as ‘sonship by adoption and not by nature through God’s 
participation in our humanity in the person of Jesus Christ’73. This is a lopsided 
definition, for it refers to the ontological part only. Bonner’s problem here is that he has 
failed to identify the multiple meanings of the word ‘nature’. Whenever Augustine 
stresses the difference between the Son of God and the sons of God in terms of ‘nature’, 
he is not implying any more than the distinction between the Creator and His creation, 
and the immutability of the former and the mutability of the latter. In many other parts 
of his works Augustine simultaneously emphasizes a crucial similarity between God 
and the soul. That is that both of them share the common immaterial ‘nature’. Thus, the 
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‘Man is an animal, rational and mortal. In this definition, when the genus which is called animal has been 
given (Homo est animal rationale mortale. Hic genere posito quod animal dictum est)’. 
68
 De Trinitate 15.9.15 (McKenna’s translation): ‘Definitio autem ipsius nominis generalis, omnes etiam 
species complectatur necesse est.’ 
69
 De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
70
 De Trinitate 9.6.9 (McKenna’s translation). 
71
 Cf., De quantitate animae 27.53, 33.76 & De Trinitate 1.8.16: ‘contemplare’, ‘scire’, ‘intellegere’ and 
‘videre’.  
72
 De quantitate animae 23.41. Also, see ibid., 25.48. 
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Creator God is immutable Good, Beauty, Being, and Reason;74 whereas the soul – as 
being created in the image of God, or as a result of the Son’s participation in our 
humanity – is mutably good, beautiful, existent, and rational.75 The ontological gap 
between the Creator and creatures is eternally insurmountable and this is what ‘sonship 
by adoption and not by nature’ means. However, God has made the soul ‘capable 
(capax [Dei])’76 of becoming immutably good (or rational/existent) through knowing 
and loving Him – in other words, through teleologically participating in Him – and this 
is what striving for ‘full adoption’77 means. Therefore, Augustinian deification is, by 
definition, ‘the process of the soul’s becoming immutably good through knowing and 
loving the Creator God, as He has made it possible by adopting us as His sons “through 
participating in our humanity in the person of Jesus Christ”78.’ In other words, for 
Augustine ‘deifying (deificari)’ means rendering the soul immutably good through 
increasing our knowledge of God and loving Him; as the Son of the Creator God 
enabled it through his incarnation, death, and resurrection, and also through our 
baptism. 
 
How, then, does deification relate to interiority? I insisted that the latter is a way of 
achieving the former. Now, in order to demonstrate the methodological character of 
interiority, I shall introduce and explain two personal issues of Augustine’s regarding 
the intellectual side of our participation in God. One of them is ‘What is the true 
knowledge of God?’ Augustine’s theological development underwent three phases 
before his baptism, namely Manichaean materialism, Stoic materialism,79 and finally 
Neoplatonic incorporealism. Manichaeism and Stoicism kept Augustine away from 
God, whereas Neoplatonism facilitated his participation in God:80 the latter is often 
dubbed as ‘Neoplatonic enlightenment’. The other important issue is how to be 
persistent in our struggle to know God better. Augustine had difficulty in rendering his 
lifestyle ethical in accordance with his previous intellectual conversion, and such a 
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 Gerald Bonner, ‘Deifïcare’, in Cornelius Mayer (ed.), Augustinus-Lexikon, (Basel: Schwabe & Co., 
1996), vol. 2, 266. 
74
 Cf., Confessiones 3.6.10, 3.7.12, 13.9.10, and 11.8.10. 
75
 Cf., Confessiones 1.6.9, 7.5.7, and 13.9.10. 
76
 Cf. De Trinitate 14.8.11 & 15.20.39. 
77
 Cf., De peccatorum meritis et remissione et de baptismo parvulorum 2.8.10 quoted in Bonner, 
‘Deification, Divinization’, 266. 
78
 Bonner, ‘Deifïcare’,!266. 
79
 Stoic materialism dominated Christian theology in the time of Augustine: I shall explain later. 
80
 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16. 
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difficulty hampered him from making further progress in gaining true knowledge of 
God: in De vera religione 3.4 and De Trinitate 2.15.2581 he maintains that ‘carnal’ 
people think about God in ‘carnal’ manners. Thus, for Augustine our intellectual 
participation in God cannot be considered in isolation from the problem of what the 
right way of pursuing knowledge of God is.  
 
What, then, does Augustine argue to be the correct methodology for gaining 
knowledge of God? In the Confessions 7.10.16 Augustine says that, when he was 
reading ‘libri platonicorum’, God led his mind to Himself by ushering him ‘into his 
inner self’82 and, then, making him see above his mind ‘the immutable light’. In the 
Confessions 10.17.26 Augustine describes the same thing more concisely: ‘Here 	 am 
climbing up through my mind towards you who are constant above me.’ We can see 
here the semantic consistency with the texts quoted, as the examples of interiority, in 
the very beginning of the Introduction. In short, Augustinian interiority is turning 
inwards, then upwards, in search for God.  
 
Note that there are three key concepts constituting the theoretical foundation of 
Augustinian interiority, namely the incorporeity of the soul and God, God’s immanence, 
and God’s transcendence. First of all, due to the incorporeal nature of God and the soul, 
God cannot be found in a material world, hence inward turn to the soul. Secondly, we 
cannot look for what we do not remember/know: ‘how may I find you, if I do not 
remember you?’83 This is to say that knowledge of God is in our memory, hence God’s 
epistemological immanence: as mentioned, for Augustine knowledge is a substance. 
Why, then, have many people almost completely – but not entirely – forgotten God and, 
consequently, do not seek Him? That is because they are preoccupied with material 
things.84 Finally, since God is the Creator of the soul, the former transcends the latter; 
hence an upward turn. 
 
We can now sum up Augustinian deification in reference to teleology and interiority. 
Since we are created to participate in Being, we are ontologically the image of God. 
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 and also De Trinitate 8.2.3. 
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 ‘redire ad memet ipsum intravi in intima mea’. 
83
 Confessiones 10.17.26 (my own translation): ‘quomodo iam inveniam te, si memor non sum tui?’ 
84
 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33. 
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Yet, due to our lack of participation in terms of remembering, knowing, and loving 
God; we have been exiled from true happiness (i.e., God) and the image has been 
disfigured. Therefore, we must deify ourselves by turning inwards and afterwards 
upwards, if we are to attain true happiness.  
 
By and large, we can find the mature Augustine’s theory of deification in the young 
Augustine’s thoughts. As a matter of fact, the terms ‘adoption’ and ‘participation’ are 
scarcely employed in the early works, and baptism does not seem to play any significant 
role. However, the most fundamental idea concerning our ontological participation – 
that is, as long as our existence is sustained by God, the image of God in us cannot be 
obliterated and so we are in the state of being invited to renew the image – was firmly 
held by the young Augustine. For instance, in De quantitate animae 2.3 Augustine 
insists in terms of ‘likeness’ that we are created to participate in God’s immortality:  
 
Augustine. … the soul is like to God. … 
Evodius. That is exactly what I should like you to explain: how the human soul is 
like to God. For, although we believe that God has been made by no one, you 
said previously that the soul is made by God Himself. 
… 
E. … God made the soul immortal … 
… 
E. … just as He, being immortal, makes something immortal in His own likeness 
… 
… 
E. … I cannot make anything immortal … 
A. … your soul has not the same power as He in whose likeness it has been 
made.  
 
Also, the Christological element is not entirely absent: 
 
today throughout the nations and peoples the proclamation is made: “In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 
This was in the beginning with God, and all things were made by him, and 
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without him was nothing made” (John I: I). In order that men may receive the 
Word, love him, and enjoy him so that the soul may be healed and the eye of the 
mind receive power to use the light, to the greedy it is declared: “Lay not up for 
yourselves treasures upon earth where moth and rust destroy, and where thieves 
break through and steal. But lay up for yourselves treasures in heaven where 
neither moth nor rust destroys, and where thieves do not break through nor steal. 
For where your treasure is there will your heart be also” (Matt. 6:19). To the 
wanton it is said: “He who sows in the flesh shall of the flesh reap corruption. He 
who sows in the spirit shall of the spirit reap eternal life” (Gal. 6:8). To the proud 
it is said: “Whosoever exalteth himself shall be abased and whosoever humbleth 
himself shall be exalted” (Luke 14:11). To the wrathful it is said: “Thou hast 
received a blow. Turn the other cheek” (Matt. 5:39). To those who strive it is 
said: “Love your enemies” (Matt. 5:44). To the superstitious: “The kingdom of 
God is within you” (Luke 17:21). To the curious: “Look not on the things which 
are seen, but on the things which are not seen. For the things which are seen are 
temporal, but the things which are not seen are eternal” (II Cor. 4:18). Finally, to 
all it is said: “Love not the world nor the things which are in the world. For 
everything that is in the world is the lust of the flesh, the lust of the eyes and the 
ambition of this world” (I John 2:15).85  
 
This text implies the divine initiative for our deification by means of the Word’s 
incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection. Moreover, teleological participation, in other 
words interiority, was fully developed by the young Augustine: 
  
‘I am happy to emphasize the good advice that the soul should not pour itself out 
in the senses beyond the measure of necessity, but rather should recall itself from 
the senses and become a child of God again, that is, be made a new man by 
putting off the old. There is surely need to begin at this reformation because of 
the neglect of God’s law - and no other warning does Sacred Scripture utter more 
often in simple truth and in parable. I should like to develop this point and, of 
course, to bind myself by the same law, so to speak, that I lay down for you, 
namely, to render an account of myself to myself, to whom I ought before all 
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 De vera religione 3.4. 
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others to render an account, and thus become to God, in the words of Horace, “a 
friend made a bond-servant to his lord.” This renovation cannot take place at all, 
unless we are remade in the image of Him who gave us that image to keep as a 
most precious treasure, when He gave us to ourselves with such a nature that 
only He Himself can rank before us. But, to me no work is more laborious, no 
activity more like inactivity, than this renovation of spirit, for the soul has not the 
strength to begin or complete it, except with the help of Him to whom it turns 
itself. Hence it comes about that man’s reformation must be sought from the 
mercy of Him whose Goodness and Power are the cause of man’s formation.’86  
 
‘Child’ in this context must mean – in the language of the mature Augustine – the state 
of being ‘adopted by grace’, not ‘by nature’.87  
 
(Note that, regarding the young Augustine’s concept of participation, David V. 
Meconi’s article ‘St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Participation’88 gives us a good 
insight into the ontological dimension, while Folliet’s ‘Deificari in otio. Augustin, 
Epistula 10.2’89 concentrates on an exposition of the teleological [or ethical] 
dimension.)  
 
I have so far demonstrated that deification includes teleology, to which interiority 
pertains. Therefore, Augustinian interiority must be approached from the perspective 
that is the amalgam of teleology and deification. 
 
The Structure of this Thesis 
 
Augustine began to construct a theory concerning interiority after reading Neoplatonism 
and subsequently undergoing an intellectual transformation. Yet, due to his continued 
failure to live up to his moral expectations, the theory would remain, for a while, 
incomplete with respect to the ethical dimension:90 this means that the intellectual part 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
86
 De quantitate animae 28.55, the Father’s of the Church translation. 
87
 Cf., In euangelium Ioannis tractatus 2.13. 
88
 Augustinian Studies 27,2 (1996), 79-96. 
89
 Cf., Folliet, ‘Deificari in otio. Augustin, Epistula 10. 2’, 225-236. 
90
 Cf., Confessions 7.20.26: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘after reading the books of the Platonists and 
learning from them to seek for immaterial truth, I turned my attention to your ‘invisible nature understood 
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of Augustinian interiority is temporally as well as logically prior to the ethical part. 
Therefore, I shall, in Part I, investigate the course of Augustine’s theological 
development in the period between reading the Hortensius and his encounter with 
Neoplatonism. In Part II, I shall examine both the intellectual and the moral dimensions 
of the young Augustine’s theory of interiority.  
 
In Part I, I shall first of all explain why, through reading the Hortensius, Augustine 
suddenly began to associate his pursuit of happiness with knowledge of God, 
knowledge of the soul, and ethical uprightness (chapter 1). Augustine encountered 
Manichaeism, Stoicism, and Neoplatonism in the course of his theological adventure; 
and settled with the last one. Hence, the questions to be explored are ‘What were 
Augustine’s criteria for determining whether a theological view is acceptable or not?’, 
and ‘Why did Manichaeism (chapter 2) and Stoicism (chapter 3) failed to meet those 
criteria?’  
 
As for Neoplatonism, it was the concept of immateriality that revolutionised 
Augustine’s way of thinking about God and the soul – especially in reference to God’s 
immanence, omnipresence, and transcendence: he had already become familiar with the 
first two through Stoicism. Thus, I shall examine how Plotinus (the founder of 
Neoplatonism) argued for God’s immateriality and the three modes of God’s existence 
(chapter 4). I shall also analyse the basic structure of Plotinian interiority, since 
Augustinian interiority is modelled on it.  
 
Although Augustine considered some Neoplatonic ideas as invaluable, he converted 
to Christianity and the creation doctrine became incorporated into his view of reality 
(Part II). Augustine regarded that the constituents of reality are hierarchically organized 
according to the criteria of divisibility, mutability, rationality, and Creator-or-creature. 
Ontologically, the soul is inferior to God while being superior to any other creature: this 
is permanently unchangeable. Teleologically, the soul’s middle rank in the hierarchy is 
not ‘static’ but ‘dynamic’.91 The young Augustine describes the dynamism of the soul 
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through the things which are made’ (Rom. 1: 20). …Of these conceptions I was certain; but to enjoy you I 
was too weak. I prattled on as if I were expert, but unless I had sought your way in Christ our Saviour 
(Titus I: 4), I would have been not expert but expunged.’ 
91
 Cf., Gerard O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine’s Thought’, in Platonism Pagan and Christian: Studies 
in Plotinus and Augustine (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), 145 & 152. 
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frequently in terms of ‘image (of God)’92, ‘ascent (to God)’93, rational-or-irrational94, 
and wise-or-unwise95 (not ‘adoption’ or ‘participation’). Depending on what we (i.e., 
our heart and mind) are preoccupied with, the ‘image of God’ either deteriorates or is 
restored: there are seven levels of ‘ascent’ or deification. (Cf., chapter 1.) 
 
To renew the image of God, we must acquire true knowledge of God. Yet, 
knowing/learning is remembering what we have already known. This is a theory of 
reminiscence that originates from Plato. Plato felt that it required a justification. Hence, 
he argued that the soul existed in a previous life, learnt many things there, and is born 
into this life with that knowledge. Augustine, too, makes references to the pre-existence 
of the soul in a number of places: in agreement with Teske, I shall argue that Augustine 
first accepted it explicitly, but subsequently implicitly.96 (Cf., chapter 2.)  
 
Alongside the theory of reminiscence, Augustine insisted on God’s epistemological 
immanence in memory. This is based on the presupposition that both God and the soul 
are incorporeal. How, then, can we be certain that their common nature is distinct from 
the body? Augustine argued (especially in De quantitate animae)97 that the incorporeity 
of the soul is provable and it automatically makes that of God conclusive. Nonetheless, 
many people are ignorant of the soul’s true nature, let alone God’s, and the cause of the 
ignorance is their preoccupation with sensible things. Consequently, some of them, like 
Augustine before his Neoplatonic enlightenment, search for God in a material realm. 
Thus, we need to free ourselves from the obsession with bodily and worldly things and, 
then, endeavour to understand the reality of the soul: this is the first step towards the 
true knowledge of God (or the first step for our intellectual ‘ascent’ to God). Yet, God is 
not only immanent in, but also transcends, the soul. Therefore, we must also strive to 
perceive God’s superiority over the soul. (Cf., sections a & b.) 
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 Soliloquia 1.1.4 & De quantitate animae 28.55. 
93
 De vera religione 29.52 & Confessiones 9.2.2. 
94
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.5 & De Trinitate 13.1.4. 
95
 Cf., De ordine 2.13.38 & Confessiones 13.2.3. 
96
 Cf., Ronald Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, The New 
Scholasticism 58 (1984), 220-235. 
97
 Passim. 
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Reason is not independent of, but always interacts with, the will. The perverse will is 
the cause of reason’s being blind to God and is responsible for our ‘irrationally’98 loving 
creatures more than the Creator. However, the depraved will cannot be healed without, 
first of all, remembering God; for we cannot love what we do not know.99 (Cf., section 
c.) Yet, only few people are capable of knowing God through reason alone.100 The 
majority of us need to rely on faith in order to purify our will.101 (Cf., section d.) 
Furthermore, since we are created, we do not have the power to help ourselves in our 
struggle to improve the image of God: we need the grace of the Creator at every level of 
our ascent to Him.102 (Cf., section e: this is to argue against Folliet’s and Bonner’s 
interpretations of the young Augustine.)  
 
In Part III, I shall turn to the Confessions. The structure of this part will be similar to 
that of the previous one. The similarity lies in stressing that, regarding Augustinian 
interiority, there is no substantial change between the early works and the later ones. 
There are two small points to notice. One is that I shall affirm again the above-
mentioned argument of Teske, that Augustine failed to free himself completely from the 
Platonic idea of the soul’s pre-existence. The other is that Augustine began to identify 
memory with the mind.103  
 
The last part of this thesis refers to De Trinitate and there are some things unique 
about it. First of all, the image of God becomes the image of the Trinity. Although 
memory, reason, and the will have always been the key features of Augustinian 
interiority from the outset, for the first time the Augustine of De Trinitate explicitly 
insists that the soul images the Trinity only if it remembers, understands, and loves 
God:104 we have the ‘capax Dei’ – in other words, we are capable of ‘participating’ in 
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 Soliloquia 1.1.5. 
99
 Cf., De libero arbitrio 2.15.40: ‘wisdom … in the knowledge of which you found delight’. 
100
 Cf., De Ordine 2.11.30. 
101
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12 & De ordine 2.9.26. 
102
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2. 
103
 Cf., Confessiones 10.14.21 & 10.9.16. Also, refer to Jean-Marie Le Blond, S. J., Les Conversions de 
saint Augustin (Paris: Aubier, 1950), 182.  
104
 Cf., John Edward Sullivan, The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its 
influence (Dubuque: Priory Press, 1963), 115-116. Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Thematic Reflections on the 
De Trinitate’, in Proceedings of the PMR Conference, vol. 12/13 (1987-1988), 224: ‘Now it is obvious to 
all that the soul as the image of God, first heard by Augustine from the lips of Ambrose in 385, is the 
major theme of the final eight books of the De trinitate. Augustine examines various triads and trinities, 
only the last of which does he think can truly be called an image of God. The memory, understanding, 
and love of God which man possesses as he gazes at the eternal presents us with the closest, albeit still 
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God with our memory, mind, and heart –, but we can image the Triune God only if we 
actually exercise the capability.105 Secondly, Augustine – linguistically – approaches the 
doctrine of the Trinity, and how the soul resembles the Triune God. Bonner maintains 
that Augustinian ‘deification pertains to the realm of dogmatic, rather than 
contemplative, theology; it describes the consequence of the saving work of Christ 
rather than a mystical state enjoyed by a contemplative.’106 Yet, an intellectual 
participation is, as I have demonstrated, a crucial factor for our teleological deification 
(or interiority) and reaches its peak in the dialectical approach to the Trinity. Thirdly, 
frequently quoting the biblical passage ‘“the invisible things of God from the creation of 
the world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his 
eternal power and Godhead” (Rom. 1:20)’107, Augustine often holds that knowledge of 
the self is an essential pre-requisite for gaining knowledge of God. However, in De 
Trinitate the logical precedence between them disappears. They are now interdependent 
on one another: in fact, this is implicitly mentioned in earlier works. Finally, Augustine 
explicitly declares that knowledge is a ‘substance’108 and, in addition, is similar to what 
it is knowledge of.109 Thus, since knowledge of God is similar to God, through 
possessing it we become deified.110 Again, this was alluded to in previous writings.  
 
Now, five (5) features of Augustinian interiority are noteworthy: contrary to some 
scholars’ insistences, none of them undergoes a change, or fails to be a core constituent 
of interiority either in his early or later works.  
 
First (5-1), the deification of the soul often – but not always – occurs in the order of 
memory, reason and will. Unless we remember God, we cannot endeavour to 
understand Him.111 Furthermore, we become ‘perfect lovers’112 of God only if we know 
Him perfectly.113  
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quite distant, image of the divine in man. This is Augustine’s final attempt at understanding the soul as an 
image of God, a theme that had occupied him for some thirty-three years.’ 
105
 Cf., De Trinitate 14.8.11 & 15.20.39. Walter H. Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for 
Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person’, Studia Patristica 17 (Part 3), 1295 & 
footnote no. 26 in p. 1297. Also, see chapter 2 ‘The image of the Triune God’ in Part IV of this thesis.  
106
 Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 372.  
107
 De Trinitate 15.2.3 (McKenna’s translation). Also, see De ordine 2.16.44 (‘God, who is better known 
by knowing what He is not’), De vera religiones 52.101, Confessiones 7.17.23. 
108
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.4.6. 
109
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
110
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
111
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.20.34-35: also, see the following footnote. 
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What, then, does ‘remembering God’ mean? In what sense is it the starting point of 
deification? Augustine associates the act of remembering with faith and reason, which 
are the two distinct – but mutually inseparable – means of gaining knowledge about 
God.114 Hence, the significance of memory must be approached with reference to reason 
(5-1-1) and faith (5-1-2) respectively.  
 
Above all (5-1-1), reason (i.e., the ‘mind’s eye’115) is capable of knowing God, with 
the help of God in terms of grace and illumination,116 inferentially through observing 
His creation.117 Yet, by the time we desire118 knowledge of God and actually search for 
it, we have already known something about Him and have retained it in our memory. In 
other words, precisely due to our memory of God, we can aspire to know God more 
than what we can remember about Him: no one can pursue what he/she does not 
know/remember.119 (As I shall explain later in this Introduction, this is an extension of 
his other argument that we can love only what we know.) Furthermore, we are 
ontologically conditioned to love only what pleases us.120 Thus, our universal, constant 
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112
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.6.  
113
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.7.14 ‘(in this life the soul labours under many bodily hardships, even though) it is 
already happy in the knowledge of God’) & 1.9.16. Confessiones 10.23.33: (Chadwick’s translation) 
‘they would have no love for it (i.e., Truth/God) unless there were some knowledge of it in their 
memory’. De Trinitate 14.12.15: (McKenna’s translation) ‘Let it, then, remember its God, to whose 
image it has been made, and understand Him and love Him.’  
114
 Cf., De ordine 2.9.26: ‘with regard to the acquiring of knowledge, we are of necessity led in a twofold 
manner: by authority and by reason. (Ad discendum item necessario dupliciter ducimur, auctoritate atque 
ratione.)’ Also, see Contra Academicos 3.20.43 & Soliloquia 1.6.13. 
115
 Soliloquia 1.6.12 & Confessiones 7.10.16. 
116
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.8.15, De vera religione 42.79, Confessiones 7.10.16 & De Trinitate 8.8.12. Augustine 
has adopted the Platonic illumination theory through Neoplatonism: see Gilson, The Christian Philosophy 
of Saint Augustine, 77-78; especially the footnote no. 34 (‘Plato, Republ. 517 b. In the De Civitate Dei 
[XI, 25; PL 41, 338], Plato is praised for having taught that God is “intelligentiae dator,” and this 
assumes the identification of God with the Idea of the Good. Moreover, the whole Allegory of the Cave 
[Plao, Republ. 514 ff.] is summarized by Augustine in Soliloq. I, 13, 23; PL 32, 881-882.’). Also, see 
Nash, Ronald H., ‘Illumination, Divine’, Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia, in Allan D. 
Fitzgerald, OSA (ed.), Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans 
Publishing, 1999), 438-440. 
117
 Cf., De vera religione 52.101 & Confessiones 7.17.23 (‘your [i.e., God’s] invisible reality is plainly to 
be understood through created things, your everlasting power also, and your divinity [Rom. 1:20]’: 
Boulding’s translation.) 
118
 More explanation will follow: in the mean time, refer to the entries ‘delight’ and ‘grace’ in the index of 
Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2006). Also, see De Trinitate 10.1.2: the relevant passage will be quoted later in this 
chapter. 
119
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.20.34-35 & Confessiones 10.24.35-10.28.39.  
120
 Cf., Sermones 159.3: ‘we do not love anything unless it delights us’ quoted in Harrison, Rethinking 
Augustine’s Early Theology, 106. 
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desire for Wisdom121, Truthfulness122, and genuine happiness123, each of which is 
another name of God, demonstrates that we have always had certain memories of God 
and have incessantly enjoyed recalling it. In short, due to the ‘innate’124 delightful 
memory of God, we have always wanted to possess Him, who is Wisdom, Truth, and 
true Happiness (beata vita). Eventually, Augustine says in Confessions 1.1.1, ‘you have 
made us and drawn us to yourself’125: this text must be interpreted in the first place in 
terms of memory, delight and desire/love (as well as reason and faith). 
 
In reference to the interaction between memory and reason in terms of delight, desire 
and love, Augustine put three questions to himself and attempted to answer them. 
 
The first question is how we initially got to know God, so that we have always had 
the memory of Him. Augustine admitted in Confessions 10.20.29 that this is a 
conundrum.  
 
The second question concerns whether or not reason takes precedence over memory. 
There are a few indications that Augustine gives priority to reason in his early works. 
For instance, in De ordine 2.2.6-7 Licentius insists that memory (as well as will) – 
constituting the ‘lower part (subjecta pars)’ of the soul – ‘serve (servire)’ reason: in 
other words, the former is the ‘servant (famulus)’, whereas the latter is the ‘master 
(dominus)’. This servant-master relationship between memory and reason lasts 
unaltered even if one becomes ‘wise’126, for no other part, but only the reason/mind of a 
wise man’s soul, is with God: being wise is the ideal state of the soul to be reached 
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121
 Cf., De ordine 2.3.10 ‘just as we shun darkness with our eyes by the very fact that we are not willing 
not to see, so likewise, whoever shall desire to escape unwisdom (Ut enim oculis tenebras vitamus eo ipso 
quo nolumus non videre, sic quisquis volet vitare stultitiam)’. 
122
 Cf., De vera religione 49.95 (‘When we are asked which is better, truth or falsehood, we answer with 
one voice that truth is better’) & 49.94. 
123
 Confessiones 10.23.33 (‘joy in Truth/God [Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate]’) & 10.20.29 
([Chadwick’s translation] ‘Is not the happy life that which all desire, which indeed no one fails to desire? 
[Nonne ipsa est beata vita, quam omnes volunt et omnino qui nolit nemo est?]’) 
124
 Cf., Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 78: ‘… in a more general sense, we can say 
that in Augustinism any knowledge, whether its object be corporeal or incorporeal, implies an innate 
element to the extent that it is a truth. Here also, the Innatism of which we speak is not an original gift 
bestowed on the soul once and for all; it means merely that in any true knowledge, there is an element 
which comes neither from things nor from ourselves, but from a source which is more intimate to us than 
our own inner selves.’ 
125
 Boulding’s translation: ‘fecisti nos ad te’. 
126
 Alternatively, ‘new, inward and heavenly man (novus homo, et interior, et caelestis)’ (De vera 
religione 26.49). 
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through deification. Augustine admires such an argument as Licentius’, though he soon 
expresses a certain reservation about it.127 In De musica 6.8.21 Augustine himself says 
that memory is an assistant (‘adjuvare’ or ’ministrare’) to reason: in reference to De 
musica Winkler maintains that Augustine depicts memory, to a certain degree, like a 
‘servant’ who provides vital services to its master.128  
 
Furthermore, we can discover the implication of reason’s superiority to memory if 
we consider which one of faith, hope and love remains for ever: bear in mind that 
memory retains what we believe, that is, what we do not yet understand.129 In Soliloquia 
1.7.14 Augustine asks, ‘Why should faith be needed, since now it (i.e., anima) sees 
(God)?’ The redundancy of faith after this life means that we will then have no need to 
retain in memory what we will have believed about God until the end of our life on 
earth. Augustine insisted on the same thing in De doctrina Christiana 1.38.42 and De 
Trinitate 1.8.17. Therefore, reason’s ultimate superiority to memory becomes manifest 
when we see God ‘face to face’130. In De Trinitate 10.11.18-19 Augustine, on the other 
hand, insists that memory and the will are not inferior to reason: all three of them are, 
rather, ‘equal (aequalis)’131 to each other as the image of the Trinitarian God.132 
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 Cf., De ordine 2.2.6-7: ‘(Augustine says that) if we do not attribute sense perception to the intellect, 
we do not attribute it to any power of the soul. It follows, then, that it must be attributed to the body. But 
to me nothing seems to be more absurdly said than this. … (Licentius replies that) The soul (anima) of a 
wise man … thoroughly cleansed by acts of virtue and already cleaving to God, merits the name of wise, 
and it is unfitting that any other part of him be called wise. Nevertheless, certain soiled and cast-off 
garments, so to speak - of which he has divested himself and from which he has, as it were, withdrawn 
unto himself - still serve that soul; or, if such a soul ought still to be pronounced integral, they certainly 
serve that part of the soul which alone is fittingly called wise; they are in subjection to it. And I believe 
that memory itself resides in this subordinate (subiecta) part. … [Hereafter, De ordine 2.2.7] Pondering over 
this declaration of his (i.e., Licentius) with admiration, I (i.e., Augustine) … “Against your opinions,” I 
(i.e., Augustine) replied, “I say nothing now, so that what we have taken in hand may be completed. 
Some other time, however, when God Himself will have rendered it opportune in accordance with order, 
we shall diligently observe how the matter stands on this point, for the question is not one of minor 
importance, or one that is exhausted by such a brief discussion.”‘ Ibid., 2.5.17: ‘that the mind (mentem) of 
a wise man remains immovable with Him (i.e., God).’ Ibid., 2.13.38: ‘unwise men generally follow their 
own feelings and habits rather than the very marrow of truth - which indeed only a very exceptional mind 
beholds’.  
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 Cf., Klaus Winkler, ‘La Théorie Augustinienne de la mémoire à son point de départ’, Augustinus 
Magister 1 (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1954), 518: ‘Dans le De musica, la mémoire reste dans une 
certaine mesure en état de serviteur, mais ses services sont indispensables’. 
129
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.4.9: see below the discussion about Augustine’s approach to memory in relation to 
faith in section (5-1-2). 
130
 Confessiones 10.5.7 & De Trinitate 1.8.16.!Also, see Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14: Augustine here 
mentions hope of understanding revealed truths because we cannot see God ‘face to face’ in this life. 
131
 De Trinitate 10.11.18. 
132
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.12.19: ‘it seems to be difficult to distinguish in it (i.e., the soul) between its 
memory of itself and its understanding of itself. That these are not in fact two things, but one thing called 
by two names, is the impression you might get in this case where they are joined together very closely 
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However, Augustine maintained such equality only in reference to souls living in this 
life. 
 
The last question is, as Harrison points out, what we love about God while we 
struggle to know Him: ‘In both texts (i.e., Confessions 10 and Soliloquia) he makes 
clear that even though he knows neither himself nor God at this stage, his desire to 
know is inspired by his love of God; his desire is, as it were, to fully know what it is 
that he loves: ‘My love for you, Lord, is not an uncertain feeling but a matter of 
conscious certainty. With your word you pierced my heart, and I loved you .... And 
what is the object of my love?’ (conf. 10. 6. 8-9); ‘Now you only I love ... I perceive I 
must return to you ... Teach me how to come to You. I have nothing else but the will to 
come. I know nothing save that transient dying things are to be spurned, certain and 
eternal things are to be sought after. This only I know, O Father, but how to come to 
you I know not' (sol. 1. 5).’133 Augustine indirectly answers the question in De Trinitate 
10.1.1-10.2.4, analyzing what actually happens when one seeks the meaning of an 
unknown word, for instance, ‘temetum’134: there are some similarities between such a 
linguistic investigation and Augustine’s pursuit of knowledge about God.  
 
Augustine, above all, restates what the question is: 
 
Suppose someone hears the word temetum, and in his ignorance asks what it 
means. … If anyone, therefore, applies himself with ardent diligence to know, 
and inflamed with this zeal continues this search, can he be said to be without 
love? What, then, does he love? … We are inquiring about what it is that he 
loves in the thing that he is eager to know, and which certainly he does not yet 
know; and we wonder why he loves it, since we know with absolute certainty 
that nothing can be loved unless it is known.135 (De Trinitate 10.1.2) 
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and one is not prior at all in time to the other; love too is not felt so obviously to be present when no 
neediness exhibits it, because what is being loved is always to hand.’ (Hill’s translation.) 
133
 Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 57. 
134
 It means any intoxicating drink or wine: see De Trinitate 10.1.2. 
135
 McKenna’s translation. 
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(The last sentence can be rephrased in reference to Augustine’s quest for knowledge of 
God as ‘… what it is that he loves in God whom he is eager to know, and whom 
certainly he does not yet know; and we wonder why he loves God …’) 
 
Next, Augustine insists that we have already known three things about ‘temetum’ by 
the time we strive to discover its definition. Moreover, we have certainly loved the three 
pieces of knowledge, which alone arouse our desire to make the effort. First, ‘temetum’ 
is a ‘sign’ ‘signifying’ something:136 only when we recognize the sign, can we be 
motivated to seek its significance.137 Second, we know what it is like to be perfectly 
proficient in a language, and the fact that we are earnestly ‘hoping’138 to achieve it:  
  
what does he love then? It must be that he knows and sees by insight in the very 
sense of things how beautiful the discipline is that contains knowledge of all 
signs; and how useful the skill is by which a human society communicates 
perceptions between its members, since otherwise an assembly of human beings 
would be worse for its members than any kind of solitude, if they could not 
exchange their thoughts by speaking to each other.139  
 
Finally (and most importantly), as long as we have the desire to learn the new word, we 
know that we love the act of knowing: 
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 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2: (McKenna’s translation) ‘it is a sign, namely, that it is not a mere word, but 
that it signifies something.’ Also, see De ordine 2.11.34 & De magistro 2.3-4. 
137
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2: (McKenna’s translation) ‘it (i.e., the sign) … shall have moved him with the 
desire of knowing the thing of which it is the sign’. 
138
 De Trinitate 10.1.2: see the following footnote. 
139
 De Trinitate 10.1.2: (Hill’s translation) ‘This then is the lovely and useful form (“speciem [decoram et 
utilem]” in Latin, “[this beautiful and useful species] species” in McKenna’s translation – that is, the 
species of the “hope” of being perfect in a language: see the beginning of chapter ‘Interiority and 
Deification’ in this Introduction) which the soul discerns and knows and loves, and anyone who inquires 
about the meaning of any words he does not know is studiously trying to perfect it in himself as far as he 
can; for it is one thing to observe it in the light of truth, another to desire to have it at one’s disposal. What 
one observes in the light of truth is what a great and good thing it would be to understand and speak all 
the languages of all peoples, and so to hear nobody as a foreigner,7 and to be heard by no one as such 
either. The loveliness of such knowledge is now perceived in thought, and the thing so known is loved. 
This in turn is contemplated, and so inflames the studiousness of learners that they get all excited about it 
and hunger for it in all the work they put into acquiring such a competence that they may embrace in 
actual use what they have prior knowledge of in reason; and the more hope anyone has of coming by such 
a competence the more ardent is his love for it. You put more passion into your study of a discipline if 
you do not despair of being able to master it. But if you have no hope at all of acquiring a thing, you are 
lukewarm in your love for it or you do not love it at all, even though you are quite aware how beautiful it 
is.’ The passages, such as ‘the more hope anyone has of coming by such a competence the more ardent is 
his love for it’ and ‘if you have no hope at all of acquiring a thing, you are lukewarm in your love for it or 
you do not love it at all’, suggest that hope and love are inseparable: hope is the object of love.  
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everyone loves knowing, a fact that cannot be unknown to anyone who desires to 
know something.140  
 
Consequently, Augustine concludes that 
 
every love of a studious mind, that is, of a mind that wants to know what it does 
not know, is not the love of that thing which it does not know, but of that which 
it does know, and on account of which it wishes to know what it does not 
know.141  
 
Note that Augustine earlier drew a similar conclusion in De quantitate animae 27.53: 
‘reason proceeds from a basis in something known in leading us to something 
unknown.’  
 
Regarding Augustine’s passionate pursuit of knowledge about God, we therefore can 
conclude that he was not in love with God whom he had not yet seen ‘face to face’142: 
he was rather in love with the act of knowing God.143 (This is not surprising at all 
because Augustine was a highly intellectual person.) Furthermore, unless Augustine 
recognized (or learned) that ‘God’ is a ‘sign’, the word ‘God’ would have been utterly 
insignificant to him.  
 
Nonetheless, there is also an important difference between Augustine’s search for the 
meaning of ‘God’ and that of ‘temetum’. When we want to learn a new word, we 
endeavour to learn in what sense it is conventionally applied. However, regarding 
what/who God is, there are often considerable disagreements about it among us. (We 
often argue against each other that one’s concept of God is more accurate than 
another’s. Also, although there are similarities, among Christians, in the ways that they 
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140
 De Trinitate 10.2.4 (McKenna’s translation): ‘ipsum scire quisque amat, quod nulli scire aliquid 
cupienti esse incognitum potest.’ 
141
 De Trinitate 10.1.3: (McKenna’s translation) ‘he who loves to know the unknown does not love the 
unknown, but the knowing of it. For unless he knows what it is to know, no one would be able to say with 
confidence, either that he does know, or that he does not know.’  
142
 Confessiones 10.5.7, De Trinitate 1.8.16, and Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14. 
143
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.3: (McKenna’s translation) ‘when you say, He loves to know the unknown, it is 
not the same as saying, He loves the unknown. The first can happen, namely, that one loves to know the 
unknown, but it is impossible to love the unknown. The word ‘know’ has not been put there without 
! #&
think about God, there are also differences among them.) Thus, when Augustine was 
determined to render ‘Wisdom’/‘God’ meaningful to himself after reading the 
Hortensius, he wanted to do so specifically in a Christian context:144 it was not a search 
for a conventional, universal way of thinking about God. That is why Augustine 
immediately turned to the Christian Bible: unfortunately, he adopted an erroneous 
approach to the Bible and inevitably would grow contemptuous of what he read in it.145 
Afterwards, he explored Manichaeism just because it appeared to be an authentic form 
of Christianity. Augustine also thought about resorting to the scepticism of the 
Academics. However, he eventually found a way to settle the problem of how ‘God’ 
should be defined: that is through understanding the Catholic teaching about God from 
the perspective of Neoplatonism (i.e., the ‘certain books of the Platonists’146).  
 
In summary, Augustine loved the act of understanding the Christian God after 
reading the Hortensius. 
 
Augustine’s approach to memory in relation to faith (5-1-2) is entirely different. 
Revealed truth about God is not innate. We must be taught about the truth in order 
subsequently to have it in our memory:  
 
I would not desire them (i.e., things about God), if I already knew them. Was I 
not able, nonetheless, to speak of them? Indeed, I spoke, not of those things 
which I grasped with my intellect, but of the things which I had gathered from 
many sources and committed to memory, the things which I believed as much as 
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reason, since he who loves to know the unknown does not love the unknown, but the knowing of it.’ 
Also, see Contra academicos 1.8.23 ‘he is searching, he is wise. He is happy in being wise’. 
144
 Cf., Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 41: ‘The precise form of 
“Wisdom” that Augustine might seek, would, of course, be very different from what Cicero would have 
recognized as “Wisdom”. Augustine was a boy from a Christian household. … One thing, however, was 
certain: a pagan wisdom, a wisdom without the “name of Christ” was quite out of the question. Paganism 
meant nothing to Augustine.’ Also, see Maurice Testard, Saint Augustin et Cicéron I : Cicéron dans la 
Formation et dans l’Œuvre de Saint Augustin (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1958), 20-35: it explains 
how the Hortensius might have influenced Augustine (‘Nous ne présenterons pas les résultats de 
l’enquête comme des certitudes, simplement comme des vraisemblances’ [p. 28]).  
145
 Cf., Confessiones 3.5.9 & 5.14.24. 
146
 Confessiones 7.9.13. 
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I could. But to know - that is something else 147 (i.e., what Augustine believed 
about God had come from many sources) (Soliloquia 1.4.9); 
 
you may be called upon in prayer that you may be known. Yet “how shall they 
call upon him in whom they have not believed? and how shall they believe 
without a preacher?” (Rom. 10: 14) 148 (i.e., through preachers we learn about 
God’s self-revelation, commit it to our memory, and believe it). 
 
In this way, despite the incomprehensibility of the Christian doctrines about God, we 
can at least bring the doctrines from memory to the mind and make an effort to 
understand them steadfastly with hope and love:149 such an effort keeps us away from 
our obsession with earthly, perishable things.  
 
What, then, makes us determined to believe the teachings of the Catholic Church and 
commit them to memory? Augustine argues that we are made to love only what pleases 
us,150 and that divine grace intellectually allures us to delight in learning the teachings 
and eventually believe them.151 In other words, a person can become a believer of the 
Catholic faith only when divine grace gives that person delight in reading about (or 
listening to) Catholic teachings. (Such an argument of his is reflected in his distinction 
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147
 ‘quod non cuperem si iam scirem: num igitur eo minus illa dicere potui? Dixi enim non quae intellectu 
comprehendi, sed quae undecumque collecta memoriae mandavi, et quibus accommodavi quantam potui 
fidem: scire autem aliud est.’  
148
 Confessiones 1.1.1. 
149
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12,!De ordine 2.5.16 & De vera religione 8.15. 
150
 Cf., Sermones 159.3: see above. 
151
 Cf., Ad Simplicianum 1.2.21: ‘Who has it in his power to have such a motive present to his mind that 
his will shall be influenced to believe? Who can welcome in his mind something which does not give him 
delight? But who has it in his power to ensure that something that will delight him will turn up, or that he 
will take delight in what turns up? If those things delight us that serve our advancement towards God, that 
is due not to our whim or industry or meritorious works, but to the inspiration of God and to the grace 
which he bestows. He freely bestows upon us voluntary assent, earnest effort, and the power to perform 
works of fervent charity . . . “It is not of him that willeth, nor of him that runneth, but of God that hath 
mercy.” We could neither will nor run unless he stirred us and put the motive power in us’ quoted in 
Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 148-149. Harrison subsequently hold that ‘The idea 
that it is delight that motivates the will is not something new to Augustine’s thought, of course. As we 
saw in the previous chapter, and as we will demonstrate further in the concluding chapters of this book, 
Augustine uses it to describe how grace inspires and motivates the will, through the gift of the Holy 
Spirit, from Cassiciacum onwards. It is also clearly present in his other reflections on Romans in the two 
years preceding the second book of Ad Simplicianum. In the Expositio propositionum … .’ Also, see 
Ibid., 150. 
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between ‘delight of the sense’ and ‘delight through the sense’ in De ordine 2.11.34:152 
he associates the latter with reason.) 
 
Augustine, on the other hand, insists that reason is involved in the act of choosing 
what we are going to believe: 
 
Authority demands belief and prepares man for reason. Reason leads to 
understanding and knowledge. But reason is not entirely absent from authority, 
for we have got to consider whom we have to believe (De vera religione 24.45). 
 
However, this passage must be interpreted in the light of Augustine’s distinction 
between the two kinds of delight mentioned in De ordine 2.11.34: that is, our 
intellectual consideration of whom we are to believe is dictated by what delights our 
reason.  
 
Since reason judges what is to be believed and committed to memory, whether or not 
remembering logically precedes reasoning is on the whole ambiguous: on the one hand, 
due to our memory of God, we can endeavour to understand/know God inferentially 
through observing His creation;153 on the other hand, reason determines what we are to 
believe and store in our memory. However, the order of occurrence between 
understanding and loving is unequivocal: we cannot love and delight in what we do not 
know or believe.154  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
152
 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34: ‘Therefore, delight of the sense is one thing; delight through the sense is 
something else. Graceful movement delights the sense, but the timely import of the movement delights 
the mind alone through the sense. (Aliud ergo sensus, aliud per sensum: nam sensum mulcet pulcher 
motus, per sensum autem animum solum pulchra in motu significatio.) This is more easily noticed in the 
case of hearing: whatever has a pleasing sound, that it is which pleases and entices the hearing itself. 
What is really signified by that sound, that is what is borne to the mind, though by the messenger of our 
hearing. And so, when we hear these lines - “Why do the suns in the winter rapidly sink in the ocean? 
What is the hindrance that holds back late-coming nights in the summer?” - our praise of the meter is one 
thing, but our praise of the meaning is something else. Neither is it in the same sense of the term that we 
say: “It sounds reasonable” and “It is spoken reasonably.”’ 
153
 e.g., God’s immateriality, immanence, omnipresence, transcendence in a Neoplatonic sense: see 
section (b) of chapter 2 in Part I. 
154
 Cf.,!De libero arbitrio 2.13.35: ‘who is happier than the man who finds joy in the firm, changeless, and 
most excellent truth?’ Also, see De Trinitate 10.1.1: (McKenna’s translation) ‘no one can in any way love 
a thing that is wholly unknown’. 
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Secondly (5-2), contemplation – in other words, gaining true knowledge of God –155 
is an integral part of deification. Although Bonner investigated the theme of deification 
appearing in the later works, it is interesting that he does not mention the text ‘we are 
like God inasmuch as we know Him’ (De Trinitate 9.11.16) at all. Consequently, 
Bonner argues that the mature Augustine’s idea of deification is based on dogmatic 
theology – primarily Christology – rather than contemplative theology: ‘Perhaps the 
most obvious feature of Augustine’s teaching is, that so far as he is concerned, 
deification pertains to the realm of dogmatic, rather than contemplative, theology; it 
describes the consequence of the saving work of Christ rather than a mystical state 
enjoyed by a contemplative. It is of course true that the question of Augustine’s 
personal mysticism is a controversial one, with a great gulf fixed between those scholars 
who maintain that he was a mystic and those who deny it. The present writer inclines to 
denial rather than to affirmation; but in this particular case, opinions on this point are 
irrelevant, in view of Augustine’s direct assertion that deification will take place only in 
the life to come.’156 However, the text from De Trinitate 9.11.16 ‘we are like God 
inasmuch as we know Him’ speaks for itself, contemplative theology is crucial for 
deification, just as it is in the early works.  
 
Thirdly (5-3), Augustine relies on dialectics to draw conclusions (through reason and 
faith) about who/what God is. What, then, is the nature of his dialectics in this respect? 
 
Augustine’s dialectical approach to knowledge of God intrinsically depends on 
finding right pairs of correlative terms, which are, for instance, ‘begotten (genitus)’ and 
‘unbegotten (ingenitus or “not begotten”157)’:158 ‘although begotten differs from 
unbegotten, it does not indicate a different substance, because just as son refers to 
father, and not son to not father, so begotten must refer to begetter, and not begotten to 
not begetter.’159 Although Augustine explains the linguistic nature of ‘signs’ in De 
Trinitate 9.7.12; his endeavour to understand Wisdom/God after reading the Hortensius 
has always been a search for correct pairs of correlative terms, with which he can 
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155
 Cf., De quantitate animae 33.74. 
156
 Gerald Bonner, ‘Augustine’s Conception of Deification’, 382.  
157
 De Trinitate 5.7.8. 
158
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.7.8: (McKenna’s translation) ‘Begotten and unbegotten are terms that are currently 
in use (genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur).’ 
159
 De Trinitate 5.7.8 (Hill’s translation). 
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describe God as the truly Transcendent Reality (res).160 Thus, before reading 
Neoplatonism, he assumed that, since ‘corporality’ and ‘nothing’ (i.e., ‘not corporality’) 
were correlative, God must have dimensional properties: otherwise, God is nothing, but 
that is highly improbable.161 However, Augustine has later learned two new pairs of 
correlative terms from the ‘libri Platonicorum’. One is ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’ (i.e., 
‘not material’), and the other is ’being’/’substance’ and ‘nothing’ (i.e., ‘not being’).162 
Eventually, he began to think of God as an immaterial being,163 and evil as ‘not a 
substance’164 or ‘nothing’165. (‘Good’ and ‘evil’, ‘beauty’ and ‘not beauty’166 are also 
two distinct pairs of correlative terms.) In addition, as a Christian, Augustine always 
distinguished ‘Creator’ from ‘creature’ (i.e., ‘not Creator’) and, so, God is the former 
whereas everything else is the latter. 
 
It must be stressed that how to think about God in an indisputably transcendent way 
was one of the most important questions that dictated Augustine’s search for knowledge 
of God from the beginning, and the problem of evil was the biggest stumbling block in 
this regard.167 Hence, trawling chiefly through Manichaeism, Stoicism, (Academic 
scepticism), Neoplatonism, and Christian theology; Augustine finally concluded that 
only the last two described God’s transcendence perfectly, that is, God is the 
immaterial168 Creator169.  
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160
 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘With all my heart I believed you to be incorruptible, 
immune from injury, and unchangeable. Although I did not know why and how, it was clear to me and 
certain that what is corruptible is inferior to that which cannot be corrupted; what is immune from injury I 
unhesitatingly put above that which is not immune; what suffers no change is better than that which can 
change.’ 
161
 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1. 
162
 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16 & 7.12.18. 
163
 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16:!‘“I am that I am.” (Exod. 3.14)’ 
164
 Cf., Confessiones 7.12.18. 
165
 Cf., Confessiones 3.7.12. 
166
 Cf., De ordine 2.19.51: ‘I shall say no more, except that to us is promised a vision (aspectum) of 
beauty - the beauty through whose imitation all other things are beautiful, and by comparison with which 
all other things are unsightly.’  
167
 Cf., Confessiones 7.3.4 & 7.5.7  
168
 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1-7.2.3. 
169
 Cf., De vera religione 18.35: ‘Whatever is must have some form, and though it be but a minimal good 
it will be good and will be of God. The highest form is the highest good, and the lowest form is the lowest 
good. Every good thing is either God or derived from God. Therefore even the lowest form is of God. … 
That out of which God created all things had neither form nor species, and was simply nothing’ quoted in 
Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 100. Also, see De vera religione 40.74, 43.81, 55.113 
& Confessiones 7.9.14. 
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Fourthly (5-4), contrary to Folliet’s170 as well as Bonner’s insistence, divine grace is 
crucial for our deification not only in the mature Augustine’s thoughts, but also in the 
young Augustine’s:  
 
today throughout the nations and peoples the proclamation is made: “In the 
beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the Word was God. 
This was in the beginning with God, and all things were made by him, and 
without him was nothing made” (John I: I). In order that men may receive the 
Word, love him, and enjoy him so that the soul may be healed and the eye of the 
mind receive power to use the light … To the proud it is said: “Whosoever 
exalteth himself shall be humbled and whosoever humbleth himself shall be 
exalted” (Luke 14:11).171  
 
(As the above text demonstrates, Christology is a crucial element of deification: ‘Let us 
therefore walk while we have the day, i.e., while we can use reason. Let us turn to God 
so that we may deserve to be illumined by his Word, the true light, and that darkness 
may not take possession of us. Day is the presence of the “light that lighteth every man 
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170
 Cf., Folliet, ‘Deificari in otio. Augustin, Epistula 10. 2’, 225-226 : ‘Tout au long de cette lettre 
Augustin va tenter de décrire ce programme afin de décider son ami à partager un tel idéal. En tout cas, 
résolution est prise par lui de vivre le plus possible à l’écart des affaires, comme étranger à tout ce qui 
passe, uniquement préoccupé de se préparer à la mort, de purifier son âme et de vivre comme mort à toute 
affection charnelle. En des formules très brèves et très denses, Augustin décrit sa vie ascétique et ce 
qu’elle lui procure dès ici-bas : joie, bonheur, tranquillité, sécurité, intimité avec Dieu. Une telle vie, 
précise-t-il, certains hommes la désirent ardemment mais ne peuvent y arriver en raison de leurs charges, 
d’autres préfèrent la vie turbulente des affaires, seul l’otium permettrait aux uns et aux autres de « se 
déifier » : ‘deificari enim utrisque in otio licebat’.’ Cf., Ibid., p 226: ‘Nul doute que le mot deificari ne 
peut s’entendre ici de l’élévation à l’ordre surnaturel par la grâce, vu le sens réfléchi qu’a ce verbe dans la 
phrase et le complément « in otio » qui lui est adjoint. … Augustin parle en chrétien converti, mais sa 
description de l’ascèse à laquelle il vise, et les expressions dont il se sert, laissent soupçonner que son 
idéal de vie présent est beaucoup plus proche de celui du sage, tel que le présentent les philosophes néo-
platoniciens, que de celui de l’Évangile : la préoccupation de la mort, la possession dès ici-bas de 
l’apatheia et du bonheur, la purification qui à elle seule nous ‘rend semblable à Dieu’, sont des traits 
caractéristiques de l’ascèse néo-platonicienne.’ Cf., Ibid., 235-236: ‘On a beaucoup discuté sur les 
rapports d’Augustin avec Plotin et Porphyre; dans le cas présent l’influence porphyrienne me paraît trop 
évidente pour être contestée. Peut-être s’étonnera-t-on de trouver encore dans la bouche du converti de 
Milan de tels accents, mais ses lecteurs ne s’y trompaient pas : « Vos lettres parlent à mon oreille comme 
le Christ, comme Platon, comme Plotin », lui écrit Nebridius en 389. Augustin n’a pas encore découvert 
toute la richesse de la grâce du Christ ; la purification, l’assimilation à Dieu par les vertus, sans le secours 
de la grâce, [236] sont à ses yeux chose possible pour l’homme. Et c’est un des grands reproches qu’il 
adressera plus tard à Porphyre qui l’avait entraîné dans cette voie, « de n’avoir pas voulu reconnaître le 
Christ Seigneur comme le Principe dont l’incarnation nous purifie ».’  
171
 De vera religione 3.4. Also, see Ibid., 16.30, 38.71, and 42.79. 
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coming into the world” [John I:9].’172 This is because, as Harrison stresses, ‘Christ is 
the “sacrament and example” of the work of divine grace in response to humanity’s 
fallenness for Augustine’173.) We can approach the indispensability of divine grace in 
two ways. One is in reference to intellectual transformation. For Augustine an 
intellectual pursuit of an object can be motivated by our desire of it alone, which in turn 
can be triggered only by our delight in that object: in short, no delight, no intellectual 
pursuit.174 Thus, pleasing us with the beauty of His creation, God allures us to transcend 
the ‘fleshly pleasure’ and advance towards the eternal joy of seeing Beauty itself (i.e., 
dialectically ‘ascending’175 to God) by questioning what the cause of the delight is:176 
all that the Creator has created is beautiful, for the Creator is Beauty itself.177 (Here, 
Augustine does not say that the beauty of created things helps us recall the standard of 
beauty – that is, Beauty or the Creator God. He rather says that we have already 
‘known’ the standard, so that we can ‘judge’ whether a thing is beautiful or not.178) The 
other way is with respect to ethical transformation. After his intellectual conversion, 
Augustine failed to free himself from his old, lascivious habit.179 Thus, due to such a 
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172
 De vera religione 42.79. Ibid., 3.4: ‘To the proud it is said: “Whosoever exalteth himself shall be 
abased and whosoever humbleth himself shall be exalted” (Luke 14:11)’. Ibid., 16.30: ‘the Word became 
flesh and dwelt among us. For thus he showed to carnal people, given over to bodily sense and unable 
with the mind to behold the truth, how lofty a place among creatures belonged to human nature’.  
173
 Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 252. Also, see Ibid., 47-48 & 253-254. 
174
 Again, refer to Sermones 159.3: see above. 
175
 Cf., De vera religione 29.52 & Confessiones 9.2.2. 
176
 Cf., De vera religione 32.59, 42.79 and 52.101 (‘We turn from artistic works to the law of the art’). 
Also, see Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 106-108. Cary emphasizes that, ‘in contrast 
to Plotinus, Augustine begins not by turning away from the senses but by examining them’: Philip Cary, 
‘Interiority’, in Allan D. Fitzgerald, OSA (ed.), Augustine through the Ages: An Encyclopedia 
(Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 455. 
177
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2: ‘O God, who from nothing hast created this world which every eye sees to be 
most beautiful.’ 
178
 De vera religione 29.53 & 30.56 (‘All things which are beautiful to the senses, whether they are 
produced by nature or are worked out by the arts, have a spatial or temporal beauty, as for example the 
body and its movements. But the equality and unity which are known only by the mind, and according to 
which the mind judges of corporeal beauty by the intermediary of the senses, are not extended in space or 
unstable in time.’) 
179
 See the chapter ‘Habit’ in Harrison, Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology, 189-193: ‘…Augustine is 
also prompted to reflect on the influence which habit exercises upon the soul in the De musica (390), 
where, as we have seen, the effect which the body has upon the soul, and its ability to operate freely, is 
one of the central themes of book 6. Here he refers to what he describes as the “impetus of carnal 
occupations (carnalium negotiorum... inpetus)”, which the soul does not, indeed, cannot restrain, because 
through “long habit” and “turbulent memories” they hinder its conversion to God. Thus, it is clearly habit, 
present in the soul through memory, which makes it difficult for the soul to overcome its sinful actions at 
will. Obviously thinking of Adam’s sin, and the effects of original sin, Augustine observes that the soul 
was strong when it first sinned, but having sinned it is made weaker, and is less capable of removing what 
it has done: “The soul does not extinguish those carnal motions at will in the same way as it exerts them 
at will. For the punishment of the sin is not in its power in the same way as the sin. Surely the soul is a 
great thing, yet it does not remain capable of suppressing its own lascivious motions.” Augustine’s 
quotation of Rom. 7: 24-5 follows naturally in this context. Later in book 6 he observes with 
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firsthand experience of himself, Augustine was acutely aware that the human person – 
being created out of nothing – is not the master of his/her own self.180 
 
Finally (5-5), no living person can know God fully and, so, deification cannot be 
completed in this life: 
 
Hope (of knowing God fully) does not leave the soul as long as it is in this life, 
181
 
 
we do not know Him (i.e., God) as He Himself knows Himself.182  
 
In summary, reason is ultimately superior to memory; contemplative theology 
continues to be an integral part of the mature Augustine’s theory of deification; 
dialectics is the only means for the intellectual side of Augustine’s ‘ascent’183 to God 
through reason and faith; divine grace is indispensable for our deification; and the soul 
cannot be fully deified in this life. Therefore, the main point of my argument in this 
thesis is to demonstrate that these central elements of Augustinian interiority remain 
unaltered. 
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characteristic psychological insight that it is the delight of sinning which fixes it in the memory so 
powerfully, and which leads to its taking hold as habit.’ (p. 191) Harrison also refers to De quantitate 
animae and De uera religione in her discussion of ‘habit’. 
180
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.15.30: ‘Do not choose to be, so to speak, your own master and under your own 
dominion, but proclaim yourself the servant of Him who is our kindest and most helpful Lord. For, if you 
do this, He will not cease to lift you up to Himself, and He will allow nothing to happen to you which is 
not for your good, even though you do not know it.’ 
181
 Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14.  
182
 De Trinitate 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation). 
183
 Cf., De vera religione 29.52 & Confessiones 9.2.2. 
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Part I. The foundations of Augustinian interiority 
 
Augustinian interiority is closely associated with Greek teleology: the former is also a 
form of the latter. The word ‘teleology’ is derived from the word ‘telos’, which means 
the goal, or the Value, in an ethical sense. For ancient Greek thinkers the goal of our life 
is eudaimonia,184 that is, happiness185 attainable through having the divine part of the 
self fully ‘actualized’186 – in other words, through possessing virtue (
), which is a 
moral and intellectual ability acquired by exercise:187 wisdom () is the highest 
virtue and is knowledge of the self and God.188  Thus, teleology is basically about an 
ethical transformation, which leads us ultimately to true happiness, through discovering 
and cultivating the divine element in us.189  
 
Augustine encountered Greek teleology through the Hortensius, which is a protreptic 
work of Cicero written in response to his friend orator Hortensius Hortalus’ attack on 
philosophy.190 Philosophy in the time of Augustine consisted of not only an intellectual 
element, but also a moral element.191 Augustine tells us in Confessions 3.4.7 that, due to 
Cicero’s ‘exhortation to philosophy’, he began to pursue ‘wisdom’. Hence, what 
Augustine meant by ‘philosophy’ is identical to what we mean by ‘teleology’.192 This is 
to say that for Augustine philosophy primarily concerns the goal of our life and, so, is 
synonymous with – as Holte puts it – ‘teleological speculation’193: ‘no one has any right 
to philosophize except with a view to happiness.’194 
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184
 Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse. Saint Augustine et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la 
philosophie ancienne  (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 13-14. 
185
 Cf., Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 14: ‘ce concept (i.e., ) ne doit pas être compris comme 
désignant premièrement ni exclusivement un état affectif, (encore qu’il implique toujours une expérience 
de nature émotionnelle)’. 
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 Cf., Holte, 14-15: ‘L’ est l’état de l’homme où l’élément divin n’est ni affaibli ni étouffé, 
mais se trouve au contraire actualisé avec son maximum de plénitude et de force’. 
187
 Cf., Holte, 15 : also, see ibid., footnote no. 1: ‘
 peut désigner toute habileté ou dextérité acquise 
par l’exercice, (cf. l’anglais « excellence »), mais particulièrement la force intérieure d’où sort l’activité 
morale et intellectuelle. 
188
 Cf., Holte, 15, footnote no. 2: ‘, au sens étroit, est déjà, défini par les stoïciens comme 
“l’intelligence des choses divines et des choses humaines”’. 
189
 Cf., Holte, 12-16. 
190
 Cf., William J. Collinge, ‘Hortensius’, in Allan D. Fitzgerald, OSA (ed.), Augustine through the Ages: 
An Encyclopedia (Cambridge: William B. Eerdmans Publishing, 1999), 437.  
191
 Cf., Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 18. 
192
 Cf., Holte, 13.  
193
 Holte, 12. 
194
 De civitate Dei 19.1. 
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Holte argues that ethics became the most important issue for Augustine after his 
conversion to philosophy/teleology.195 However, what was equally important, and even 
logically prior, to Augustine’s yearning for a radical change in his lifestyle was gaining 
knowledge of God and of the self (i.e., wisdom). The reason is that in Greek teleology 
acquiring wisdom is an essential prerequisite for an ethical transformation: in other 
words, a practical conversion depends on a theoretical conversion. Augustine’s own life 
attests to it. For instance, from Neoplatonism he learnt to perceive God as immaterial 
and, so, identical with Wisdom196 and Happiness197. Only then was he able to check his 
preoccupation with material, earthly and carnal things, though not completely.198 
Eventually, he says in Confessions 4.2.3,  
 
I knew nothing about love for you, of whom I had no conception other than of 
physical objects luminous with light.199 
 
In other words, as long as Augustine thought about God in a materialistic manner, he 
was incapable of loving things other than what he could perceive with his senses. In 
short, due to the priority of theory over practice, Augustine wanted to know God and the 
soul as the first step forward to happiness through an ethical transformation. 
 
Neoplatonism helped Augustine to settle partially his problem concerning what the 
right way to think about God and the soul is, and to establish a theory concerning how 
we must approach God epistemologically. Augustinian interiority involves not only 
intellect, but also memory, will, faith, hope, love, and divine grace. However, we cannot 
love what we do not know. Also, the collective role of faith, hope, love and divine grace 
is primarily to assist reason in its search for God. Consequently, although acquiring 
knowledge of God is only an intermediate stage on our way to true happiness, the 
former is on the other hand the goal of the intellectual part of Augustine’s teleological 
project:  
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
195
 Cf., Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 13: ‘quand Augustin identifie la philosophie avec la spéculation 
téléologique, c’est que dans sa pensée l’éthique constitue la tâche première et propre de la philosophie.’ 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2. 
197
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.3. 
198
 Cf., Confessiones 8.1.2: ‘now I had discovered the good pearl. To buy it I had to sell all that I had; and 
I hesitated (Matt. 12:46).’ 
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wisdom … in the knowledge of which you found delight (De libero arbitrio 
2.15.40), 
 
To the rational and intellectual soul is given to enjoy the contemplation of his 
(i.e., God’s) eternity, and by that contemplation it is armed and equipped so that 
it may obtain eternal life200 (De vera religione 3.3), 
 
When I seek you, my God, what I am seeking is the happy life (Confessiones 
10.20.29), 
 
This is eternal life, that they should know you, the one true God, and Jesus Christ 
whom you have sent (Jn 17:3). (De Trinitate 1.8.17) … Now therefore let us look 
for the trinity which is God in these eternal things, incorporeal and unchangeable, 
since the happy life which is nothing if not eternal is promised to us in the 
contemplation of them. (Ibid., 15.4.6) 201 (Here, Augustine combines the 
Christian term ‘eternal life’ with the Greek teleological term ‘happy life’.) 
 
Therefore, in this part of my thesis I shall tread the course of Augustine’s teleological 
adventure before his baptism, investigating the main characteristics of each major 
source of his theological learning. I shall focus on explaining how Augustine was 
influenced by the Hortensius, why he was dissatisfied with Manichaeism and Stocism, 
and finally which part of Neoplatonism played a decisive role in shaping his mind. (I 
shall present the finalised theological view of the young Augustine in the first chapter of 
Part II under the title ‘Augustine’s view of reality’.)  
 
In a nutshell, after reading the Hortensius, Augustine changed his way of pursuing 
happiness: he now began to strive for knowledge of God and the soul so that he could 
love God, render his lifestyle ethical, and finally attain true happiness. Thus, in chapter 
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 (Chadwick’s translation.) ‘Non enim amare te noveram, qui nisi fulgores corporeos cogitare non 
noveram’. I find the following translation of Outler is more accurate: ‘I knew not how to love thee 
because I knew not how to conceive of anything beyond corporeal splendors.’ 
200
 ‘in quibus (i.e., ‘pura mente’) animae tantum rationali et intellectuali datum, ut eius aeternitatis 
contemplatione perfruatur, atque afficiatur200 ex ea, aeternamque vitam possit mereri’ 
201
 ‘…in ipsis rebus aeternis, incorporalibus et incommutabilibus, in quarum perfecta contemplatione 
nobis beata, quae nonnisi aeterna est, vita promittitur, Trinitatem quae Deus est inquiramus.’ Also, see De 
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1, I shall investigate the significance of such a change in Augustine, in historical, 
theological and philosophical context. I shall also explain what Greek teleology is.  
 
In his pursuit of true knowledge of God, Augustine encountered firstly Manichaeism, 
next Stoicism, and finally Neoplatonism, before his conversion to the Catholic faith. In 
the theological exploration of his Augustine had two criteria for determining whether a 
theory of reality is acceptable or not. One is that it should resolve the problem of evil.202 
The other is that it should describe God as irrefutably transcendent: God must be 
incorruptible, inviolable, and immutable.203 These two are, in fact, inseparably 
intermingled: if God is genuinely transcendent, nothing can pose threat to Him in any 
way. Manichaeism and Stoicism failed to meet the two criteria, whereas Neoplatonism 
did not.204 This is the reason why Augustine makes references to some Manichaean and 
Stoic ideas when he mentions the significance of his encounter with Neoplatonism in 
Book 7 of the Confessions. Thus, examining some relevant features of the former two 
will help us to understand the impact of Neoplatonism on the formation of Augustine’s 
mind.  
 
In chapter 2, I shall examine Manichaeism: God and Evil are two independent, co-
equal and co-eternal powers and are at war against one another. Eventually, such a 
dualism makes God vulnerable to the evil force. 
 
In chapter 3, I shall investigate Stoicism. Referring to Confessions 7.1.1-2 and 7.5.7, 
Baguette argues that, after abandoning Manichaeism, but before reading ‘certain books 
of the Platonists’205, Augustine studied Stoicism.206 The reasoning behind the argument 
of Baguette is that Augustine’s idea of God’s being ‘diffused (infussum or diffusum)’207, 
‘permeating (penetrare)’208, ‘filling (implendo)’209, and ‘surrounding (ambientem)’210 
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Trinitate 1.6.10: ‘life everlasting (i.e., eternal life) can scarcely be mortal and subject to change (Neque 
enim ipsa vita aeterna mortalis est secundum aliquam mutabilitatem)’. (All are Hill’s translations.) 
202
 Cf., Confessiones 7.3.4 & 7.5.7  
203
 Cf., Soliloquia 7.1.1. 
204
 Cf., Soliloquia 7.3.4 (the problem of evil and Manichaeism) & 7.5.7 (the problem of evil and 
Manichaeism and Stoicism). 
205
 Soliloquia 7.9.13. 
206
 Cf., Charles Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l'évolution de saint Augustin’, Revue des Études 
Augustiniennes 16 (1970), 47-77.  
207
 Confessiones 7.1.1. 
208
 Confessiones 7.1.2. 
209
 Confessiones 7.1.2. 
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the world are all compatible with Stoic materialism: Stoicism, together with 
Epicureanism, dominated the Roman world in Augustine’s time.211 
 
Stoicism is fundamentally a material pantheism (whereas Manichaeism is material 
dualism):212 God penetrates and concurrently encompasses the whole world; thus God is 
omni-presently immanent in, and is inseparably intermingled with, the world in an 
ontological sense. Yet, such pantheism makes impossible even to raise questions about 
evil as an experiential reality: 
 
I visualized you, Lord, surrounding it (i.e., God’s creation) on all sides and 
permeating it, but infinite in all directions … God is good and is most mightily 
and incomparably superior to these things. But being God, God created good 
creatures. See how God surrounds and fills them. Then where and whence is 
evil? How did it creep in?213 
 
Neoplatonism, on the other hand, helped Augustine to resolve the problem of evil: it 
did not give Augustine the solution to the problem, but only suggested a way to settle 
it.214 More importantly, the immaterial concepts of soul and God (i.e., Intellect and the 
One) in Neoplatonism revolutionized Augustine’s way of thinking about God’s 
immanence, omnipresence and transcendence. Eventually, Augustine adopted the basic 
structure of the Neoplatonic idea regarding how to ascend to God intellectually.215  
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 Confessiones 7.5.7 
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 Cf., Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s Quest of Wisdom: Life and Philosophy of the Bishop of Hippo, 
(USA: The Bruce Publishing, 1945), 55. 
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 Cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l'évolution de saint Augustin’, 57. 
213
 Confessiones 7.5.7 (Chadwick’s translation). Note that in Stoicism the mode of God’s existence with 
respect to the universe is modelled on that of the soul’s (i.e., pneuma, which means literally ‘hot/fiery 
breath’) with respect to the body: Cf., Michael Lapidge, ‘7 Stoic Cosmology’, in John M. Rist (ed.) The 
Stoics (London: University of Califonia Press, 1978), 167-169. 
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 Cf., Michele Federico Sciacca, Saint Augustin et le néoplatonisme : la possibilité d’une philosophie 
chrétienne, (Louvain: Publications universitaires de Louvain, 1956), 14: ‘Avant tout Augustin a vu, à ce 
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see Sciacca, Saint Augustin et le néoplatonisme, 13-19; Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo: Life, and 
Controversies (Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1963), 201-204, chapter (iv) ‘Creator-or-creature’ in Part 
II. 
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 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16. 
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Our ‘mind’s eye’216 cannot ‘see’ God ‘face to face’217. We can only perceive the 
reality of God dialectically through understanding His creation.218 Accordingly, 
Plotinus’ argument for God’s immateriality is based on his proof of the soul’s 
incorporeity, which I shall investigate in the first section of chapter 4. Afterwards, I 
shall examine how Plotinus maintains God to be immanent, omnipresent, and 
transcendent; and finally the key elements of his theory concerning interiority: 
whenever the need arises, I shall mention in what way Augustine’s thoughts resemble 
Plotinus’.  
 
1) The Hortensius 
 
Just before telling us, in the Confessions 3, about the impact that reading the Hortensius 
had on him, Augustine argues that being happy is unquestionably a universal desire.219 
At the same time, Augustine regretfully confesses how he used to pursue happiness: for 
instance, he enjoyed gratifying his carnal desires, loved the joy felt in watching stage 
plays, and pursued his career in rhetoric220 for no other reason than making himself 
happy.221  
 
At nineteen years of age, Augustine, as a student of eloquence, had to read the key 
textbook Hortensius in the course of the syllabus. Yet, it turned out that he was 
captivated not by its style, but by its exhortation to ‘imperishable Wisdom’.222 He 
immediately decided to pursue a different kind of happiness, which is ‘worthy’ and not 
‘vain’,223 and which can be attained only through dedicating one’s whole life (i.e., the 
mind and the heart) to Wisdom. 
 
In the historical context of the Graeco-Roman era, such a transformation as 
Augustine’s was an archetype of a ‘cultural’ conversion occurring among certain 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12 & Confessiones 7.10.16 
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 Cf., Confessiones 10.5.7 & De Trinitate 1.8.16. Also, see Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14. 
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 Cf., De vera religione 25.47 & 29.52, De doctrina Christiana 1.4.4, De Trinitate 15.2.3. 
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 Cf., Confessiones 3.2.3: (Boulding’s translation) ‘yet there can be no doubt that everyone aspires to be 
happy. (Certe omnis homo gaudere vult.)’ 
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 Cf., Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 36-37. 
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 Cf., Confessiones 3.2.2-3.3.6. 
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 Cf., Confessiones 3.4.7-8. 
223
 Cf., Confessiones 3.4.7: (Outler’s translation) ‘Suddenly every vain hope became worthless (viluit) to 
me …’. 
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people. In ancient Greece, there coexisted two major cultural traditions, which were 
mutually irreconcilable. One was ‘literary’ or ‘rhetorical’, whereas the other was 
‘philosophical’. The well-known representatives of the former are the Sophists and 
Isocrates, whereas those of the latter are Socrates and Plato. The former constituted the 
dominant consciousness, whereas the latter was the road less travelled. The clash 
between the two traditions continued unabated in late antiquity. Thus, Augustine’s 
decision to pursue Wisdom was actually an alteration of his cultural orientation – that is, 
adapting himself to a tradition which was entirely new and unfamiliar to him.224 
However, we need to note that, despite the commencement of his love affair with 
philosophy, Augustine continued to study rhetoric rather than giving it up altogether. In 
other words, the two mutually irreconcilable traditions were merged together in 
Augustine until he renounced his career in 384 AD. This was possible because, as 
Courcelle explains, in Augustine’s educational context philosophy was the ‘crowning’ 
part of the rhetoric curriculum and was taught by the teachers of rhetoric.225  
 
Now, there are two things to note. One is that philosophy in the Graeco-Roman era 
involved not only the intellectual, but also the moral as well as the social dimension.226 
Hence, what was called a ‘philosophical conversion’ in those days was, in fact, more 
like what we in the twenty-first century regard as a ‘religious conversion’.227 The other 
is that Augustine decided to devote himself to philosophy for only one, single reason: 
that is, to attain true happiness.228 
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 Cf., Henri-Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique (Paris: E. de Boccard, 1938), 
1938, 169-173. Also, see by the same authour, Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité (Paris: éd. Seuil, 
2nd ed.1950), 283-284.  
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 Cf., Henri-Irénée Marrou, Saint Augustin et la fin de la culture antique, 172. 
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 Cf., Henri-Irénée Marrou, Histoire de l’éducation dans l’antiquité (Paris: éd. Seuil, 2nd ed.1950), 284. 
228
 Cf., Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1961), 3. 
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Augustine’s quest for true happiness never waned throughout his life. Holte argues in 
his book Béatitude et Sagesse that one can find hard evidence of it in De civitate Dei, 
which Augustine began to compose forty years after reading the Hortensius.229 Here, 
Augustine re-emphasizes that what causes a person to pursue Wisdom is solely that 
person’s desire for happiness: 
 
The reason for this is that no one has any right to philosophize except with a 
view to happiness. Now, what makes a man happy is the supreme good. 
Hence, there is no reason for philosophizing apart from the supreme good. From 
this it follows that no school of philosophy is properly so called unless its search 
is for the supreme good.230 (De civitate Dei 19.1) 
 
Although Augustine wrote it at the age of at least fifty-nine, it provides us with 
additional information concerning the influence of the Hortensius upon the formation of 
his mind.  
 
There are three keywords in the excerpt from De civitate Dei 19.1. These are ‘happy 
(beatus)’, ‘philosophy’ (i.e., love of Wisdom), and ‘supreme good (finis boni)’. All 
these are teleological term: ‘supreme good (finis boni)’ – more precisely, ‘finibus 
bonorum et malorum’ – is Cicero’s Latin translation of ‘telos ()’.231 We can find 
similar language and overtones in the Confessions 3.4.7–8. For example, ‘Wisdom’, 
‘philosophy’, and ‘delight (gaudium) of human vanity’ unmistakably connote teleology. 
Therefore, I shall explain briefly what Greek teleology is and what its chief issues are. 
(Holte maintains that Augustine’s early works display his knowledge of Cicero’s 
teaching of ethics and moral philosophy, thus Augustine must have read some other 
Ciceronian books, for example, De finibus.232) 
 
Telos is fundamentally an ethical term, though how a philosophical school used it is 
semantically different from another. This is to say that ethics is the core element of 
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 Cf., Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse. Saint Augustine et le problème de la fin de l’homme dans la 
philosophie ancienne (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 12. 
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 Cf., Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 17-18. 
! %"
Greek teleology. On the other hand, eudaemonia constitutes the nucleus of Greek ethics. 
Consequently, eudaemonism in an ethical sense is at the heart of Greek teleology: 
Christians translated ‘eudaemonia ()’ often as ‘beatitudo’, whereas pagan 
philosophers as ‘beata vita’.233  
 
The primary meaning of eudaimonia does not concern feelings, even though it 
always involves the emotional dimension of human life. It, in the first place, refers to an 
ideal life where our desires are satisfied without immoderation (
):234 the ancient 
Greeks believed that such a life belongs to gods only.235 
 
Although there is no evidence that eudaimonism has a religious aspect, 
etymologically the term ‘eudaimonia’ has its origin in religion: it is derived from the 
word ‘daimon ()’236, which means god or goddess. It was widely believed, 
among those who refused to secularize eudaimonia, that daimon is a divine, supreme 
‘part’237 (or ‘power’238/‘faculty’239) of the human person.240 That part is generally 
considered to be ‘intelligence’: for instance, Plato explicitly designated human reason as 
‘daimon’ (Timaeus 90 a),241 but Cicero interestingly does not.242 Nonetheless, in the 
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cultured milieu of ancient thought, one generally took for granted that the soul is 
divine.243 
 
The divine power grows or deteriorates in counter-proportion to other kinds of 
powers that we (i.e., the soul) have. Thus, eudaimonia denotes the ideal state of human 
existence, in which the divine power is fully actualized by eradicating the other powers 
completely.244 (Augustine cites a similar Ciceronian text from the Hortensius in De 
Trinitate 14.19.26: ‘if the souls which we have are eternal and divine, we must 
conclude, that the more we let them have their head in their natural activity, that is, in 
reasoning and in the quest for knowledge, and the less they are caught up in the vices 
and errors of mankind, the easier it will be for them to ascend and return to Heaven’245.) 
One can cultivate the daimon to the full only by means of virtue (
)246 and its 
supreme form is Wisdom (), which Stoics (one of whom is Cicero) define as 
knowledge of things divine and human:247 accordingly, Augustine says in De ordine 
2.18.47, ‘To philosophy pertains a twofold question: the first treats of the soul; the 
second, of God.’248 
 
In summary, Greek teleology concerns itself with maximizing the divine capacity 
(i.e., daimon, which is often considered to be reason) of the human person in order to 
achieve and maintain the optimum ethical lifestyle (i.e., eudaimonia) through knowing 
God and the human person (i.e., Wisdom).249 Similarly, after reading the Hortensius, 
Augustine strived to find the right way to think about God and render his lifestyle 
ethical.250  
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Having converted to philosophy, Augustine immediately turned to the Christian 
Bible. This is certainly due to the fact that the Catholic faith was the religion of his 
upbringing. Moreover, an important characteristic of the 4th century Christianity is that 
Christ was seen as the ‘Wisdom of God’ rather than the suffering Saviour: there were no 
crucifixes in Augustine’s time. Thus, having resolved to pursue Wisdom and then 
picking up the Bible, Augustine obviously thought that he was about to find ‘True 
Wisdom’.251 Nonetheless, Augustine was rather disappointed with the Bible.252 Brown 
explains exactly what made him think that it was not worth reading as follows: ‘He had 
been brought up to expect a book to be “cultivated and polished”: he had been carefully 
groomed to communicate with educated men in the only admissible way, in a Latin 
scrupulously modelled on the ancient authors. Slang and jargon were equally abhorrent 
to such a man; and the Latin Bible of Africa, translated some centuries before by 
humble, nameless writers, was full of both. What is more, what Augustine read in the 
Bible seemed to have little to do with the highly spiritual Wisdom that Cicero had told 
him to love. It was cluttered up with earthy and immoral stories from the Old 
Testament; and, even in the New Testament, Christ, Wisdom Himself, was introduced 
by long, and contradictory, genealogies.’253 
 
2) Manichaeism 
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Augustine was drawn to Manichaeism in his search for true happiness. He believed that 
Manichaeans were ‘authentic Christians’, for they constantly repeated the name of 
God.254 Also, he found their ‘rationalism’ very appealing.255 How, then, did the 
Manichaean Augustine perceive God? Notice the following two things about 
Manichaeism. One is that its perception of God and its theory of evil were 
inseparable.256 The other is that, regarding what God is, there is inconsistency between 
its official doctrines and its adherents’ actual teachings: this undoubtedly puzzled 
Augustine. Thus, I shall, first of all, summarize the Manichaean views concerning 
God/Good and Evil from Bonner’s St. Augustine of Hippo: Life, and Controversies. 
Secondly, I shall explain what the inconsistency is. Finally, I shall explain briefly what 
Augustine maintained to be the problem with his way of seeing things, so that he was 
unable to identify and tackle any shortcoming of Manichaeism as he would later be able 
to do. 
 
‘In the beginning,257 two co-equal and co-eternal powers of Good/God and Evil – or 
Light and Darkness – existed side by side, and neither could destroy the other. 
However, they were not by nature preserved from the possibility of contact for, while 
they were both infinite, the Kingdom of Light extended to the North, the East, and the 
West, but the Kingdom of Darkness to the South alone, so that there was a point of 
contact where the Kingdom of Darkness pierced like a wedge into the realms of Light. 
It was this point of contact, and the enclave of Darkness in the world of Light, which 
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made possible the intermingling which we see in the present world, where good and evil 
are mixed. 
 
The Kingdom of Light decided to fight the enemy himself. He therefore evoked a 
first emanation, the Mother of Life, who, in turn, evoked another being, Primal Man – 
not to be confused with Adam. Primal Man, clothed in the Five Bright Elements: Air, 
Wind, Light, Water, and Fire, which formed his soul, descended to the frontier of the 
Kingdoms of Light and Darkness and engaged the enemy armies in combat. Here he 
was defeated and the Five Bright Elements were devoured by the princes of Darkness, 
the infernal Archons. This was the Fall, as the Manicheans conceived it. The Bright 
Elements which the evil Archons had devoured were the soul of Primal Man, the Son of 
God, who was himself a hypostasis of the soul of his Father. In consequence, the dark 
Archons had, within their own entrails, a portion of the substance of God. 
 
Primal Man addresses to the Father a cry for help, and was eventually delivered into 
his heavenly homeland. Although Primal Man had been redeemed, the Five Bright 
Elements were still mingled with darkness in the entrails of the evil Archons, and it was 
necessary that they too should be delivered. Their deliverance was the sole purpose of 
the construction of the world. 
 
Meanwhile, the King of Darkness engendered two demons, a male called Ashaqloun 
and a female called Namraël, and sent them into the world to frustrate the purposes of 
the powers of Light. Ashaqloun united with Namraël to engender the first two human 
beings, Adam and Eve. The human race, then, is sprung from demonic parents, as is 
witnessed by its body, which is the same form as that of the demons, and by its 
sexuality, which urges it to couple and reproduce, thus continuing to imprison particles 
of Light in the flesh. Nevertheless, because of the presence of some particles of Light 
which are consubstantial with God, the human person is not wholly a diabolic creature; 
a good nature exists in him and he can free himself from his fleshly bonds and ascend to 
the Paradise of Light. 
 
The machine for the separation of Light from Darkness had been established and, 
through the ages, according to Mani, it continued the work for which it was designed. 
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Gradually, the particles of Light were disengaged from the carnal mass; the souls of the 
Elect, after death, were gathered into the ‘Column of Glory’ from which they were 
transferred, by means of the Moon and of the Sun, to the Paradise of their origin. 
However, this process of liberation is impeded by the sins of humanity, of whom the 
great majority choose to cling to the mixture, and so prolong the captivity of Light in 
Darkness. In the end, Good and Evil will once again be separate, as they were in the 
beginning.’258 
 
Note the following four points, against which Augustine would argue later. Firstly, 
God and Evil are two independent co-equal and co-eternal powers. Secondly, the 
hypostasis of the soul of Primal Man (or the Son of God) and that of his Father consist 
of the Five Bright (physical) Elements; namely Air, Wind, Light, Water, and Fire. 
Thirdly, God and Evil are currently intermingled in terms of hypostasis, for the latter 
has devoured the Son of God. Finally, the human body originates from Evil, whereas 
the soul originates from Good.259 Thus, the entrapment of the soul within the body 
signifies a dominion of the evil power over the former, not completely but to a certain 
extent. (Later, Augustine would maintain that God is the immaterial, incorruptible, 
immutable, and transcendent Creator; who is the Good, the Being, and Wisdom. Also, 
all creatures are good, for their existences are sustained by the supreme Good or the 
Being, whereas evil is non-existence.) 
 
Contrary to the Manichaean system, its followers260 were not actually prepared to 
admit that God can be defiled: they liked to hold that God is uncompromisingly 
incorruptible.261 Thus, due to the inconsistency, Augustine had to question continually 
how he should understand evil without detriment to the incorruptibility of God: God 
must remain transcendent any evil force. It remained an unresolved problem for more or 
less a decade. However, after reading the libri platonicorum262 and then converting to 
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Christianity with a Neoplatonic mindset, Augustine could solve the problem of evil and 
simultaneously diagnose why he had been unable to do so as a Manichaean. Mann puts 
Augustine’s self-diagnosis in a nutshell as follows: ‘Although Manichaeism is dualistic, 
the dualism is confined within a thoroughgoing materialism. Goodness is identified with 
corporeal light; evil with physical darkness. The youthful Augustine found this feature 
of Manichaeism unobjectionable because he antecedently had had difficulty 
understanding how anything could exist without being corporeal (Conf. 5.10–19, 7.1.1–
2). It was, he says, as if God were a boundless ocean completely permeating the finite 
sponge of the created world (Conf. 7.5.7). Taking the metaphor a step further, we can 
offer on behalf of the Manichaeans the observation that the same sponge is also awash 
with a supremely toxic fluid – indeed, that the two fluids together not only permeate but 
constitute the sponge.’263 This is, in fact, partially flawed, for perceiving God as ‘a 
boundless ocean completely permeating the finite sponge of the created world’ is 
compatible with Stoicism, not Manichaeism: I shall explain this in the subsequent 
chapter. 
 
Note that the intellectual part of Augustine’s quest for Wisdom was fundamentally 
dialectical: he tried to find correct pairs of correlative terms, with which he could 
describe God as truly transcendent. Thus, since ‘incorporeity’ was not part of the 
Manichaean Augustine’s vocabulary, his view of reality was in terms of either-
corporeal-or-nothing (i.e., if not corporeal, then it does not exist): ‘Is truth then a 
nothing, simply because it is not spread out through space either finite or infinite?’264 
This was the reason that Augustine was incapable of resolving the problem of evil. 
 
Immediately after departing from Manichaeism, Augustine took on another form of 
materialism called Stoicism. The transition from the former to the latter was – as 
Baguette puts it – a transition from materialistic dualism to materialistic pantheism.265  
 
3) Stoic materialism 
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In 1970, Baguette published the article ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint 
Augustin’.266 The main point of the article is to insist that Augustine’s mind was shaped 
by Stoic materialism during the period in between his involvement in Manichaeism and 
his acquaintance with Neoplatonism. 
 
Prior to demonstrating the legitimacy of his argument, Baguette stresses that 
Augustine’s loyalty to Manichaeism had already begun to wane by the time he was 
about to familiarize himself with Stoic materialism. Such disintegration of Augustine’s 
Manichaeism should be ascribed to his interest in and exploration of ‘many other 
philosophers’ ideas (multa philosophorum)’ before he met Faustus at the age of twenty-
nine.267 While associating with Manichaeans, he studied various subjects, namely 
‘logic, geometry, music, arithmetic’268, astrology,269 Aristotle’s Categories,270 and 
Academic scepticism:271 he was experimenting with – as André Mandouze puts it – ‘the 
scientism, the rationalism, and the materialism of his time’.272  
 
During the experimentation, Augustine compared the ‘rational’273 certitude of 
scientific knowledge with Manichaean doctrines. Augustine was eventually 
disillusioned with the ‘appearance of rationalism’274 of the latter.275 For instance, 
contrary to the scientifically minded people, who accurately calculated and predicted 
eclipses of the sun and the moon, ‘the Manichees believed eclipses occurred when the 
sun or the moon wished to veil their eyes from the terrible cosmic battles between the 
light and the darkness’.276 (Also, what Augustine meant by ‘philosophy’ – that is, ‘love 
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of Wisdom’ – became broader: it then began to include science, like mathematics and 
astronomy.277)  
 
Thereafter, Augustine studied Stoic materialism. Baguette holds that the best 
evidence of this can be found in the Confessions 7.1.1–2 and 7.5.7, though there are also 
Neoplatonic vestiges in the same passages, as R.J. O’Connell argues:278 
 
I was unable to grasp the idea of substance except as something we can see with 
our bodily eyes. … even though I was no longer hampered by the image of a 
human body, I was still forced to imagine something corporeal spread out 
in space, whether infused into the world or even diffused through the infinity 
outside it. This was still the case even though I recognized that this substance 
was imperishable, inviolable and immutable (necessarily so, being superior to 
anything perishable, subject to violation or changeable); because anything to 
which I must deny these spatial dimensions seemed to me to be nothing at all, 
absolutely nothing, not even a void such as might be left if every kind of body – 
earthly, watery, aerial or heavenly – were removed from it, for though such a 
place would be a nothingness, it would still have the quality of space.279 
(Confessiones 7.1.1) 
 
Hence I thought that even you, Life of my life, were a vast reality spread 
throughout space in every direction: I thought that you penetrated the whole mass 
of the earth and the immense, unbounded spaces beyond it on all sides, that earth, 
sky and all things were full of you, and that they found their limits in you, while 
you yourself had no limit anywhere. Since material air – I mean the atmosphere 
above the earth – posed no barrier to the sun's light, which was able to penetrate 
and pass through it, filling it entirely without bursting it apart or tearing it, I 
assumed that not only the material sky, air and sea, but even the material earth, 
were similarly traversable by you, penetrable and open in all their greatest and 
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tiniest parts to your presence, which secretly breathes through them within 
and without, controlling all that you have made. I held this view only because I 
was unable to think in any other way; it was false.280 (Confessiones 7.1.2) 
 
I conjured up before my mind's eye the whole of creation: all the things in it that 
we can see, such as earth and sea and stars and trees and living things that are 
mortal, and all that we do not see in it, such as the heavenly firmament 
overhead and all the angels and all its spiritual inhabitants; and my 
imagination gave form to them also, and arranged them in their due places as 
though they had been corporeal. And I envisaged your creation as one huge 
mass in which all were arrayed according to bodily kinds, both those 
things which were really bodily in nature and the bodies I had myself 
attributed to spirits. I pictured it as enormous, not of such size as it really was, 
of course, for that I could not know, but as large as my fancy stretched, yet finite 
on all sides. I imagined you, Lord, who are infinite in every possible respect, 
surrounding and penetrating it in its every part, like a sea extending in all 
directions through immense space, a single unlimited sea which held within itself 
a sponge as vast as one could imagine but still finite, and the sponge soaked in 
every fibre of itself by the boundless sea. This was how I pictured your creation 
filled with your infinite being.281 (Confessiones 7.5.7) 
 
Referring to these Augustinian texts, Baguette holds that there are four indications, 
which suggest Augustine’s familiarity either with Cicero’s De natura deorum or Pliny 
the Elder’s Naturalis Historia, or both of them. 
 
Firstly, Augustine followed the Stoic way of enumerating the four basic components 
of the world from the perspective of cosmology, namely, earth, water, air and fire. 
Notice that both air (aer) and fire (feu, alternatively sky [caelum] or star [sidus]) are 
always adjacent to each other: for example,  
 
omni corpore et terreno et humido et aerio et caelesti (7.1.1), 
caeli et aeris et maris sed etiam terrae corpus (7.1.2), 
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terra et mare et aer et sidera (7.5.7). 
 
In Stoicism one component of the world is generated from/by another and, thus, the 
arrangement of all the components must follow the order (or the reverse order) of their 
generation:282 this is the theory of mixture. Consequently, the similarities between 
Augustine and Stoics in this respect are by no means accidental coincidences. They 
suggest that Augustine knew the central tenet of the Stoic theory of mixture.283 
 
Secondly, we need to take into account the Stoic doctrine of pneuma284 in 
conjunction with the theory of mixture,285 whose crucial feature is ‘the interpenetration 
of body and body’:286 these will explain the way that Augustine used to perceive God’s 
immanence in (all the constituents of) the world. 
 
We above all need to understand the significance of pneuma in Greek philosophy. It 
literally means ‘breath’ (or ‘wind’) and its cosmological significance had ‘its origin in 
biological thought.’ In Aristotle’s system, it was not ‘external air which was breathed’, 
but the innate ‘source of bodily vitality’. Zeno, the founder of Stoicism, adopted the 
Aristotelian idea of pneuma: eventually, as for the latter, so for the former pneuma – 
which is corporeal – was ‘spread throughout the entire body, thus vitalizing it.’ Yet, 
unlike Aristotle, Zeno made it identical with the soul: hence, the latter’s perception of 
soul was thoroughly materialistic.287 In this Zeno was followed by all the major 
Stoics.288 Such identification led to ‘the Stoic hypothesis of the composition of the 
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pneuma which was supposed to be a mixture of air and fire’.289 Later, the idea of cosmic 
pneuma emerged in Stoicism:290 it was simply ‘that of the bodily pneuma, penetrating 
all parts of the body and vitalizing it, applied by analogy to the universe.’291 Note that 
‘pneuma or one of its components was also defined by the collective “pneuma-like 
matter”’292.  
 
In Stoic cosmology, the mixture of air and fire – or either one of them – was the 
‘active agent par excellence’.293 Thus, ‘the Stoics make Fire to be the stuff of all things. 
God is the active Fire, which is immanent in the universe, but He is at the same time the 
primal Source from which the crasser elements, that make the corporeal world, come 
forth. These crasser elements proceed from God and are at length resolved into Him 
again, so that all that exists is either the primal Fire – God in Himself – or God in His 
different states. When the world is in existence, God stands to it as soul to body, being 
the soul of the world. He is not something entirely different from the stuff of the world, 
His Body, but is a finer stuff, the moving and forming principle – the crasser stuff, of 
which the world is formed, being itself motionless and unformed, though capable of 
receiving all sorts of movement and form.’294 In summary, the fire – which is ‘vis 
vitalis’ and divine – pervades all beings, sustaining their existences.295 
 
The doctrine of pneuma is obvious in Cicero’s De natura deorum.296 Baguette, then, 
holds that the above Augustinian texts were written in the spirit of the same doctrine. 
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Consequently, the texts portray God as a large being who permeates infinite space on 
every side, penetrating the entire mass of the world (cf., 7.1.2),297 like the sunlight 
penetrating and simultaneously filling the air without breaking/splitting it (cf., 7.1.2), or 
like a huge sea soaking a finite sponge entirely within itself (cf., 7.5.7).298 Also, 
regarding the passage ‘infused into the world or even diffused through the infinity 
outside it’299 (7.1.1), the way in which Augustine applied ‘infused’ and ‘diffused’ in 
reference to God is similar to the way that Stoics perceived God’s omnipresent 
immanence in the world – that is, the theory of mixture that pneuma ‘pervaded’ and 
‘extended’ (or ‘stretched’) throughout the universe.300  
 
Thirdly, Baguette holds that Augustine was influenced not only by Cicero’s 
pantheistic view expressed in De natura deorum, but also Pliny the Elder’s in Naturalis 
Historia: it will explain how Augustine used to perceive God’s omnipresence.  
 
In Cicero’s doctrine of pneuma, air – through physical contact with heat – is 
transformed into spiritus; then, the spiritus, which is the divine, ultimate source of life, 
supplies vitality to all animated things.301 Cicero referred to such activity of air (or 
spiritus) as ‘adspiratio’.302 This Ciceronian term is, as Baguette insists, akin to 
Augustine’s ‘inspiratio’ in the Confessions 7.1.2.303 Hence, Augustine’s perception of 
God was compatible with the Ciceronian concept of air.  
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phenomena is expressed very clearly. Cicero goes on to illustrate thermic effects by various examples, 
such as generation of heat by friction, and the role played by heat in melting, evaporation, etc.’ 
297
 ‘Ita etiam te, vita vitae meae, grandem per infinita spatia undique cogitabam penetrare totam mundi 
molem’. 
298
 Cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 60-61. 
299
 ‘siue infusum mundo sive etiam extra mundum per infinita diffusum’. 
300
 Cf., Sambursky, Physics of the Stoics, 29-30. This is to say that for Stoics ‘pervading’ and 
simultaneously ‘extending’ are the ways that God (or pneuma) ontologically blends Himself with the 
world: see Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 61-62. Note that 
Augustine had two other pairs of terms that signified exactly the same thing: one were ‘penetrate 
(penetrare)’ and ‘surround (ambire)’ (cf., 7.5.5) and the other were ‘penetration (penetrabile)’ and 
‘circulation (peruium)’ (cf., 7.1.2). 
301
 Cf., Baguette, 62. 
302
 For example, ‘animantes autem adspiratione aeris sustinentur’ (Cicero, De natura deorum 2.33.83 
quoted in Baguette, 62: hereafter, Cicero developed his own theory of mixture). 
303
 ‘I assumed that not only the material sky, air and sea, but even the material earth, were 
similarly traversable by you, penetrable and open in all their greatest and tiniest parts to your presence, 
which secretly breathes through them within and without, controlling all that you have made. (sic tibi 
putabam non solum caeli et aeris et maris sed etiam terrae corpus peruium et ex omnibus maximis 
minimisque partibus penetrabile ad capiendam praesentiam tuant, occulta inspiratione intrinsecus et 
extrinsecus administrante omnia, quae creasti.)’ 
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Prior to discussing a similarity between Pliny and Augustine, Baguette first of all 
mentions two features of Pliny’s physics, which are consistent with Cicero’s, in order to 
argue for a certain continuity of Stoic ideas between them.304 One is that ‘air’ and 
‘spiritus’ are mutually equivalent and interchangeable terms. The other is that the life of 
the living things originates from air (or spiritus), which permeates the entire universe. 
Next, Baguette stresses that there is a striking similarity between Pliny’s expression ‘per 
cuncta rerum meabilem totoque consertum’305 and Augustine’s ‘ex omnibus maximis 
minimisque partibus penetrabile’:306 that is, material pantheism. Consequently, 
Augustine’s concept of God at this stage was consistent with Pliny’s view that pneuma 
is omnipresent.307 
 
Finally, the above Augustinian texts distinguish God from the universe by 
contrasting the infinitude of the former with the finitude of the latter, though both of 
them interpenetrate and so are inseparably intermingled with one another. The 
distinction demonstrates that Augustine already knew and participated in the debate 
concerning what is cosmologically infinite and what else is not: he was not totally 
conforming to Stoicism in this debate. In Stoicism, if the universe – which is corporeal 
– is unique and finite, then there must be an infinite void outside it. Yet, God is 
corporeal whereas the infinite void is not.308 Furthermore, God cannot permeate 
anything that is not material. Eventually, the God of Stoicism is confined and localized 
only within the universe. Augustine, on the other hand, held that God is present even in 
the infinite void.309 (Probably, Augustine’s disagreement is grounded on some 
Manichaean ideas that still lingers on within him.) 310 
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304
 Baguette cites four passages from Naturalis Historia for examination as follows; ‘proximum spiritus, 
quem Graeci nostrique eodem uocabulo aera appelant, uitalem hunc et per cuncta rerum meabilem 
totoque consertum’ (2.4.5), ‘inter hanc caelumque eodem spiritu pendent, certis discreta spatiis, septem 
sidera’ (2.4.6), ‘Tot animalium haustus spiritum e sublimi trahit, at ille contra nititur, tellusque ut inani 
caelo spiritum fundit’ (2.39.38), and ‘uenti sunt, sine adsiduo mundi incitu et contrario siderum occursu 
nascuntur, sine hic est ille generabilis rerum naturae spiritus huc illuc tamquam in utero aliquo uagus...’ 
(2.45.45) (cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 63). 
305
 Naturalis Historia 2.4.5. 
306
 Confessiones 7.1.2 quoted in Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 
64: ‘penetrable and open in all their greatest and tiniest parts to your presence’. 
307
 Cf., Baguette, 62-64. 
308
 The void is neither a being nor a non-being. It is an intermediary state between being and non-being: 
see Baguette, 73 (‘il ne possède pas la valeur et la consistance propres aux corps; il n’est qu’un 
incorporel, c’est-à-dire une réalité intermédiaire entre l’être et le néant’). 
309
 Cf., Baguette, 72. 
! &&
In this regard, Baguette observes that Augustine’s choice of language is rather more 
compatible with Plutarch’s. Plutarch distinguished ‘to pan ( )’ from ‘to olon ( 
)’: the former signifies the whole of the universe as well as the void, whereas the 
latter only the universe save the void, though both terms literally mean ‘all’ or 
‘whole’.311 If we compare them with Augustine’s language, then ‘per infinita spatia’ 
(7.1.2)312 pertains to ‘ ’, whereas ‘earth (terra)’ and ‘heaven (caelum)’ (7.1.2)313 
to ‘ ’.314 
 
In summary, due to his familiarity with Stoicism, Augustine perceived that the world 
consists of fire, air, water, and earth: God, like pneuma, penetrates and concurrently 
encompasses the whole world, being inseparably intermingled with it: there is an 
infinite void outside the corporeal universe but, contrary to Stoics, the infinite God, as 
Plutarch insisted, is omnipresent not only within but also beyond the universe: anything 
that is not corporeal is absolute nothing, not even an empty space.315 Nonetheless, the 
problem of evil still remained unresolved and, so, Augustine was not entirely satisfied 
with the Stoicism: ‘See how God surrounds and fills them (i.e., the created beings). 
Then where and whence is evil?’316  
 
Note that Stoic corporealism was a common phenomenon in the western Empire and 
was widespread among Christian thinkers in late antiquity.317 Also, before Augustine in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!
310
 Cf., Baguette, 73-75. 
311
 Cf., Plutarque, Des oppositions des philos., 2.1 quoted in Baguette, 73.!Also, see Lapidge, ‘7 Stoic 
Cosmology’, 176-177. 
312
 ‘(spread) throughout the infinite space’. 
313
 ‘earth, sky and all things were full of you, and that they found their limits in you (haberet te terra, 
haberet caelum, haberent omnia et illa finirentur in te)’. 
314
 Cf., Baguette, ‘Une période stoïcienne dans l’évolution de saint Augustin’, 73.  
315
 Cf., Confessiones 7.1.1 & Baguette, 74. Augustine’s concept of nothing seems to be different from 
Stoics’: see Lapidge, ‘7 Stoic Cosmology’, 177: ‘accordingly modern commentators have pictured the 
Stoic universe as a finite ball floating in an infinite void. But the Stoic view may not have been so simple. 
For the Stoics everything which existed was corporeal; they admitted only four types of incorporeal 
things, which had no real existence but were only “things said” (lekta) (SVF 2. 331). One of these four 
incorporeals was “nothing” (kenon) (SVF 1. 95; 2. 331). Presumably the kenon or void beyond the 
universe was conceived by the Stoics as this sort of incorporeal; the conception is tantamount to saying 
“there is nothing outside the universe.”’ 
316
 Confessiones 7.5.7. 
317
 For example, Tertullian, the principal theologian of Africa prior to Augustine, held that both God and 
the soul were bodies: see Ronald Teske, ‘Augustine’s theory of soul’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2001),118. However, Madec points out that the methodology of determining which Christian thinkers 
were truly influenced by Stoicism needs to be critically examined: see Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et 
la Philosophie (Paris: Institut d’Études Augustiniennes, 1996), 34-35. 
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the Latin West, ‘there was no clearly articulated concept of non-bodily or spiritual 
beings – except in the ‘Milanese circle’ of Christian Neoplatonists, including Ambrose, 
within which Augustine came into contact with the spiritualist metaphysics of 
Plotinus.’318 Even after the death of Augustine in 430, throughout the rest of the 5th 
century, the incorporeity of the soul was still an idea as peculiar to the majority of the 
Christians319 as any corporeal concept of the soul, like theirs, would be alien to the 
majority of 21st century Christians:320 the term ‘incorporeal ()’ is of 
Neoplatonic origin.321 
 
In 384 Augustine started to attend the sermons of Ambrose in Milan. Teaching that 
both God and the soul are immaterial,322 Ambrose introduced Augustine to 
Neoplatonism and Christian spiritualism.323 Having been under the spell of materialism, 
Augustine was ‘unknowingly (nesciens)’ impressed by what Ambrose preached: it, all 
of a sudden, began to break the spell.324 (In addition, there were two other things that 
Augustine learned from Ambrose. One is that ‘allegorization’ was ‘an effective answer 
to Manichaean attacks on the “grossness” of the Old Testament.’ The other is that, ‘for 
fallen man, belief is the essential prerequisite for understanding [Confessiones 6.5.7–
8].’)325 Soon afterwards, Augustine began to read ‘certain books of the Platonists’,326 
based on which he started to settle the problem of evil and establish a new way of 
thinking about God and the human person. Also, through the books Augustine was able 
to adopt the framework of the Plotinian interiority and develop, with addition of 
Christian elements, his own theory of interiority.327 
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318
 Cf., Teske, ‘Augustine’s theory of soul’, 118. Also, see John Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 
in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1996), 403. 
319
 For example, Faustus, the bishop of Riez in Southern Gaul, maintained that God is material. 
320
 Cf., Ernest L. Fortin, Christianism et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle : La querelle de 
l’àme humaine en Occident (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1959), 43 & 51. 
321
 Cf., Fortin, Christianism et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle, 49. 
322
 Cf., De beata vita 1.4: ‘I have noticed frequently in the sermons of our priest, and sometimes in yours, 
that, when speaking of God, no one should think of Him as something corporeal; nor yet of the soul 
(aliquando in sermonibus tuis, cum de Deo cogitaretur, nihil omnino corporis esse cogitandum, neque 
cum de anima)’. 
323
 Cf., Madec, Saint Augustin et la Philosophie, 37.!By then, Augustine had also despaired of finding 
Truth in the Catholic faith: see Confessiones 5.13.23-14.24. 
324
 Cf., Confessiones 5.13.23-14.24. 
325
 Cf., Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 403. 
326
 Confessiones 7.9.13. 
327
 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16. 
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4) Neoplatonism 
 
In the Confessions 7.9.13 and 8.2.3 Augustine says that he encountered, in 386, some 
‘books of the Platonists (libri platonicorum)’328. Notice, first of all, that ‘Platonism is 
not a closed system with a simple character: it rather has a variegated and complex 
history.’329 Secondly, in late antiquity and throughout the Middle Age, Platonism was 
known ‘in the guise of Neoplatonism’. (‘Middle Platonism’ is the designation of the 
Platonism in the period from Antiochus of Ascalon in B.C. 130, to Numenius of 
Apamea in the late second century A.D., who is followed by Plotinus, the founder of 
Neoplatonism, in A.D. 204–270.) It was chiefly because Plotinus and his successors 
considered themselves simply as Platonists, emphasizing that they were the ‘legitimate’ 
heirs of the philosophical legacy of Plato. Moreover, throughout these periods, the 
Platonic tradition was generally taken for granted as a unified system.330 Thirdly, 
‘Neoplatonism’ and ‘Neoplatonist’ were coined only in the eighteenth century,331 
referring to the system established by Plotinus and his followers as distinct from Plato’s 
Platonism. Therefore, the ‘books of the Platonists’ as Augustine knew were actually the 
books of the Neoplatonists.332 Finally, Augustine studied Neoplatonism not only once 
but throughout his lifetime. Rist tentatively suggests that ‘Augustine’s acquaintance 
with Neoplatonism is probably to be divided into three stages: firstly, before his 
conversion; secondly, in the 390s; finally, after about 400, when he seemed to have 
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328
 Marius Victorinus translated them from Greek to Latin: see R. A. Markus, ‘Marius Victorinus’, in 
Arthur H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1967), 331.  
329
 Maria Luisa Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, trans. 
Lloyd Gerson, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 14. 
330
 Cf., Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 22 & John Rist, 
‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 387-388. 
331
 Cf., Lloyd P. Gerson, ‘Introduction’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 5. 
332
 Cf., Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 22. Yet, 
Neoplatonism shares the common features that constitute the very backbone of Platonism; namely ‘the 
admission of two levels of reality, one sensible and the other intelligible, of which the second is the true 
cause of the first, which is not capable of explaining itself; the distinction in man of two parts, 
corresponding to the two levels of reality, that is, body and soul (related to the intelligible and 
incorruptible); the association of ethics with eschatology in a religious vision of the world; the conviction 
of the necessity of separating the soul from the body’: see Ibid., 14. 
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become concerned in particular with the anti-Christian arguments of Porphyry and those 
whom he influenced.’333 
 
There is an ongoing debate concerning who the author(s) of the libri platonicorum 
are/is, or what the contents of those books are. For instance, O’Daly insists that Enneads 
4.2 (On the Essence of the Soul), 4.3 (On Difficulties about the Soul), and probably 4.7 
(On the Immortality of the Soul) are part of the libri platonicorum,334 for Henry at least 
Enneads 1.6 (On the Beautiful) and 5.1 (On the Three Principal Hypostases),335 and for 
Rist only Enneads 1.6.5.1 and 6.9.336 Nonetheless, it is generally agreed that the 
authorship directly and/or indirectly337, via Porphyry, belongs to Plotinus.338  
 
Plotinus was born in Lycopolis, Egypt in A.D. 205: it is not certain whether he was a 
Greek or a Hellenized Egyptian. In 233 (i.e., at the age of twenty-eight) Plotinus went to 
Alexandria, seeking for philosophical learning. There, he met and taught by Ammonius 
Saccas, about whom we know very little. In 242, in pursuit of Persian and Indian 
philosophy, he joined the Persian expedition of the Emperor Gordian. However, the 
expedition came to a halt due to the assassination of the Emperor. So, Plotinus moved to 
Rome in 245 and lived there till 270. While in Rome, he produced fifty-four treatises, 
which are collectively a ‘unified synthesis’ of the ideas of almost all the Greek thinkers 
before him and, so, are widely acclaimed especially by modern scholars.339 (Copleston 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
333
 Cf., Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 406. Similarly, O’Daly holds that ‘among the latter 
(considered as a source of Porphyry’s own distinctive psychology) the Summikta Zêtêmata was likely to 
have been used from 386 on, and the de regressu animae was known to Augustine from about 417 at the 
latest’: see Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind (London: Gerald Duckworth, 1987), 9. 
334
 Cf., O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 9 & 10: also, refer to the footnotes.  
335
 Cf., Paul Henry, La vision d’Ostie. Sa place dans la Vie et la Œuvre d’Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1938). 
336
 Cf., Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 1996, 406. 
337
 See Rist, 386: ‘We are not immediately concerned with the influence of Neoplatonism as a whole on 
Christianity: that again is too wide a topic, for Plotinus was merely the founder of Neoplatonism, not 
perhaps even the most typical Neoplatonist, and many of his successors developed his basic insights plus 
additions of their own, in ways which he did not know, and which he would often not have approved. In 
treating of Plotinus’s indirect influence we can at this stage do little more than observe that the later 
Neoplatonists of antiquity reinforced many of his original claims, and therefore his reputation, both 
among those who read him personally and among those who knew him through second-hand sources, and 
second-hand sources might be Christian as well as pagan.’ 
338
 Cf., S. Connolly, ‘The Platonism of Augustine’s ascent to God’, Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. 78 
(1952), 45-46. Also, see Goulven Madec, Saint Augustin et la Philosophie (Paris: Institut d’Études 
Augustiniennes, 1996), 38; and Willy Theiler, Forschungen zum Neuplatonismus (Berlin Walter de 
Gruyter, 1966), 160-165. 
339
 Cf., Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 10: ‘Plotinus has 
gathered the legacy of nearly eight centuries of Greek philosophy into a magnificently unified synthesis. 
The philosophers mentioned explicitly in the Enneads are few enough and include no one outside the 
Hellenic period. They are Pherecydes, Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans, Heraclitus, Anaxagoras, 
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insists that Plotinus most likely knew Christian faith, the Enneads are utterly silent 
about it.340). The treatises of Plotinus were later edited and compiled by his student 
Porphyry, grouping them into six books, each of which consists of nine parts, ‘hence the 
title Enneads from the Greek word for “nine”’.341  
 
How, then, did Augustine read the libri platonicorum? The fact that Augustine had, 
in his hands, limited texts from Plotinus’ monumental work (in the history of Greek 
philosophy) means that, as Rist argues, Augustine’s approach to the work was not that 
of a ‘scholar’, but that of a ‘determined seeker for the way to a good life based on 
truth’342: I take ‘the way to a good life based on truth’ to mean a teleological 
conversion, for which Augustine was earnestly yearning as a result of reading the 
Hortensius. In addition, Augustine was, above all, a Christian. Despite his deviation 
from the Catholic Church, the name of Christ was still the only way to his spiritual 
‘safety’ in the world believed to be infested with demons.343 The God/Truth of 
Augustine’s ‘residual’ faith’344 – as Peter Brown puts it – prior to his baptism was 
basically the Christian God, regardless of how much he was to be influenced by 
Neoplatonism. Hence, Augustine read the libri platonicorum in search for a way that he 
could deepen and enrich his understanding of Catholic theology and thereafter attain 
true happiness.  
 
Augustine tells us in the Confessions that he found and learned four things from the 
libri platonicorum. ‘Firstly, it was the evidence about God and his eternal Word (cf., 
7.9.14), but not about the Incarnation of the latter. Secondly, he discovered that a man 
must return to himself (cf., 7.10.16); he must look within for God (or Wisdom/Truth), 
toward his own soul, rather than to the world “outside.” Thirdly, he learned that all 
things exist insofar as they derive their being from God (cf., 7.20.26).’345 Finally and 
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Empedocles, Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, and Epicurus. Nevertheless, citations and allusions are far more 
numerous than direct references, and these, along with biographical material, permit us both to deepen 
and to broaden significantly our knowledge of Plotinus’s sources by tracing the trajectory of speculation 
through Plotinus’s predecessors.’ 
340
 Cf., Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume I: Greece and Rome (New York: 
Doubleday, 1952), 464. 
341
 Cf., Gerson, ‘Introduction’, 2-3 & Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume I, 463-464. Porphyry 
wrote the Life of Plotinus and added it to the Enneads as an Introduction. 
342
 Rist, ‘Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 405. 
343
 Cf., Peter Brown, Augustine of Hippo (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), 41-42. 
344
 Cf., Brown, Augustine of Hippo, 41. 
345
 Rist, ’16 Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 406-407. 
! '*
most importantly, the human soul and God/Truth are incorporeal (cf., 7.20.26). All 
these four are mutually interconnected and are pertinent to Augustinian interiority. 
Thus, based on Augustine’s summary of the lessons learned from the libri 
Platonicorum, I shall investigate the relevant parts of Plotinus’ ideas.  
 
The starting point will be the last one of the four (i.e., the incorporeal nature of the 
soul and God). This is because the Neoplatonic concept of incorporeity helped 
Augustine to settle permanently the problem ‘What is the right way to think about 
God?’346 Consequently, he abandoned Manichaean and Stoic materialism, and returned 
to the Catholic faith.347 Furthermore, the soul’s and God’s immateriality are the very 
foundation of God’s immanence, omnipresence, and transcendence, all of which are the 
key constituent concepts of Plotinian interiority.348  
 
Note that I shall refer whatever Plotinus holds to be ‘prior’349 to the soul as ‘God’,350 
that is, the One/Good351 and Intellect/Nous: I shall explain briefly what the One and 
Intellect are. These concepts are the essential constituents of Plotinus’ famous doctrine 
of procession (or emanation352), which he developed in answer to the traditional 
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346
 The main intellectual problem that Augustine faced during the years prior to, and immediately after, 
386 was not the existence of God, but the nature of God as a spiritual being. Accordingly, Teske holds 
that ‘in reading Confessions III through VII, one can hardly miss the repeated recurrence of one theme, 
namely, Augustine’s complaint about his inability to conceive a spiritual substance’: see Ronald Teske, 
‘The Aim of Augustine’s Proof That God Truly Is’, International Philosophical Quarterly 26 (1986), 
254-255. 
347
 Cf., Confessiones 3.7.12 & 7.10.16. 
348
 Rist argues that, ‘if Christianity is thought to be Neoplatonic, or to find Neoplatonism an essential 
explanatory tool, it must be Augustine – more than any other Fathers of the Church – who first saw it to 
be so, or made it so’: see Rist, ’16 Plotinus and Christian Philosophy’, 404 & 408-409. 
349
 O’Meara argues that the term ‘hierarchy’ was coined in the 6th century A.D.: it is not a Plotinian term. 
‘Prior (proteros)’ and ‘posterior (husteros)’ – rather than ‘superior’ and ‘inferior’ – are actually the 
language that Plotinus employed to describe how things of the world are relationally structured: see 
Dominic J. O’Meara, ‘3 The hierarchical ordering of reality in Plotinus’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 66-79, especially 
66-67 & 78-79. 
350
 Actually, ‘in Plotinus (as in all Greek thinkers) the word  (God or god) is of wider application than 
our word “god”.’ Furthermore, Plotinus distinguished between ‘the God (ó )’ and ‘god (or God, 
)’: the former signifies the One whereas the latter Intellect. For instance, he does not say that the One 
is ‘more than the God (ó ), but more than god/God ()’: ‘when you think of him (i.e., the One) as 
Intellect or God, he is more’ (Ennead 6.9.6.12-15). (See Rist, J, ‘Theos and the One in Some Texts of 
Plotinus’, Mediaeval Studies 24 [1962], 169-180, especially 169-170.) Such a distinction does not exist in 
Augustine. Hence, it is safe to conclude that Augustine identified Plotinus’ One and Intellect with the 
Christian God.  
351
 In Plotinus the One () and the Good () are the twin names: see Ennead 2.9.1.  
352
 Gatti is critical about any ‘emanationist interpretation’ of Plotinus: see Maria Luisa Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: 
The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 31. 
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problem in Greek metaphysics, which is ‘why and how do many derive from One?’353 
Plotinus, firstly, insisted that the One, which is ‘beyond being’354, is the source of all 
beings.355 Secondly, the One ‘generates’ Intellect, which is identical with the world of 
Platonic Forms/Ideas356 and, so, is the principle that shapes the world ‘posterior’357 to it: 
for instance, it makes material things beautiful,358 renders the soul ‘intellectual’,359 and 
is the source of our human values in the moral and aesthetic world below – in other 
words, ‘the source of our moral and aesthetic words and propositions’.360 Human 
intellect not only participates in, but also is itself, the divine Intellect: 361 Intellect 
nondiscursively contemplates the One. Nonetheless, note that a large part of Plotinus’ 
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353
 Gatti, ‘1 Plotinus: The Platonic tradition and the foundation of Neoplatonism’, 28: also, ‘Plotinus has 
formulated another exceedingly difficult question that no one of the Greek philosophers had ever posed 
before: why does the One exist and why is it what it is?’ 
354
 Ennead 5.1.10. Also, see Ennead 5.2.1.5-7: ‘the One is not being, but the generator of being’ quoted in 
Cristina D’Ancona Costa, ‘15 Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality of the First 
Principle’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 1996), 370. As for diverse interpretations of what ‘beyond’ means, refer to John Rist, 
‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, Journal of the History of Philosophy 17, no. 2 
(1989), 185-186. 
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‘IV The Background of the Doctrine “That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”’, in Plotinian 
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they are one reality described from different points of view.”’ For further reference, see Cristina 
D’Ancona Costa, ‘15 Plotinus and later Platonic philosophers on the causality of the First Principle’, 370; 
Dominic J. O’Meara, Plotinus: an introduction to the Enneads, (Oxford Clarendon Press, 1993), 42; 
Andrew Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity (London: Routledge, 2004), 14-17 (especially the section 
‘Intellect itself’: ‘the objects of thought are not outside the intellect’ in page 15). 
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 Cf., Dominic J. O’Meara, ‘3 The hierarchical ordering of reality in Plotinus’, 66-79.  
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 Cf., Ennead 5.8.3. 
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 Cf., Ennead 2.9.1. 
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 Cf., Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 183 & 195. 
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 Ragnar Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, Studia Ephemeridis 
“Augustinianum” 32 (1990), 74: in Confessions 7. 9.13-15 ‘Augustine asserts that, according to Plotin, 
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‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, in Arthur H. Armstrong (ed.), The Cambridge History 
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statements about Intellect still remain equivocal.362 Thirdly, Intellect ‘generates’ the 
soul, from which material things, such as the body, finally ‘emanate’.  
 
Plotinus says, ‘he who has learnt to know himself will know from whence he 
comes’363. In the wide sense it means that self-knowledge is the prerequisite for gaining 
knowledge of God, hence know thyself.364 This is to say that in Plotinus a proof of the 
soul’s incorporeity is simultaneously that of God’s: this, in turn, is the grounds for his 
insistence on God’s immanence. 365 Therefore, I shall examine, in section (a), how 
Plotinus argued for the soul’s immateriality and, afterwards, in what sense God is 
immanent, (omnipresent,) and transcendent. In section (b), I shall investigate Plotinus’ 
theory of interiority. 
 
Key points 
 
Owing to his immaterial concept of God, how Plotinus perceived God’s immanence 
and omnipresence was completely different from the material pantheism of Stoicism.366 
This is to say that Plotinus’ use of the ‘small word “in”’367 in relation to God’s 
immanence is basically ‘metaphorical’368 and, so, must be interpreted in terms of nature 
and knowledge. (God is not present in any of His creation by occupying a space. 
Similarly, the soul is not located in the body, as if one material thing is placed in 
another.) In a nutshell, the word ‘in’ connotes that God and the soul share the same 
nature, and that the former is always knowable to the latter. As for God’s omnipresence, 
Plotinus approached it in terms of power. God’s generative power reaches out to all that 
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 Cf., Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 183 & 195. 
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 Cf., Ennead 6.9.7.33 & 6.7.34.12. Also, see Noel Hubler, ‘The Role of Aesthetics in Plotinus’ Ascent 
of the Soul’, in Aphrodite Alexandrakis (ed.), Neoplatonism and Western Aesthetics, (New York: State 
University of New York Press, 2001), p.198. 
364
 Cf., Ennead 4.3.1 & 6.7.41. 
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 Cf., Hubler, ‘The Role of Aesthetics in Plotinus’, 199: ‘immaterial things are not separated by space as 
are bodies’. Also, see Ennead 5.9.7 (‘Intellect [i.e., God] is within, which is the actual primary realities’), 
6.9.8.31-35, and Hubler, 199-201.  
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 Cf., Robert B. Todd, ‘6 Monism and Immanence: The Foundations of Stoic Physics’, in John M. Rist 
(ed.) The Stoics, (London: University of California Press, 1978), 137 (& 138): ‘Monism and immanence 
are the central ideas in Stoic physical theory. They are associated in any monistic system because the One 
must in some sense be present in all that is derived from and dependent on it. In Stoicism this recurrent 
metaphysic is expressed in materialistic terms with the One being a physical element Fire, and the sphere 
of its immanence the cosmos that evolves from it; Fire is immanent both by being the self-moving source 
of a cosmogony, and by a continued presence in the created cosmos.’ 
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 Philip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2000), 103. Also, see Ennead 5.9.7. 
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God has been generating: this is the very sense in which Plotinus maintains that the 
‘posterior’ is literally in the ‘prior’. Thus, the body is in the generative power of the soul 
while the soul is in that of God.369 In addition to God’s immanence and omnipresence, 
Plotinus also argued for God’s transcendence, which is lacking in Stoicism, in terms of 
‘(structural) simplicity’ and ‘(ontological) dependence’. A generator is structurally 
simpler than what it has been generating. (Immaterial things are, by nature, ‘simpler’ 
than material things.) Also, the existence of the posterior (i.e., the generated) depends 
on the omnipresent generative power of the prior (i.e., the generator), not vice versa. 
(The way that Augustine insists on God’s immanence and omnipresence is similar to 
Plotinus’. However, their perceptions of God’s transcendence were bound to be 
different from one another due to Augustine’s adherence to the creation doctrine of 
Christianity.) 
 
By reason of God’s immanence and transcendence, Plotinus maintains that we must 
return to the source of our being by turning inwards to the soul (as opposed to outwards 
to material things), then upwards to the transcendent God in an attempt to deify (or 
divinize) ourselves:370  
 
life in that realm (i.e., Plato’s World of Ideas/Forms) is the active actuality of 
Intellect; and the active actuality generates gods in quiet contact with that Good 
(i.e., the One or the first Principle), and generates beauty, and generates 
righteousness, and generates virtue. It is these the soul conceives when filled with 
God (i.e., Intellect), and this is its beginning and end; its beginning because it 
comes from thence, and its end because its good is there. And when it comes to 
be there (i.e., Intellect) it becomes itself and what it was … The soul then in her 
natural state is in love with God and wants to be united with him. … (there is our 
true love, with whom also we can be united,) having a part in him and truly 
possessing him … we may embrace him with the whole of ourselves and have no 
part with which we do not touch God. There one can see both him and oneself as 
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 Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 103. Also, see Ennead 5.9.7. 
369
 Cf., Ennead 5.5.9. Also, see O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to the Enneads, 26-27 & Cary, 
Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 29-30, 103. 
370
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 5 (‘turn our attention inwards and upwards’) & O’Meara, 
Plotinus, 103 (‘Plotinus often refers to the methods and problems involved in attaining union with the 
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it is right to see: the self glorified, full of intelligible light - but rather itself pure 
light - weightless, floating free, having become - but rather, being - a god.371  
 
Regarding the deification which was a common issue to many ancient thinkers,372 I 
have already explained in my Introduction that Augustine was more Porphyrian than 
Plotinian.373  
 
Note that, in this thesis, all texts cited from the Enneads are of A. H. Armstrong’s 
translations, since, as Gerson argues, Armstrong’s are still the best.374  
 
a) The incorporeity of the soul 
 
Plotinus advocates the Greek traditional aphorism ‘Know yourself’, insisting that ‘it 
gives us knowledge in both directions, of the things of which the soul is the principle 
and those from which it is derived.’375 Yet, ‘yourself’ should mean ‘your soul’: the most 
important thing that we must know about the soul is that, contrary to Stoicism, the soul 
is immaterial; for it is the foremost clue to knowledge of God.376 Plotinus’ arguments 
for the soul’s incorporeity rely on inferences and analogies. I shall introduce only two of 
them that resemble Augustine’s.  
 
Plotinus, first of all (1), maintains that, if we presume the soul to be corporeal, then 
its act of perceiving a sensible object must be something like getting a seal-impression 
of a seal-ring imprinted in wax. Here, the basic premise taken for granted by Plotinus 
(as well as Augustine) is that sense-perception is the admittance of the ‘impression’ or 
‘imprint’ of a corporeal object into the soul through the body.377 Consequently, if we 
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One. For the sake of convenience we might distinguish three stages in reaching this goal: (1) the return to 
one’s true self as soul; (2) attaining the life of divine intellect; (3) union with the One’). 
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 Ennead 6.9.9 (Armstrong’s translations).  
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 Cf., O’Meara, Plotinus, 102. 
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 Cf., Georges Folliet, ‘Deificari in otio. Augustin, Epistula 10. 2’ in Recherches Augustiniennes 2 
(1962), 226. 
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 Cf., Lloyd P. Gerson, ‘Introduction’, 8. 
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 Ennead 4.3.1. Also, see Ibid., 3.4.3, 6.5.7, 6.7.35, 6.9.9; & Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner 
Self, 25. 
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 Cf., Ennead 6.1.26. 
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 Cf., Ennead 1.1.7 (& 4.7.6): ‘soul’s power of sense-perception need not be perception of sense-
objects, but rather it must be receptive of the impressions produced by sensation on the living being (i.e. 
the compound of the soul and the body)’. Also, see De vera religione 3.3 (‘impressae’), Confessiones 
10.8.15 & 10.14.22, and De Trinitate 11.2.3 (‘imprimatur’). 
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consider the soul to be material, then we cannot explain how innumerable sense data are 
being stored in our memory. For instance, if the soul is fluid, then no sense perception 
will remain permanently imprinted in the memory because nothing can leave a lasting 
impression of itself in, for example, water. For those who think of the soul as something 
solid, it must above all be stressed that we can leave only one impression of an object 
on a solid matter either at a time or permanently. Accordingly, if the soul is corporeal, 
then it logically follows that we must be incapable of remembering more than one 
sensible object either for the rest of our lives, or until we encounter another object. 
However, as a matter of fact, our memory retains countless sense data. Therefore, the 
soul cannot be corporeal.378 
 
In De quantitate animae Augustine, too, examines the nature of sense data in our 
memory in order to draw an inferential conclusion about the nature of the soul. 
However, his approach is not in terms of number, but size, in reference to the data. This 
is because Augustine has to deal with Evodius’ insistence that the soul, though invisible 
to the corporeal eyes, is spatially extended and its size must be a bit larger than that of 
the body.379 Augustine maintains that, if Evodius’ argument is assumed to be true, then 
sense data in our memory must also have dimensional properties and must be smaller 
than the soul, so that the data can be said to be contained in the soul. Then, determining 
the dimensions of the soul becomes problematic when we consider the size of a mental 
image of, for instance, the city of Milan. The image, like the city itself, must be 
immeasurably huge: the two must be of the same magnitude, since both of them are 
material by nature. In addition, in order for the image to be contained in the memory the 
soul has to be proportionately as big as the city. This is absurd.380 Therefore, we cannot 
presume that sense data in memory have dimensional properties.  
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 Cf., Ennead 4.7.6. 
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 Cf., De quantitate animae 5.7: ‘Augustine. Is the soul inside the body only, like the contents of 
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Note that both Plotinus’ and Augustine’s arguments are dictated by the same 
principle: the soul and what is in it (or the memory) must be of identical nature. Thus, if 
a sense datum is proved to be immaterial, then the soul itself must also be so, and vice 
versa: 
 
how then will something which is a size think what is not a size and think what is 
partless with something which has parts? (Ennead 4.7.8) 
 
if corporeal things are seen with the eyes of the body, in accordance with 
marvellous affinity of natures, should not the soul by which we see these 
incorporeal things be itself neither a body nor in any way like a body.381 (De 
quantitate animae 13.22) 
 
The other (2) way that Plotinus demonstrates the soul’s incorporeity is through 
contrasting, as an analogy, the differences between quantity and quality382 and then 
elucidating their relation to bodily things from the perspective of ontology. Ultimately, 
the question is which one of quantity and quality is essential for the existence of 
material things. Hence, it goes without saying that Plotinus is here drawing an analogy 
between the soul and quality, and between the body and quantity.  
 
Quantity, which refers to dimensional sizes,383 is a primary, essential entity of a 
material thing: thus no quantity, no body.384 On the other hand, quality is separable from 
and, so, is ‘acquired’ by, a corporeal thing.385 Furthermore, the presence of a quality in a 
material thing is utterly irrelevant to any quantitative change of that thing:  
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that the soul is only as great as the body.’  
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 ‘Atqui si corporea corporeis oculis mira quadam rerum cognatione cernuntur; oportet animum quo 
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 Cf., Ennead 4.7.81.25. 
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if every body and every mass ceases to be what it was before when divided,386 
but when a body is broken up the same quality remains complete in every piece, 
as for instance the sweetness of the honey is no less sweetness in every fragment, 
sweetness could not be a body, and the same is true of the other qualities.387 
 
Like quality, mental powers – such as thinking, perceiving, reasoning, desiring, and 
supervising –388 are also unaffected by any dimensional change of the body: 
 
if the powers (i.e., of the soul) were bodies, it would be necessary for the strong 
powers to be large masses, and the ones which could do little, small masses. But 
if the powers of large masses are small, but even the smallest masses have great 
powers, action must be attributed to something other than size: to something 
sizeless, therefore; 389 
 
Moreover, since quality and the powers pertain to a homogeneous group from the 
perspective of ontology, the latter are different from the body: 
 
quality in being different from quantity is different from body.390 
 
Now, in order to explain the existence of the ‘bodiless’ mental powers observable from 
the body, we must postulate a ‘kind of being’, which is ‘sizeless’: that is the soul.391 In 
summary, the soul is ‘bodiless’ and ‘sizeless’, hence immaterial: in other words, it has 
no quantity, without which we cannot imagine the existence of a material thing. 
 
Similarly, Augustine, too, makes a distinction between quality and quantity: 
 
Aug. Tell me whether “greater” and “better” seem to you to be two distinct 
things or one and the same thing called by two different names. 
Ev. I know that we say that one thing is greater and another is better.  
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 Ennead 4.7.81. 
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 Cf., Ennead 4.7.81. 
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 Ennead 4.7.81. 
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 Ennead 4.7.81.  
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 Cf., Ennead 4.7.81. 
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Aug. Which of these two do you think connotes quantity?  
Ev. That which we say is greater.392 
 
Next, Augustine mentions that the intellectual power of the soul is not proportionate to 
the size/quantity of the body: 
 
The magnitude of a body is not without reason called its bulk, and, if bulk is to 
be reckoned of great value, then elephants would be wiser than we … a little bee 
knows more than an ass; certainly, to compare their size would be more 
than ridiculous.393 
 
Finally, since the soul lacks quantity, its mode of existence is not occupying space like 
the body: 
 
focus your attention on the problem of whether the soul has a kind of quantity 
and local extension, if I may use such terms. Now, because it is not a body – 
otherwise it could not understand anything incorporeal, as the previous reasoning 
proved – it undoubtedly lacks space by which bodies are measured.394 
 
Having introduced how Plotinus argues for the immateriality of the soul, we need to 
question why Augustine thinks that the pagan concept ‘incorporeal’ is perfectly 
compatible with the Catholic theology of his time.395 Fundamentally, Augustine holds 
that the Neoplatonic concept of incorporeity is synonymous with the Pauline word 
‘invisible’: ‘For by him were all things created, that are in heaven, and that are in earth, 
visible and invisible’.396 Therefore, not only the soul but also God, both of which are 
invisible, are by nature incorporeal (or spiritual): 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
392
 De quantitate animae 16.27. 
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Also, see Fortin, Christianism et Culture Philosophique au Cinquième Siècle , 49. 
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this world must be used, not enjoyed, so that the invisible things of God may be 
clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, - that is, that by 
means of what is material and temporary we may lay hold upon that which is 
spiritual and eternal.397 
 
Notice that in Augustine’s vocabulary both ‘intelligible’ and ‘spiritual’ are synonymous 
with ‘incorporeal’: ‘intelligible’ is more frequently applied as an antonym of 
‘sensible’398, whereas ‘spiritual’ as that of ‘carnal/corporeal’399. 
 
Fortin, however, contests Augustine’s equation of ‘invisible’ with ‘incorporeal’ for 
the following two reasons. One is that the two terms are semantically different from one 
another: for instance, air is invisible but still material. The other is that the biblical 
usage of the word ‘soul’ is conspicuously materialistic.400 (Fortin makes another 
interesting point, that is, that Plato never insisted on the incorporeity of the soul, though 
in his time it was widely considered to be invisible: later generation Platonists 
maintained that the soul is immaterial.401) 
 
i) God’s immanence 
 
In Ennead 5.1.10 Plotinus says that God (i.e., the One and Intellect) and the universal 
Soul are ‘in’ the individual soul, which is ‘outside’ the realm of sense-perception: 
 
there is the One beyond being … next in order there is Being and Intellect … the 
nature of Soul in the third place. … they are present also in ourselves. I do not 
mean in (ourselves as) beings of the sense-world - for these three are separate 
(from the things of sense) - but in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of 
sense-perception; “outside” here is used in the same sense as those realities are 
also said to be “outside” the whole universe … Our soul then also is a divine 
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 De doctrina Christiana 1.4.4: ‘utendum est hoc mundo, non fruendum, ut invisibilia Dei, per ea quae 
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thing and of a nature different (from the things of sense), like the universal nature 
of soul. 
 
Here, Plotinus stresses that God is not in the soul in a material sense. Also, the soul 
cannot be said to be located in, or confined to, a physical space. Thus, Plotinus’ use of 
‘in’ in reference to God’s immanence is intrinsically metaphorical. How, then, are we to 
understand the small words ‘in’? There are two ways. One is in terms of nature and the 
other in terms of knowledge: these two are inseparably interconnected.  
 
Ontologically, Plotinus’ cosmology is not a dualism between the material realm and 
the immaterial realm; since material things are not independent of, but rather 
continuously being generated and sustained by, intelligent beings – in short, the latter is 
the life of the former. 402 Yet, as the above excerpt from Ennead 5.1.10 speaks for itself, 
there is a sharp, essential distinction between the natures of the two realms (‘Our soul 
… is … of a nature different [from the things of sense]’).403 Consequently, ‘A is 
“outside” B’ means ‘A’s nature differs from B’s’, whereas ‘A is “in” B’ means ‘A and 
B have the same nature’. Therefore, the passage ‘they (i.e., the first three hypostases) 
are present … in [ourselves as] beings outside the realm of sense-perception’ means that 
God is, by nature, similar to the soul, but different from the body.404  
 
Note that for Plotinus understanding corporeal beings and incorporeal beings 
requires two distinct mindsets respectively.405 Hence, turning away from a material 
realm to an immaterial realm fundamentally means changing our mode of thinking.406 
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Plotinus calls this ‘purification’ and it constitutes a basic part of his theory concerning 
teleology/interiority.407 
 
Epistemologically, God’s immanence ‘in’ the soul means that the former is always 
knowable to the latter: for Plotinus that is the logically inevitable conclusion from the 
premise that God and the soul share the same nature. Here, we need to understand the 
intelligibility of Intellect and the One separately.  
 
Intellect is the ‘cause’ (or the source) of our knowledge of, for example, virtue. 
Simultaneously, the former is identical with the true, eternal knowledge of virtue, which 
is in other words the Platonic Form/Idea (of virtue).408 Now, Plotinus, on the one hand, 
says that the upper part of the soul (i.e., individual intellect)409 always remains in 
Intellect, while the lower part is involved in the world of sense perception:  
 
our soul does not altogether come down, but there is always something of it in 
the intelligible.410  
 
On the other hand, he also says that the true knowledge is in the soul: 
 
an understanding of the soul … that it (i.e., the soul) derives from Intellect, and 
that it (i.e., the soul) is by sharing in the rational principle which comes from it 
(i.e., Intellect) that it (i.e., the soul) possesses virtue; after this they must grasp 
that there is an Intellect other than that which is called reasoning and reckoning, 
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the place where they are; but in looking you must not look for it with your eyes or in the way you look for 
bodies.’  
407
 O’Meara summarizes Plotinus’ argument for why we need purification as follows; ‘an understanding 
of the human condition as Plotinus sees it: deriving from divine intellect, we are souls whose nature it is, 
as expressions of the One, to organize and perfect material existence. Our love of the One (the Good), 
from which everything of value comes, may however be overlaid by infatuation with our works, with 
material things, which causes us to forget ourselves, to become ignorant, evil, and unhappy. Release from 
vice and misery comes by turning our attention back to the One and reaching it as far as possible.’ 
(O’Meara, Plotinus, 100.) Also, see Ennead 4.7.10. 
408
 Cf., Enneads 3.8.9, 5.4.2, 5.5.1, 5.1.10, 5.9.7 & 6.9.5. Also, refer to Armstrong, ‘IV The Background 
of the Doctrine “That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”’, 395.  
409
 Cf., Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 183 & 195. 
410
 Cf., Ennead 4.8.8 quoted in Henry J. Blumenthal, ‘4 On soul and intellect’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), 
The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 92. Also, see 
Bussanich,!‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 56; O’Meara, Plotinus, 102; Cary, Augustine’s 
Invention of the Inner Self, 25 & Enneads 4.8.7, 2.9.2. 
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… and that our bodies of knowledge are rational principles411 in the soul and of a 
kind which have already become manifest there because Intellect the cause of 
knowledges has become present in the soul.412 
 
From these Plotinus concludes that the (higher part of) the soul can obtain the eternal 
knowledge of virtue directly, not through our corporeal senses:  
 
it is certainly not by running around outside that the soul “sees self-control and 
justice”, but itself by itself in its understanding of itself and what it formerly was, 
seeing them standing in itself like splendid statues all rusted with time which it 
has cleaned.413 
 
Note that, whenever Plotinus says that an object is cognitively ‘outside’ the soul, he 
means that that object is knowable only through bodily senses.414  
 
The One is ‘beyond being’.415 Its epistemological significance is that the One 
transcends ‘the highest type of thought’416 and, thus, is intrinsically ‘ineffable’417. 
Nonetheless, Plotinus claims that we can still have at least a glimpse of the ineffable 
One by means of ‘intellection’ and discursive thinking.418 (Of the two cognitive 
methods, the former is superior to the latter.419) Schroeder maintains that ‘in saying that 
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411
 The ‘rational principles’ is ‘Platonic Forms’: see Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 28. 
412
 Ennead 6.9.5. 
413
 Ennead 4.7.10. Also, see Ibid., 4.7.8, 5.5.1 & 5.1.10 (‘this reasoning part of the soul, which needs no 
bodily instrument for its reasoning’).  
414
 Cf., Ennead 5.5.1 & 5.1.10.  
415
 Ennead 5.1.10. Also, see Ibid., 5.2.1.5-7.  
416
 Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 39. 
417
 Schroeder, ‘14 Plotinus and language’, 336: ‘Plotinus’s highest metaphysical principle, the One or 
Good, is ineffable (V 3.13.1; cf. V.3.14.1-8; V 5.6.11-13; VI.9.5.31-2).’ 
418
 Schroeder, 336: see above. ‘Intellection’ is an ‘immediate, intuitive, and comprehensive 
understanding’: see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 39. 
419
 Bussanich, 39: ‘the One transcends … the highest type of thought (cf. VI.9.4.1-16). Discussions about 
the first principle, therefore, usually stress the limits of reasoning and insist on transcending analysis and 
conceptualization. … He (i.e., Plotinus) is convinced that discursive thinking is a weakened form of 
thought, which is inferior to and relies on intellection (noêsis), the immediate, intuitive, and 
comprehensive understanding … Since even pure visionary thinking cannot grasp the One, far more 
limited is the derivative faculty of discursive rationality (dianoia), which utilizes reified conceptual 
objects for analysis and reasons successively, that is, inferentially (V3.2-3, 7-9).’ Note O’Meara’s 
argument concerning how we are to understand the ‘non-discursive’ way of knowing: ‘One might be 
tempted to compare the higher ‘non-discursive’ way of knowing that Plotinus has in mind with modern 
concepts of intuitive, artistic, or poetic understanding, as opposed to scientific or logical thought. This 
comparison could be misleading. Plotinus is not speaking of a form of knowing that is an alternative, 
possibly a corrective, to science and logic. Rather it represents the goal of science and logic. In his view, 
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the One is ineffable, Plotinus has already made a statement, albeit negative, about the 
One. So at least this negative statement is permissible. … Plotinus uses negation to 
avoid confusion of an incorporeal reality accessible only to the mind or spirit with a 
corporeal reality perceived by our senses.’420 
 
In summary, Plotinus’ use of ‘in’ with respect to God’s immanence is fundamentally 
metaphorical, implying that God is similar to the soul in terms of nature and, so, is 
knowable to the soul without any need of corporeal senses. Similarly, when Augustine 
says that God is in the soul, he means that God is an intelligible reality like the soul and, 
so, is approachable directly by our mind: 
 
Those things that are comprehended by the intellect, however, are comprehended 
as existing nowhere else but in the comprehending mind itself and, at the same 
time, as not contained in space.421 
 
ii) God’s transcendence 
 
Plotinus perceives God’s transcendence in terms of dependence and simplicity: these 
two are also his criteria for determining how reality is organized.  
 
In Plotinus reality is a structure of – in O’Meara’s language – ‘nonreciprocal 
dependence’: ‘A (the posterior) depends on B (the prior) – or cannot be without B (the 
prior) – in such a way that B does not depend on A.’422 Thus, the prior intrinsically, 
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discursive thinking is, for us, the means to an end, complete knowledge, and not the end itself, which is a 
possession of truth such that it is free of the troublesome, fallible methods which we must use to reach it. 
And this truth is found in the unity constituted by divine intellect and its objects of thought, the Forms’ 
(O’Meara, Plotinus, 43). Also, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 56 [‘The noetic life 
lived by the soul is both intellectual (I.3.4.10-17) and visionary (V.8.4.5-9, 12.3-7; VI.7.12.22-30).’] & 
John Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 191. 
420
 Schroeder, ‘14 Plotinus and language’, 336. Regarding Plotinus’ negative theology, see Bussanich, ‘2 
Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 40-41: ‘Learning about the One has positive and negative aspects. … 
the negative way to the One is often thought to be superior. Language cannot specify what the One is, 
only what it is not (V.3.14.6-7). Even the designations One and Good are deficient signs of the One’s 
reality (II.9.1.1-8, V.5.6.26-30, VI.7.38.4-9, VI.9.5.29-34). …’ 
421
 De immortalitate animae 6.10. Similarly, ‘Do not go abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward 
man dwells truth’ (De vera religione 39.72) & ‘no one can reach truth who looks for it outside the mind’ 
(De vera religione 49.94). 
422
 O’Meara, ‘3 The hierarchical ordering of reality in Plotinus’, 69. O’Meara explains more as follows: 
‘the posterior depends on the prior, being constituted by the prior, incapable of existing “without” the 
prior which can exist without it. The prior is thus part of, or in, the posterior (as constitutive of it), just as 
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ontologically transcends the posterior. Similarly, Augustine maintains the same 
‘nonreciprocal dependence’ between God and His creation:  
 
For the one who supremely and primordially is is one who is absolutely 
immutable and who can say in the fullest possible sense, “I am who am” and 
“You will say, the one who is has sent me to you.” Hence, other things that exist, 
but could not exist if they were not from him, are good to the extent that they 
receive their being.423 
 
The Plotinian term ‘simple ()’ is crucial for understanding why the prior is 
transcendent to the posterior. To put in a nutshell, what generates is simpler than what is 
generated.424 In other words, the posterior is more ‘multiple’425 or ‘composite’426 than 
the prior.  
 
We can also find the language of ‘simple (simplex)’427 in Augustine. However, his 
use of the word is far narrower than Plotinus’. Any equivalent to the One’s simplicity 
cannot be found in Augustine.428 The only similarity that I can observe is their use of 
the term in conjunction with spatiality, divisibility, and perishability. For example, 
Plotinus maintains that dimensionality intrinsically connotes divisibility and 
perishability: 
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the posterior is potentially in the prior (as coming from it): causes are “in” their effects and effects are 
“in” their causes. But while a part of the posterior, the prior is also apart from it as independent of it. Thus 
the prior is both immanent in the posterior and transcends it: the One is “everywhere” and “nowhere.” As 
independent and as prior, the cause is different from the posterior, its effect, superior in perfection and 
more powerful: causes (in the special sense of cause implied by the notion of priority “by nature”) are 
superior to their effects.’ (Ibid., 79.) Note that, as mentioned briefly, the omnipresent immanence of 
causes (i.e., the prior) in their effects (i.e., the posterior) must be in interpreted only in terms of the 
generative power of the former: see!Ennead 5.5.9. Also, refer to O’Meara, Plotinus: An Introduction to 
the Enneads, 26-27 & Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, 
29-30, 103. 
423
 De doctrina christiana 1.32.35. Also, see De vera religione 14.28 & Confessiones 11.4.6. 
424
 Cf., Ennead 3.8.9 & 5.6.3.10-15. Also, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 50-51. 
425
 Ennead 3.8.9. 
426
 Ennead 5.4.2. 
427
 De quantitate animae 1.2. 
428
 For the One’s simplicity, see Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, 42-47. Also, see 
Ennead 2.9.1, 5.3.13 & 6.8.12.  
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since they have size, because they are bodies, they can be divided and broken up 
into little pieces and so undergo destruction also in this way,429  
 
the soul is a single and simple nature which has actual existence in its living; it 
cannot, then, be destroyed in this way. … the soul, as has been demonstrated, is 
not a mass or a quantity.430 
 
Augustine agrees: 
 
wherever a line (i.e., a geometric intelligible line) can be cut, it is cut through a 
point 431 (In geometry the line is constituted by innumerable points, which cannot 
be divided. Thus, Augustine is here arguing that the indestructible point is 
simpler than, and so more superior to, the destructible line),  
 
Observe, now, whether the sound of a word can be split up into letters, while its 
soul, that is, its meaning, allows no division, since it is exactly the very thing 
which you said a little while ago appears to have neither width nor length in our 
thought, 432 
 
it (i.e., the soul) seems to be something simple. 433 
 
In summary, the simplicity of the soul in terms of extension connotes the lack of a 
geometrical shape. Therefore, for both Plotinus and Augustine the soul is immortal, 
due to its indivisibility (even in an immaterial sense), and transcends the perishable 
body.434 
 
Although God and the soul share the same immortal nature, both Plotinus and 
Augustine insist that the soul is mutable whereas God is immutable. However, in 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
429
 Ennead 4.7.1 & 4.7.6 (‘a size is naturally capable of division to infinity’). 
430
 Ennead 4.7.12 & 3.6.1 ‘(if it is a substance without magnitude and must necessarily possess 
incorruptibility)’. 
431
 De quantitate animae 12.19. 
432
 De quantitate animae 32.66. 
433
 De quantitate animae 1.2. 
434
 Cf., De quantitate animae 1.2, 2.3 & Ennead 4.7.10. 
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Plotinus only the lower part of the soul is changeable.435 On the other hand, in 
Augustine the entire soul is mutable with respect to time, but not with respect to space. 
For instance, over a period of times, our reason’s ‘soundness (sanus)’ can either get 
better or deteriorate,436 our ability to judge art works can be sharpened,437 and our 
emotions fluctuate.438 Yet, these changes are utterly irrelevant to our geographical 
movements: in other words, reason’s soundness/sharpness and emotion are not affected 
by any change in the body. 
 
b) Plotinus’ theory of interiority 
 
Greek teleology concerns attaining true happiness (eudaimonia) in an ethical sense 
through knowing God and the self:439 knowledge of God and the self helps us to 
discover which power of ours is divine, so that we can cultivate it fully, while 
eradicating all other powers.440 Since the soul is an important ‘clue’ to knowledge of 
God,441 pursuing self-knowledge must be the starting point of our teleological project. 
Accordingly, Plotinus’ system begins with the search for self-knowledge.442  
 
For Plotinus the human person consists of the body and the immaterial ‘inner 
man’443, which ‘encompasses’ the soul, Intellect, and the One.444 The soul has many 
‘power ()’445, such as sense-perception, memory, and ‘discursive reason’.446 
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435
 Cf., Enneads 4.8.7, 5.1.10 &!6.9.7. 
436
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12.  
437
 Cf., De vera religione 30.54: Augustine maintains that judging pertains to reason alone. 
438
 Cf., De vera religione 10.18. 
439
 See chapter (1) ‘The Hortensius’. 
440
 Cf., Ragnar Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 14-15: ‘L’ 
est l’état de l’homme où l’élément divin n’est ni affaibli ni étouffé, mais se trouve au contraire actualisé 
avec son maximum de plénitude et de force, les autres puissances vitales étant soit déracinées soit 
soumises à sa direction.’ 
441
 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 83: ‘Cicero is telling Augustine, all draw the soul 
away from the body and the senses. What is more, they all take the soul as a clue to the nature of God, for 
“there is in the human soul something divine.” The piety of these philosophers is thus obedience to the 
divine command, “Know Thyself,” which both Cicero and Plotinus interpret to mean “know thy soul.”’ 
442
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 5. 
443
 This is the term that Plotinus borrowed from Plato. See Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 7: here, 
Smith refers to Enneads 5.1.10 & 1.1.10.15, and Plato, Republic IX 589A. 
444
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 7. 
445
 Ennead 1.1.7. 
446
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 7: note that memory and reason can operate ‘not only through, 
but also independently of’, the body. 
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(For Augustine too the soul has ‘power [vis or potentia]’447.) Among many powers of 
the soul, ‘(discursive) reason’ is the agent (or ‘the principal part of the soul’448) that 
determines our fate. In other words, our teleological state depends on our reason’s 
orientation.  
 
Reason operates in between sense-perception449 and intellect.450 Due to its middle 
position, reason gains ‘information’ through the two powers, which always operate 
jointly: for instance, ‘if we make the judgement that Socrates is good, we see Socrates 
with our eyes and note his behaviour, but make the particular judgement that he is good 
by appealing to our knowledge of the Good in itself, the absolute standard:  
 
if it (i.e., reason) says whether he is good, its remark originates in what it knows 
through sense-perception, but what it says about this it has already from itself, 
since it has a norm of the good in itself.451  
 
Our knowledge of the “good in itself” comes from our intellect to our discursive reason, 
where it can be deployed to interpret the sense-perception.’452  
 
Human intellect not only participates in, but also is itself, the divine Intellect, which 
is identical with the world of Platonic Forms/Ideas.453 This is to say that the ‘divine’454, 
transcendent Intellect is ‘ours’455: it is not something other than the self. Regarding our 
ownership of intellect/Intellect, Smith remarks that in Plotinus intellect is ‘the core of 
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447
 Cf., De quantitate animae 32.69 & 35.79 (‘our inquiry concerns itself with the power of the soul, and 
conceivably the soul can put all these things into action simultaneously … let us, following the ascending 
order, call the first act vitalization; the second, sensation; the third, art; the fourth, virtue; the fifth, 
tranquillity; the sixth, initiation; the seventh, contemplation.’). Also, De ordine 2.2.6. 
448
 Enneads 5.3.3.38-40 quoted in Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 12. 
449
 Plotinus makes a distinction between ‘sensation and perception’: see Smith, Philosophy in late 
antiquity, 8.!Also, see Armstrong, ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, 258 
450
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 12. 
451
 Enneads 5.3.3.6-9 quoted in Smith, 8. 
452
 Smith, 9-10. Also, see Armstrong, ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, 257-258: ‘how 
souls know this material world … Our higher knowledge, the knowledge of the Forms in intellect, owes 
nothing to the body or its senses: it comes to soul directly “from within”, by virtue of its contact and 
kinship with intellect. … it is this higher knowledge which provides our discursive reason with the 
principles which it should use in making judgements on our sense-experience and regulating our life in 
the body.’ 
453
 Cf., Enneads 3.8.9, 5.4.2, 5.5.1, 5.1.10, 5.9.7 & 6.9.5. Also, refer to Armstrong, ‘IV The Background 
of the Doctrine “That the Intelligibles are not Outside the Intellect”’, 395 
454
 Cf., Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, 74. 
455
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 12. 
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our real self’, which ‘transcends our empirical self (i.e., reason)’.456 Similarly, 
Blumenthal formulates the Plotinian structure of the human person as ‘soul1 + soul2 + 
matter’, by which he means ‘(discursive) reason + intellect + body’.457 (In Augustine the 
individual is simply soul + matter.458) Therefore, Plotinus insists that our ‘empirical 
self’ must turn away from the sense world and must become the ‘real self’ – in other 
words, must become united to the universal Intellect. 459  
 
Hereafter, ‘with our intellect we must rise in self-transcendence to union with the 
One’460, thus deification. Regarding the union with the One, Rist argues that, even 
though Plotinus claimed that ‘we can “become” the One’, he never actually said, ‘I am 
the One’.461 Thus, Plotinus’ claim would be that ‘we become the One, but we are not the 
One. And the best interpretation of that idea is that “become” means “become more 
one-like” in the sense that although we cannot distinguish ourselves or even be 
distinguished from the One at that time (or better in that mode of being), we are not the 
One’462. 
 
Note that at the level of (discursive) reason our self-knowledge is knowledge of our 
own individual self ‘as other’. At the level of intellect the knower and the known 
become identical, yet there still exists a duality between the self as the agent of 
cognition and the self as the object of cognition: thus, our self-knowledge is ‘an image 
knowledge’ of the self – not oneself. 463 When our intellect rises to the level of the One, 
there is no duality between the knower and the known and, so, we gain true self-
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456
 Cf., Smith, 12-13.  
457
 Cf., Blumenthal, ‘4 On soul and intellect’, 83. 
458
 Cf., De quantitate animae 1.2. 
459
 Transcending our ‘empirical self’ is making not only intellectual, but also ethical, advancement: ‘when 
man is living at his highest level; his right action springs spontaneously from his higher self’s unbroken 
contemplation’ (Armstrong, ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, 253). 
460
 Armstrong, 250. Intellect’s ‘self-transcendence’ means ‘leaving itself behind’. But ‘for Plotinus there 
is no way of passing beyond intellect other than through intellect’ (ibid., 239). Note that ‘Platon, en effet, 
pense que la distance entre Dieu et l’homme est insurmontable aussi en cette vie, nul ne doit s’appeler « 
sage » () mais seulement « ami de la sagesse » (). L’union mystique avec la divinité 
qu’on trouve chez Plotin, est un trait totalement inconnu de Platon, encore que Plotin ne s’avance jamais 
jusqu’à affirmer une identité métaphysique’: Holte, Béatitude et Sagesse, 49. 
461
 Cf., Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 187. 
462
 Cf., Rist, 187-188. 
463
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 12. 
! )+
knowledge;464 though, as explained above, there still remains otherness between 
them.465  
 
Now, if one asks why the majority of us are not aware of the existence of our own 
intellect – let alone, what it does - Plotinus answers that we are conditioned to direct 
‘our attention either outwards towards sense-perception or inwards towards our 
intellect. But the needs of the body and the affairs of everyday life attract us only 
towards an outward deployment of our attention’466, while making us forget who/what 
we truly are. Thus, he insists that liberating ourselves from the world of sense-
perception (i.e., an ethical transformation or ‘purification’467) is essential for our 
awareness of the higher ‘aspects’ of our nature:468  
 
the soul must let go of all outward things and turn altogether to what is within, 
and not be inclined to any outward thing, but ignoring all things (as it did 
formerly in sense-perception, but then in the realm of Forms), and even ignoring 
itself, come to be in contemplation of that One.469 
 
In summary, Plotinian interiority concerns turning the ‘attention’ of our reason away 
from sense perception ‘inwards’ to the ‘real self’, and then ‘upwards’ to the One 
through intellect.470 
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464
 Cf., Smith, 12 & Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume I: Greece and Rome, 471. 
465
 Cf., Rist, ‘Back to the Mysticism of Plotinus: Some More Specifics’, 187-188. 
466
 Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 10-11. Thus, ‘The fate of the individual, his descent into body and 
return to the Intelligible world, form the core of his thinking.’ (Ibid., 61.) 
467
 Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume I, 470. 
468
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 62-63: ‘Plotinus here finds a place for Plato’s concept of 
virtues as purifications which help to initiate the soul’s turning away and rejection of this world …The 
fact that Plotinus does not dwell on the details of ‘political virtue’ does not mean that they are irrelevant. 
In fact they represent a prerequisite for the ascent of the soul, but are, to a large extent, taken for granted 
by him and, therefore, do not, in his view, merit detailed discussion.’  
469
 Ennead 6.9.7. 
470
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 5 & 11. 
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II. Early works 
 
To summarise Plotinian interiority explained in the previous chapter, ‘we (i.e., 
discursive reason)’471 must turn towards ‘our’ intellect and simultaneously become 
united to universal Intellect/Nous,472 thus ‘inward’: since individual intellect is identical 
with universal intellect,473 turning to the former is same as turning to the latter. Next, we 
must strive for union with the One, hence ‘upward’.474 Individual intellect, universal 
Intellect, and the One transcend (discursive) reason and, so, both the inward turn and the 
upward turn are in fact the movements of transcending ourselves. What, then, makes the 
two stages of interiority distinct from each other? Their differences lie in their 
objectives. The inward movement is restoring our ‘real self’,475 whereas the upward 
movement is becoming something other than ourselves (i.e., becoming like the One in 
Rist’s terms).476  
 
Augustine’s interiority is modelled on the basic framework of Plotinus’: that is, we 
must turn away from material things into the soul and, then, upwards to God, so that we 
can become like God:477  
 
the soul should not pour itself out in the senses beyond the measure of necessity, 
but rather should recall itself from the senses and become a child of God again, 
(that is, be made a new man by putting of the old)478 (‘doubtlessly, becoming a 
child of God’ is an upward turn to the transcendent God)479, 
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471
 ‘Since it is “we” who perceive, he (i.e., Plotinus) locates the “we” or self at the level of discursive 
reason’: Andrew Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity (London: Routledge, 2004), 7. 
472
 Cf., Frederick Copleston, A History of Philosophy, Volume I: Greece and Rome (New York: 
Doubleday, 1952), 471. 
473
 Cf., Ragnar Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, Studia Ephemeridis 
“Augustinianum” 32 (1990), 74 & Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, p 31. 
474
 Cf., Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity, 5 & 11. 
475
 Cf., Smith, 12-13 
476
 Cf., Ennead VI.9.9.24-7: ‘The soul’s innate love (erôs emphutos) makes clear that the Good is there.... 
For since the soul is other than God (i.e., the One) but comes from him it is necessarily in love with him’ 
quoted in John Bussanich, ‘2 Plotinus’s metaphysics of the One’, in Lloyd P. Gerson (ed.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Plotinus (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), 55. 
477
 De Trinitate 9.11.16: ‘We are like God inasmuch as we know Him’.  
478
 De quantitate animae 28.55: ‘anima, ne se ultra quam necessitas cogit, refundat in sensus; sed ab his 
potius ad seipsam colligat, et repuerascat Deo’ 
479
 See the Introduction. 
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Do not go abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth480, 
 
But you were more inward than my inward part and higher than the highest 
element within me.481 
 
Despite some similarities between Augustine and Plotinus, there are also differences 
between them. For instance, although Augustine, like Plotinus, insisted that reason (i.e., 
‘mind’s eye’482) is the agent of interiority,483 Augustine did not maintain that the soul 
has another power superior to reason, such as the Plotinian intellect/Intellect. (In 
Augustine the individual consists of the soul and the body;484 not reason, intellect, and 
matter/body as in Plotinus.485) Also, although Augustine’s concept of God resembles the 
second Hypostasis in Plotinus’ system (e.g., God is the ‘Father of Intelligible Light’486 
that makes our reason’s cognitive activities possible),487 Augustine’s God is also the 
Creator of the soul:  
 
God, its (i.e., the soul’s) Creator, is, so to speak, the soul’s proper habitation and 
its home488.  
 
Eventually, Augustine insisted that we must, first of all, turn inwards and see – with 
the ‘mind’s eye’ – not only the soul’s incorporeal and rational nature, but also its 
created nature. Secondly, turning upwards, we are to understand not only God’s 
immateriality, immanence, omnipresence and transcendence in a Neoplatonic sense, but 
also God’s Creatorship. Thirdly, we must also endeavour to understand revealed truths 
about God by means of faith, love, and hope. Finally, since we – as helpless creatures – 
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depend on the Creator God in all respects, divine grace is indispensable for our ascent to 
God.  
 
In chapter 1, I shall investigate Augustine’s view of reality, for it is precisely what 
makes his interiority distinct from Plotinus’. For Augustine reality is hierarchically 
structured and God is at the apex. The hierarchy489 is based on comparisons between 
God and His creation from various perspectives.490 What, then, are the perspectives? In 
other words, what are the criteria, according to which Augustine constructed a hierarchy 
of being? This question will help us understand his way of thinking about God – 
especially God’s transcendence –, and so I shall examine the criteria/perspective in 
section (a) of chapter 1. 
 
Note that, as explained in the Introduction, Augustine’s pursuit of knowledge of God 
was fundamentally a search for pairs of correlative terms, with which he can make a 
correct distinction between God and His creation. For instance, before reading the ‘libri 
platonicorum’, Augustine saw reality in terms of ‘changeable’-or-‘unchangeable’:491 the 
immutable God is superior to (or ‘better’492 than) mutable beings. From Neoplatonism 
Augustine learned the terms ‘material’ and ‘immaterial’: the soul and God are 
immaterial whereas the body is material. As a Christian, Augustine made a distinction 
between ‘Creator’ and ‘creature’. Eventually, the foregone conclusion is that God is the 
immutable, immaterial, rational Creator; whereas His creation lacks at least one of those 
qualities (e.g., the soul is immaterial and rational, but neither immutable nor the 
Creator). Therefore, investigating the criteria of Augustine’s hierarchy is the same thing 
as finding out which pairs of correlative terms are theologically acceptable. 
 
Augustine’s finalised view of reality, the result of his intellectual transformation, 
became the guideline for his moral transformation: the Confessions tell us that the 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
489
 i.e., ‘hierarchy of being’ (Philip Cary, ‘Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine’s Life’, in 
Kim Paffenroth and Robert Peter Kennedy [eds.], A Reader’s Companion to Augustine’s Confessions 
[London: Westminster John Knox Press, 2003], 111) or ‘scale of nature’ (S. Connolly, Saint Augustine’s 
ascent to God II, The Irish Ecclesiastical Record, vol. 80 [1953], 34). 
490
 Cf., De vera religione 52.101: ‘the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly 
seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead (Rom. 1:20).’ 
491
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conversion of his mind493 occurred prior to that of his heart494. Thus, from the 
perspective of ethics Augustine’s ‘hierarchy of being’495 is a ‘hierarchy of value’496 in 
terms of ‘better’ and ‘love’. Accordingly, Augustine says in De vera religione 48.93,  
 
(He who delights to rule should submissively cleave to God, the sole ruler of all 
things, loving God more than himself. This is perfect justice, to) love the better 
things more and the lesser things less.497 
 
Since God is at the apex of the hierarchy and so is ‘better (potius)’ than anything else, 
we are to ‘love (diligere)‘ God more than His creation.  
 
Although the nature and the value of the soul are, from the perspective of ontology, 
permanently superior to those of the body, but inferior to those of God;498 the 
teleological499 state of the soul – in other words, how ‘wise (sapiens)’ and ‘happy 
(beatus)’ we are – is changeable.500 In other words, our reason and will can either move 
closer to, or away from, God and the ‘happy life (beata vita)’501: we can become either 
wise and happy through gaining knowledge of God, or foolish and unhappy through 
forgetting Him. Augustine describes such dynamism of the soul chiefly in terms of the 
‘image (imago)’502 of God and ‘rationality’503. Therefore, in section (b) of chapter 1, I 
shall examine what Augustine means by ’image (of God)’ and ‘rationality’, and how he 
associates them with the soul’s dynamism in reference to the hierarchy: here, I shall be 
arguing that the concepts of deification, ‘image of God’, and ‘rationality’ are mutually 
interconnected. I shall also investigate his theory of assessing how far one has advanced 
to (or moved away from) God. 
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In chapter 2, I shall investigate Augustine’s methodology of improving our 
rationality (alternatively, restoring the image of God, or getting ourselves deified) 
through reason, the will, faith, hope, and the grace of God.  
 
In section (a) of chapter 2, I shall explain why reason, not the will, is the agent of 
Augustinian interiority, though both of them are the determinants of one’s ‘level 
(gradus)’504 of rationality (or how much one has restored the image of God). 
 
In section (b) of chapter 2, I shall examine Augustine’s theory concerning how 
reason can ascend to God and there are two major issues in this respect.  
 
To begin with, we cannot search for what we do not know (1). Thus, reason is not 
independent of memory505 (and divine illumination506) and ‘reason’s search (rationis 
inquisitio)’507 for knowledge of God is actually a process of recalling what we have 
already known about God:508 in short, knowing God is remembering God. This is a 
legacy of the Platonic theory of reminiscence, and in order to justify such a theory of his 
Plato had postulated the pre-existence of the soul, with which Augustine was also 
familiar.509 Now, the pre-existence of the soul is in conflict with the creation doctrine, 
whereas the theory of reminiscence is not. Therefore, Augustine encountered a difficult 
problem here. Since the soul is merely a creature, we can only ‘discover’ (or 
‘disinter’510) – not create – knowledge of God in the memory.511 Yet, how and when did 
the knowledge first enter into our memory? What is Augustine’s stance on the soul’s 
pre-existence? Here, following Teske’s argument, I shall be insisting that Augustine 
first accepted it explicitly but subsequently implicitly.512 
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Being able to remember God means God’s epistemological immanence within the 
soul (2) (this is possible due to their common, incorporeal nature): thus, ‘do not go 
abroad. Return within yourself. In the inward man dwells truth.’513 Regarding God’s 
immanence, Cary insists that for the young Augustine Truth is ‘inseparably’514 present 
in the soul and, so, ‘the highest part of the soul’ must be immutable/immortal like 
God/Truth.515 Consequently, ‘whenever the mind is turned to itself it is necessarily 
turned to God, and vice versa’516: in other words, ‘in Augustine’s earliest writings … 
there is so little that distinguishes turning to the soul from turning to God’517. (Cary’s 
term ‘the highest part of the soul’ reminds us of the individual intellect, which 
transcends discursive reason, in Plotinus. But I cannot press it because Cary does not 
make it explicit.) However, I shall argue against Cary that, although Augustine 
maintained God’s inseparable immanence, Augustine also insisted on God’s 
transcendence as the Creator of the soul. Consequently, Augustine’s use of 
‘inseparably’ in relation to God’s immanence must be interpreted from the perspective 
of epistemology rather than ontology: ontologically, God is transcendent; thus we still 
need to turn upwards to God after turning inwards to the self. 
 
As a result of the sin of the first humans, not only our reason518 but also our will519 
have been malfunctioning: the fall of the will is the cause of reason’s being blind to 
God.520 Consequently, not only our reason but also our will have to be healed. What, 
then, does Augustine argue to be the ideal state of the will? I shall investigate this in 
section (c) of chapter 2, under the title of ‘Rationality of one’s way of life’. By ‘way of 
life’ I mean how we relate to material things, the self, and God in terms of, for example, 
‘delight’521, ‘love’522, ‘avoid’523, ‘enjoyment’, and ‘use’524: all these are Augustine’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
513
 De vera religione 39.72: ‘Noli foras ire, in teipsum redi; in interiore homine habitat veritas’. 
514
 Soliloquia 2.12.22. 
515
 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p 105. 
516
 Cary, p 105. 
517
 Cary, p 105. 
518
 Cf., De ordine 1.10.29: ‘To have their minds immersed in darkness - that is the common lot of all the 
foolish and unlearned’. 
519
 Cf., De vera religione 37.68: ‘This is the origin of all impiety of sinners who have been condemned 
for their sins. Not only do they wish to scrutinize the creation contrary to the commandment of God, and 
to enjoy (frui) it rather than God’s law and truth - that was the sin of the first man who misused his free 
will - but in their state of condemnation they also make this addition to their sin’ (pay attention to the 
word ‘enjoy’). 
520
 Cf., De vera religione 14.27: ‘it is by the will that sin is committed.’ 
521
 De vera religione 11.22. 
522
 De vera religione 11.22-12.23. 
! )'
own terms, with which he describes the movements of the will. The foregone 
conclusion is that our will must ‘desire (optare)’ God more than anything else.525 Yet, 
the will’s activity depends on reason’s activity because we cannot love or hate what we 
do not know.526 In other words, practice depends on theory. Therefore, I shall approach 
the practical (or ethical) dimension of Augustinian interiority in reference to the 
theoretical dimension. 
 
In section (d) of chapter 2, I shall examine how faith, love, and hope assist us to 
render our reason and will sound. The fundamental argument of Augustine in this 
respect is that, since we do not see God ‘face to face’527 and the majority of us are 
incapable of acquiring true knowledge of God through reason alone,528 faith helps us to 
fix our mind’s eye on God. Yet, we must not simply believe, but must – with passion – 
endeavour to understand, revealed truths.529 In this way we can be persistent in 
maintaining an ethical lifestyle, loving to tread the path to God with the hope of seeing 
Him ‘face to face’. 
 
In section (e) of chapter 2, I shall explain why Augustine stresses the indispensability 
of divine grace for our intellectual, as well as ethical, ascent to God. This is 
fundamentally based on his perception of God as the Creator: we, as created beings, are 
not the masters of ourselves, but the Creator God is,530 thus our spiritual transformation 
depends on God’s assistance in all respects and at all stages.  
 
1) Augustine’s view of reality 
 
a) The hierarchy 
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The idea that the universe is comprised of diverse ‘levels of reality’531 is of Greek 
origin, for instance, the theory of procession that Plotinus constructed partially in 
answer to the question concerning ‘the derivation of a multiplicity from unity’.532 The 
One is the supreme principle of unity, from which Intellect (i.e., the world of Platonic 
Forms/Ideas) derives.533 The soul (or the world soul), which is generated by Intellect, 
rules over corporeal things: the soul is the life of the body.534 What underlies the 
Plotinian theory of procession is that ‘reality is a structure of dependence, the posterior 
depending on the prior, being constituted by the prior, incapable of existing “without” 
the prior which can exist without it. … As independent and as prior, the cause is 
different from the posterior, its effect, superior in perfection and more powerful: causes 
(in the special sense of cause implied by the notion of priority “by nature”) are superior 
to their effects.’ 535 
 
Augustine, too, believed that reality is hierarchically536 structured in terms of ‘better 
(melius)’ and ‘worse (deterius)’ even before his encounter with Neoplatonism.537 
However, from the libri Platonicorum he learned a new way of assessing in what sense 
one thing is ‘better’ or ‘worse’ than another. Furthermore, despite his fascination with 
Neoplatonism in 384, Augustine converted to the Catholic faith within the next two 
years and, so, not only Neoplatonism but also the Christian faith contributed to the 
formation of his hierarchical view of reality.538 Therefore, I shall investigate the young 
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Christian Augustine’s ‘hierarchical scheme’539 as the foundation of his interiority. There 
are, in fact, a number of different versions of the scheme.540 Yet, since all of them are 
compatible with each other, I shall explain their common key elements in order to 
highlight in what way God is transcendent, and why the soul ranks next to God.  
 
Note that, as mentioned, Augustine’s ‘hierarchy of being’541 is also a ‘hierarchy of 
value’542 in an ethical sense. Thus, since Wisdom, God, Being, and the Good are one 
and the same thing;543 the supreme being is the supreme good, which is most valuable 
and desirable.544  
 
i) Divisibility 
 
In De quantitate animae Augustine discusses geometric divisibility as a criterion for 
determining firstly the values of geometric figures, and then the values of the soul and 
the body, in order of superiority. Notice that Augustine’s discussion of geometry 
follows the elementary definitions of geometric figures that appear in Euclid’s first 
book Elements. Yet, we cannot say whether or not Augustine actually read the book or 
any other relevant text.545 Furthermore, his approach to geometry is more 
‘philosophical’ than scientific.546  
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(1) Geometric divisibility 
 
Augustine first of all defines what a ‘line’ is, that is, a length without any width and 
thickness.547 In a similar manner we can think of ‘width (latitudo)’548 alone, which is 
two-dimensional with no height or thickness. In the physical world such a line and 
width do not exist, for all sensible things are essentially three-dimensional. Thus, for 
Augustine as well as for the Greeks, to whom he is indebted in this respect, geometry is 
the study of ideal figures.549  
 
Having defined what the ideal line and width are, Augustine proceeds to argue that 
the line is superior (pluris) to the width, since the former is divisible only crosswise 
whereas the latter both lengthwise and crosswise. In short, Augustine identifies less 
divisibility with more superiority.550  
 
The line, however, is not supreme in geometry, for it consists of ‘signs’ or ‘points’. 
Note that the geometric ‘sign’ should not be confused with Augustine’s other term 
‘sign’ in De magistro 2.3-4, which he uses in a linguistic sense in conjunction with 
‘significatio’. Augustine’s use of the geometric ‘sign’ is equivalent to ‘point’ in modern 
geometry, such as the ‘beginning of a line’ or the ‘centre of a figure’.551 A point has no 
length: it has no parts at all and, so, is indivisible in any way.552 Since a line is divisible 
through multiple points/signs, each of the latter is superior to the former.  
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In summary, the sign/point is the supreme geometric figure, followed by the line and 
then width.553  
 
Note that in Augustine divisibility connotes ontological dependability (indigere):  
 
I see that width needs length; otherwise it could not be understood. I notice 
further that length does not need width for its existence, but without a sign it 
could not exist. The sign (signum, i.e., a geometric point), however, clearly 
stands by itself and needs none of these.554  
 
In other words, since width is comprised of lines, ontologically the former depends on 
the latter: similarly, since signs constitute a line, the former cause the latter to exist.  
 
(2) Divisibility of the body and the soul 
 
Following Greek ideas, Augustine holds that the human person consists of the soul and 
the body.555 Even though they are ontologically combined together to form the one 
single human person, they are of two distinct ‘natures’556: the soul is immaterial 
whereas the body is material. Now, the soul is hierarchically superior to the body, since 
the latter ontologically depends on the former: the immortal557 soul is the life of the 
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mortal body.558 There is another way that we can approach the soul’s superiority. That 
is from the perspective of divisibility.  
 
Referring to the tail of a lizard cut off from the rest of the body, which continues to 
wriggle; Evodius argues in De quantitate animae 31.62 that it unmistakably implies that 
the soul of the lizard is in the state of being divided into two, and that a segment of the 
divided soul is present in the tail. Augustine immediately refutes such an argument of 
Evodius by means of an analogy between the human person and a ‘word (verbum or 
nomen)’ in De quantitate animae 31.63-35.69. Notice that Augustine’s point here is not 
to explain biologically why the tail severed from the main part of the body still makes 
movements and appears to be fully animate; but to argue that, despite the tail’s 
separation, the lizard’s soul remains permanently undivided: he is no way capable of, or 
interested in, giving a biological explanation.  
 
A word consists of a ‘sound’ (or a pronunciation) and ‘what that sound signifies’ 
(i.e., meaning).559 The sound ‘pertains’ to the ear, whereas the meaning to the mind. 
Moreover, the sound, which occupies a time span, is ‘corporeal’560 and, so, is analogous 
to the body in terms of nature. (For Augustine whatever is divisible by either space or 
time is material.561) The meaning, on the other hand, is similar to the soul: the meaning 
is a ‘quasi-soul’562, since it has no dimensional properties nor is extended in time.563  
 
Now, if the word ‘sun’, for instance, is divided into individual letters564, then any one 
of the letters cannot ‘retain’565 the meaning of the word ‘sun’: in other words, each letter 
constituting a word cannot signify what that word as a whole signify. The complete loss 
of the meaning caused by such a division is analogous to the departure of the soul from 
the body at death.566  
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 Cf., De quantitate animae 33.70, 13.22 & De Moribus Ecclesiae 1.27.52 (‘a rational soul using a 
mortal and earthly body’). Also, see Pegis, ‘The mind of St. Augustine’, 40. 
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 Cf., De quantitate animae 32.65. 
560
 De quantitate animae 32.67: ‘velut corpus’. 
561
 Cf., De quantitate animae 32.68: ‘But, since everything that the senses perceive is contained in time 
and place, or rather, the senses perceive what time and space contain, then what we perceive by the eyes 
is divided by space; what we perceive by the ears is divided by time.’ 
562
 De quantitate animae 32.67: ‘quasi anima’. 
563
 Cf., De quantitate animae 32.66-68. 
564
 Cf., De quantitate animae 32.66: ‘individual letters (litteras singulas)’. 
565
 De quantitate animae 32.67: ‘retinere’. 
566
 Cf., De quantitate animae 32.66-67. 
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Augustine subsequently examines what happens when the word ‘Lucifer’567 – 
composed of ‘light (lux, whose genitive case is lucis)’ and ‘bring (-fer from fero)’ – is 
divided between the second and third syllable:  
 
the first part has a meaning when we say ‘Luci.’ So, therefore, life exists in more 
than one half of its body. The part that is left (i.e., ‘-fer’) also has a soul, for, 
when you are told to carry something, that is what you hear.568  
 
Here, Augustine is not insisting that the example of dividing ‘Lucifer’ into ‘luci’ and 
‘fer’ analogously explains why the two disconnected pieces of the lizard’s body can 
continue to live independently of one another. His point is that ‘Lucifer’, being broken 
up into ‘luci’ and ‘fer’, completely loses its meaning, rather than having the meaning 
split up in two. Yet, each of ‘luci’ and ‘fer’ continues to be meaningful independently of 
one another as if they are two separately ensouled bodies. Similarly, since the soul is, 
like a meaning of a word, simple (simplex)569 and immaterial; it can depart from the 
body but is utterly indivisible.570 Therefore, the soul is superior to the body: in fact, 
‘there is nothing better than the soul’571.  
 
ii) Mutability 
 
Divisibility implies mutability and, so, all material things as well as all immaterial 
geometric figures – except the sign/point – are mutable. However, indivisibility does 
not necessarily connote immutability and the unique instance is the soul. The indivisible 
soul is mutable with respect to time, not space.572 For instance, reason’s ‘soundness 
(sanus)’ changes independently of our physical movements.573 The more we sharpen 
our artistic skill over a certain period of time, the better our ability to judge art works 
will become.574 Also, our emotions often fluctuate.575  
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 That is the planet Venus, the morning star, or literally ‘the light-bringer’. 
568
 De quantitate animae 32.67. 
569
 Cf., De quantitate animae 1.2. Also, see section ii) ‘God’s transcendence’ of chapter 4 in Part I. 
570
 Cf., De quantitate animae 32.68. 
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 Cf., De quantitate animae 34.78. 
572
 Cf., De vera religione 10.18 
573
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12.  
574
 Cf., De vera religione 30.54: Augustine maintains that judging pertains to reason alone. 
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The soul’s dimensional indivisibility but temporal mutability is an important clue for 
understanding in what way God transcends the soul, that is, that God must be 
immutable with respect to not only space but also time: 
 
All things which are beautiful to the senses … have a spatial or temporal beauty, 
as for example the body and its movements. But the equality and unity which are 
known only by the mind, and according to which the mind judges corporeal 
beauty through the senses, are not extended in space or unstable in time. … all 
(sensible beauties) are judged by one and the same standard of changeless 
equality. … Clearly, then, the standard which is called truth is higher than our 
minds.576  
 
In Soliloquia Augustine argues for God’s absolute immutability in a somewhat different 
way:577  
 
But will it not be true that truth has ceased to exist? And if the statement will not 
be true, truth does not cease to exist. And if the statement will be true, what is 
the reason that it will be true after the collapse of truth, when there is no truth 
any longer? (Ergone interisse veritatem verum non erit? Si non erit verum, non 
ergo interit. Si verum erit, unde post occasum veritatis verum erit, cum iam 
veritas nulla est?)578  
 
This passage can be rephrased in a more logical way as follows: 
 
1) If truth has perished, then nothing can be true at all. ( ‘interisse veritatem verum 
non erit’.) 
2) If truth has perished, then the statement ‘truth has perished’ can never be true, for 
nothing can be true at all. ( ‘Si non erit verum, non ergo interit.’) 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!
575
 Cf., De vera religione 10.18. 
576
 De vera religione 30.56. 
577
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.15.28: ‘truth in no way perishes’. 
578
 Soliloquia 2.15.28. 
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3) Truth must exist in order that at least the statement ‘nothing can be true at all’, or 
‘truth has perished’, is to be true. ( ‘Si verum erit, unde post occasum veritatis 
verum erit, cum iam veritas nulla est’.) 
4) Therefore, it is not true that truth has perished: ‘truth cannot perish’579. 
 
In summary, Truth/God580 is immutable with respect to space and time, whereas the 
soul only in terms of space. Thus, God is superior to the soul followed by all other 
creatures581, which are mutable in all respects.582  
 
iii) Rationality 
 
Augustine first of all classifies souls into three categories and establishes their 
hierarchical ranks according to the criterion of rationality; namely the vegetative souls 
of plants, the sensitive (or perceiving) souls of beasts, and the intelligent souls of the 
human persons in ascending order.583 Only the human soul has reason,584 thus it is 
supreme among all the souls of creatures. Yet, God is the highest Reason:  
 
another Reason from on high (i.e., God) rules over all things.585  
 
Why, then, does more rationality mean more superiority? Augustine holds that an 
important function of reason is judging and ‘what judges is superior to what is 
judged.’586  
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579
 Soliloquia 2.15.28. 
580
 God – who is Beauty, Chastity, Truth, Life, Good, Wisdom, and Happiness – makes His creation 
beautiful, chaste, true, good, wise, and happy (Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.3). 
581
 God is the Creator of the soul (Cf., De quantitate animae 34.78).  
582
 Bourke discusses Augustine’s hierarchical scheme from the perspective of mutability in his book 
Augustine’s View of Reality (Villanova: Villanova Press, 1964), 3-7. 
583
 Cf., De quantitate animae 33.72-76. 
584
 Cf., De quantitate animae 33.70-72. Notice that!Augustine differentiates intelligence or ‘reason 
(ratio)’ from ‘skill (affaber)’. For example, the swallow is more skilful at constructing a nest than the 
human person, but is unable to understand the nature of numbers (cf., De ordine 2.19.49). Again, an 
unintelligent person can sing more skilfully without any knowledge of rhythm and melody than an 
intelligent person who has that knowledge (cf., Ibid., 2.19.49). Also, see O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy 
of Mind, 11.  
585
 De ordine 1.8.25. Also, see Confessiones 11.8.10. 
586
 De vera religione 29.53. 
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Since the human soul is capable of making, for instance, aesthetic judgments, it is 
supreme among God’s creation. Yet, the soul, ‘by itself’, cannot judge the beauty and 
movement of bodies.587 There must be the absolute, unchangeable ‘standard of all arts 
(lex omnium artium)’588. Furthermore, our reason ‘sees (videre)’589 the standard, and we 
refer to it when we assess the aesthetic value of a bodily thing.590  
 
The standard of beauty is God, for it is immutable,591 and is not an object of our 
judgments. In other words, human reason can judge everything else except God, who is 
the Reason. God rather judges us.592 Also, we can be mistaken in judging, for our reason 
is mutable. Thus, the immutable standard is ‘higher (supra)’ than the human soul,593 
which ‘excels (praestare)’594 all bodily things.595  
 
iv) Creator-or-creature 
 
The creation doctrine is an important part of the young Augustine’s theory of reality. In 
many places of his early works Augustine explicitly mentions God’s Creatorship; for 
example,  
 
O God, who from nothing hast created this world (Soliloquia 1.1.2)596, 
 
soul is not what God is … nothing is nearer to God among all the things He has 
created than the human soul (De quantitate animae 34.77)597, 
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 Cf., De vera religione 31.57: ‘Itaque cum se anima sentiat nec corporum speciem motumque iudicare 
secundum seipsam’. 
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 De vera religione 30.56. 
589
 De vera religione 30.56: ‘This standard of all the arts is absolutely unchangeable, but the human mind, 
which is given the power to see (videre) the standard, (can suffer the mutability of error. Clearly, then, the 
standard which is called truth is higher than our minds.)’ 
590
 Cf., De vera religione 30.54-31.57. 
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 Cf., De vera religione 31.57. 
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 Cf., De vera religione 30.54, 30.56 (‘it [i.e., the soul] is excelled by the nature according to which it 
judges and concerning which it cannot judge’) & 31.58 (‘truth alone judges of us when we cleave to it’). 
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 Cf., De vera religione 30.56. 
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 De vera religione 29.53. 
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 Cf., De vera religione 30.54-31.57. 
596
 ‘Deus qui de nihilo mundum istum creasti’. 
597
 ‘animam humanam non esse quod Deus est; ita praesumendum, nihil inter omnia quae creavit, Deo 
esse propinquius.’ 
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He (i.e., God) rules all creation, subjects the body to the soul, the soul to Himself, 
and so everything to himself (ibid., 36.80)598, 
 
seek the one God who alone is superior to our minds, and by whom clearly every 
soul and the whole world has been created (De vera religione 2.2)599. 
 
Why, then, is the creation doctrine indispensable for Augustine?600 Neoplatonism 
alone was inadequate to resolve the problem of evil, especially in reference to the 
Manichaean dualism between the Good and Evil. The creation doctrine also played a 
decisive role in this respect.601 To begin with, there are two important points in 
Augustine’s account of creation. One is that God creates ex nihilo, out of nothing.602 
The other is that everything that God creates is good: in other words, the Good God is 
not the author of evil.603 Based on these two premises, Augustine concluded that evil is 
a privation of good. Moreover, since the Good is Being itself, the complete privation of 
good is nothing (or non-being). In short, evil is nothing.604 Conversely, nothing is 
evil.605  
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 ‘Deus … omne quod condidit regit, subiicit animae corpus, animam sibi, et sic omnia sibi’. Also, see 
De quantitate animae 1.2, 33.76 & 33.75. 
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 ‘unum Deum quaererent, quem solum supra mentes nostras esse, et a quo omnem animam et totum 
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 Cf., William E. Mann, ‘Augustine on evil and original sin’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman 
Kretzmann (eds.), The Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
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Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 84: ‘In making 
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 Cf., Mann, ‘Augustine on evil and original sin’, 41 & Gerald Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo: Life, and 
Controversies (Norwich: The Canterbury Press, 1963), 201. 
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 Cf., De ordine 2.2.6, Soliloquia 1.1.2, Confessiones 7.10.16 & 7.15.21. 
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Augustine, as Bonner insists, ‘owed to the Neoplatonists the discovery that evil is a 
privation of good.’606 However, ‘Plotinus, while firmly relegating Evil to the realm of 
Non-Being, never arrives at the Augustinian position of Evil as simply a privation of 
Good’.607 Thus, although ‘the key to the resolution of the ethical problem is suggested 
in the writings of the Neoplatonists, in adopting it for his own use, Augustine subjected 
it to a fundamental modification in conformity with the Christian doctrine of 
creation.’608  
 
God’s Creatorship is not only the key to the resolution of Augustine’s ethical 
problem, but also constitutes the foundation of his theory of teleology609. For example, 
the human person, being a creature, is utterly inadequate and therefore depends on the 
divine grace for everything (i.e., including our deification):610 I shall explain this in 
section (e) of chapter 2 in Part II. Also, since there is an ontologically insurmountable 
gulp between the Creator – who has no maker of His own self611 (and is Trinitarian612) – 
and His creation; we need to turn not only inward, but also upward: ‘seek the one God 
who alone is superior to our minds, and by whom clearly every soul and the whole 
world has been created.’613 God’s Creatorship is Augustine’s rationale for our upward 
turn, whereas the One’s transcendence over being [i.e., ‘beyond being’614] is Plotinus’. 
 
Regarding how Augustine associates God’s Creatorship with the hierarchy, O’Daly 
remarks that ‘God is both distinct from, and part of, this hierarchy. As its transcendent 
creator, whose providence extends throughout his creation, he is other than that 
creation, immutable where it is, even at its highest, rational level, subject to change. But 
he is also the first term of the scale of being, the necessarily existent, most perfect, and 
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 Cf., De ordine 2.7.23: ‘the nonentity which is called evil (nihil quod dicitur malum)’ Also, see 
Soliloquia 1.1.2. 
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 Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo, 201. 
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 Cf., Bonner, 201-204: thus, ‘it is important not to over-emphasize his debt to them for, on this issue, 
there is a great gulf fixed between Neoplatonism and Christian doctrine’. Also, see Carol Harrison, 
Rethinking Augustine’s Early Theology: An Argument for Continuity (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
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 Bonner, St. Augustine of Hippo, 199. 
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 See chapter 1 ‘The Hortensius’ in Part I. 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2. 
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 Cf., De quantitate animae 2.3 & De vera religione 11.21. 
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 Cf., De ordine 2.5.16. Also, see De vera religione 7.13 (‘There is one God; Father, Son and Holy 
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 De vera religione 2.2. 
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 Ennead 5.1.10 & 5.2.1.5-7. 
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most uniform being at the apex.’615 I understand that O’Daly here uses ‘hierarchy’ in 
two different senses, that is, one as a synonym of ‘order’ and the other as a 
characterization of Augustine’s view of reality. Gilson makes a similar distinction. He 
first of all insists that ‘the sum-total of all the eternal essences and of the temporal 
things participating in these essences forms a hierarchy of higher and lower realities, 
and the relationships born of this hierarchy constitute what is called order.’616 Now, 
Gilson’s interpretation of Augustine is that God is the author of the order: ‘nature is 
ruled by this order perforce because God Himself has imposed it. (As a part of nature, 
man also is subject to the divine order.)’617 Madec also holds that for Augustine God 
transcends the order, since the former is the Creator of the latter,618 and this is what 
O’Daly means by ‘God is distinct from the hierarchy.’ On the other hand, when 
Augustine mentions the Creator God in reference to his view of reality, God is ‘part of 
the hierarchy’ as the ‘first term of the scale of being.’ Thus, ‘hierarchy’ in this sense is 
synonymous with ‘view of reality’: all beings, including God, are ‘hierarchically’ 
structured. 
 
In summary, reality is hierarchically ordered in terms of superiority. Having learned 
the Neoplatonic concept of incorporeity, Augustine insisted that the immaterial are 
superior to the material, for the former are less divisible and less mutable than the latter. 
Among immaterial beings the rational are ‘better’619 than the irrational. (For this reason 
the soul is better than the geometric point/sign, though both of them share the same 
‘simple’620 nature.) Both God and the soul are incorporeal and rational. Nonetheless, the 
soul is mutable with respect to time whereas God is absolutely immutable and, so, the 
latter transcends the former. From the perspective of the creation doctrine, creatures are 
inferior to their Creator, since the former depend on the latter in all respects. This is the 
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 O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine’s Thought’, 145. 
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 Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (London: Victor 
Gollancz, 1961), 132. 
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 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 132. 
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 Cf., Goulven Madec, ‘Sur la Vision Augustinienne du Monde’, 141: ‘« L’auteur de l’ordre, c’est 
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 ‘potius’ (De vera religione 48.93) or ‘melius’ (Confessiones 7.1.1). 
620
 Cf., De quantitate animae 1.2.  
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basic framework of Augustine’s view of reality, which would never change for the rest 
of his life.  
 
b) The theory of spiritual development 
 
By nature, the soul permanently occupies the middle position between God and the 
body in the hierarchy.621 Yet, depending on what we can see with our mind’s eye and 
loves, we either advance upwards to God (alternatively, make progress in terms of 
‘happy life’622, or become deified) or fall downwards away from Him. Augustine 
discusses such a bi-directional movement of the soul in terms of ‘image of God’.623  
 
i) The image of God 
 
Augustine’s concept of image is not original. Neither is there any lengthy or developed 
treatment of it.624 Sullivan maintains that in Augustine’s early works625 ‘we find only 
one explicit reference to the image text from Genesis (i.e., Soliloquia 1.1.4), and little 
apparent use is made of it. On the other hand many texts can be cited to show the 
influence of Plotinus’ concept of the divine image upon Augustine’626. Some of these 
are as follows:  
 
Firstly and most notably, Augustine interpreted the biblical reference to the image of 
God (i.e., Genesis 1.26)627 as meaning only the rational soul: ‘God is a spirit and this 
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 Cf., Anton C. Pegis, ‘The mind of St. Augustine’, in Mediaeval Studies, vol. VI (1944), 41: ‘The soul 
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implies from Augustine’s point of view a wholly spiritual sense of man as the image of 
God’628. (Hence, the soul is superior to the body.) 
 
Secondly, in the comparison between images (or resemblances) and what they 
resemble, the former are inferior to the latter: the inferior is related to, and also depends 
on, the superior as being like to it.629 Thus, of necessity the soul is inferior to God630, 
whom it resembles. Augustine, in fact, holds that all creatures are ‘imitations’ of God: 
 
I shall say no more, except that to us is promised a vision of beauty - the beauty 
through whose imitation (imitatione) all other things are beautiful631. 
 
Yet, since the soul is the closest image of God, the soul ranks immediately after God:  
 
we are remade in the image of Him who gave us that image to keep as a most 
precious treasure, when He gave us to ourselves with such a nature that only He 
Himself can rank before us.632  
 
Finally, as for Plotinus, so for Augustine, the notion of image connotes the ‘dynamic 
tendency of the inferior image to become more like to its superior by some return upon 
this model-principle’.633 This is the sense, in which the young Augustine used the term 
‘reformare’ in association with ‘image of God’,634 and also, as Sullivan holds, ‘divine’ 
with regard to the soul: ‘in confirmation of this (i.e., Plotinus’) influence (and that of 
Cicero) we can refer to Augustine’s use of the term “divine” with regard to man. This 
term will appear rarely, if at all, in his later writings, but now it is used abundantly. 
Augustine talks of the “divine mind dwelling in mortals”; he refers to the “divine 
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faculty,” to “that part of the mind which is divine”;(Cf. Contra Acad., I, 1, 3) he warns 
that “man will not be divine unless he turns aside from the mortal element”;(Cf. De 
Ordine, II, 11, 31) he speaks of the soul “returning, as it were, to the region of its 
origin.”(Cf. Contra Acad., II, 9, 22)’635 Thus, perfecting the image of God means 
deifying the soul, and vice versa: I have already explained in the Introduction that 
Augustinian interiority is a methodology for teleologically deifying the soul.  
 
In summary, the soul’s middle rank between God and the body is eternally 
unchangeable from the perspective of ontology. Yet, depending on where our mind and 
heart are orientated, our soul – the image of God – can either be deformed or 
‘reformed’/deified.636 
 
Apart from ‘image (of God)’, there are many other expressions, with which 
Augustine mentions the bi-directional movement of the soul; for example, ‘rationality’ 
(i.e., sania and ‘insania’637): 
 
The sixth stage is complete transformation into life eternal, a total forgetfulness 
of temporal life passing into the perfect form which is made according to the 
image and likeness of God.638 
 
There is no such word as ‘rational’ or ‘irrational’ in the above text. However, I shall 
explain in the following chapter that the seven levels of the spiritual development 
discussed in De quantitate animae 33.70-76, 35.79, and De vera religione 26.49 are 
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Plotinus’ uses of ‘image’ and Augustine’s: for a more detailed discussion of the former, see Paul Aubin, 
‘L’image dans l’oeuvre de Plotin’, Recherches de science religieuse 41 (1953), 348-379. 
636
 Cf., De vera religione 20.38, 46.88 & 55.107. Soliloquia 2.9.17 (quoted in Sullivan, The image of 
God, 10-11). Also, see O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine’s Thought’, 145-146: ‘This hierarchical order 
is not static, at least not for humans: even if they, as rational beings with free will, are intrinsically 
superior to irrational beings without free will, their souls and wills can situate them on a level below that 
which is appropriate to their nature.’ 
637
 Soliloquia 1.1.5. 
638
 De vera religione 26.49. 
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actually the seven degrees of the soul’s ‘rationality’: also, the ‘remaking’ of the image 
of God means the same as the soul’s (seven levels of) ‘growth in greatness’.639  
 
ii) Seven levels of rationality640  
 
Base on his view of reality, Augustine develops, in terms of ‘irrationality (insania)’, a 
theory concerning various stages of spiritual (alternatively, teleological or deificatory) 
transformation. Augustine defines ‘irrationality’ as the state of being ignorant about 
God and, consequently, not loving Him: we cannot love what we do not know.641 Notice 
that there are many paraphrases of ‘irrationality’; for instance, ‘dull of mind (caecus ... 
mente)’642, ‘uninstructed men (minus eruditis hominibus)’643, ‘unwise men (stulti 
homines)’644, ‘carnal men (carnalium hominum)’645, and ‘old man (veteris hominis)’646. 
Augustine, on the other hand, describes the opposite state as ‘health of sound men 
(valetudini sanorum)’647, ‘good men (bonos vires)’648, ‘spiritual man (homo 
spiritalis)’649, ‘new, inward and heavenly man (novus homo, et interior, et caelestis)’650, 
and ‘the few who are wise (sapientibus paucis)’651. Consequently, the irrational must 
become rational, the carnal spiritual, or the unwise wise – in a word, renew the ‘image’ 
of God.  
 
How, then, can an irrational person become rational? In other words, how does 
Augustine argues that we can understand God, so that we can then love Him? Augustine 
holds that 
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639
 Cf., Richard Jacobs, ‘De Quantitate Animae (388 A.D.)’, The Tagastan 31 (1985), 205.  
640
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.5. 
641
 Cf.,!De libero arbitrio 2.13.35 & De Trinitate 10.1.1. 
642
 De ordine 1.1.2. 
643
 De ordine 1.1.2. 
644
 De ordine 2.13.38. 
645
 De vera religione 6.11. 
646
 De vera religione 26.49. 
647
 De ordine 1.8.24; Cf., Ibid., 1.11.32 ‘intellect of a few sound men (paucorum sanorum intellectus)’. 
648
 De vera religione 6.11. 
649
 De vera religione 12.24. 
650
 De vera religione 26.49. 
651
 De vera religione 28.15. 
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the invisible things of God from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being 
understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and Godhead 
(Rom. 1:20).652  
 
(Faith is also crucial for gaining knowledge of God, but I shall discuss it in section (d) 
‘Faith, hope, and love’ in chapter 2.) How come we can infer who God is from what we 
know about His creation? Augustine explains it in terms of ‘signum’ and 
‘significatio’.653 The movements of a dancer, for instance, are the signs (signa) 
representing what the dancer thinks or/and feels (significatio).654 Also, words are 
pronounced (signa) in order to pass on information (significatio) from one to another.655 
Similarly, the beauty of a sensible thing and our ability to make an aesthetic judgement 
(signa) point to the existence of the absolute, intelligible standard of beauty 
(significatio), which is God.656 Also, through realizing the soul’s immaterial nature 
(signa) we can certainly perceive not only God’s incorporeity, but also His immanence, 
omnipresent, and transcendence (significatio).657 The soul is the most important 
springboard to knowledge of God and, so, epistemologically turning to the former must 
be the first stage of our teleological deification. In short, all creatures are the ‘nods’658 
(signa) towards their Creator (significatio).659 Nonetheless, ‘irrational’ people are 
incapable of identifying and interpreting the clues to knowledge of God embedded in 
His creation – most importantly, the significance of the soul’s immateriality. 
Consequently, they remain in the enjoyment the ‘delight of the sense’, being unable to 
even think about savouring the ‘delight through the sense’.660  
 
The transition from irrationality to rationality is the basic framework of Augustinian 
interiority. However, Augustine elaborates it four times in De ordine, De quantitate 
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652
 De vera religione 52.101: similarly, ‘How great the things that are made, that we may find Thee!’ (De 
ordine 1.5.14) and ‘something concerning God Himself drawn from that comparison of sensible things’ 
(Soliloquia 1.8.15). Yet, what Augustine inferentially discovered about God is largely Platonic in 
character: for a discussion about the Platonic influence upon Augustine in this respect, see Gerard 
O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 189-193 [i.e., ‘(iv) Augustine and the Platonic theory of 
Forms’]. 
653
 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34. 
654
 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34. 
655
 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34. 
656
 Cf., De vera religione 30.56, 59-60. 
657
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.4,!De quantitate animae 2.3 & De vera religione 43.81, 44.82.. 
658
 De libero arbitrio 2.10.43 quoted in Carol Harrison, Rethinking Augustine's Early Theology, 108. 
659
 Cf., De vera religione 52.101. 
660
 Cf., De ordine 2.11.34. 
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animae, and De vera religione; stretching the two-tier system into seven different 
levels: all the four versions of seven-levels of the soul’s rationality share the same 
structure, which is ‘a developmental sequence turning the soul from attachment to sense 
experience, toward itself, and finally to truth’661, echoing the landmarks in his spiritual 
journey to God.662 Note that the actual Augustinian expression is ‘seven levels of the 
soul’s greatness’663, not ‘seven levels of the soul’s rationality’ (cf., De quantitate 
animae 33.70-76). Yet, Augustine uses the term ‘greatness/magnitude (quantus)’ in 
reference to ‘virtue’664 and ‘power (vis or potentia)’665, not to dimensional size: above 
all, the soul is immaterial. Simultaneously, Augustine enumerates seven different kinds 
of the soul’s ‘power’ as follows; ‘the first act, vitalization; the second, sensation; the 
third, art; the fourth, virtue; the fifth, tranquillity; the sixth, initiation; the seventh, 
contemplation.’666 His argument here is clear: the more irrational we are, the higher-
level power we are incapable of exercising. Thus, the phrase ‘the soul’s greatness’667 
means actually ‘the soul’s rationality’. 
 
Land-
marks 
Citations 
Themes 
De ordine De quantitate animae 
1. 
Augus
-tine 
in his 
teens 
When the mind is directed to 
the multitude of material 
objects, it cannot see the 
beauty of the universe. [Cf., 
1.2.1-4]  
‘The Second Level of the 
Soul … The soul applies 
itself to the sense of touch; 
through it it feels and 
distinguishes hot and cold, 
rough and smooth, hard 
preoccu
-pation 
with 
corpo-
real 
things  
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661
 Richard Jacobs, ‘De Quantitate Animae (388 A.D.)’, The Tagastan 31 (1985), 205. 
662
 O’Daly holds that the Augustinian distinction between the seven levels of rationality was influenced 
by Greek philosophy: see O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 14-15. 
663
 De quantitate animae 33.70: ‘quanta sit anima septem gradus demonstrant’. 
664
 Cf., De quantitate animae 16.28: ‘when a child is praised for growing up, what is said to be the goal of 
that growing, if not virtue? … You should not think, therefore, that the soul grows by increasing its size 
with age as the body does. For, by growing, the soul comes to virtue, which, we admit, derives all its 
beauty and perfection not from any greatness of space, but from the great power of consistency. And if 
greater is one thing and better is another, as you already admitted, the soul should not be called greater 
but better by reason of its advancing with age and becoming subject to reason.’ Also, see Ibid., 14.24: 
‘We must regard the soul as great, great indeed, but not great with any material bulk. That way of 
thinking comes more easily to those who are well trained and approach these questions not from a desire 
of empty glory, but from a divine love of truth’. 
665
 De quantitate animae 32.69: ‘how great the soul is, not in regard to extension in space and time, but in 
regard to its power (vi) and capacity (potentia).’  
666
 De quantitate animae 35.79. 
667
 De quantitate animae 33.70. 
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and soft, light and heavy. 
Then it distinguishes between 
unnumbered differences of 
taste and smell and sound 
and shapes, by tasting, 
smelling, hearing and seeing. 
And in all these it comes to 
know and seek what suits the 
nature of its body; it rejects 
and shuns what is unsuited.’ 
[33.71]  
2. 
After 
read-
ing the 
Hor-
tensius 
1. ‘The chief cause of this 
error is that man does not 
know himself. Now, for 
acquiring this self-
knowledge, he needs a 
constant habit of 
withdrawing from things 
of the senses and of 
concentrating his thought 
within himself, and 
holding it there.’ [1.1.3]  
2. Reason enables a person to 
understand what that 
person does. [Cf., 2.19.49] 
1. ‘The Third Level of the 
Soul … the power of 
reason and thought’ 
[33.72] 
2. ‘The Fourth Level of the 
Soul … the more it 
becomes the cause of its 
own delight, the more it 
dares to withdraw from 
baser things and wholly to 
cleanse itself’ [33.73] 
Endea-
vouring 
to 
under-
stand 
the self 
3. 
After 
read-
ing 
Neo-
platon
-ism 
‘the Greek word from which 
the term, philosophy, is 
derived is in the Latin tongue 
called love of wisdom. … 
there is another world utterly 
remote from these eyes of 
ours, a world which the 
intellect of a few sound men 
‘The Third Level of the Soul 
… the science of arithmetic’ 
[33.72] 
Ex-
ploring 
intelli-
gible 
things 
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beholds.’ [1.11.32]  
4. 
After 
read-
ing the 
Scrip-
tures 
‘To philosophy pertains a 
twofold question: the first 
treats of the soul; the second, 
of God. The first makes us 
know ourselves; the second, 
our origin. The former is the 
more delightful to us; the 
latter, more precious. The 
former makes us fit for a 
happy life; the latter renders us 
happy. The first is for 
beginners; the latter, for the 
well instructed. This is the 
order of wisdom’s branches of 
study by which one becomes 
competent to grasp the order 
of things and to discern two 
worlds and the very Author of 
the universe, of whom the soul 
has no knowledge save to 
know how it knows Him not.’ 
[2.18.47] 
1. ‘The Seventh Level of the 
Soul … we are in the very 
vision and contemplation 
of truth’ [33.76] 
2. ‘The Seventh Level of the 
Soul … From this we 
shall realize how full of 
truth are the things we are 
commanded to believe’ 
[33.76] 
At-
tempt-
ing to 
contem-
plate 
God 
 
De quantitate animae 35.79 also follows the same framework:  
 
Land-
marks 
De quantitate animae 35.79 Themes 
1. 
Augus
-tine 
in his 
teens 
1st Level 
‘vitaliza-
tion 
(animatio
)’ 
‘concerning 
the body 
(de corpore)’ 
‘excellently concerning 
another thing 
(pulchre de alio)’ 
preoccu
-pation 
with 
corpo-
real 2nd ‘sensa- ‘through the ‘excellently through 
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Level tion’ body 
(per corpus)’ 
another thing 
(pulchre per aliud)’ 
things  
3rd Level ‘art’ 
‘about the 
body 
(circa 
corpus)’ 
‘excellently about 
another thing 
(pulchre circa aliud)’ 
2. 
After 
read-
ing the 
Hort-
ensius 
4th Level ‘virtue’ 
‘toward itself 
(ad 
seipsam)’ 
‘excellently in the 
presence of an excellent 
thing 
(pulchre ad pulchrum)’ 
Endea-
vouring 
to 
under-
stand 
the self 
5th Level 
‘tran-
quillity’ 
‘in itself 
(in seipsa)’ 
‘excellently in an 
excellent thing 
(pulchre in pulchro)’ 
3. 
After 
read-
ing 
Neo-
platon
-ism 
6th Level 
‘initiation 
(ingressio
)’ 
‘toward God 
(ad Deum)’ 
‘excellently in the 
presence of Excellence 
(pulchre 
ad pulchritudinem)’ 
Ex-
ploring 
intelli-
gible 
things 
4. 
After 
read-
ing the 
Scrip-
tures 
7th Level 
‘contem-
plation’ 
‘in God 
(apud Deum)
’ 
‘excellently in 
Excellence 
(pulchre apud 
pulchritudinem)’ 
Attempt
-ing to 
contem-
plate 
God 
  
De vera religione 26.49 describes how the one, who has already become an ‘inward 
person (homo interior)’, makes further progress: yet, the basic structure of the 
description remains unaltered:  
 
Land-
marks 
Spiritual progress of the inward man (homo interior)  
depicted in De vera religione 26.49 
Themes 
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2. 
After 
reading 
the 
Horten-
sius 
1 
‘In the first stage he is taught by the rich stories of history 
which nourish by examples.’ 
Endea-
vouring 
to 
under-
stand 
the self 
3. 
After 
reading 
Neopla-
tonism 
2 
‘In the second stage he forgets human 
affairs and tends towards divine things (ad 
divina). He is no longer kept in the bosom 
of human authority, but step by step (by) 
through the use of reason he strives to reach 
the highest unchangeable law.’ 
‘toward 
God 
(ad 
Deum)’668 
Explor-
ing 
intelli-
gible 
things 
4. 
After 
reading 
the 
Scrip-
tures 
3 
‘In the third stage he confidently (marries) weds carnal 
appetite to strong reason, and inwardly rejoices in the 
sweetness of the union. Soul and mind are joined together 
in chaste union.’ 
Attempt
-ing to 
contem-
plate 
God 
4 
‘The fourth stage is similar, only now he acts much more 
firmly, and (springs forth) emerges as the perfect man, 
ready to endure and overcome all the persecutions, 
tempests and billows of this world.’ 
5 
‘In the fifth stage he has peace and tranquillity on all 
sides. He lives among the abundant resources of the 
unchangeable realm of supreme ineffable wisdom.’ 
6 
‘The sixth stage is complete transformation into life 
eternal, a total forgetfulness of temporal life passing into 
the perfect form which is made according to the image 
and likeness of God.’ 
7 
‘The seventh is eternal rest and perpetual beatitude with 
no distinguishable ages. As the end of “the old man” is 
death, so the end of “the new man” is eternal life. The 
“old man” is the man of sin, but the “new man” is the 
man of righteousness.’ 
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668
 De quantitate animae 35.79. 
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Note Cary insists that ‘in Augustine’s earliest writings … there is so little that 
distinguishes turning to the soul from turning to God’669: I shall argue against him in 
section ‘God is in the soul’ chapter 2. 
 
2) Return to reason670 in order to ascend to God 
 
a) Why reason 
 
What, then, causes the soul to move upwards or downwards in the hierarchy? The fall is 
solely due to the misuse of the will.671 The ascent to God is more complex; for not only 
the will, but also reason, memory, faith, hope, and divine grace are involved. All these 
are indeed connected to each other. For instance, reason does not operate independently 
of memory: due to our memory of God, we can ‘desire (cupere)’ to know God,672 whom 
we do not see ‘face to face’673. Also, our intellectual life and our emotional life are 
inseparable.674 Thus, without a passion for knowledge of God, we cannot engage 
ourselves in the pursuit of the knowledge. In other words, if we are not interested in 
theology, we simply do not study it. What, then, makes us intrigued by theology in the 
first place? God attracts our mind and heart to Himself, otherwise we – as created 
beings – remain utterly helpless in restoring the image of God.675 Note that, although 
Augustine discusses, in Confessions, the problem of the will in detail, he was acutely 
aware of the same problem even in Cassiciacum, undoubtedly from the experience of 
his own self: 
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669
 Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 105. 
670
 Cf., De ordine 2.11.31: ‘regressus esse in rationem debet’. 
671
 Cf., De vera religione 14.27 (‘it is by the will that sin is committed’), 20.38 & 37.68. Also, see 
Eleonore Stump, ‘Augustine on free will’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 131. ‘On his (i.e., 
Augustine’s) view in the De libero arbitrio, then, human beings are unable to form a good volition unless 
God produces it in them or co-operates in producing it. Nonetheless, when they will to sin, according to 
Augustine they are culpable. It apparently follows that a person can be morally responsible for a sinful act 
of will even when it was not possible for her not to will to sin. … a person who is unaided by grace 
cannot do otherwise than sin, and yet she is morally responsible for the sin she does.’ 
672
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.4.9. Also, see section ‘Reasonsing is remembering’ in chapter 2. 
673
 Confessiones 10.5.7 & De Trinitate 1.8.16.!Also, see Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14: Augustine here 
mentions the hope of understanding revealed truths because we cannot see God ‘face to face’ in this life. 
674
 O’Daly correctly insists in this respect that ‘Augustine’s concept of intellectual activity is never 
morally neutral’: see Gerard O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine’s Thought’, in Platonism Pagan and 
Christian: Studies in Plotinus and Augustine (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), 153. 
675
 See section ‘Reason shapes way of life’ of chapter 2 in Part II. 
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if there is in me any vain desire, do Thou Thyself cleanse me and make me fit to 
look upon Thee. (Soliloquia 1.1.6) 
  
If the soul, while it continues in the course of human life, overcomes the desires 
which it has fed to its own undoing by enjoying mortal things, and believes that it 
has the aid of God’s grace enabling it to overcome them, if it serves God with the 
mind and a good will, it will undoubtedly be restored, and will return from the 
mutable many to the immutable One. (De vera religione 12.24) 
 
Also, notice that, as the texts quoted from Contra Academicos 1.1.3, Soliloquia 1.1.6 
and De vera religione 12.24 demonstrate, Augustine makes clear that our will cannot be 
rendered sound without divine assistance.  
 
Nonetheless, since we cannot love what we do not know, knowing God precedes 
loving Him.676 In order to be a ‘perfect lover’ of God, we must first become a ‘perfect 
knower’ of God.677 Regarding the relationship between memory and reason, we have 
always had knowledge of God in our memory, yet only reason – not memory or the will 
– attempts to remember God fully (or ‘disinter’678 the knowledge): I shall explain this 
subsequently. This is to say that reason is the agent of interiority assisted by memory, 
the will, faith, hope, and divine grace; thus ‘return to reason’679. Our reason is currently 
in a state of ‘sleep’ due to the fall and, so, must be ‘awakened’ to God, of whom we 
remember so little: 
 
that divine element in you (quod in te divinum), whatever it may be - the element 
because of which you have always sought after what is fitting and worthwhile; 
because of which you have preferred to be generous rather than wealthy; as a 
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676
 Cf., De libero arbitrio 2.13.35 & De Trinitate 10.1.1: see the last paragraph of ‘(5-2)’ in my 
Introduction. Similarly, Linden holds that ‘L’élévation morale de l’homme demeure une condition 
nécessaire, absolue, et cette élévation morale s’opère conformément et parallèlement au développement 
de la connaissance intellectuelle’: see Lambertus van der Linden, ‘Ratio et Intellectus dans les premiers 
écrits de saint Augustin’, Augustiniana (1957), 17. 
677
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.6. 
678
 Soliloquia 2.20.35: ‘refodere’. 
679
 De ordine 2.11.31. Also, see Linden, ‘Ratio et Intellectus dans les premiers écrits de saint Augustin’, 
16: ‘La vie selon la ratio est la recherche de la vérité des choses humaines et divines, l’activité qui 
cherche et aboutit finalement à la sapientia, possession totale de la science des choses humaines et 
divines. La ratio, en tant qu’activité animée par un mouvement intérieur, fera place à l’intellectus, en tant 
que contemplation quiète de Dieu, et d’emblée l’âme possèdera la vie heureuse.’  
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result of which you have never wanted to be more powerful rather than to be 
more just; the reason you have never given in to adversities and improprieties - 
that element, I say, which has been lulled to sleep by the lethargy of this life, a 
hidden Providence has decided to awaken by the various hard reverses you have 
suffered. (Contra Academicos 1.1.3) 
 
Here, what Augustine means by the ‘divine element’ is, in fact, reason:680 
 
Man is animal, rational and mortal. In this definition, when the genus which is 
called animal has been given, then we notice that two distinguishing notes are 
added. And by those distinguishing notes, man, I believe, was to be admonished 
both whither he is to return and what he ought to flee, for, just as the soul’s 
forward movement has fallen down to the things that are mortal, so ought its 
return be to reason. By the one term, rational, man is distinguished from brute 
animals; by the other term, mortal, he is distinguished from God. Therefore, 
unless it holds fast to the rational element, it will be a beast; unless it turns aside 
from the mortal element, it will not be divine (divina). (De ordine 2.11.31) 681 
 
b) Reason’s journey to God 
 
Reason is the ‘intellect’682, the ‘mind’s eye’683, or a ‘power of the soul’684, which is the 
agent of knowing (scire)685 or understanding (intellegere)686. All knowledge gained 
through sense-perception, discursive thinking, or intuitive insight is an act of reason.687 
Yet, the soul is created out of nothing and its existence is sustained by the Creator God. 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
680
 Cf., John Edward Sullivan, The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its 
influence (Dubuque: Priory Press, 1963), 7-8. Also, see Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind 
(London: Gerald Duckworth, 1987), 7: ‘The mind (mens, ratio) is a “part of the soul” (pars animi), 
namely its best “part” (c. Acad. 1.5)’.  
681
 Augustine says in De Immortalitate Animae 2.2 that reason is either the soul itself or is in the soul: 
‘Ratio profecto aut animus est, aut in animo.’  
682
 De ordine 2.2.5 (‘Wherefore, if we know anything, I think it is contained in the intellect [intellectu] 
alone, and by it alone can it be grasped’) & 1.11.32. 
683
 Cf., De ordine 2.4.11 (‘mentis oculos’) & 2.2.7. 
684
 Cf., De quantitate animae 35.79: ‘animae potentia’. 
685
 Cf., De libero arbitrio 2.3.9: ‘whatever we know, we grasp and hold fast by reason (Quidquid enim 
scimus, id ratione comprehensum tenemus)’ quoted in O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 178. 
686
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.7.14. 
687
 Cf., Arthur Hilary Armstrong, Christian faith and Greek philosophy (London: Darton, Longman & 
Todd, 1960), 68. 
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Thus, reason’s cognitive activity is not from itself. God – as divine illumination – 
makes reason’s cognition possible, just as the corporeal eye can see things only in the 
sunlight:688  
 
Reason, which is speaking with you, pledges to make God known to your mind 
just as the sun is shown to the eyes. The senses of the soul are, as it were, the 
mind’s own eyes; those things, moreover, which are most certain in the sciences 
are like the things which the sun shines upon that they may be seen - such as the 
earth and all things earthly: but it is God Himself who does the illumining. Yet, I 
- Reason - am in minds as the act of looking is in the eyes. To have eyes is not 
the same as to look, and to look is not the same as to see. Therefore, the soul 
needs three distinct things: that it has eyes which it can properly use, that it 
looks, and that it sees.689  
 
Note the following two points: 
 
One is that Plato was the first person who drew an analogy between the corporeal eye 
and reason, and between the sun and intellectual/divine illumination:690 through divine 
illumination the objects of cognition become intelligible to reason just as sunlight 
renders material things visible to the eye. Hence, Augustine’s image of the sun is an 
exact ‘replica’ of Plato’s.691  
 
The other is that Augustine distinguishes the two epistemological activities of reason, 
namely ‘looking (aspicere)’ and ‘seeing (videre)’. ‘Looking’ means, for instance, 
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688
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.8.15. 
689
 Soliloquia 1.6.12 & 1.8.15. 
690
 Refer to the ‘Allegory of the Cave’ in the Republic and Phaedrus. Also, see Philip Cary, Augustine’s 
Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 
18 & 40. Also, ‘for Plotinus the One or God is the sun, the transcendent light’: see Frederick Copleston, 
A History of Philosophy, Book One, Volume II: Augustine to Scotus (New York: Image, 1952), 62. 
691
 Cf., Armstrong, Christian faith and Greek philosophy, 70-71: yet, Augustine on the other hand holds 
that the intellectual light is ‘the Interior Teacher, Christ dwelling in the soul and teaching it from within.’ 
However, the exact significance of Augustine’s doctrine of divine illumination is ‘elusive’: see Gareth B. 
Matthews, ‘Knowledge and illumination’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 180:!for a concise 
summary of Augustine’s theory of divine illumination, see 173-175 & 180-181. Copleston also holds that 
the interpretation of Augustine’s theory of divine illumination is ‘uncertain’: see Copleston, A History of 
Philosophy, Book One, Volume II: Augustine to Scotus, 62-67.  
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‘analyzing (discernere)’692, ‘synthesizing (connectere)’693, understanding the nature of 
numbers,694 ‘defining’695, ‘distributing’, ‘distinguishing’, or ‘judging’696: all these 
instances are equivalent to the activities of discursive reason in Plotinism.697 Hence, as 
for Plotinus, so for Augustine, reason is the agent of interiority:698 Augustine associates 
‘soundness’ with ‘looking’ only (e.g., ‘healthy eye [sanos oculos]’) rather than 
‘seeing’.699 ‘Seeing (videre)’ God, on the other hand, means ‘knowing (scire)’ or 
‘understanding (intellegere)’ God700 and this is the goal of interiority: ‘O God, … whom 
to see (videre) is to possess’701 (and possessing God is attaining true happiness)702. 
 
Augustine makes the same distinction as above in terms of ‘reasoning (ratiocinatio)’ 
and ‘knowledge (scientia)’ in De quantitate animae 27.52-53. ‘Reason (ratio)’ is the 
‘mental sight (mentis aspectus)’703, the ‘interior eye (interiorius oculus)’704, or the 
‘mental eye (oculi mentis)’705. ‘Reasoning’ is ‘reason’s search (rationis inquisitio), that 
is, the actual moving of the sight over the things that are to be seen (aspicienda).’706 
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692
 De ordine 2.18.48. 
693
 De ordine 2.18.48. 
694
 Cf., De ordine 2.19.49. 
695
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.20: ‘Is it not clear to you that it could not be a branch of learning if it contained no 
definitions and no divisions and distinctions of classes and kinds? (Nonne tibi videtur, si nihil in ea 
definitum esset, et nihil in genera et partes distributum atque distinctum, eam nullo modo disciplinam 
esse potuisse?)’ 
696
 De vera religione 29.53. 
697
 Cf., Andrew Smith, Philosophy in late antiquity (London: Routledge, 2004), 7-8: ‘Where then does he 
locate the individual person? Since it is ‘we’ who perceive, he locates the ‘we’ or self at the level of 
discursive reason … reason, which stands midway between sense-perception and intellection’. Also, see 
Ennead 2.9.2 quoted below. 
698
 Cf., Ennead 2.9.2: ‘one part of our soul is always directed to the intelligible realities, one to the things 
of this world, and one is in the middle between these; for since the soul is one nature in many powers, 
sometimes the whole of it is carried along with the best of itself and of real being, sometimes the worse 
part is dragged down and drags the middle with it’. 
699
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.13: ‘Reason is the gaze (aspectus) of the soul, but, since it does not follow that 
everyone who gazes (aspicit) at an object sees (videat) it, correct and perfect gaze (aspectus), of the kind 
which is followed by vision (visio), is called virtue; for, virtue is correct and perfect reason. But, even 
though it may have healthy eyes (sanos oculos), the gaze (aspectus) itself (i.e., of the soul) cannot turn 
them toward the light.’ 
700
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.2.7: ‘I desire to know (scire) God and the soul.’ Ibid., 1.7.14: ‘when the soul shall 
succeed in seeing (videre), that is, knowing (intellegere) God’.  
701
 Soliloquia 1.1.3. 
702
 See my Introduction. 
703
 De quantitate animae 27.53. 
704
 De quantitate animae 14.23. 
705
 De quantitate animae 19.37. 
706
 De quantitate animae 27.53. 
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‘Knowledge (scientia and sapientia707)’ is having the sight of the mind (mentis 
aspectus) directed upon an object and seeing (videre) it.708  
 
Notice that, although Augustine maintains that we – that is, reason – can strive to 
understand God only by divine illumination, knowing God is, in other words, seeing the 
divine light itself: 
 
A certain admonition, flowing from the very fountain of truth, urges us to 
remember (recordemur) God, to seek Him, and thirst after Him tirelessly. This 
hidden sun pours into our innermost eyes that beaming light. His is all the truth 
that we speak, even though, in our anxiety, we hesitate to turn with courage 
toward this light and to behold it in its entirety, because our eyes, recently 
opened, are not yet strong enough. This light appears to be nothing other than 
God. (De beata vita 4.35) 
 
Pay attention to the first sentence of the above text. The first step of approaching the 
divine light (i.e., God) is remembering God. This is to say that ‘turning … toward this 
light and to beholding it in its entirety’ is the same as recalling God fully from our 
memory, thus a theory of reminiscence. 
 
i) Reasoning is remembering 
 
As the text from De beata vita 4.35 cited above demonstrates, Augustine associates 
‘reasoning’ with ‘remembering’: we cannot search for what we do not remember. 
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707
 De quantitate animae 27.52. Note that, distinguishing between knowledge of created things (scientia) 
and that of God (sapientia), Augustine insists that the former is inferior to the latter (Cf., Soliloquia 
1.5.11-1.6.12). Hence, using scientia as the springboard, we must strive to gain sapientia. See Soliloquia 
1.14.25 (‘we seek or desire other things only for wisdom’s sake’) & De quantitate animae 33.75 (‘this 
activity, namely, the ardent desire to understand truth and perfection, is the soul’s highest vision it 
possesses none more perfect, none more noble, none more proper. [haec actio, id est, appetitio 
intellegendi ea quae vere summeque sunt, summus aspectus est animae, quo perfectiorem, meliorem 
rectioremque non habet.]’) De quantitate animae 33.75 may be interpreted as meaning that reason is 
divided into a higher part and a lower part. However, unlike Plotinus and Plato, such a distinction of 
Augustine, as Armstrong argues, is not ‘between two different mental processes or faculties: it is between 
two different functions of one and the same faculty, reason. The higher reason is reason at work on divine 
truth, the lower is reason at work on human and material things. The parallel distinction is that between 
wisdom - the specific excellence achieved by the mind in dealing with divine things, and knowledge or 
science, its specific excellence achieved in dealing with lower things.’ (Armstrong, Christian faith and 
Greek philosophy, 71-72.) 
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Memory of God is an essential prerequisite for ‘seeking (quaerere)’709 God. In other 
words, due to our memory of God, we are able to ‘desire’710 to learn more about Him:  
 
Suppose you have forgotten something, and other men desire, as it were, to recall 
it to your memory. They say, therefore, is it this or that, offering you things 
different from it as though they were similar. But you do not see what you are 
desirous of remembering, yet you see that it is not what they say. When this 
happens, does it seem that you have entirely forgotten? The very caution by 
which you are advised not to admit to their false suggestions is a part of 
remembrance. … Such persons, therefore, do not yet see the true, but they cannot 
be deceived or misled, and they know sufficiently what they are seeking. 
(Soliloquia 2.20.34) 
 
(Here, Augustine seems to be explaining why he could not have committed himself 
fully to Manichaeism, or why he could not be entirely convinced of its theological 
teachings: according to the theory of reminiscence, that was because he knew or 
‘remembered’ at least what truth should be like.)  
 
How, then, did knowledge of God/Truth (as well as other intelligible things) first 
enter the soul/memory? This was, in fact, Plato’s own question that no one before him 
had asked711 and his purpose of raising the question was to justify his theory of 
reminiscence.712 Plato’s answer took the form of a ‘myth’, that is, ‘a myth of 
transmigration and reincarnation of souls, borrowed from Greek religion and poetry.’713 
The theory is that ‘our soul is immortal, existing both before and after its time in the 
body - inhabiting in fact a whole series of bodies, each of which it enters at birth and 
leaves at death.’714 Hence, learning is merely recollecting what ‘we learned in a 
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708
 Cf., De quantitate animae 27.53.  
709
 Soliloquia 2.20.34. 
710
 Soliloquia 1.4.9.  
711
 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 15.  
712
 Meno 81d: ‘Seeking and learning are wholly recollection’ quoted in Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the 
Inner Self, 14: Plato was also the first person to systematize a theory of reminiscence. Also, see Aimé 
Solignac, ‘La notion de « memoria » chez Augustin’, in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité (Paris: Beauchesne, 
1980), vol. 10, 995. ‘Augustin connaissait, par l’intermédiaire de Cicéron (Tusculanes I, 24, 56 à 25, 61), 
les thèses de Platon sur l’anamnèse ou réminiscence, et les pages du Ménon sur l’esclave-géomètre (cf De 
Trinitate XII, 15, 24)’. 
713
 Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 15-16. 
714
 Cary, 16. 
! *"'
previous life but have since forgotten’715, rather than learning something completely 
new. 
 
Augustine knew the Platonic doctrine concerning the soul’s ‘repeated 
incarnations’716 (‘repeated’ is the important word here), which is not compatible with 
Christian dogmas, and a scholarly debate in this respect still remains unresolved. Did 
Augustine ever think that it is necessary to postulate the soul’s pre-existence in order to 
justify and complement his theory of reminiscence? 
 
As a matter of fact, Augustine never insisted that God created the soul before the 
body.717 Yet, Gilson, interpreting the young Augustine’s terms ‘forgetfulness’ and 
‘reminiscence’ ‘in the sense these terms have in the Platonic doctrine of the soul’s pre-
existence’718, says, ‘I am inclined to think that at first Augustine accepted the genuine 
Platonic doctrine.’719 In reference to Augustine’s later works Gilson maintains that 
Augustine developed a theory of reminiscence which no longer demands the idea of the 
soul’s pre-existence as an essential prerequisite,720 since ‘the Platonic recollection of the 
past gives way to that Augustinian memory of the present whose role becomes more 
and more important.’721  
 
‘Recollection/memory of the past’ and ‘memory of the present’ are Gilson’s own 
terms. He associates the former with recalling the experience of what existed before but 
no longer is; for instance, a person’s current memory of the Berlin Wall that that person 
saw between 1961 and 1989. If we draw an analogy between the Berlin Wall and God, 
and between the disappearance of the Wall and the soul’s separation from God (or the 
soul’s forgetfulness of God); then the conclusion is that what we can remember about 
God has come from our experience of Him before the soul entered the body. Gilson 
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715
 Cary, 16: Cary’s verdicts on Plato’s theory of recollection, and the myth of transmigration and 
reincarnation of the soul, are that the former is ‘an enduring Platonist doctrine’, whereas the latter is, ‘as 
an explanation, a failure.’ 
716
 Ronald Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, The New 
Scholasticism 58 (1984), 230. 
717
 Cf., Etienne Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, trans. L. E. M. Lynch (London: 
Victor Gollancz, 1961), 71 & O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 199. 
718
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 71: refer to Soliloquia 2.20.35, De immortalitate 
animae 4.6, Epistula. 7.1.2 & De quantitate animae 20.34. 
719
 Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 71. 
720
 Cf., Gilson, 72. 
721
 Gilson, 75. 
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argues that this is what Augustine initially adopted but would later give up. As for the 
‘memory of the present’, it refers to the recollection of what currently or eternally 
exists; for instance, the memory of our own soul.722 According to the theory of 
reminiscence getting to know the soul is same as recalling what we have already known 
about it, and the soul is always ‘present to itself’.723 Therefore, the memory of the soul 
is the ‘memory of the present’. Similarly, Gilson insists that the mature Augustine’s 
emphasis on the ever presence of God in our memory transformed his theory of 
reminiscence in the way that it no longer depends on the idea of the soul’s pre-
existence. Since God is eternal and, so, has never been absent from us; our memory of 
God is, not that of the past, but that of the present.724 Gilson’s interpretation of the 
mature Augustine might seem rather perplexing, but our subsequent discussion of 
Teske’s arguments against Gilson will hopefully clarify Gilson’s points. 
 
Note that Gilson identifies Augustine’s theory of divine illumination with that of 
‘memory of the present’.725 In other words, for Gilson both Augustine’s theory of divine 
illumination and that of reminiscence concerns memory, but the latter makes reference 
to the past, whereas the former to the present. 
 
Against Gilson Teske, first of all, argues as follows: 
 
The Augustinian doctrine of ‘memory of the present,’ however, if it is to replace 
Platonic reminiscence that involves recollection of past experience and pre-
existence, must not merely claim that the object remembered is presently 
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722
 Cf., Ronald Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, 222-223. & 
O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 446. 
723
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.3.5: (McKenna’s translation) ‘nothing can be more present to itself (i.e., the mind) 
than itself (se ipsa nihil sibi possit esse praesentius)’. Also, see Confessiones 10.15.23: (Chadwick’s 
translation) ‘I mention memory and I recognize what I am speaking about. Where is my recognition 
located but in memory itself? Surely memory is present to itself through itself, and not through its own 
image. (Nomino memoriam et agnosco quod nomino. Et ubi agnosco nisi in ipsa memoria? Num et ipsa 
per imaginem suam sibi adest ac non per se ipsam?)’ 
724
 Cf., Gilson, The Christian Philosophy of Saint Augustine, 71-72, 82 & 75 (‘he [i.e., Plato] was wrong 
in concluding … that the soul remembers truth as one remembers knowledge of the past. The fact is that 
truth is always within our grasp … The Platonic recollection of the past gives way to that Augustinian 
memory of the present whose role becomes more and more important.’). 
725
 Cf., Gilson, 82: ‘To see things in God’s light implies, not Platonic memory of the past, but 
Augustinian memory of the present’. Also, see Gerard O’Daly, ‘Memory in Plotinus and two early texts 
of St. Augustine’, in Platonism Pagan and Christian: Studies in Plotinus and Augustine, (Ashgate: 
Aldershot, 2001), 468. ‘There is no mention of the illuminating aid of God in EVII; but one essential 
feature of the illuminatio theory is stressed, the validity of a memory of what now is.’ 
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existing, but must also make the further claim that the object was not first 
experienced in the past, then retained in memory, and finally recalled. In other 
words, for the Augustinian memory of the present, of which Gilson speaks, the 
pastness of the experience has to be eliminated.726  
 
Next, re-interpreting the same Augustinian texts on which Gilson bases his arguments, 
Teske concludes that not only the young Augustine’s, but also the mature Augustine’s, 
references to memory always – at least implicitly – refer to the prior existence and 
experience of the soul.727  
 
O’Daly, on the other hand, rejects any claim that the soul’s pre-existence – in 
whatsoever form – was ever a part of the young Augustine’s system, let alone the 
mature Augustine’s:  
 
Augustine considers pre-existence to be a possible hypothesis, but without opting 
for it. Nowhere in his early writings does he unequivocally assert the soul’s pre-
existence: it is never more than one possibility among others.728 
 
In summary, regarding Augustine’s attitude to the soul’s pre-existence, there are 
three interpretations. Firstly, Augustine initially admitted it but later renounced it 
(Gilson). Secondly, Augustine first accepted it explicitly but subsequently implicitly 
(Teske). Finally, Augustine rejected it from the beginning (O’Daly). 
 
It is true that, as O’Daly insists, Augustine did not explicitly assert the soul’s pre-
existence. However, as Teske holds, Augustine’s uses of the term ‘experience 
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 Teske, ‘Platonic reminiscence and memory of the present in St. Augustine’, 223. 
727
 Cf., Teske, 223. Teske holds that even De Trinitate 12.15.24, in which Augustine explicitly rejects the 
Platonic reminiscence in favour of a divine illumination theory (Cf., 229-231), cannot be interpreted as 
abandoning the Platonic ‘memory of the past’ altogether (Cf., 235). 
728
 O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 199: however, he later says that ‘the language of recollection 
is as metaphorical in quant. an. 35 as elsewhere, but that the metaphor is confusingly assertive there.!(p 
201)’ Also, see, by the same author, ‘Memory in Plotinus and two early texts of St. Augustine’, 468-469; 
and ‘Did St. Augustine ever believe in the Soul’s Pre-existence?’, Augustinian Studies 5 (1974), 227-35 
(see footnotes no. 1 & 2). Armstrong too holds the same view as O’Daly’s: see Armstrong, Christian 
faith and Greek philosophy, 70.  
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(experiri)’729 in this respect clearly refer to the past. For instance, in De vera religione 
30.54 Augustine says, 
 
art in the popular sense is nothing but the memory of things we have experienced 
and which have given us pleasure, with the addition of some skilled bodily 
activity. If you lack the skill you can still judge of the works produced even 
though you cannot produce them. And the power of judging is much better.730  
 
Bear in mind that in Augustine’s thoughts there is the unchangeable ‘standard (lex) of 
all the arts’ – that is, God – ‘above (supra)’ the mind.731 Moreover, since our mind is 
‘given the power to see (videre)’732 the standard, we are able to make aesthetic 
judgements according to it.733 Now, pay attention to the phrase ‘memory of things we 
have experienced and which have given us pleasure’734. Augustine here is not saying 
that we are eternally experiencing the standard, or that we perpetually have pleasure in 
‘seeing’ it as a result of the experience. Therefore, the memory of the experience and 
the pleasure is an occurrence in the past, though the standard is eternally ever-present in 
memory.  
 
We can see a similar instance in Confessions. Regarding our innate, universal desire 
for the ‘happy life (beata vita)’735 – that is the ‘joy in Truth’736, or the joy derived from 
God737 –, the Augustine of the Confessions insists that it logically presupposes the 
existence of knowledge (‘notitia’738) of it in our memory, which in turn comes from our 
experience of it.739 Here, again, the experience of the ‘joy (laetari)’740 is a thing of the 
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 De vera religione 30.54 & Confessiones 10.21.30. 
730
 ‘Ita reperitur nihil esse aliud artem vulgarem, nisi rerum expertarum placitarumque memoriam, usu 
quodam corporis atque operationis adiuncto: quo si careas, iudicare de operibus possis, quod multo est 
excellentius, quamvis operari artificiosa non possis.’ 
731
 Cf., De vera veligione 30.56: ‘supra mentem nostram esse legem, quae veritas dicitur’. ‘Beauty’: 
Soliloquia 1.10.17 and De vera religione 3.3 & 33.62. 
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 De vera religione 30.56. 
733
 Cf., De vera religione 39.73. 
734
 ‘rerum expertarum placitarumque memoriam’ 
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 Confessiones 10.20.29.  
736
 Confessiones 10.23.33: ‘beatam vitam, quod non est aliud quam de veritate gaudium’. 
737
 Cf., Confessiones 10.22.32: ‘That is the authentic happy life, to set one’s joy on you, grounded in you 
and caused by you (ipsa est beata vita, gaudere ad te, de te, propter te).’ 
738
 Confessiones 10.20.29 quoted in Gérard Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez 
saint Augustin’, Augustiniana 4 (1954), 505. 
739
 Cf., Confessiones 10.20.29-21.31.  
740
 Confessiones 10.21.30. 
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past so that even in sorrow we can remember the past moment of being joyful:741 I shall 
discuss it in detail in section ‘God’s immanence’ of chapter 2 in Part III.  
 
In summary, we gain knowledge of a being/thing through experiencing it. 
Eventually, although both the young Augustine and the mature Augustine would not 
like to admit the pagan idea concerning the pre-existence of the soul, both of them could 
not find a way to explain how our innate knowledge of God is possible through 
recollection other than by making references to the past experience of the soul before 
the body. 
 
ii) Reason does not create, but discovers, knowledge of God742 
 
Alongside the term of ‘remember’, Augustine also uses ‘discover (invenire)’743, in 
association to our intellectual journey to God, and it has two implications.  
 
One is that knowledge of God is a being. In De quantitate animae 27.53 Augustine 
says that ‘knowledge stands higher than reason’744. Since he applies the terms ‘higher’ 
and ‘lower’ with respect to the hierarchy745 of ‘substances’746, undoubtedly Augustine 
considers that knowledge is an ontological category: in De Trinitate 9.4.6, Augustine 
explicitly says that ‘knowledge is a substance’747. Thus, when Augustine insists that we 
can know God inferentially748 in reference to His creation,749 he is at the same time 
arguing that reasoning is not ‘creating’ but ‘discovering’.750  
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 Cf., Confessiones 10.21.30: ‘gaudium meum etiam tristis memini’.  
742
 Cf., De vera religione 39.73: ‘Reasoning does not create but discovers (Truth/God) (ratiocinatio talia 
facit, sed invenit)’. 
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 De vera religione 39.73. 
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 ‘scientiam pluris quam rationem’. 
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 Cf., De quantitate animae 34.78. 
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 Cf., De ordine 2.17.46: ‘no difference between the substance (substantiam) of God and that of the 
soul.’ De vera religione 7.13 ‘For every thing, substance (substantia), essence or nature, or whatever 
better word there may be, possesses at once these three qualities: it is a particular thing; it is distinguished 
from other things by its own proper form; and it does not transgress the order of nature.’  
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 ‘substantia sit scientia’. 
748
 i.e., in Augustine’s language, ‘reasoning (ratiocinatio)’. 
749
 Cf., De vera religione 52.101.  
750
 Cf., De vera religione 39.73: ‘reasoning does not create but discovers it (i.e., truth) (ratiocinatio talia 
facit, sed invenit)’. 
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The other is that human reason is not the Creator: whatever reason understands – 
whether it be about God, the soul751 or any other thing – is not a mental ‘creation 
(facere)’ but a ‘discovery (invenire)’: 
 
when, either reasoning with ourselves or being cleverly questioned by another 
about certain liberal arts, we discover that those things we have found are 
nowhere else but in our mind, and since discovering is not the same as making or 
causing - otherwise the mind would bring forth eternal things by means of 
temporal discovery, for it often does discover eternal things.752  
 
Note that ‘liberal arts’ in the above text means the academic disciplines that are ‘made 
(fiere)’753 true by Truth/God. However, Augustine maintains that the ‘art of 
argumentation’ (i.e., dialectics) is one of the disciplines as well as Truth itself or God 
Himself.754  
 
iii) God is in the soul 
 
We can endeavour to ‘remember’, ‘discover’, and ‘understand’ God because Truth/God 
is in the soul755/memory and ‘reasoning’ (in search for knowledge of God) is 
‘remembering’ (Him): 
 
there is another form of forgetting which can more properly be described as 
nearer to recalling or recognition of the truth. It is like the experience of seeing 
something and realising for a certainty that we have seen it at some time in the 
past. We even assert that we know it, yet we have our work cut out for us to 
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 Cf., De quantitate animae 14.24: ‘reason itself, by which the soul endeavours to discover (invenire) 
even itself’.  
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 De Immortalitate animae. 4.6: ‘cum vel nos ipsi nobiscum ratiocinantes, vel ab alio bene interrogati de 
quibusdam liberalibus artibus ea quae invenimus, non alibi quam in animo nostro invenimus: neque id est 
invenire, quod facere aut gignere; alioquin aeterna gigneret animus inventione temporali (nam aeterna 
saepe invenit …)’. Also, see De vera religione 39.73 & Augustine, A., The Immortality of the Soul, The 
Fathers of the Church Series, trans. Ludwig Schopp (Washington DC: The Catholic University of 
America Press, 1947), 24, footnote 6: ‘“Discover” is not necessarily to be understood as (reminiscense) in 
the Platonic sense. For in Soliloquia 1.8.15 Augustine clearly states the doctrine of divine enlightening.’  
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 Soliloquia 2.17.31. 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.19-2.13.24. See section ‘Learning (disciplina) is in the soul’ (Cf., Ibid., 2.13.24) 
of chapter 2 in Part II. 
755
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.13.24 & 2.19.33 (‘all that the soul knows it possesses within itself’). 
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recollect and recall where or when or how or in whose presence the thing came to 
our notice. For instance, if this happens in the case of some human being, we ask 
where we got to know him, and, when he tells us, suddenly the whole 
circumstances come flooding back into our memory like a light and the memory 
need labour no longer to help I us to remember. (Soliloquia 2.20.34) 
 
That is also the situation in the case of those who are well trained in the liberal 
disciplines: they draw out, one might even say, dig out, in the course of learning 
such pieces of knowledge which were without doubt buried within them in 
forgetfulness. Nevertheless, they are not content, and they will not rest until they 
have gazed long and deep on the face of all that truth whose splendour glows 
within those arts. (Soliloquia 2.20.35) 
 
In other words, unless God/Truth is in memory, we cannot ‘remember’ Him. 
 
Memory is where knowledge of God is present, but it does not make memory on a 
par with reason. Having memory of God is not being ‘with’ God, but understanding 
God is: since ‘whatever understands God is with (cum) God’756, only the intellect/reason 
of those who know God (i.e., ‘wise men’) is with God.757 Memory, on the other hand, is 
of no use for a ‘wise man’, for he sees God.758 There is indeed a moment when the wise 
man needs memory and that is when he wants to teach Wisdom to others. Yet, in this 
case, memory acts like a ‘slave’759 to his reason.760 (These were, in fact, the arguments 
of Trygetius but Augustine accepts them.) 761 Furthermore, as I explained in the 
Introduction,762 Augustine maintains reason’s ultimate superiority over memory from 
the perspective of the afterlife: in the afterlife we do not need memory because we see 
God ‘face to face’: 
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 De ordine 2.2.4. 
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 Cf., De ordine 2.2.5: ‘if we know anything, I think it is contained in the intellect alone, and by it alone 
can it be grasped. Whence it follows that, if what the wise man knows by understanding is with God, then 
the entire thing which the wise man knows can be with God.’  
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 Cf., De ordine 2.2.7: ‘a wise man … has everything in front of the interior eyes of the intellect.’ 
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 Cf., De ordine 2.2.6. 
760
 Cf., De ordine 2.2.4-7.  
761
 Cf., De ordine 2.2.4-7.  
762
 See, in my Introduction, the section marked as ‘(5-1)’ or ‘(5-1-1)’. 
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Why should Faith be needed, since now it sees (God)?763 (We commit what we 
believe to memory) 
 
what need is there of memory for a wise man, who has everything in front of the 
interior eyes of the intellect.764 
 
In summary, memory is inferior to reason: ‘memory itself resides in this subordinate 
part.’765 However, did the young Augustine insist on reason’s superiority to the point of 
its being indistinguishable from God? Cary argues that Augustine’s perception of God’s 
immanence makes God’s transcendence766 insignificant and, so, in his earliest works 
‘there is so little that distinguishes turning to the soul from turning to God’767. 
Regarding ‘the mature version of Augustine’s inward turn’, Cary holds that ‘there are 
two distinct movements, first “in” then “up.” In the second movement, the soul looks 
not at itself but above its mutable self to the immutable Truth.’768 ‘But’, Cary maintains, 
‘this second movement is unnecessary if the highest part of the soul is immutable or if 
the immutable Truth is inseparably present in the soul. … as if whenever the mind is 
turned to itself it is necessarily turned to God, and vice versa’769: ‘the central purpose of 
the Soliloquies … was to prove that the soul could not suffer such changes. Hence 
Augustine’s mature view on this subject represents a profound about-face from his early 
project.’770 (‘Inseparably’771 is the keyword.)  
 
Cary is right that for the young Augustine the soul is immortal due to its 
inseparability from Truth/God. 772 However, as I explained in section ‘Mutability’ in 
chapter 1, the soul is not entirely immutable. For instance, reason’s ‘soundness (sanus)’ 
changes.773 Also, our emotions often fluctuate.774 Cary uses ‘immortality’ and 
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 Soliloquia 1.7.14. In De Trinitate 8.4.6 he says that ‘we walk by faith, not by sight (2 Cor. 5.7)’. 
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 De ordine 2.2.7. 
765
 De ordine 2.2.6:  
766
 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 39. 
767
 Cary, p 105. 
768
 Cary, p 105. 
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 Cary, p 105. 
770
 Cary, p 106. 
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 Soliloquia 2.12.22. 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.13.24. 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 1.6.12.  
774
 Cf., Soliloquia 10.18. 
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‘immutability’ interchangeably as Augustine did in De immortalitate animae 2.2.775 
Yet, in other parts of his early works Augustine applies them in two different senses: as 
explained in section ‘The hierarchy’ of chapter 1, the incorporeal soul is 
indivisible/immortal, but mutable. In addition to reason’s partial mutability, Cary 
overlooks the significance of the creation doctrine in the young Augustine’s system: as 
mentioned in section ‘Creator-or-creature’ of chapter 1, Augustine insisted on an 
insurmountable, ontological gap between the Creator and the created soul.  
 
How, then, are we to understand God’s inseparable immanence? I shall investigate it 
in reference to God’s transcendence.  
 
(1) Immanence  
 
(a) Learning (disciplina) is in the soul 776  
 
The outline of Augustine’s argument for God’s immanence is as follows: (1) only a 
certain kind of truth is divine; (2) ‘disciplina (it literally means “learning”, but has a 
hermeneutical problem that I shall explain later)’777 is an archetypal instance of what 
Truth/God makes true; (3) since the soul – not the body – is the agent of cognitive 
activities, disciplina pertains to the soul and, so, Truth/God itself must be in the soul 
(the soul does not need any corporeal medium to access intelligible realities). Note that 
for Augustine the art of argumentation (i.e., dialectics) is not only one of disciplinae but 
also Truth itself (or the ‘Intelligible Light’778):779 
 
it (i.e., ‘the science of argumentation’) is through itself that it is a true branch of 
learning (per seipsam disciplina vera est). Who, then, will think it strange if that 
by which all things are true is through itself and in itself the true Truth. 
(Soliloquia 2.11.21) 
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 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 102. 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.13.24. 
777
 Soliloquia 2.11.19. 
778
 Soliloquia 1.1.3. 
779
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.20–21. 
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Firstly (1), there are two kinds of truth. One is ‘self-contradictory’ and ‘two-faced’ – 
that is, on the one hand, true, on the other hand, false. For instance, a picture of a horse 
is ‘truly’ a picture if that horse is not real, otherwise the picture is false.780 The other 
kind of truth is eternal and makes other things true781: this is God, who is immanent 
within the soul.  
 
Secondly (2), regarding the truthfulness of disciplina, we need to understand what 
disciplina means before examining why Augustine argues that it is always true. 
‘Disciplina’ is derived from the word ‘learn (discere)’782. However, only certain kinds 
of learning can be classified as disciplina and they are the academic disciplines that are 
established on the basis of the principles (rationes) of definition, division, and 
distinction;783 for example, the art of argumentation (disciplina/regulae disputandi) and 
grammar:784 both the principles and the art of argumentation are, in fact, dialectics.  
 
Now, for Augustine the truthfulness of dialectics is beyond doubt: in an 
epistemological sense, dialectics is ‘self-evident’.785 Therefore, disciplina is always 
true. Surprisingly, Augustine maintains that we cannot make any mistake when we 
apply dialectics – that is, an act of ‘looking (aspicere)’786 or ‘reasoning (ratiocinatio)’787 
– in learning:  
 
no one who learns and holds on to what he learns can be said not to know. 
Moreover, no one knows the false.788  
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.10.18: ‘how would the picture be true, if the horse were not false?’ 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.10.18. 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.20. 
783
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.20: ‘I can think of no kind of a branch of learning in which definitions, divisions, 
and reasoning do not perform their functions in defining the nature of a thing, in assigning to everything 
its proper place without any confusion of parts, in excluding nothing germane to the subject, in including 
nothing which does not belong there, in doing all that for which it is called a branch of learning.’ 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.21. 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.19-20. 
786
 Soliloquia 1.6.12. 
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 De quantitate animae 27.53. 
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 Soliloquia 2.11.20. Later, Augustine says, ‘In corporal and spiritual (imaginary) perception the soul is 
liable to error; but in things intellectually seen it is not liable to error if there be any error, it is because the 
soul does not really intellectually see; for what it intellectually sees is true (de Gen. ad litt. xii. 25, 52). 
Similarly elsewhere. “Intellectual perception is not liable to error; for either: he who thinks something 
else than what is, does not intellectually see; or: if he does intellectually see, it follows it is true” (ibid. 14, 
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Cary’s interpretation of this text is that - and I agree with him – is that learning 
(disciplina) is catching sight of some intelligible truth.789  
 
Finally (3), in De immortalitate animae Augustine explains why disciplina is in the 
soul.  
 
Note that there is, however, an exegetical problem concerning ‘disciplina’ in ‘If 
disciplina exists anywhere … . (De immortalitate animae 1.1.)’ There is the same 
problem with the phrase ‘disciplina is truth (Est autem disciplina veritas)’ in Soliloquia 
2.13.24. Referring to the text quoted above from Soliloquia 2.11.21, Cary argues that 
‘this clause (i.e., “per seipsam disciplina vera est”) could also be read as providing its 
own subject, in which case it should be translated: “discipline is true through its own 
self.” In that case the conclusion is that not merely dialectic, but discipline itself is 
Truth. This conclusion too could be supported by Reason’s line of argument, which 
implies that Discipline in general is true by virtue of something internal to it, namely, 
the discipline of argumentation. Precisely because the discipline of dialectic makes all 
the disciplines true, Discipline in general makes itself true. Thus it seems that if 
dialectic is Truth, then Discipline also is Truth and Augustine has succeeded in 
justifying the premise he needs for his proof of the immortality of the soul.’790 In 
summary, the problem is whether ‘disciplina’ in this context means one of several 
disciplinae or disciplina in general.791  
 
Cary approaches the problem in terms of ‘signum’ and ‘res (or sigificatio)’.792 
According to Augustine’s explanation in De ordine 2.11.34 signum is sensible whereas 
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29)’: Cuthbert Butler, Western Mysticism: The Teaching of Ss Augustine, Gregory and Bernard on 
Contemplation and the Contemplative Life (London: Constable & Company, 1922), 50. 
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 Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p 96-98: ‘(the argument is, on the face of it, bizarre: the 
basic premise amounts to the claim that one can never learn anything false. Either Augustine is convinced 
that no one can ever acquire false beliefs7 or else his premise ought to be read as a claim about the 
concept of “learning”: any learning worthy of the name means finding truth, not falsehood.) The import 
of the premise would then be that in true learning we do not just come to believe that some sentence or 
other is true - as if learning was merely the acquisition of opinion not knowledge - but rather we catch 
sight of some intelligible truth. If that is the meaning of the premise, then the really questionable part of 
the argument is the claim that the liberal arts actually consist of such learning.’ Next, Cary continues to 
investigate it further, raising the following question; ‘why should we think that disciplina necessarily 
consists of discere, in this strong sense of learning to see the intelligible truth?’ 
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 Cary, p 99. 
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 Cary, p 98. 
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 Cf., Cary, p 96. 
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res is intelligible. For example, an artistic work (i.e., a signum) signifies the existence of 
the law of arts.793 However, both disciplinae and Truth are incorporeal and, so, must be 
res: on the other hand, signa are the words spoken or written for communication in 
teaching and learning.794 Therefore, Cary takes ‘disciplina’ (i.e., signum) as meaning 
disciplina in general (i.e., res).795 However, in Soliloquia 2.19.33 Augustine explicitly 
distinguishes one disciplina (e.g., geometry) from another (i.e., Truth). Moreover, in the 
same text Augustine emphasized that Truth (i.e., one disciplina) makes geometry (i.e., 
another disciplina) and the soul immortal: 
 
whether the forms of geometry are in the truth or the truth is in them, no one 
doubts that they are contained in our soul, that is, in our intelligence, and because 
of this it follows of necessity that the truth exists in our soul. If every discipline is 
in our soul as in a subject inseparably, and if the truth cannot pass away, why, I 
ask you, do we have doubts about the perpetual life of the soul because of some 
familiarity with death? (Soliloquia 2.19.33) 
 
Therefore, I shall, in this thesis, take ‘disciplina’ in De immortalitate animae 1.1796 and 
Soliloquia 2.13.24797 as meaning dialectics, which is a disciplina as well as Truth/God 
itself. 
 
In Soliloquia 2.19.33 Augustine simply insists that the immanence of disciplina in 
the soul – more specifically in reason – is self-evident, but in De immortalitate animae 
explains the reasoning behind it as follows: 
 
disciplina is somewhere, for it exists, and whatever exists cannot be nowhere. 
Again, disciplina can exist only in that which lives. For nothing that does not live 
learns anything, and disciplina cannot possibly exist in something that does not 
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 Cf., De vera religione 52.101. 
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 Cf., De magistro 2.3. 
795
 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p 96: ‘the liberal arts are God. But this is exactly the 
import of Augustine’s key premise here. He flatly identifies disciplina, the word for studies in the liberal 
arts curriculum, with veritas, the Truth by which every truth (verum) is true - which, as the previous 
discussions at Cassiciacum make clear, can be nothing other than God.’ 
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 ‘If disciplina exists anywhere … .’ 
797
 ‘disciplina is truth (Est autem disciplina veritas)’ 
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learn. Again, disciplina exists always. For whatever exists and is immutable must 
necessarily exist always. … all that the soul knows it possesses within itself.798  
 
Those things that are comprehended by the intellect, however, are comprehended 
as existing nowhere else but in the comprehending mind itself and, at the same 
time, as not contained in space. (De immortalitate animae 6.10)799 
 
It must be stressed that, only if we understand/know God, reason is with God. 
Otherwise, Truth/God is in memory alone, and memory is a800 ‘world’801, where 
intelligible things are found:802  
 
all true reasons/principles are in its (i.e., of animum) secret places, although 
because of ignorance or forgetfulness it may seem not to have them or to have 
lost them803,  
 
Hence, reason endeavours to see God, who is in the memory – in other words, reason 
strives to be with God, who is in the memory – and that is the goal of our life. 
 
Notice that Augustine argues for God’s immanence not only epistemologically, but 
also ontologically: 
 
whatever understands God is with God. (De ordine 2.2.4) 
 
We (i.e., reason) move closer to God by understanding God: we cannot be with God 
without knowing Him. Thus, if there is no epistemological movement, there is no 
ontological movement either:804 the former is the essential condition for the latter. On 
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 Each soul is a world rather than the world, for one soul is completely isolated from another in this life: 
‘they could not perceive one another’s minds.’(De ordine 2.12.35) 
801
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(France : Desclée de Brouwer, 1962), 565: ‘Notons cependant qu’Augustin raisonne toujours comme si la 
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what grounds, then, does Augustine maintain that God is (not only epistemologically 
but also) ontologically present in the soul? He says that  
 
what he (i.e., a wise man) perceives by the soul, is with (cum) God805 (De ordine 
2.2.5). 
 
In other words, knowledge of God is ontologically ‘with (cum)’ God, who is ‘an eternal 
substance’806: where knowledge of God exists is where God Himself is. Consequently, 
knowledge is an ontological reality. In De Trinitate 9.4.6, Augustine explicitly says that 
‘knowledge is a substance’807. However, we can find a synonymous expression in his 
early works. In De quantitate animae 27.53 Augustine says that ‘knowledge stands 
higher than reason’808: since he applies the terms ‘higher’ and ‘lower’ with respect to 
the hierarchy809 of ‘substances’810, we can conclude that knowledge is a substance even 
for the young Augustine. (Note that De ordine 2.2.4 is a synthesis of De immortalitate 
animae 6.10 and De ordine 2.2.5.) All these lead to the conclusion that knowledge of 
God, which is superior to the soul, is hierarchically on a par with God: since immaterial 
beings are not separated, or in the vicinity of, each other in a physical (or geographical) 
sense; the word ‘with (cum)’ in the above text quoted from De ordine 2.2.5 must be 
interpreted as meaning hierarchical equality. The Augustine of De Trinitate, however, 
insists that knowledge of God is inferior to God:  
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présence de l’idée de Dieu à la mémoire était équivalente à la présence de Dieu en son être; sans doute 
estime-t-il que, Dieu étant objet d’une connaissance intelligible, atteindre son idée est identiquement 
atteindre l’objet de cette idée. Il parcourt donc, d’un élan rapide, les divers niveaux de la mémoire. Dieu 
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; il n’est pas non plus au plan de la mémoire affective ; il n’est pas davantage « en ce siège que l’esprit 
possède pour lui-même dans la mémoire », car Dieu n’est pas l’esprit, mais le maître de l’esprit (xxv, 36). 
Ceci fait découvrir la vanité de la première question : il est inutile de chercher pour Dieu un lieu dans la 
mémoire, car sa présence se fait selon un mode qui échappe à toute localisation : « et quid quaero quo 
loco eius habites, quasi uero loca ibi sint » (ibid.).’ 
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that knowledge (i.e., of God) is less than He, because it is in a lower nature; for 
the mind is creature, but God is Creator.811  
 
In summary, the more our reason gains knowledge of God from the memory, the 
closer we (i.e., reason) move towards God; since the knowledge, which is a substance, 
is with God. 
 
Augustine insists on not only the immanence of disciplina within the soul/memory, 
but also their inseparability.812 This is because of the most common, traditional 
objection to the theory of reminiscence. ‘The fact of ignorance seems to show disciplina 
is not always in us.’813 Thus, in order to safeguard his theory of reminiscence, 
Augustine maintains the inseparability of disciplina and the soul. 
 
(b) Disciplina and the soul are inseparable 
 
Augustine explains the inseparability of the soul and Truth/God as follows:  
 
a thing is in a subject in such a manner that that thing cannot be separated from 
the subject, as the form and appearance which we see in this wood, as light is in 
the sun, as heat is in fire … whatever is inseparably in a subject cannot continue 
if its subject does not continue … if fire were to be without heat, it would not be 
fire, and we can call snow only that which is white.814  
 
‘This sense of “in” is one that “Augustine” claims is familiar to him from his school 
days. It comes in fact from the one text of classical Greek philosophy that Augustine 
ever mastered firsthand (even if in translation), Aristotle’s Categories. Augustine is 
claiming that intelligible things are in the mind in the same way a quality is in a 
substance as its subject. Thus God is “in” the soul in the sense of the word “in” defined 
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 De Trinitate 9.11.16. (McKenna’s translation) 
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 Cf., Soliloquia 2.12.22. 
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 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 100-102, especially 101. 
814
 Soliloquia 2.12.22. 
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by Aristotle’s notion of a quality being “in” a subject: “By ‘in a subject’ l mean what is 
in something, not as a part, being incapable of existing separate from what it is in.”’815  
 
Due to the inseparability of disciplina and the soul, Augustine concludes that the soul 
also must be immortal: 
 
If whatever is in a subject endures forever, the subject itself must of necessity 
endure. Every branch of learning is in the soul as in a subject. If, therefore, 
disciplina endures forever, then the soul must endure forever. But, learning is 
truth (est autem disciplina veritas), and, as reason showed in the beginning of 
this book, truth abides forever. Therefore, the soul endures forever; if it died, we 
would not call it the soul.816  
 
Therefore, Cary is right to maintain that ‘Augustine’s argument for the immortality of 
the soul clearly implies the divinity of the soul’817. ‘For the crucial attribute of the 
intelligible things that Augustine locates in the soul is their immutability, and their 
presence in the soul makes the soul also immutable, at least in its higher or rational part. 
And for Augustine (and also for all orthodox Christians in his times) immutability is the 
one attribute that is most clearly and certainly characteristic of deity, the characteristic 
that distinguishes God from everything else’818:  
 
the countenance of truth is ever one and changeless,819  
 
reason is immutable.820 (De immortalitate animae 2.2 [386/387])  
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 Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, p 102. Also see the footnote no. 35: ‘See Conf. 4:28-29. 
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However, Augustine argues that, although the soul possesses certain ‘characteristic of 
deity’, such as immutability (or immortality), God still transcends the soul: I shall now 
demonstrate it.  
 
(2) Immanence and transcendence 
 
Cary argues that ‘in contrast to Plotinus, the mature Augustine comes to picture the 
inner space of the soul as something other than the intelligible world itself. This 
otherness (i.e., the soul’s otherness from God) is marked by the contrast between 
mutability and immutability. In contrast to the changelessness of Truth, the soul is 
mutable, which means that it is vulnerable to changes for the worse – corruption and 
evil and perhaps even death. Yet the central purpose of the Soliloquies (as we have 
seen) was to prove that the soul could not suffer such changes. Hence Augustine’s 
mature view on this subject represents a profound about-face from his early project.’821 
Not only in Soliloquia (and De immortalitate animae), but also in later works, the 
young Augustine stresses the immutability of reason, for instance, De vera religione 
49.95: 
 
When we are asked which is better, truth or falsehood, we answer with one voice 
that truth is better. And yet we are so sunk in trifles and baseness that we are 
much more ready to cling to jests and games in which deception, not truth, 
delights us; than to the precepts of the truth itself. So by our own judgment and 
out of our own mouth we are sentenced because we approve one thing by reason 
and pursue another in our vanity.  
 
In short, the truthfulness of reason’s judgements is unchangeable, though carnal desires 
can make reason malfunction.822 Thus, reason is always and absolutely the trustworthy 
guide for our journey to God.823  
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 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 106. 
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Notice that Augustine insists on the certainty of our judgment and intelligence only 
in reference to truth other than revealed ones. For instance, in De immortalitate animae 
2.2 Augustine argues that reason never fails to grasp mathematical truth: 
 
reason is immutable. … It is always in the same way that two and four make six. 
In the same way, it is always true that four is the sum of two and two … Such 
reasoning is not subject to change; therefore reason exists. In no way, on the 
other hand, can that which is inseparably in a subject remain unchanged, after the 
subject itself is changed. 
 
Revealed truth, on the other hand, still remains impenetrable or ‘ineffable’ to reason 
(cf., De ordine 2.7.24 [386]):824 reason has become too ‘dull’825 to understand the truth 
that the Catholic Church teaches. Yet, Wisdom, which includes revealed truths, is 
superior to mathematical truth: 
 
I would not dare assert that wisdom derives from number or is contained in it. I 
do not see how I could do so because I am acquainted with many mathematicians 
or accountants, or whatever else they may be called, who work out perfectly 
accurate and remarkable calculations. But of wise men, I either know very few, 
or possibly none at all. Wisdom, it strikes me, is far nobler than number. (De 
libero arbitrio 2.30 [388-395]) 
 
Moreover, training our mind with mathematics and ‘the science of right reasoning’ can 
prepare us to understand what the Christian faith teaches (cf., De ordine 2.18.47): I shall 
consider this further in section ‘Train the mind’ of chapter 2. 
 
Nonetheless, Augustine, in other parts of his early works, insists on the soul’s 
mutability not only with respect to emotion,826 but also with respect to reason, for 
instance, 
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 Cf., Gerard O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 164: ‘Indeed, true philosophy, as understood 
here by Augustine, deals in transcendental and eschatological categories that make assertions about the 
full attainability of truth in this life seem as implausible to him as they are to the Academic sceptic’. 
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The mind is like healthy eyes when it is cleansed of every taint of the body, that 
is, detached and purged of the desires for earthly things … it cannot see unless it 
is healthy (videre nequit nisi sana). (Soliloquia 1.6.12 [386/387]) 
 
When Augustine says that ‘the mind has to be healed (sanandum esse animum)’827 in 
De vera religione 3.3 (389/391), it is only a recapitulation of Soliloquia 1.6.12. 
Furthermore, Augustine does not consider reason’s immutability (or immortality) on a 
par with God’s, for God is the Creator whereas the soul is His creation (Cf., Soliloquia 
1.1.2). Thus, God is Truth itself (Cf., Ibid., 1.1.2), but the soul is made to see the Truth 
only under divine illumination (Cf., Ibid., 1.6.12 & 1.8.15). In other words, reason’s 
immutability is not spontaneous, but due to the grace of the Creator.  
 
In De quantitate animae 2.3 (387/388) Augustine makes clear the ontological 
difference between the Creator God and the soul, who is the image of God:  
 
A. … the soul is like to God. … 
E. That is exactly what I should like you to explain: how the human soul is like 
to God. For, although we believe that God has been made by no one, you said 
previously that the soul is made by God Himself. 
… 
E. … God made the soul immortal … 
… 
E. … just as He, being immortal, makes something immortal in His own likeness 
… 
… 
E. … I cannot make anything immortal … 
A. … your soul has not the same power as He in whose likeness it has been 
made.  
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 Cf., ‘Nothing hinders the perception of truth more than a life devoted to lusts, and the false images of 
sensible things, derived from the sensible world and impressed on us by the agency of the body, which 
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Referring to the same text, Vannier interprets the soul’s immortality as a consequence 
of being created ‘similar’ to God (or to the ‘image of God’): ‘ce statut original de l’âme 
vient de ce que «l’âme est semblable à Dieu» (De quantitate animae II,3, p. 231). 
Créée, mais créée immortelle (ibid.), l’âme est véritablement capax Dei. … Sans doute 
Augustin reprend-il pour sa démonstration une structure platonicienne, mais il met aussi 
et surtout l’accent sur la possibilité d’action qui est donnée à l’être humain, sur le 
caractère dynamique de sa ressemblance avec Dieu.’ 828 Note ‘capax Dei’ is an 
Augustinian term appearing in De Trinitate, and means our capability to ‘participate’ 
teleologically in God – that is, to remember, understand, and love God.829 Now, if what 
Vannier means by ‘capax Dei’ is the soul’s capacity to become like God – in other 
words, our capacity to deify ourselves –, then he is certainly right in this respect: 
‘participate’ is a deificatory language of Church Fathers.830 
 
Later, Augustine argues in De vera religione that, although our body has become 
mortal due to our sin,831 the Creator God does not allow our soul to perish832, or to be 
totally separate from Him.833 In other words, God has made the soul immortal. 
 
Therefore, due to the ontological gap between God and the soul, the soul must turn 
not only inwards but also upwards in search for the Creator God.  
 
(Later, in the Confessions Augustine argues for the same thing in a similar manner. 
The fact that none of us wants to be deceived834 demonstrates that reason is always in 
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 Marie A. Vannier, ‘Le statut de l’âme dans le “De quantitate animae”’, Lectio Augustini 7 (1991), 172-
173. 
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 e.g., De Trinitate 14.8.11: (McKenna’s translation) ‘For it is His image by the very fact that it is 
capable of Him, and can be a partaker of Him (Eo quippe ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est, eiusque 
particeps esse potest)’. See Walter H. Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the 
Highest Trinitarian Image in the Human Person’, Studia Patristica 17 (Part 3), 1295 & 1297, footnote no. 
26. Also, see section ‘The image of the Triune God’ of chapter 2 in Part IV. 
830
 Refer to the first half of the Introduction. 
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 Cf., De vera religione 26.48: ‘This is the tradition concerning God’s temporal dispensation and his 
providential care for those who by sin had deservedly become mortal.’  
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 Cf., De vera religione 55.107: ‘We worship one God from whom, through whom and in whom we 
have our being, from whom we fell away, being made unlike him, by whom we have not been allowed to 
perish, the principle to which we have recourse, the form we imitate, the grace whereby we are recon-
ciled.’ 
833
 Cf., De vera religione 14.28: ‘Things are made need his good, i.e., the chief good, the supreme 
essence. They become less when by sin they are less attracted to him. But they are never entirely 
separated from him. Otherwise they would not exist at all. Movements of the soul are the affections, 
depending on the will.’ 
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touch with Truth/God, even though our will has become depraved.835 However, reason 
is not divine:836 it is created,837 since the soul itself is neither Being838 itself nor the 
Creator839. Thus, God’s immortality is the only ‘true’ one.840)  
 
(3) Immanence and omnipresence 
 
Comparing Soliloquia 1.15.29 with De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 83 
section 20 (388-395), Cary holds that there is a difference between the two texts 
regarding Augustine’s theology from the perspective of ontology.841 In the Soliloquia 
Augustine says that Truth does not exist anywhere in space (‘non … in loco’) or in 
material beings (‘non … in rebus mortalibus’), yet it still has to exist ‘somewhere’, for 
‘everything, that is, must be somewhere.’842 Thus, Truth exists in the soul.843 However, 
by the time Augustine wrote the De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus, Cary insists 
that Augustine had changed his mind: the immaterial God is not ‘somewhere’ (‘God is 
not anywhere’844), but ‘all things are in Him (i.e., God)’845. ‘From this point onward,’ 
Cary argues that, ‘when Augustine says that God does not exist in a place, he does not 
mean that God is absent from any place but that his mode of being is non-spatial and 
therefore he is omnipresent.’846  
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 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘I have met with many people who wished to 
deceive, none who wished to be deceived. … They love the truth because they have no wish to be 
deceived’ 
835
 Cf., Confessiones 10.20.29, 10.21.31, 10.23.33-34. 
836
 Cf., Confessiones 10.25.36: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘you (i.e., God) are not the mind itself. (nec ipse 
animus es)’. 
837
 Cf., Confessiones 5.3.4: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘they do not in a religious spirit investigate the 
source of the intelligence with which they research into these matters. Moreover, when they do discover 
that you (i.e., God) are their Maker, they do not give themselves to you so that you may preserve what 
you have made.’ 
838
 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16. 
839
 Cf., Confessiones 10.25.36. 
840
 Cf., Confessiones 11.7.9: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘everything is said in the simultaneity of eternity 
(i.e., when the Word, the Son of God, speaks). Otherwise time and change would already exist, and there 
would not be a true eternity and true (vera) immortality. … No element of your (i.e., God’s) word yields 
place or succeeds to something else, since it is truly immortal and eternal.’ De Trinitate 1.1.2: (Hill’s 
translation) ‘Then there is the apostle’s remark, who alone has immortality (1 Tm 6:16); since the soul too 
is called, and is, immortal in some way, he would not have said who alone has, unless it were the case that 
true (vera) immortality is unchangingness, which nothing created can have as it is peculiar to the creator.’ 
841
 Cf., Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self, 104. 
842
 Soliloquia 1.29. 
843
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.29. 
844
 De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 83 section 20 quoted in Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the 
Inner Self, 104. 
845
 De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 83 section 20 quoted in Cary, 104. 
846
 Cary, 104. 
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My interpretation of Augustine is that the above two texts are not contradictory to 
one another: the difference does not show a change in Augustine’s mind. Rather, they 
are two distinct statements about God made from two different perspectives, thus they 
can be synthesized in a mutually coherent manner. Briefly, the Soliloquia is an 
ontological statement about God/Truth from the perspective of epistemology (as 
explained, for Augustine knowledge is a substance)847, whereas the De diversis 
quaestionibus octoginta tribus is a statement about the power of God that sustains the 
existence of all His creation.  
 
The De diversis quaestionibus octoginta tribus 83 section 20 does not tell us in what 
sense all things are in God, but in what sense they are not in Him:  
 
all things are in him rather than he himself being anywhere … they are not in 
God as if he himself were a place, for place is in space which is occupied by the 
length, breadth, and height of a body.  
 
Augustine here makes clear that the analogy of how a material thing is in a place cannot 
explain God’s omnipresence. How else, then, can we interpret ‘all things are in him’? 
That is in terms of power:  
 
Who, O great God, can deny that Thou rule all things in order? (De ordine 
1.5.14) 848  
 
In other words, everything is governed by the divine order. Probably, in Augustine’s 
thoughts the divine power permeates the entire universe in a similar manner that the 
power of the soul reaches to every part of the body and, so, we are able to move any 
part of it at will:  
 
why should it be surprising if the soul is not corporeal, nor extended in length, 
nor spread out in breadth, nor made solid by depth, and yet is present so 
effectively in the body as to control (regimen) all the members of the body and 
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 See section ‘Learning (disciplina) is in the soul’ of chapter 2 in Part II. 
848
 Also, see De ordine 1.3.8: ‘nothing is done apart from order’.  
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serves as a pivot of action, so to speak, for all the motions of the body? (De 
quantitate animae 14.23)849  
 
In summary, creatures are in the God, not in the sense that a material thing is located 
in another, but in His omnipresent power that sustains their existence. On the other 
hand, Truth/God is not omnipresent from the perspective of epistemology. Truth must 
exist ‘somewhere’ and that is in memory, for only the mind can understand Truth: I 
have already explained Augustine’s conception of God’s immanence.  
 
Now, in De vera religione 11.21 Augustine makes a statement about God 
synthetically from the two perspectives: 
 
A life, therefore, which by voluntary defect falls away from him who made it, 
whose (i.e., God’s) essence it enjoyed, and, contrary to the law of God, seeks to 
enjoy bodily objects which God made to be inferior to it, tends to nothingness. … 
Who is he, then, save the one God, the one truth, the one salvation of all, the first 
and highest essence from which all that exists derives existence as such?850  
 
In short, quite apart from our epistemological activity, our existences are always 
sustained by the omnipresent divine power. Also, even though we are epistemologically 
exiled from our spiritual homeland, God’s saving power is never absent.  
 
iv) Train the mind 
 
Rendering reason ‘sound (sanus)’ 851 is crucial for understanding God, otherwise 
attempting to see Truth can do more harm than good for us:  
 
(There are some eyes so healthy and vigorous that they can fearlessly turn 
toward the sun as soon as they are opened. For such as these light itself is health; 
it is not a teacher that they need, but only, perhaps, some caution. It is enough 
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 Also, see De quantitate animae 5.7. 
850
 Also, see De vera religione 11.22 (‘The highest essence imparts existence to all that exists’) & Ibid., 
14.28 (‘Things are made need his good, i.e., the chief good, the supreme essence.’) 
851
 Soliloquia 1.6.12.  
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for them to believe, to hope, and to love.) Others, however, are dazzled by the 
very lustre which they so ardently desire to behold and, not seeing it, they gladly 
return to the darkness. To these, even though they now are such as might rightly 
be called healthy, it is dangerous to want to show what they are as yet incapable 
of seeing. They are, therefore, first to be trained, and, for their own good, their 
love is to be restricted and nourished.852  
 
(This text reminds us of Augustine’s experience of reading the Christian Bible 
immediately after the Hortensius.853) Thus, our mind has to be trained at least with 
dialectics or mathematics, so that we can become intellectually ‘healthy’854 enough to 
resolve difficult issues related to God, for example, the problem of evil: 
 
no one ought to aspire to a knowledge of those matters (e.g. the problems of 
evil) without that twofold science, so to speak – the science of right reasoning 
and that of the power of numbers. And, if anyone thinks that this is indeed a 
great deal, let him master either numbers alone or only dialectics. (De ordine 
2.18.47) 
 
The ‘science of right reasoning’ can be interpreted in two ways. In a narrow sense it 
simply means only dialectics, that is, the discipline of defining, dividing, and 
synthesizing.855 In a wide sense it signifies all branches of learning (disciplinis)856, since 
they are established by means of dialectics,857 for example, grammar:  
 
When the science of grammar had been perfected and systematized, reason was 
then reminded to search out and consider the very power by which it produced 
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 Soliloquia 1.13.23. 
853
 Cf., Confessiones 3.5.9. 
854
 ‘sanus’ (Soliloquia 1.6.13) or ‘valetudo’ (De ordine 1.8.24). 
855
 Augustine accepted Greek dialectics and ethics, whereas Ambrose only ethics: see Ragnar Holte, 
Béatitude et Sagesse (Paris: Études Augustiniennes, 1962), 151. For Plotinus dialectics is ‘the way in 
which the mind lays immediate hold on intelligible truth, for its operations are determined by the structure 
of the intelligible world and it comes into play naturally when the mind reaches the level of Intellect.’ 
(Armstrong, H., ‘Part III Plotinus, Chapter 14: Man and Reality’, in Arthur H. Armstrong [ed.], The 
Cambridge History of Later Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy [Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 1967], 235.) 
856
 Cf., De Ordine 2.5.15. 
857
 Cf., De Ordine 2.13.38. 
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art, for, by definition, division, and synthesis it not only had made it orderly and 
syntactical, but also had guarded it against every subtle encroachment of error.858  
 
An instance that Augustine uses ‘science of right reasoning’ in the wide sense is as 
follows: 
 
If you have a care for order,’ I replied, ‘you must return to those verses, for 
instruction in the liberal arts … produces devotees more alert and steadfast and 
better equipped for embracing truth.859 
 
As for the number system (i.e., Mathematics)860, the reason why Augustine insists on 
its usefulness for making our reason ‘healthy’ is that eternal truth can be found in the 
form of numbers, for instance, ratios:  
 
But, one to two, or two to four, is a ratio in the truest sense. That ratio was no 
truer yesterday than today … it will always be such as it is now.861  
 
Precisely due to the immutability of mathematical truth, Augustine says that  
 
numbers and wisdom are of one and the same kind.862 
 
Thus, although Augustine is aware that we can ‘count more easily than be wise’863, 
learning numbers helps us to be aware of intelligible realities that transcend our 
minds:864  
 
he can search after things divine - not merely as truths to be believed, but also as 
matters to be contemplated, understood … if he does not know what pure 
nothing is, what formless matter is, what a lifeless informed being is, what a 
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 De Ordine 2.13.38. 
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 De Ordine 1,8,24. 
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 Cf., De Ordine 2.18.47 quoted above. 
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 De Ordine 2.19.50. 
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 Cf., De libero arbitrio 2.31: ‘una quaedam eademque res est’ quoted in O’Daly, Augustine’s 
Philosophy of Mind, 182. 
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 De libero arbitrio 2.30 quoted in O’Daly, Augustine’s Philosophy of Mind, 183. 
864
 In Plotinus both numbers and Forms belong to the second hypostasis (i.e. nous). 
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body is, what species in a body is, what place and time are, what in a place and 
at a time signify, what local motion is, what non-local motion is, what stable 
motion is, what eternity is, what it is to be neither in a place nor nowhere, what 
is beyond time and forever, what it is to be nowhere and nowhere not to be, what 
it is to be never and never not to be - anyone who does not know these matters 
… such a one will fall into every possible error. But then, whoever has grasped 
the meaning of simple and intelligible numbers will readily understand these 
matters.865  
 
There is another academic discipline, which is not mentioned in De ordine 2.18.47 
cited above, but which can also prepare us to ‘see (videre)’866 Truth. That is geometry. 
Referring to the geometric discussion between Augustine and Evodius in De quantitate 
animae, Fortin comments that such a discussion gives ‘Augustine the opportunity to 
subject Evodius to an exercitatio mentis or mental gymnastic by which, if all goes well, 
his intellect will gradually be freed from the shackles of the senses (cf. 15,25).’867 
 
In summary, we need to train ourselves by means of dialectics and/or mathematics, 
so that we can attempt to understand ‘things divine - not merely as truths to be believed, 
but also as matters to be contemplated, understood, and retained.’868 Also, in this way 
we can be on our guard against falsehoods about God, though we do not yet know (or 
remember) Him fully.869 
  
c) Reason shapes way of life 
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 De Ordine 2.16.44 & De Vera Religione 42.79. 
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 Soliloquia 1.7.14. 
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 Ernest L. Fortin, ‘Augustine’s “De quantitate animae”, or the Spiritual Dimensions of Human 
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After reading the Hortensius, Augustine not only strived to know God/Wisdom, but also 
to lead a good life.870 Accordingly, Augustine mentions rationality not only in terms of 
theology (i.e., reason), but also of our way of life (i.e., the will); for instance, 
 
Reason, then, proceeds from a rational soul into reasonable things which are 
done or spoken:871  
 
There are, then, three classes of things in which that “something reasonable” is 
to be seen. One is in actions directed toward an end; the second, in discourse; the 
third, in pleasure. The first admonishes us to do nothing without purpose; the 
second, to teach correctly; the last, to find delight in contemplation. The first 
deals with right living; the other two, with those branches of learning which we 
are now considering.872  
 
Our view of reality and our way of life are inseparably linked: the former logically 
precedes and shapes the latter.873 This is what Augustine meant when he said, ‘someone 
who gives his approval to nothing does nothing.’874  
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Augustine understands way of life in terms of relationship. A person’s lifestyle is 
that person’s manner of relating himself/herself to material things, the self, other 
persons, and God: all of them are hierarchically875 organized. Bear in mind that ‘man 
(homo)’ means only the soul: ‘our real selves are not bodies.’876  
 
How, then, do we relate to the constituents of the hierarchy? To describe various 
modes of the soul’s relationship with them, Augustine uses words such as ‘love 
(amo/diligo)’877, ‘avoid (fugio)’878, ‘follow (sector)’ 879, ‘delight (delecto)’880, ‘neglect 
(negligo)’881, etc. ‘Love’ is most frequently employed, but its meaning varies according 
to the context. For instance, loving things other than God means a strong attachment to 
them: ‘loving (diligunt) temporal things they do not want the things they love (amant) 
to pass away.’882 Loving God, on the other hand, means making an effort to know 
God/Truth/Wisdom with dedication, passion and single-mindedness: ‘to prize nothing 
more highly than the finding of truth, to wish for, to think of, to love nothing else.’883 
(Later, Augustine creates two new terms to explain the ideal relationship between the 
soul and each of the four constituents of the world, namely ‘enjoyment [fructus]’ and 
‘use [utor]’.884) Therefore, I shall subsequently investigate Augustine’s arguments 
concerning how our view of reality fashions our way of life in terms of relationship – in 
other words, how a person’s way of thinking about God and the soul shapes and affects 
that person’s ‘rationality in action’885. I shall approach it from the perspective of our 
relationship with God (2-1), the self (2-2), and other persons (2-3). 
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Note that entrusting ourselves to a religion is giving our ‘approval’886 to its 
teachings. An important component of a belief system is a theory of reality, according 
to which we often change (or endeavour to change) our way of life. Thus, faith is also 
an influential factor that shapes our lifestyle and I shall explain it later in a separate 
chapter.887  
 
Firstly (2-1), only if we admit that God is Truth and love it, will we pursue 
Truth/God and endeavour to lead a virtuous life: ‘what else is the face of God than the 
truth for which we yearn and for which, as the object of our love (amatae), we make 
ourselves clean and beautiful?’888 Otherwise, we will strive to be happy with inferior, 
perishable things, such as money889, and our life will become miserable:  
 
Life which delights (delectata) in material joys and neglects (negligit) God tends 
to nothingness and is thereby iniquity. …In this way life becomes earthly and 
carnal. So long as it is so it will not possess the kingdom of God, and what it 
loves (amat) will be snatched from it. It loves what, being matter, is less than life 
… for by loving inferior things it is given a place among the inferior creatures, 
being deprived of its pleasures and afflicted with grief.890  
 
Secondly (2-2), regarding our relationship with the self, we above all need to 
understand what relating to one’s own self means. Augustine maintains that there are 
many faculties of the soul – for example, reason, memory, emotion, the power to 
control the body891, and the power of sense perception892 –, and that they are related to 
each other in terms of dominance and submission. The ideal relationship between the 
faculties of the soul is to have reason in charge: 
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The soul of a wise man … thoroughly cleansed by acts of virtue and already 
cleaving to God, merits the name of wise, and it is unfitting that any other part of 
him be called wise. Nevertheless, certain soiled and cast-off garments, so to 
speak - of which he has divested himself and from which he has, as it were, 
withdrawn unto himself - still serve that soul; or, if such a soul ought still to be 
pronounced integral, they certainly subserve that part of the soul which alone is 
fittingly called wise; they are in subjection to it.893  
 
(‘That part of the soul which alone is fittingly called wise’ means reason [ratio].) 
 
Having clarified what a relationship with oneself means, Augustine holds that, if we 
acknowledge God’s Creatorship, then we can ‘use (utor)’ created beings in order to 
‘enjoy (fructus)’ the Creator.894 Otherwise, we will become slaves to our own vicious 
emotions, such as anger and envy.895  
 
However, Augustine is aware that an intellectual transformation does not always 
results in an affective transformation: this must be from his own experience before his 
conversion to the Christian faith. Our perverted will must be cured, independently of 
rendering reason healthy, so that the will be not a hindrance but an assistance to reason. 
Yet, we ourselves cannot bring this about, only God can by means of ‘delight’.896 
Brown maintains in his book Augustine of Hippo that ‘feeling’ was not an issue in 
Augustine’s early thoughts.897 However, as mentioned, Augustine perceived our 
relationship with all the constituents of the world in terms of ‘love’ and its synonyms. 
Thus, I shall, first of all, introduce the scholarly debate in this respect. Next, I shall give 
more evidence that the affective transformation was one of key issues for the young 
Augustine. Finally, I shall argue that in Augustine’s early thoughts God takes the 
initiative of making us love and delight in the act of striving to know God.  
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Regarding the young Augustine’s association of the will with ‘delight’, Harrison’s 
argument against Brown is noteworthy. Referring to Ad Simplicianum (396 AD), Brown 
says, ‘For the first time Augustine came to see man as utterly dependent on God, even 
for his first initiative of believing in Him…[he] had come to this conclusion through a 
reassessment of the nature of human motivation. It is this psychological discovery 
which gives cogency to the interpretation that he placed on Paul. Briefly, Augustine had 
analysed the psychology of “delight”. “Delight” is the only possible source of action, 
nothing else can move the will’.898 Quoting a passage from the Sermones 159.3 (i.e., 
‘we do not love something unless it delights us’899), Harrison agrees with Brown on the 
‘psychology of “delight”’: ‘this is a theme which is sounded in Augustine’s thought 
from the very beginning to the very end and which fashions everything he has to say 
about the way in which the will of created beings operates. The will is only motivated 
when something delights it. … “The will can have no motive unless something presents 
itself to delight and stir the mind.”’900 Also, Harrison says, ‘Brown is absolutely right: 
the ‘psychology of delight’ is indeed the place where Augustine locates the operation of 
grace upon the will: grace presents the errant and disabled will of fallen human beings 
with what will unfailingly delight it and thereby inspire it to the good.’901 However, 
Harrison disagrees with Brown’s insistence that it is absent in Augustine’s early 
thoughts: ‘Brown insists that this insight is not found in Augustine’s earlier work: “Ten 
years before, this element had been notably lacking in Augustine’s programme for a 
‘well-trained soul’: such a soul would have risen to truth by academic disciplines, 
supported by ‘sparkling little chains of argument’. Now ‘feeling’ has taken its rightful 
place as the ally of the intellect.”902 We will need to question this conclusion’903. 
Harrison cites the following texts as the evidence that delight was an important element 
of Augustine’s system from the very beginning:  
 
physical bodies occupy a given space; the soul’s space is its desire (en.Ps. 6.9);  
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our affections are our feet…according as each man has affection, according as 
each has love, so does he either approach or recede from God (ibid 94.2);  
 
Delight is like a weight for the soul; delight orders the soul, for ‘where your 
treasure is, there will your heart be also (mus.6.11.29).904  
 
I also argue, in agreement with Harrison, that the ‘psychology of “delight”‘905 is an 
essential part of the young Augustine’s thoughts. The term ‘delight (delectare/beatus)’ 
in the early works may not be conspicuous to some of us. Nonetheless, we can find 
many synonymous terms, such as ‘affection (affectus)’906, ‘desire (cupire)’, ‘love’, 
‘enjoy (frui)’, ‘pleasure’, and ‘wish (velle)’:  
 
they wish (velle) to scrutinize the creation contrary to the commandment of God, 
and to enjoy (frui) it rather than God’s law and truth - that was the sin of the first 
man who misused his free will,907 
  
when you shall have become such a man that no earthly thing whatever delights 
(delectare) you, believe me, at that very moment, at that point of time, you will 
behold what you desire (cupire).908  
 
Also, I mentioned above that Augustine used ‘love (amo/diligo)’, ‘avoid (fugio)’, 
‘follow (sector)’, ‘delight (delecto)’, and ‘neglect (negligo)’ to describe how we relate 
to material things, the self, other persons, and God. Thus, affective transformation was 
one of key issues for the young Augustine and he approached it in terms of ‘delight’ and 
its synonyms. 
 
Regarding the other argument of mine that God takes the initiative in healing our 
perverted will,909 I shall again turn to Carol Harrison’s book Rethinking Augustine’s 
Early Theology. Here, she stresses that in Augustine we – as ’fallen human beings’ – are 
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‘incapable of returning to the truth, to love, desire and delight in God rather than the 
world; to cleave to God, and to thereby be sanctified by being conformed to Him.’910 
Next, referring to De Beata Vita 4.35 (386 AD), De fide et symbolo 19 (393 AD), and 
De Moribus 1.13.23-1.14.24 (387/389 AD), she argues that the Christian concept of the 
Holy Spirit as ‘love’ plays an important role in Augustine’s consideration concerning 
the relationship between the Trinitarian God and the human person. The task of the 
Holy Spirit is to bind not only the Father and the Son,911 but also us and God by 
‘inspiring in us the desire, delight and love which enable us to cleave to, and be 
conformed to God’912:  
 
It is through love, then, that we become conformed to God; and by this 
conformation, and circumcision from this world we are not confounded with the 
things which are properly subject to us. And this is done by the Holy Spirit…for 
the love of God is shed abroad in our hearts by the Holy Spirit which he has 
given unto us (Rom.5:5)…But we could not possibly be restored to perfection by 
the Holy Spirit, unless He Himself continued always perfect and immutable. And 
this plainly could not be unless He were of the nature and of the very substance 
of God, who alone is always possessed of immutability and invariableness. ‘The 
creature has been made subject to vanity’ (Rom.8:20). And what is subject to 
vanity is unable to separate us from vanity and to unite us to the truth. But the 
Holy Spirit does this for us. He is therefore no creature. For whatever is, must be 
either God or creature …how can anything be man’s chief good but that in 
cleaving to which he is blessed? Now this is nothing but God, to whom we can 
cleave only by affection, desire, and love.913  
 
In addition to the argument of Harrison, I insist that for Augustine our desire for 
God/Wisdom, together with a memory914 of Him, are innate within us. Hence, we are 
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able to recall God, though faintly, and then desire to know Him more. Augustine 
analogously explains it as follows: if we see an object obscurely in darkness, we 
naturally want to bring it into light for a clear view: 
 
For, just as we shun darkness with our eyes by the very fact that we are not 
willing not to see, so likewise, whoever shall desire to escape unwisdom, let him 
not try to understand it; rather, let him regret that on account of it he does not 
understand the things that can be understood.915 
 
Such an innate desire (as well as theological knowledge in our memory) is the grace of 
God: God never abandons us, though we have turned away from Him:  
 
if Thou shouldst abandon us, we are lost; but Thou dost not abandon us, because 
Thou art the Supreme Good whom no one ever rightly sought and entirely failed 
to find. … But, if there is in me any vain desire, do Thou Thyself cleanse me and 
make me fit to look upon Thee.916  
 
Furthermore, God not only evokes a good will in us, but also sustains and consolidates 
it: 
 
So with God’s guidance a man of good will can turn the troubles of this present 
life to the advantage of courage. Among abounding pleasures and temporal 
prosperity, he may prove and strengthen temperance. In temptations he may 
sharpen his prudence, that he may not only not be led into them, but may also 
become more vigilant and more eager in his love of truth which alone never 
deceives.917  
 
Omnipotent God may himself show the truth, or he may use good angels or men 
to assist men of good will to behold and grasp the truth.918 
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Note that, in order to ascend to God, both reason and the will must cooperate. 
However, they also maintain their independence from one another to a certain degree. 
Thus, an intellectual transformation does not always result in an ethical/affective 
transformation. Also, although the will has become depraved, reason is still capable of 
making sound judgments – especially concerning what we must love – because God 
always sheds His light upon our intelligence:  
  
When the soul has become involved in its sin, it learns (discit), by paying the 
penalty (luendo poenas), the difference between the precept it refused to obey 
and the sin which it committed. In this way it learns (discit) by suffering to know 
the evil it did not learn (didicit) to know by avoiding it. By making comparison 
between its former and its present state it loves more earnestly the good which it 
loved too little, as is seen from its failure to obey.919  
 
(Augustine does not use the word ‘reason (ratio)’ in this text, but ‘learning (discere)’ 
clearly signifies that its agent is reason.) This is to say that, although a perverse will has 
brought down reason from heaven to earth, God has not allowed our reason to be 
completely impaired to the point of being unable to make any sound judgment. In short, 
reason is not entirely subjugated by the will: reason is still under the guidance of divine 
illumination to a certain extent. 
 
Due to the independence of reason, our return journey to God begins with reforming 
reason, not the will. For instance, Augustine says that ‘we are thus admonished that we 
ought to turn our love from bodily pleasures to the eternal essence of truth.’920 This 
means that God awakens our reason first by admonition and, then, transforms our 
depraved will accordingly. This is consistent with my interpretation of Augustine that a 
person’s view of reality shapes that person’s way of life. Another instance is 
Augustine’s distinction between ‘delight of the sense’ and ‘delight through the 
sense’.921 I explained that these two types of delight are associated with ‘signum’ and 
‘significatio’: ‘delight of the sense’ is the enjoyment of signum, whereas ‘delight 
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through the sense’ that of significatio.922 I also mentioned that the transition from the 
former to the latter means giving up the enjoyment of sensible beings for the sake of the 
enjoyment of immaterial beings. However, such a transition is possible only if we 
intellectually perceive the significatio of a signum: 
 
All things which are beautiful to the senses, whether they are produced by nature 
or are worked out by the arts, have a spatial or temporal beauty, as for example 
the body and its movements. (De vera veligione 30.56) …But many stop with 
what delights men and are unwilling to rise to higher things, so that they may 
judge why visible things give pleasure. (Ibid., 32,59)  
 
In summary, since the will cannot delight in what we do not know; the 
transformation of our will depends on what we remember (memory), perceive (reason), 
and judge to be rational. Thus, God helps us remember (memory) and acknowledge 
(reason) His supreme existence, then makes us yearn (will) for full knowledge of Him. 
Moreover, we also need the grace of God to sustain our love of knowing God, so that 
our will continually assists reason in our journey to God: (again, as quoted above,) 
 
A certain admonition, flowing from the very fountain of truth, urges us to 
remember (recordemur) God, to seek Him, and thirst after Him tirelessly.923  
 
As we can see here, regarding how to ascend to God in terms of the relationship 
between memory, reason, and the will, Augustine’s theory is already Trinitarian. Later, 
in De Trinitate, he discusses how to make a journey to God in terms of memory, 
understanding (reason), and love as the image of the Triune God. Notice that both in the 
early works and the later works the order of the deification924 of the soul always follows 
the sequence of memory, reason, and will. 
 
Finally (2-3), regarding our relationship with others, Augustine holds that we are to 
love their reason (ratio),925 while hating their sins,926 because not only ‘my’ reason 
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(ratio), but also theirs, are the properties of God: unless we accept that our reason/souls 
belong to the Creator God, our relationships with others will be ‘carnal’, ‘temporal’, and 
‘inhuman’ rather than spiritual, eternal, and human.927 In addition, unless a person 
acknowledges the utter helplessness of created beings and the need for the divine grace, 
then that person will not tolerate others’ absurdity.928 
 
d) Faith, hope, and love 
 
Faith pertains to theory, not practice, and theory shapes practice. How, then, does 
Augustine think that faith affects our way of life, or our ‘rationality in action’929? Also, 
why is faith important, since we have reason, the ‘mind’s eye’930?  
 
In answer to the last question, Augustine insists that we do not see God – in the 
language of the later works – ‘face to face’931. Similarly, in Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14 
Augustine says that we need, in this life, to be persistent in hoping to know God fully: 
‘Hope, by which it trusts that it will see (visurum), if only it gazes (aspexerit) intently 
… Hope does not leave the soul as long as it is in this life. … the soul, after this life, 
unites itself wholly to God’. But once we see God, we do not need faith: ‘Why should 
Faith be needed, since now it sees (God)?’932 Now, as quoted above, ‘someone who 
gives his approval to nothing does nothing’933: in other words, no knowledge or belief, 
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no action. Yet, only few people can know God through reason alone,934 whereas the 
majority of us cannot: due to the Fall, our minds have become ‘dull’.935 Consequently, 
since most of us do not see God ‘face to face’ in this life, the only way to improve the 
rationality of our reason and, subsequently, our will is first of all having faith in 
revealed truths passed on to us through the orthodox Christian tradition. In other words, 
‘dull’ minded people need guidance of an authority and the legitimate authority is the 
Catholic Church: 
 
The mind is like healthy eyes when it is cleansed of every taint of the body, that 
is, detached and purged of the desires for earthly things - which cleansing it 
obtains, at first, only by faith. As long as a thing cannot be demonstrated to it 
because it is unhealthy and defiled by vices - for it cannot see unless it is healthy 
- it will have no regard for its own health unless it believes that, otherwise, it 
will not see.936  
 
Take note of Augustine’s argument in this text that faith purges us from our depraved 
desires: faith transforms our way of life in terms of love.937 
 
 Nonetheless, in other parts of his works, Augustine says that we can take full 
advantage of faith only if it is accompanied by the hope of seeing God ‘face to face’ 
after this life:938 his emphasis on such a hope is actually a call to the intellectual pursuit 
of Wisdom (i.e., ‘crede ut intelligas’939).940 Hence, faith alone is only the starting point, 
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not the completion, of Augustinian interiority. We must make an effort, with hope, to 
understand what we believe: ‘it is not by faith alone, but by trustworthy reason, that the 
soul leads itself little by little to most virtuous habits and the perfect life.’941 Based on 
the same idea, Augustine distinguishes ‘carnal Catholics (carnales catholici)’ from 
‘spiritual Catholics (spiritales catholici)’: the former have faith, but no understanding or 
action; whereas the latter strive to understand more deeply what they believe.942  
 
Although our reason needs assistance from faith, Augustine on the other hand argues 
that reason chooses what to believe:  
 
Authority demands belief and prepares man for reason. Reason leads to 
understanding and knowledge. But reason is not entirely absent from authority, 
for we have got to consider whom we have to believe (De vera religione 24.45).  
 
Soliloquia 1.1.4 can also be interpreted as implying reason’s precedence over faith:  
 
O God, who has made man to Your image and likeness, a fact which he 
acknowledges who knows himself.  
 
In other words, only those, who have already made an inwards turn to themselves and 
have rendered their reason sound, can see the reasonableness of believing the Scriptural 
teaching that we are made to the image of God.  
 
Augustine indeed has faith not only in Christian doctrines, but also in our intellectual 
ability (i.e., ‘reasoning [ratiocinatio]’943) – though the ability is very limited – to draw 
truthful conclusions through inference. For example, in Soliloquia 2.18.32-2.19.33 
Augustine is so convinced that his argument for the soul’s immortality is utterly 
flawless.944 Also, those well-trained minds, which understand the incorporeity of God 
and the soul, are also trustworthy. We can reach these conclusions under divine 
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illumination. Thus, he expresses such a conviction of his by saying to himself, ‘Believe 
now your reasons; (believe the Truth)’.945 In fact, for Augustine what is contradictory to 
reason is not faith, but ‘irrationality (insania)’. For instance (though not a good 
instance), he holds that even for a ‘dull’946 person it is absolutely unacceptable that God 
Himself commits evil, though he/she may agree that evil is outside the scope of divine 
providential power: 
 
those who ponder these matters are seemingly forced to believe either that 
Divine Providence does not reach to these outer limits of things or that surely all 
evils are committed by the will of God. Both horns of this dilemma are impious, 
but particularly the latter. For, although it is unsound and most perilous to the 
soul to hold that anything is beyond God's control, yet even among men no one 
is blamed for what he could not do or prevent. The imputing of negligence is 
indeed much more pardonable than the charge of ill will or cruelty. Reason, 
therefore, not unmindful of piety, is in a manner forced to hold that things of 
earth cannot be governed by powers divine or that they are neglected and 
unnoticed, rather than to hold that they are governed in such wise that all 
complaining about God is inoffensive and blameless.947 
 
Therefore, Augustine’s emphasis on reason does not oppose faith but irrationality.  
 
From the perspective of faith, Augustine classifies humanity into four categories 
according to their levels of rationality: the most praiseworthy group of people are 
‘spiritual Catholics’, for they understand what they believe;948 next the Catholics, who 
do not yet understand revealed truths but sustain their lives with ‘faith’, ‘hope’, and 
‘love’;949 then ‘carnal Catholics’950, for they have faith but make no effort to know God. 
Finally, the most irrational people are non-Catholics (as well as heretics and 
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schismatic951). Augustine argues that they are ‘proud’952 people and their pride is the 
stumbling block against their becoming Catholics. Regarding how they conduct their 
lives, Augustine says that they become circumcised;953 love themselves, not God;954 
worship things other than the Creator;955 maintain unchristian relationship with others 
(e.g., they want others to worship them956); seek power (potentiam);957 and are 
ambitious958.  
 
The significance of the four categories of people becomes more apparent if we 
approach it in the light of the relationship between view of reality and way of life. 
Theoretically we can work out four sets of combinations between correct and incorrect 
views of reality, and right and wrong ways of life as follows: 
 
1. A wrong view of reality resulting in a perverse way of life (stage 1). 
2. A wrong view of reality resulting in a virtuous lifestyle (stage 2).959  
3. A correct view of reality but still remaining in a perverse way of life (stage 3).960 
4. A correct view of reality resulting in a virtuous lifestyle (stage 4). 
 
Set 1, 3 and 4 cover the whole range of Augustine’s experience of himself: stage 1 is 
what he used to be in his early youth; stage 3 represents his frustration at not being able 
to change his lifestyle and get himself baptized; and stage 4 is the state which he 
attained in Cassiciacum after reading the Letter of Paul to the Romans.961  
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Now, ‘carnal Catholics’ are either in stage 3 or probably will be. ‘Spiritual 
Catholics’, on the other hand, are firmly rooted in the stage 4. Faith, hope and love can 
make one jump from stage 1 or 3 to stage 4. Yet, it must be stressed again that the entire 
process of becoming ‘rational’ through faith and reason in terms of theory and practice 
is brought about by the grace of God; since reason is not the Creator, but is merely one 
of the created things which depends utterly on the Creator.  
 
e) Divine grace 
 
It is generally agreed in Augustine scholarship that grace is not an important part of his 
thoughts before 391. However, as a matter of fact, the word ‘grace’ is not entirely 
absent in the early works; for instance, 
 
it (i.e., the soul) has the aid of God’s grace (gratia) enabling it to overcome them 
(i.e., ‘enjoying mortal things’) (De vera religione 7.24),  
 
The human body was perfect of its kind before man sinned, but after he had 
sinned it became weak and mortal. Though that was the just punishment for sin 
... The beauty of justice is in complete accord with the grace (gratia) of loving-
kindness, seeing that we who were deceived by the sweetness of inferior goods 
should be taught by the bitterness of penalties. (Ibid., 15.29: also, see Ibid., 
17.33, 23.44, and 55.113)  
 
Notice that the above texts are extracted from only De vera religione, which was 
composed between AD 389 and 391. However, despite the scarcity of the word ‘grace’ 
in the earlier works, we can find many synonymous expressions, such as 
‘compassion/clemency (clementia)’962, ‘gift of God (Dei donum)’963, ‘admonition 
(admonitio)’964, ‘His help (adiuvante)’965, and ‘the most helpful Lord (utilissimi 
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Domini)’966. Also, Augustine considers God’s becoming man as an expression of divine 
grace: 
 
the most subtle chain of reasoning would never call back to this intelligible 
world souls that have been blinded by the manifold shadows of error and 
rendered forgetful by the deepest filth from the body, had not God the Highest, 
moved by a certain compassion for the multitude, humbled and submitted the 
authority of the Divine Intellect even to the human body itself. (Contra 
academicos 3.19.42) 
 
Great, indeed, though it be that so great a God has for our sake deigned to take 
up and dwell in this body of our own kind. (De ordine 2.5.16) 
 
Note that, as explained in the Introduction, the mature Augustine’s theory of deification 
consists of two parts, namely ontological and teleological: regarding the former, God 
has already made us ‘participate’ in Him by ‘adopting’ us as His sons through the Son’s 
incarnation, crucifixion and resurrection, and our baptism. Similarly, we can interpret 
the above texts from the young Augustine’s works as referring to the ontological 
dimension of deification: the Son has already prepared the way for us to ‘participate’ 
teleologically (i.e., with our memory, mind, and heart) in God. 
 
Augustine’s emphasis on the necessity of divine grace is based on his interpretation 
of the creation doctrine, that is, that the state of being created out of nothing intrinsically 
connotes utter dependence on the Creator. Hence, it goes without saying that our ascent 
to God depends on divine grace in every respect. The evidence can be found in his 
earliest works written in Cassiciacum and one of them is Soliloquia. Before examining a 
part of the Soliloquia, I shall introduce Watson’s argument concerning the general spirit 
of the text. 
 
In section ‘Reason shapes way of life’ in chapter 2, I have already explained the 
young Augustine’s awareness of the problem that an intellectual transformation does 
not always (or necessarily) result in a moral/affective transformation. I also argued that 
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in Augustine’s thoughts God takes the initiative in healing our perverted will. Similarly, 
Watson insists that, when Augustine was writing the Soliloquia, he was very 
‘conscious’ of the same problem. Furthermore, Augustine acknowledged that the 
Christian Bible was relevant in this respect more than the libri platonicorum:  
 
The books of the Platonists encouraged him to press on towards the incorporeal 
truth, but, according to his later account in the Confessions, they were not 
sufficient on their own to bring him to it. He turned once again to the Scriptures, 
particularly to Paul. Paul made him aware, in a way the books of the Platonists 
could not do, of the law in his members fighting against the law of his mind 
(ibid.7,26-27). Paul’s writings convinced him that the ascent to God was not just 
an intellectual struggle upwards: it was also a fight against the body. The fact that 
so much emphasis was placed on physical struggle reassured Augustine and 
helped to lead him onwards, however violent the struggle became. In Paul he 
could see the Neoplatonist flight from the body, but he saw it presented as the 
vivid reality of the everyday experience of the ordinary man, rather than the 
serene ascent of the intellectual in his ivory tower.967  
 
This argument of Watson indeed explains why Augustine discusses God’s Creatorship – 
in reference to our inability to give up our immorality, our utter dependence of Him, and 
the problem of evil – right in the beginning of the Soliloquia, for instance, 1.1.2: 
 
1) O God, the Founder (conditor) of the Universe, grant (praesta) me first of all 
that I may fittingly supplicate Thee; next, that I may so act that I may be 
worthy of a hearing from Thee; finally, I beg Thee to set me free (liberes). 
2) O God, through whom all those things, which of themselves would not exist, 
strive to be.968 
3) O God, who does not permit (permittis) to perish even that which is self-
destructive (perimit). 
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4) O God, who from nothing has created this world which every eye sees to be 
most beautiful. 
5) O God, who dost not cause evil, and who dost cause that it become not most 
evil. 
6) O God, who, to those few who have their refuge in that which truly is (quod 
vere est), shows that evil is nothing. 
7) O God, through whom the universe, even with its sinister side, is perfect. 
8) O God, by whose ordinance the uttermost discord is as naught, since the less 
perfect things are in harmony with the more perfect. 
9) O God, whom everything loves which is capable of loving whether knowingly 
or unknowingly. 
10) O God, in whom are all things (Deus in quo sunt omnia) and yet the 
shamefulness of every creature does not shame Thee, their wickedness does 
not harm (nocet) Thee, nor does their error deceive Thee. 
11) O God, who has not willed that any save the pure should know the True. 
12) O God, the Father (pater) of Truth, the Father of Wisdom, Father of True and 
Supreme Life, Father of Happiness, Father of the Good and the Beautiful, 
Father of Intelligible Light, Father of our watching and our enlightenment, 
Father of the covenant (pignoris) by which we are admonished (admonemur) 
to return to Thee.969 
 
I shall rephrase some passages in the above text and separate them into two groups, so 
that we can easily compare Augustine’s perception of the human person with that of 
God from the perspective of the creation theory. 
 
First of all, regarding the ontological and teleological state of created beings;  
 
1. they cannot bring forth and maintain their own existences [2]; 
2. they are, by nature, self-destructive (perimere) [3]; 
3. we can only ask for (rogare) divine assistance (praestere), since God alone can 
liberate us [1]; 
4. we can only render (agere) ourselves worthy to be heard by God [1]; 
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5. and finally God takes the initiative for our return to Him by admonishing 
(admonere) us [12]. 
 
Next, as for God, 
 
1. God is the Creator (conditor) [1], producing things out of nothing [4]; 
1.1. God is the First Cause (pater) [12]; 
1.2. God is Being Itself (quod vere est) [6];  
1.3. God’s power is omnipresent (Deus in quo sunt omnia) [10]; 
1.4. God sustains the existence of His creation [2];  
1.5. God is the Ruler, without whose permission (permittere) nothing can take place 
[3];  
1.6. God is transcendent, so that nothing can harm (nocere) Him [10];970 
2. God is the Helper (praestere) [1]; 
3. God is the Liberator (liberare) [1]; 
4. and finally divine grace is at work among us through the covenant [12]. 
 
In summary, since we have no ‘dominion (potestas)’ over ourselves,971 the whole 
process of our journey back to God – even ‘undertaking (suscipere)’ it – entirely 
depends on God’s ‘help/grace (adjuvare/clementia)’.972 
 
Due to his perception of the human person as being utterly helpless, Rist argues that 
Augustine was probably able to criticise Neoplatonism from the outset: ‘it could 
describe, metaphysically, something of the “end” for humanity but fail to provide the 
means. (Plato and) Plotinus supposed that the natural divinity of the human soul (part of 
which could remain sinless) provides us with sufficient means to climb to “heaven,” to 
the perfect life. Within us is a pearl in the oyster, a pure, uncontaminated part of the 
self, which we can with effort free of its contaminations derived from empirical life, so 
that once again we become perfect. However, Porphyry973 and his student Iamblichus 
had lost this confidence in our innate goodness: Iamblichus taught that the whole soul is 
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fallen. That means that we have inadequate resources within ourselves to return to the 
One. We need the help of the gods.’974  
 
Having discussed the young Augustine’s theory of interiority, it is necessary to 
remind ourselves of why pursuing Wisdom suddenly began to be important for him 
after reading the Hortensius: as Pegis writes,  
 
The search for deliverance is the secret of Augustine’s disquietude. He is not 
seeking a definition (of the human person), he is seeking liberty; he is not 
seeking Plotinian immaterialism, he is seeking liberation from servitude to the 
flesh whose care he finds so attractive and in whose attractiveness he has lost 
himself and God; he is not seeking to recall and to recapture the life of a 
Plotinian divinity, he is seeking the grace of God. Christian liberty: this is 
Augustine’s ultimate search.975  
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III. The Confessions 976 
 
The entire Confessions can be viewed as an organic whole from the perspective of 
deification, of which interiority is a crucial constituent part. Before proceeding to 
demonstrate it, I shall briefly remind readers of the scholarly controversy concerning 
how to approach the structural layout of the thirteen books of the Confessions. The crux 
of the controversy is whether or not there is any consistency between Books 1-10 and 
Books 11-13, or an underlying central theme that can explain coherently the difference 
between Books 1-9, Book 10, and Books 11-13. Augustine says in Retractationes 32,  
 
The thirteen books of my Confessions praise the just and good God for my evil 
and good acts, and lift up the understanding and affection of men to Him … The 
first ten books were written about myself; the last three about Holy Scripture, 
from the words: “In the beginning God created heaven and earth” as far as the 
Sabbath rest. 
 
Although Augustine insists in the first half of the excerpt that the sole aim of the 
Confessions is to praise God through helping his readers turn to God with their minds 
and hearts, many scholars, concentrating on the second half, argue that there is an 
apparent discontinuity, at least at a superficial level, between the two/three groups of the 
thirteen books. For instance, the ‘tone’ of the first nine books is noticeably different 
from the remaining four books: the former are narrative, descriptive, and 
autobiographical whereas the latter are largely philosophical and theoretical.977 Thus, 
their question is ‘What is the main topic and what are merely “digressions” and 
“appendices”?’978 Some of them endeavour to identify the principle that dominates the 
whole Confessions. For instance, Pizzolato locates the unity of the Confessions in the 
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idea that Books 1-9 describe the six ages of Augustine’s life979 and Books 10-13 offer a 
commentary on the six days of creation in Genesis, ending with the final day of rest in 
the kingdom of God. Augustine parallels these two ideas explicitly in a couple of texts 
elsewhere, and here the parallel is clear in his use of imagery derived from the days of 
creation to describe the ages of his own life (e.g., the tempestuous seas/waters of 
adolescence). What he describes in microcosm in the first part of Confessions he then 
describes in macrocosmic terms in the second part.980 A few other scholars, for 
example, Zepf, argue that there is no common theme that knits the two parts together.981  
 
At first glance Augustine, does not, in any part of the Confessions, seem to address 
himself to the issue of deification. As a matter of fact, there is no such word as 
‘deificari’ or its synonyms. However, if we acknowledge that Augustinian deification 
consists of an ontological dimension (established on the foundation of the creation 
doctrine and Christology) and a teleological dimension, and that the latter is in turn 
comprised of an intellectual part (i.e., memory, reason, understanding, and faith) and a 
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practical/ethical part (i.e., love) then we can easily observe that the overall structure of 
the entire Confessions follows his own theory regarding the logical sequence of the 
deificatory process. I have already mentioned that there are parallels between the young 
Augustine’s theory of teleological development and the course of his spiritual life from 
his infancy.982 So, I am here insisting that deification is the central theme of the 
Confessions, repeating my previous argument that the mature Augustine’s theory 
concerning the multiple levels of the soul’s divinity (or ‘greatness’983) is fundamentally 
based on the landmarks in his own spiritual development. I shall demonstrate this before 
exploring the Confessions from the perspective of interiority (i.e., a methodology of 
getting ourselves teleologically deified). Note that the above text cited from 
Retractationes 32 can be interpreted in a deificatory sense. That is to say that the 
Augustine of the Confessions ‘praises’ God by narrating his spiritual journey to God: 
first of all, he read the Hortensius at the age of nineteen and it helped him remember984 
God (cf., 3.4.7-3.4.8), whom he had previously forgotten (cf., 1.1.1-3.3.6); secondly, he 
endeavoured with passion to ‘see’985 God through understanding His creation (e.g., 
3.5.9 -10.43.70); and finally attempted to understand revealed truth with faith and love 
in the hope of completing his ‘ascent’986 to God (e.g., 11-13). 
 
The Confessions start with the affirmation that we (i.e., the soul) are ontologically 
conditioned to desire God, and are innately given the ‘capacity’987 to reach Him with 
our heart and mind by means of divine grace (cf. 1.1.1-1.5.6): 
 
(Note that, unless stated otherwise, all texts quoted from the Confessions in this 
introductory section of Part III are Chadwick’s translations.) 
 
Man, a little piece of your creation, desires to praise you, a human being “bearing 
his mortality with him’ (2 Cor. 4: 10), carrying with him the witness of his sin 
and the witness that you ‘resist the proud’ (1 Pet. 5:5). … You stir man to take 
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pleasure in praising you, because you have made us for yourself, and our heart is 
restless until it rests in you (1.1.1),  
 
Without you, whatever exists would not exist (1.2.2), 
 
you (i.e., God) command me to love you … Open them (i.e., Augustine’s ears) 
and ‘say to my soul, I am your salvation.’ (1.5.5)  
 
Bear in mind that, although our body has become mortal by virtue of our sin (cf., 1.1.1), 
our soul remains immortal because God has made us ‘participate’988 in His Being – in 
other words, God continually sustains the soul’s existence (cf., 1.2.2).989 (As explained 
in the Introduction, ‘participation’990 as well as ‘adoption’991 are the language of 
deification among the Church Fathers.) Also, for the same reason, our soul is enabled to 
desire God constantly. Augustine explains our ontological participation in God in two 
ways. One is in terms of the creation doctrine: we are made in the image and likeness of 
God, which cannot be obliterated (cf., 13.22.32). Thus, as the image of 
‘Reason’992/God, we are forever supremely rational among God’s creation: 
 
humanity, in your (i.e., God’s) image and likeness, put in authority over all 
irrational animals by your image and likeness, that is by the power of reason and 
intelligence. (13.32.47)   
 
The other is from the perspective of Christology: 
 
He is ‘the mediator between God and men, the man Christ Jesus’ (I Tim. 2: 5). 
He appeared among mortal sinners as the immortal righteous one, mortal like 
humanity, righteous like God. Because the wages of righteousness are life and 
peace (Rom. 6: 23), being united with God by his (i.e., Christ’s) righteousness he 
made void the death of justified sinners, a death which it was his will to share in 
common with them. (10.43.68)  
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Since the body is anyhow doomed to die, the passage ‘he made void the death of 
justified sinners’ must be interpreted in the sense that, as the image of the ‘Life’, the 
soul is made immortal by Christ’s death: as God is the ‘life of souls’, the soul is 
eternally the ‘life of bodies’ (cf., 3.6.10). There is another similar text: 
 
In him (i.e., Christ) ‘the prince of this world’ (John 14: 30) found nothing worthy 
of death and killed him, and ‘the decree which was against us was cancelled’ 
(Col. 2: 14). (7.21.27) 
 
Due to the cancellation of the decree against us, the soul is allowed to ‘participate’ 
continually in Being/God (and is simultaneously given the potential to ascend to Him). 
 
In the remaining part of the Confessions 1.6.7-13.35.50 Augustine narrates his 
teleological journey, analysing and interpreting it in reference to the ‘seven levels of the 
soul’s greatness’993, and there are six key points worth noting for our purposes (6). 
 
Beginning with the examination of his infancy, Augustine first of all (6-1) explains 
what he holds to be an ‘irrational’ state of the soul, in which he was unable to get the 
image of God in him renewed – in other words, he was unable to remember God and 
was consequently obsessed with material and worldly things. (Cf., Confessiones 1.6.7-
3.3.6) 
 
Secondly (6-2), Augustine describes how his memory of God was refreshed through 
reading the Hortensius, (cf., Confessiones 3.4.7-3.4.8) and how he attempted and failed 
to render the memory more explicit through the Christian Bible, Manichaeism, 
Stoicism, and ‘many other philosophers’ ideas (multa philosophorum)’994 (cf., 3.5.9-
6.16.26).  
 
Thirdly (6-3), Augustine insists that God initiated his intellectual ascent to Himself 
through the ‘libri platonicorum’ (cf., Confessiones 7.1.1-7.10.16): 
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By the Platonic books I was admonished to return into myself. With you as my 
guide I entered into my innermost citadel, and was given power to do so because 
you had become my helper (Ps, 29: 11). I entered and with my soul’s eye, such as 
it was, saw above that same eye of my soul the immutable light higher than my 
mind … And I found myself far from you ‘in the region of dissimilarity’ (Ennead 
1.8.13.15f [from Plato, Stateman 273d])995, and heard as it were your voice from 
on high: ‘I am the food of the fully grown; grow and you will feed on me. And 
you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats, but you will be 
changed into me.’ And I recognized that ‘because of iniquity you discipline man’ 
and ‘cause my soul to waste away like a spider’s web’ (Ps. 38: 14) (7.10.16)996.  
 
Again, ‘dissimilarity’ and ‘you (i.e., Augustine) will be changed into me (i.e., God)’ are 
deificatory expressions. 
 
Fourthly (6-4), referring to his utter helplessness in rendering his lifestyle ethical, in 
accordance with his previous intellectual conversion, Augustine first of all ascribes it to 
the created nature of our existence and then argues for the indispensability of 
faith/baptism and divine grace for our deification from the perspective of Christology 
(cf., Confessiones 7.9.13- 9.13.37): 
 
There (i.e., in ‘libri platonicorum’) I read … ‘… He (i.e., the Word) was in the 
beginning with God. All things were made by him, and without him nothing was 
made. What was made is life in him; and the life was the light of men. And the 
light shone in the darkness, and the darkness did not comprehend it.’ Moreover, 
the soul of man, although it bears witness of the light, is ‘not that light’, but God 
the Word is himself ‘the true light which illuminates every man coming into the 
world’. Further, ‘he was in this world, and the world was made by him, and the 
world did not know him’. But that ‘he came to his own and his own did not 
receive him; but as many as received him, to them he gave the power to become 
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sons of God by believing in his name’, that I did not read there (John 1: 1-12) 
(7.9.13).  
 
Notice here that in Plotinus the upper part of the soul (i.e., the intellect [whereas the 
lower part is discursive reason]) permanently remains in God (i.e., Intellect or the 
World of Platonic Forms/Ideas). Thus, in Augustine’s interpretation of Neoplatonism in 
comparison to Christianity, it is likely that in the former the soul is potentially the 
‘light’/God whereas in the latter it is not. Due to the creation doctrine, Christians insist 
on the soul’s becoming that ‘light’ only by ‘adoption’:  
 
you (i.e., God) sought us that we should seek you, your Word by whom you 
made all things including myself, your only Son by whom you have called to 
adoption the people who believe (Gal. 4: 5), myself among them (11.2.4).  
 
‘Adoption’, like ‘image of God’ and ‘participation’, is applied both in an ontological 
sense and in a teleological sense: this is to say that, although we are created as ‘adopted 
sons’ of God, the ‘adoption’ has not yet been completed. 
 
In the Confessions the evidence concerning the Christological element of 
Augustinian deification is very conspicuous, and I shall provide more of it in order to 
justify my argument that deification is indeed the central theme of the thirteen books as 
an organic whole: 
 
unless I had sought your way in Christ our Saviour (Titus I: 4), I would have 
been not expert but expunged (7.20.26)997,  
 
I read there (i.e., in the ‘libri platonicorum’) that the Word, God, is ‘born not of 
the flesh, nor of blood, nor of the will of man nor of the will of the flesh, but of 
God’. But that ‘the word was made flesh and dwelt among us’ (John 1: 13-14), I 
did not read there. …The books (i.e., the ‘libri platonicorum’) say that before all 
times and above all times your only-begotten Son immutably abides eternal with 
you, and that souls ‘receive his fullness’ (John 1: 16) to be blessed, and that they 
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are renewed to be wise by participation in wisdom abiding in them. But they do 
not contain that ‘at the right time he died for the impious’ (Rom. 5: 6), and that 
you ‘did not spare your only Son but gave him up for us all’ (Rom. 8: 32). For 
you have hidden these things from the wise and revealed them to babes, that 
toiling and burdened they should come to him to be restored (reficeret) 
(7.9.14)998, 
 
his (i.e., Christ’s) wonderful birth from a virgin was an example of despising 
temporal things to gain immortality for us (7.19.25).  
 
The word ‘expunge’ in the first excerpt must be interpreted with respect to the soul in a 
teleological sense. The second excerpt shows Augustine’s Christology in reference to 
both the ontological (i.e., ‘souls “receive his fullness” to be blessed’, and all human 
souls have already the Son’s ‘fullness’) and the teleological (i.e., ‘they are renewed to 
be wise by participation in wisdom’, and how much one person ‘participates in 
Wisdom’ differs from another) dimensions of deification. The last excerpt from 7.19.25 
is Augustine’s Neoplatonic interpretation of Christ’s incarnation: the virgin birth of 
Christ is God’s admonition that we must turn away from the world of senses to the 
world of intelligible beings.  
 
Note that the Augustine of the Confessions often uses ‘salvation’ and ‘eternal life’ in 
a deificatory sense:  
 
Who will enable me to find rest in you? … if I fail to love you, you are angry 
with me … Open them (i.e., Augustine’s ears) and ‘say to my soul, I am your 
salvation.’ After that utterance I will run and lay hold on you. Do not hide your 
face from me (cf. Ps. 26: 9). Lest I die, let me die so that I may see it (1.5.5),  
 
That is how it was when at that moment we (i.e., Monica & Augustine in Ostia) 
extended our reach and in a flash of mental energy attained the eternal wisdom 
which abides beyond all things. If only it could last, and other visions of a vastly 
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 ‘Garriebam plane quasi peritus et, nisi in Christo, salvatore nostr, viam tuam quaererem, non peritus 
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 ‘…venirent ad eum laborantes et onerati et reficeret eos’. 
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inferior kind could be withdrawn! Then this alone could ravish and absorb and 
enfold in inward joys the person granted the vision. So too eternal life is of the 
quality of that moment of understanding after which we sighed (9.10.25)999, 
 
I was superior to these external objects but inferior to you, and you are my true 
joy if I submit to you, and you have made subject to me what you created to be 
lower than me. This was the correct mean, the middle ground in which I would 
find health (salutis), that I should remain ‘in your image’, and in serving you be 
master of my body. (7.7.11)1000 
 
How can salvation be obtained except through your hand remaking what you 
once made? (5.7.13)1001  
 
In short, ‘salvation’, which is semantically interchangeable with ‘rest’ and ‘eternal life’ 
(cf., 1.5.5, 9.10.25 & 7.7.11), is the ‘remaking’ of the image of God (cf.,5.7.13) through 
attempting to ‘see’ God ‘face to face’1002 (cf., 1.5.5 & 9.10.25) 1003 while liberating 
ourselves from the bondage to material things (cf., 7.7.11). 
 
Fifthly (6-5), in the last part of Book 10, Augustine expresses his Christology in 
reference not only to the ontological dimension, but also the teleological dimension, of 
deification: 
 
For us he was victorious before you and victor because he was victim. For us 
before you he is priest and sacrifice, and priest because he is sacrifice. Before 
you he makes us sons instead of servants by being born of you and being servant 
to us. With good reason my firm hope is in him. For you will cure all my diseases 
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 ‘… talis sit sempiterna uita quale fuit hoc momentum intelligentiae, cui suspirauimus’. Also, see De 
vera religione 3.3 & De Trinitate 1.8.17: ‘eternal life, that they should know you, the one true God, and 
Jesus Christ whom you have sent (Jn 17:3).’ 
1000
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1002
 Confessiones 10.5.7. 
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 Also, see Confessiones 8.1.2 (‘Of a certainty, all men are vain who do not have the knowledge of 
God, or have not been able, from the good things that are seen, to find him who is good’), 10.5.7 & 
12.13.16. 
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(Ps. 102: 3) through him who sits at your right hand and intercedes with you for 
us (Rom. 8: 34) (10.43.69), 
 
‘That is why Christ died for all, so that those who live should not live for 
themselves, but for him who died for them’ (2 Cor. 5: 15) (10.43.70). 
 
In short, Christ – through His incarnation, death, and resurrection – has made us 
‘adopted’ sons of God (cf., 10.43.69: ‘he makes us sons instead of servants by being 
born of you and being servant to us’), enabling our soul to ‘participate’ in His ‘Life’1004 
(cf., 10.43.70: ‘those who live’). Moreover, only Christ can lead us to our ‘salvation’ 
(cf., 10.43.69: ‘you will cure all my diseases [Ps. 102: 3] through him’) and make our 
life full in God (cf., 10.43.70: ‘should not live for themselves, but for him’). In the 
remaining part of Book 10 Augustine minutely reiterates how he has come to acquire 
knowledge of God, which is both the goal and the means of his teleological project. 
Thus, the whole of Book 10 serves more like a summary of Books 1-9. 
 
Finally (6-6), Augustine attempts to ascend to God through faith, hope and love in 
Books 11-13; for knowing God (especially His immateriality, immanence, 
omnipresence, and transcendence) through understanding His creation is not sufficient 
to complete our teleological journey: Holte correctly maintains that ‘Augustinian faith is 
a faith in search of understanding, striving for union with God in an act of perfect 
intellectual contemplation of the divine reality, implying a state of perfect rest and 
peace.’1005  
 
We have seen that Christology has become more integral to the mature Augustine’s 
theory of deification than the young Augustine’s. Otherwise, there is no noteworthy 
difference between them. Thus, as in Part II, I shall, first of all, examine the mature 
Augustine’s hierarchical view of reality in chapter (1), for it gives reasons why he 
maintained that we must turn to God. Afterwards, in chapter (2), I shall investigate how 
Augustine argued that we can move closer to God in terms of reason, will, faith, and 
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 Cf., Confessiones 3.6.10. 
1005
 Ragnar Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, Studia Ephemeridis 
“Augustinianum” 32 (1990), 71. 
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divine grace. I shall outline and explain how I am going to investigate this at the 
beginning of this chapter. 
 
1) Augustine’s view of reality 
 
Like the young Augustine, the mature Augustine understood that reality is 
hierarchically structured. The hierarchy of reality is also a ‘hierarchy of value’1006 in 
terms of ‘better’1007, ‘love’1008 and happiness1009: God is the ‘supreme Value’.1010 
Augustine’s criteria for the value system (cf., the Confessions 10.7.11-8.12, 10.17.26 
and 10.25.36) are basically same as the young Augustine’s, following the schema of the 
Neoplatonic hierarchy ‘esse, vivere, intelligere’ in ascending order.1011  
 
The human soul is ontologically located between the body and God. Yet, from the 
perspective of teleology1012 the soul can rise to the level of God or fall below it: in other 
words, the hierarchical order is not ‘static’ for the soul.1013 Nonetheless, God wills that 
we ‘orientate’1014 ourselves to Him alone. Otherwise, being created from nothing, we 
are destined to suffer from ‘restlessness’.1015 Corcoran is absolutely right when he 
comments: 
 
as man emerges from the creative hands of God, he has within himself a motion, 
a dynamism towards God. It is precisely because man is not complete in himself 
that he is in motion to something outside himself where he will find his 
completion. … man must find his identity outside himself, and whether he rises 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1006
 Cary, ‘Book Seven: Inner Vision as the Goal of Augustine’s Life’, 117. 
1007
 ‘potius’ (De vera religione 48.93) or ‘melius’ (Confessiones 7.1.1). 
1008
 De vera religione 48.93. 
1009
 Cf., Le Blond, Les Conversions de saint Augustin, 178-180. ‘It (i.e., vitam beatam) is enough, it is 
there.’ (Confessiones 10.20.29 quoted in Le Blond, 177.) Also, see Soliloquia 1.1.3: ‘O God, Happiness, 
in whom and by whom and through whom all those things are happy which are happy’. 
1010
 Cf., Le Blond, 175 & 178-179. Confessiones 9.5.10: ‘O si viderent internum aeternum’ quoted in Le 
Blond, 178. 
1011
 Cf., Gérard Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez saint Augustin’, 
Augustiniana 4 (1954), 508. 
1012
 See chapter 1 ‘The Hortensius’ in Part I. 
1013
 Cf., Gerard O’Daly, ‘Hierarchies in Augustine's Thought’, in Platonism Pagan and Christian: Studies 
in Plotinus and Augustine (Ashgate: Aldershot, 2001), 145. 
1014
 Quoted in Corcoran, ‘A Guide to the Confessions of St. Augustine’, 19. 
1015
 Cf., Confessiones 1.1.1: ‘fecisti nos ad te’. This is related to ‘my weight is my love’ (Ibid., 13.9.10): 
for more explanation, see the beginning of section ‘Practical dimension’ in chapter 2. 
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above himself or sinks below himself depends on the choices he makes. If he 
opts for God, he will reach the full potentialities of his being and find rest.1016 
 
I take ‘man must find his identity outside himself’ as ultimately meaning that we are the 
image of God and, so, must strive to renew the image.1017 
 
Augustine mentions the ‘dynamism’1018 of the soul in terms of the ‘image of God’1019 
and ‘renewing (renovare)’ the image means deification:  
 
man “is renewed in the knowledge of God after the image of him who created 
him” (Col. 3: 10).1020 (Confessiones 13.22.32). 
 
Augustine describes the ‘dynamism’ of the image of God in several ways. Sagacity is 
one: God is immutable Wisdom, whereas we – the image of Wisdom/God – can become 
wise or foolish.1021 Thus, becoming wise is becoming like Wisdom/God. Rationality is 
another instance: God is ‘eternal Reason’1022, whereas human reason is created and 
mutable.1023 In Confessiones 10.6.9-10 Augustine concisely describes two levels of 
rationality1024 in reference to our ability to understand God through understanding (or 
by ‘judging’) His creation: those, who question whether a being is created or not, 
pertain to the upper level; otherwise to the lower level. Thus, becoming rational is 
becoming like Reason/God. (In Part II, I explained that the concepts of sagacity, 
rationality, and image of God are interconnected.)1025 Becoming wiser or more rational 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1016
 Corcoran, 19. 
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 Confessiones 6.3.4 (‘man being made by you your image (Gen. 1:26)’) & 13.22.32 (‘man “is renewed 
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 Chadwick’s translation: ‘homo “renovatur in agnitione Dei secundum imaginem eius, qui creavit 
eum”’ 
1021
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 Cf., ‘integer sensus’. 
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 See section ‘The image of God’ in chapter 1. 
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is simultaneously an ascent to ‘Being’ itself (i.e., ‘I am who I am’),1026 or increasing our 
being, because our existence itself is the image of the supreme Being:  
 
cum te primum cognovi, tu adsumpsisti me ut viderem esse quod viderem, et 
nondum me esse qui viderem (Confessiones 7.10.16)1027. 
 
Chadwick translates it as follow: 
 
When I first came to know you, you raised me up to make me see that what I saw 
is Being, and that I who saw am not yet Being.1028 
 
Wetzel criticizes the above translation, arguing that ‘it seems as if Augustine had the 
ambition of one day becoming God (Being).’1029 If Wetzel’s interpretation of Chadwick 
is right, then I argue that the latter has grasped the true spirit of Augustinian interiority: 
the small word ‘not yet (nondum)’ suggests that becoming God/Being is the goal of 
Augustine’s spiritual life, though he admitted that the goal is unattainable in this life. 
Note that Wetzel himself observes the idea of deification in Augustine in the same part 
of the Confessions:  
 
I (i.e., God) am the food of the fully grown; grow and you (i.e., Augustine) will 
feed on me. And you will not change me into you like the food your flesh eats, 
but you will be changed into me.1030 (Confessions 7.10.16) 
 
Wetzel comments on this passage in a manner which endorses the passage from the 
above translation of Chadwick’s: ‘by the time Augustine would have had his fill of God, 
there would be no Augustine left, but only God.’1031  
 
2) Deification of the soul 
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Augustine maintains that everybody has the innate desire to become like God, and 
endeavours to justify it from the perspective of teleology. He first of all insists that we 
have a natural, universal yearning for ‘happy life (beata vita)’;1032 next argues that the 
happy life is the ‘joy in Truth’ and Truth is God:1033 
 
if I put the question to anyone whether he prefers to find joy in the truth or in 
falsehood, he does not hesitate to say that he prefers the truth, just as he does not 
hesitate to say he wants to be happy. The happy life is joy based on the truth. 
This is joy grounded in you, O God, who are the truth (Confessiones 
10.23.33)1034.  
 
Since true happiness is the ‘joy’ in God/Truth, wanting to be happy is the same as 
yearning for God/Truth and vice versa:  
 
When I seek you, my God, what I am seeking is happy life.1035 
 
‘Seeking God’ means searching for knowledge of God and, upon acquiring the 
knowledge, we become like God. In other words, we become wiser and more rational 
through knowing God, for we (i.e., the soul) are the image of 
Wisdom/‘Reason’1036/God:  
 
What could be worse arrogance than the amazing madness (dementia) with 
which I asserted myself to be by nature what you (i.e., God) are? I was 
changeable and this was evident to me from the fact that I wanted to be wise and 
to pass from worse to better.1037 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1032
 Cf., Confessiones 10.21.31 & 10.23.33 (see below). ‘This was a commonplace dictum in ancient 
philosophy’: see Vernon J. Bourke, Augustine’s love of wisdom: an introspective philosophy (West 
Lafayette: Purdue University Press, 1992), 43. 
1033
 Other kinds of joy are ‘detestable’ (cf., Confessiones 10.21.30). 
1034
 (Chadwick’s translation) ‘… Beata quippe vita est gaudium de veritate. Hoc est enim gaudium de te, 
qui Veritas es, Deus’. Also, see Confessiones 10.20.29 & 10.22.32. 
1035
 Cf., Confessiones 10.20.29: ‘Cum enim te, Deum meum, quaero, vitam beatam quaero.’ And Ibid., 
10.22.32: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘There is a delight which is given not to the wicked (Isa. 48.22), but to 
those who worship you for no reward save the joy that you yourself are to them (Est enim gaudium, quod 
non datur impiis, sed eis, qui te gratis colunt, quorum gaudium tu ipse es).’ 
1036
 Confessiones 11.8.10. 
1037
 Confessiones 4.15.26. 
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Consequently, by making progress in our pursuit of true happiness (i.e., ‘joy’ in 
Truth/God), we become deified; and vice versa.  
 
Therefore, in the first section of this chapter I shall investigate the intellectual 
dimension of Augustinian interiority, starting with his question ‘How is it possible for 
us to yearn for the “joy in Truth/God”?’ His answer in a nutshell is that we have already 
had the knowledge of the happy life in our memory, thus God’s immanence.1038 
However, our memory of God/Happiness is ‘implicit’ and so we must strive to render it 
‘explicit’ in order to attain true happiness.1039 This is to say that getting to know God is 
nothing other than reminiscing God. Here, there still remains the problem of the soul’s 
pre-existence in relation to Augustine’s theory of reminiscence: as Teske maintains, the 
mature Augustine’s arguments for God’s epistemological immanence ‘implicitly’ (in 
Teske’s term) refer to ‘the pastness of the experience’ of God.1040 God is not only 
immanent, but also omnipresent in terms of power and ontologically transcendent1041 - 
in other words, transcendent by nature1042: 
 
I will pass beyond even my memory that I may find you ... where? … If I find 
you somewhere beyond my memory, that means that I shall be forgetful of you. 
And how shall I find you, once I am no longer mindful of you?1043 (Confessiones 
10.17.26) 
 
Since the mind and memory are identical,1044 ‘passing beyond (transire) my memory 
that I may find you’ means that God transcends the mind, thus an upward turn. 
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However, we cannot say ‘beyond (praeter) memory’ in terms of epistemology, for 
‘beyond’ in this sense means complete oblivion (cf., Confessiones 10.18.27).  
 
It must be stressed that God’s epistemological immanence is not the primary reason 
for Augustine to insist on an inward turn. In fact, as for the young Augustine, so for the 
Augustine of the Confessions our mind can ascend to God through understanding not 
only the soul but also His other creation:  
 
your (i.e., God’s) invisible reality is plainly to be understood through created 
things.1045  
 
Nonetheless, what matters to Augustine most is how to think correctly about God’s 
immanence – from which the theory of reminiscence ensues –, omnipresence, and 
transcendence; and what enables to settle the theological issues. As Augustine learned 
from his experience, it is the immaterial concept of God that must be the foundation of 
our theology.1046 Now, we do not ‘see’ God ‘face to face’ in this life.1047 How, then, can 
we come to know God’s incorporeity? Only through understanding the nature of our 
own soul we can know that God is also incorporeal, thus inwardness.  
 
Why, then, do we remember so little about the happy life (or God)? 1048 It is because 
we are preoccupied with material things.1049 As Chadwick holds that for Augustine ‘to 
remember God is a conscious act of will, a decision’1050, the intellectual dimension of 
Augustinian interiority is not independent of the practical dimension. Thus, in the 
second section of chapter 2, I shall investigate the practical dimension in terms of the 
will (or love) and the key points are as follows. Firstly, the activity of the will relies on 
what reason (i.e., the ‘mind’s eye’1051) can see, or what we can remember. Yet the 
direction of ‘reasoning (ratiocinari)’1052 follows what the heart desires to recall from the 
memory. Secondly, God has designed the mechanism of the heart in such a way that it 
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should become restless when it turns away from Him. Thirdly, turning away from God 
means not so much loving ‘wrong things’ as loving things in a ‘wrong way’.1053 
Fourthly, faith remedies our perverse love of God’s creation. Finally, if the will is 
‘divided’1054 as to whether or not to follow the decision of the mind, then only divine 
grace can resolve the dilemma (in other words, divine grace makes the ‘split’1055 will 
‘whole [plenus]’1056). 
 
a) Intellectual dimension: inward and upward 
 
a) God’s immanence  
 
To recapitulate, Augustine insists that we have an innate desire for the happy life (or 
God).1057 However, we cannot love what we do not know.1058 Consequently, all of us 
must have known what true happiness is. In other words, we have got ‘knowledge 
(notitia)’ of the happy life in our memory, thus God’s epistemological immanence: 
 
they would have no love for it (i.e., beata vita) unless there were some 
knowledge (notitia) of it in their memory1059 (Confessiones 10.23.33), 
 
it (i.e., the happy life) is known to everyone. If they could be asked if they want 
to be happy, without hesitation they would answer with one voice that they so 
wish. That would not be the case unless the thing itself, to which this term 
(‘happy life’) refers, was being held in the memory.1060 (Ibid., 10.20.29) 
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! *)*
Now, Verbeke insists that ‘notitia’ is knowledge, which is ‘obscure and more or less 
implicit, but real’ 1061; whereas ‘cogitatio’1062 is ‘actual and explicit knowledge’, which 
can be gained only via ‘notitia’.1063 Thus, pursuing knowledge of God (or the ‘happy 
life’) means an endeavour to transform the ‘latent’ and ‘implicit’ notitia of God into the 
‘actual’ and ‘explicit’ ‘cogitatio’.1064 
 
How come we have the knowledge of the happy life in memory? Augustine answers 
the question with the following analogy: we can seek, for instance, a lost coin because 
we have seen it beforehand and still remember it.1065 Similarly, because we have the 
memory of the happy life – that is, ‘joy in Truth/God’1066 – from ‘experiencing 
(experiri)’1067 it, we are able to recall it and yearn for it. 1068  
  
Where and when did we experience the happy life?1069 This is Augustine’s question, 
but he did not attempt to answer it for the fear of admitting the Platonic theory of the 
soul’s pre-existence.1070 Nonetheless, if we examine carefully Augustine’s use of the 
word ‘experience’, it is difficult to disprove Teske’s argument that Augustine’s theory 
of reminiscence ‘implicitly’ presupposed the existence of the soul prior to the body.1071  
 
We, above all, need to pay attention to Augustine’s distinction among desire, 
knowledge (notitia), reality (res), and experience in the basic argument of his for God’s 
immanence – that is, our desire for the happy life logically presupposes our possession 
of the knowledge about it, which comes from our experience of it. 
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Scholasticism 58 (1984), 220-235. 
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Now, the distinction between notitia and res is, on the one hand, meaningless: 
Augustine says in Confessions 10.23.331072 that we have the notitia of the happy life in 
memory; but in the Confessions 10.20.29 that the happy life itself (res ipsa) is in 
memory.1073 (I explained how the young Augustine’s distinction between epistemology 
and ontology disappears at the end of section ‘Learning [disciplina] is in the soul’ in 
chapter 2 in Part II.) Similarly, regarding the liberal arts, Augustine says in Confessions 
10.9.16: 
 
The immense spaces of my memory harbour even more than these (i.e., the 
images of mountains … and stars), however. Here too are all those things which I 
received through the liberal arts (doctrinis liberalibus) and have not yet 
forgotten; they are stored away in some remote inner place, which yet is not 
really a place at all. However, in this case it is not images of the realities that I 
harbour, but the realities themselves (res ipsas).1074  
 
Thus, we can assume that for the Augustine of the Confessions notitia is a res. 
Augustine explicitly insists it in De quantitate animae as well as in De Trinitate:  
 
knowledge stands higher than reason (scientiam pluris quam rationem)1075 
(‘Higher’ and ‘lower’ are hierarchical terms from the perspective of 
ontology)1076,  
 
knowledge is a substance (substantia sit scientia).1077 
 
On the other hand, Augustine differentiates notitia from res in the way that the 
former is a result of ‘experiencing’ the latter. In other words, without experiencing a 
res, the notitia of that res cannot exist in memory: 
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 quoted above. 
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 Boulding’s translation. 
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I experienced it (i.e., the happy life, res ipsa) in my mind when I was glad, and 
the knowledge (notitia) of it stuck in my memory, so that I could remind myself 
of it.1078 (Confessiones 10.21.30) 
 
Although Augustine maintains in Confessions 10.9.16 that liberal arts (doctrinis 
liberalibus) are realities (res ipsae),1079 he holds in Confessions 10.21.30 that there is a 
difference between our pursuit of, for instance, mathematical knowledge and that of the 
happy life as follows: 
 
It is surely not the way in which we remember numbers. A person who has a 
grasp of numbers does not still seek to acquire (adipisci) this knowledge 
(notitia). But the happy life we already have in our knowledge (notitia), and so 
we love it; and yet we still wish to acquire (adipisci) it so that we may be 
happy.1080 
 
This passage can be interpreted as meaning that having the notitia of the happy life in 
the memory and loving to recall it – even in the moment of sorrow –1081 are different 
from attaining (adipisci) the res ipsa of the happy life. The reason is that in Confessions 
10.20.29 Augustine associates adipisci with res, not notitia: 
 
The thing itself is neither Greek nor Latin. Greeks and Latins and people of other 
languages yearn to acquire it.1082 (res ipsa nec Graeca nec Latina est, cui 
adipiscendae Graeci Latinique inhiant ceterarumque linguarum homines.) 
 
Since the distinction between notitia and res explains why we can recall the memory of 
a happy moment in the past while currently feeling miserable,1083 and leads to the 
conclusion that the act of remembering in this respect is recalling the notitia rather than 
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 De Trinitate 9.4.6. 
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 (Chadwick’s translation) ‘expertus sum in animo meo, quando laetatus sum, et adhaesit eius notitia 
memoriae meae, ut id reminisci valeam’ 
1079
 Cf., Confessions 10.9.16. 
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 Cf., Confessions 10.21.30. 
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 Chadwick’s translation. 
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 Cf., Confessiones 10.21.30 
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attaining (adipisci) the res ipsa; the experience of the happy life remains as an 
occurrence in the past. Therefore, as Teskes argues, Augustine was not all that 
successful in severing the tie between our memory (i.e., notitia) of God and its reference 
to our experience of God as a past event.1084  
 
Note that in De Trinitate 9.11.16 Augustine distinguishes notitia of God from God 
Himself by insisting that the former is inferior to Him:  
 
it (i.e., notitia of God) remains inferior (inferiore) to God because it is an inferior 
nature (i.e., the soul), our consciousness being a creature, but God the creator. 
(From this we can gather that when the mind knows and approves itself, this 
knowledge is its word in such a way that it matches it exactly and is equal to it 
and identical, since it is neither knowledge of an inferior thing like body nor of a 
superior one like God.)1085 
 
(Consequently, notitia of God, which is inferior to God, is superior to the soul.) 
Furthermore, in De Trinitate Augustine makes a sharp distinction between knowledge 
and its subject in terms of ‘parent’ and ‘offspring’: I shall explain this in section 
‘Knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of that thing’ in chapter 3 in Part IV. 
 
Despite the connundrum concerning ‘where’ and ‘when’ we experienced the happy 
life,1086 God’s immanence in our memory is an abiding conviction of Augustine. Also, 
despite the ambiguity concerning whether or not res and notitia are one and the same, 
Augustine’s reasoning for God’s immanence is always, in the first place, 
epistemological:  
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you (i.e., God) have deigned to dwell in my memory from the time I learned of 
you. … you dwell in it, since I have remembered you from the time I learned of 
you, and I find you in my memory when I call you to mind.1087 
 
Yet, God simultaneously transcends the soul in terms of power and nature, thus an 
upward turn.  
 
ii) God’s omnipresence and transcendence 
 
O’Connell insists in his book St. Augustine’s Confessions: The Odyssey of Soul that in 
Plotinus there is a ‘gigantic’ problem of consistency between God’s (i.e., the One or 
Intellect) omnipresence and the soul’s fall: the question is ‘How, on the face of it, is a 
“turning away” any longer possible, when every turn will also be “towards” the 
Omnipresent?’1088 Unfortunately, Augustine did not seem to have sensed the 
problem.1089 Such a criticism of O’Connell is based on his ignorance that Augustine 
maintained God’s immanence in an epistemological sense and God’s omnipresence in 
terms of power: 
 
my God, I would not exist, I would not be at all, were you not in me. Or should I 
say, rather, that I should not exist if I were not in you, from whom are all things, 
through whom are all things, in whom are all things? Yes, Lord, that is the 
truth,1090 (Confessiones 1.2.2), 
 
he (i.e., God) did not create and then depart; the things derived from him have 
their being in him,1091  
 
if they did not have their existence in you, they had no existence at all.1092 
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In other words, we are ‘in’ God, or in God’s ever present creative and sustaining power 
that extends throughout His creation. Notice the first sentence ‘I would not exist, I 
would not be at all, were you not in me.’ In the same part of the Confessions Augustine 
constantly asks how God can be ‘seized (capere)’ by the soul: 
 
Is there any place within me into which my God might come? How should the 
God who made heaven and earth come into me? Is there any room in me for you 
(est quidquam in me, quod capiat te), Lord, my God? Even heaven and earth, 
which you have made and in which you have made me - can even they contain 
(capiunt) you? Since nothing that exists would exist without you, does it follow 
that whatever exists does in some way contain (capiat) you? … To what place 
can I invite you, then, since I am in you?1093 (Confessiones 1.2.2) 
 
Here, Augustine’s questions are not from the perspective of epistemology or ontology. 
He is rather expressing his doubt concerning whether or not divine power can be 
‘confined (capere)’ to the soul.  
 
Yet, Augustine sometimes makes statements about God in terms of both 
epistemology and divine power simultaneously; for instance,  
 
you (i.e., God) were within, but I outside, seeking there for you, and upon the 
shapely things you have made I rushed headlong … They held me back far from 
you, those things which would have no being were they not in you.1094  
 
I take this passage as meaning ‘Forgetting that you are epistemologically immanent 
within me, my mind searched for (knowledge of) you in your creation, whose existence 
is sustained by your omnipresent power alone.’ Taking into consideration that ‘within’ 
and ‘outside’ are metaphors1095 denoting similarity and difference respectively, the 
above text can also be interpreted as ‘Being ignorant that you (i.e., God) and my soul 
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 Boulding’s translation. 
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 Confessiones 10.27.38. (Boulding’s translation) 
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 Philip Cary, Augustine’s Invention of the Inner Self: The Legacy of a Christian Platonist, Oxford 
University Press, 2000, p. 103. Also, refer to section ‘God’s immanence’ in chapter (4) in Part I. 
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share the same immaterial nature, I searched for you in your material creation, whose 
existence is sustained by your omnipresent power.’  
 
In summary, from the perspective of divine power all creatures are in God, whereas 
from the perspective of epistemology He is in our memory. Therefore, although our 
‘mind’s eye’1096 or ‘reason (ratio)’1097 can either turn away from God, or turn back to 
God (in other words, we can either remain oblivious to God or are determined to 
remember God); we cannot, by any means, escape from the providential power of God: 
 
‘Him (i.e., God) we love; he made these things and is not far distant.’ For he did 
not create and then depart; the things derived from him have their being in him. 
Look where he is wherever there is a taste of truth. (He is very close to the heart; 
but the heart has wandered from him. ‘Return, sinners, to your heart’ [Isa. 46: 8 
LXX], and adhere to him who made you.)1098  
 
(As for precisely what Augustine means by ‘heart’, see the following section ‘Practical 
dimension’ in chapter 2.) 
 
Augustine argued for God’s transcendence in terms of nature and ontology. For 
instance, God’s nature is incorruptible1099 and immutable1100. Ontologically, God is the 
First Cause.1101 Also, God is the first epistemological principle.1102 In addition, as 
explained, knowledge (notitia) of God in the memory, is ‘higher (plus)’1103 than the soul 
in terms of ‘substance’1104 or ‘thing (res)’.1105 Thus, as Solignac remarks, Augustine’s 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1096
 Confessiones 7.10.16: ‘oculus animae’. 
1097
 Confessiones 10.6.10. 
1098
 Confessiones 4.12.18 (Chadwick’s translation). 
1099
 Cf., Confessiones 3.8.16: (Boulding’s translation) ‘how can our vices touch you, who are 
incorruptible? What crimes can be committed against you, who are immune from harm?’ 
1100
 Cf., Confessiones 7.17.23: (Boulding’s translation) ‘I realized that above my changeable mind soared 
the real, unchangeable truth, which is eternal (inveneram incommutabilem et veram veritatis aeternitatem 
supra mentem meam commutabilem).’ 
1101
 Cf., Confessiones 7.10.16: ‘I am who am” (Exodus 3.14)’.  
1102
 Cf., Confessiones 5.3.4: (Boulding’s translation) ‘With their (i.e., philosophers) intellect and the 
intelligence you have given them they investigate these things’. 
1103
 De quantitate animae 27.53: ‘when this sight of the mind, which we call reason, sees some reality 
upon which it is focused, we call that knowledge (cum ille mentis aspectus, quem rationem vocamus, 
coniectus in rem aliquam, videt illam, scientia nominatur)…’. 
1104
 De Trinitate 9.4.6. 
1105
 See section ‘God’s immanence’ in chapter 2. 
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statements about God’s immanence and transcendence with respect to memory are 
‘paradoxical’.1106 
 
Since God is transcendent, we are to turn not only inwards but also upwards in our 
search for (knowledge of) God. The culmination of the ascent is, for example, ‘seeing 
(vidi)’ the ‘unchanging light (lucem incommutabilem)’,1107 ‘touching (attingimus)’ the 
‘eternal Wisdom (aeternam sapientiam)’,1108 or ‘acquiring (adipisci)’ the ‘happy life 
(beata vita)’.1109 Augustine’s terms, ‘seeing’ and ‘touching’, in this context are often 
interpreted as mystical experiences.1110 However, like Cary, I argue that Augustine’s 
visions of God in Milan, after reading the libri platonicorum, as well as in Ostia with 
his mother Monica, during their intimate conversation with one another, are ‘not 
mystical, but epistemological: an insight into the fact that all the mind’s knowledge is 
dependent on its intellectual ability to judge things by the light of unchanging Truth 
(7.17.23)’1111.  
 
There are problems in defining ‘mysticism’.1112 However, whatever it is, it involves 
just two things, namely the mind and the heart. Moreover, since we cannot love, nor 
have any feeling towards, what we do not know;1113 Augustine’s visions of God are, in 
the first place, cognitive experiences and, so, we must concentrate on what he 
intellectually underwent (or his epistemological theory), not how he felt emotionally, in 
interpreting Him. 
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From the perspective of the mind, Augustine’s so-called mystical experiences are 
none other than ‘dialectically’1114 ‘understanding’1115 Gods transcendence. This is, in 
other words, rendering – in the language of Verbeke1116 – ‘latent’ and ‘implicit’ 
knowledge of God in the memory ‘actual’ and ‘explicit’ through ‘reasoning 
(ratiocinari)’1117. Accordingly, referring to Augustine’s account of his Neoplatonic 
ecstasies at Milan, Bonner points out that it is a highly ‘intellectualised’ account: ‘these 
descriptions (i.e., Confessiones 7.10.16 & 9.10.25) of personal experiences are, perhaps 
surprisingly, even more intellectualised than that of the De quantitate animae (i.e., 
33.70-76), a fact which explains Etienne Gilson’s observation that “one never really 
knows whether Saint Augustine is talking as a theologian or a philosopher.”’1118 
Similarly, Turner emphasizes that Augustine’s ascent to God in Milan and Ostia is 
partly – but indispensably – an ‘itinerarium mentis’ (which is characteristically an 
‘itinerarium intus’).1119 
 
Furthermore, after arriving at Neoplatonic conclusions about God’s transcendence in 
Milan and Ostia, 1120 intellectually Augustine had nothing else to achieve, apart from 
attempting to deepen his understanding of revealed truth. We can see another instance 
of Augustine’s discovery of a truth in Confessions 10.23.33. After years of pursuing 
happiness in God’s creation, Augustine finally concludes that true happiness is the ‘joy 
in Truth/God’1121: intellectually, he has nothing more to attain, yet there is no mention 
of ecstasy in this case. In Confessions 10.21.30 Augustine draws a parallel between 
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studying mathematics and pursuing the happy life, simultaneously emphasizing that the 
latter is not simply an intellectual exercise: (to quote again) 
 
It is surely not the way in which we remember numbers. A person who has a 
grasp of numbers does not still seek to acquire (adipisci) this knowledge 
(notitia). But the happy life we already have in our knowledge (notitia), and so 
we love it; and yet we still wish to acquire (adipisci) it so that we may be 
happy.1122 
 
Unlike our quest for mathematical knowledge, what more is required to attain the happy 
life is an ethical transformation: ‘There is a delight which is given not to the wicked 
(Isa. 48: 22), but to those who worship you for no reward save the joy that you yourself 
are to them.’1123 Hereafter, Augustine insists upon a total conversion of our heart to the 
‘joy in Truth/God’. Thus, Augustine’s experiences in Milan and Ostia were the 
experiences of a strong conviction that his final conclusions about God’s transcendence 
were no less ‘certain (certus)’ than any mathematical truth like ‘seven and three make 
ten’.1124 
 
Augustine’s ethical conversion followed his intellectual conversion. 
 
b) Practical dimension 
 
Augustine’s emphasis on the indispensability of the will’s role in our deification is more 
conspicuous in the Confessions than in his earlier works. But can we discuss it 
independently of reason? If not, what is the relationship between reason and the will?  
 
Holte is right to hold that, in spite of the will’s inferiority to reason, ‘the will plays a 
decisive role even in the intellectual processes’1125: ‘the direction of the intellect is 
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wholly dependent on the direction of the will.’1126 Notice that, as for the young 
Augustine, so for the Augustine of the Confessions, reason is ‘superior’1127 to the will 
because, only upon gaining knowledge of God, can the renewal of the image of God 
take place: (to cite again) ‘man “is renewed in the knowledge (agnitione) of God after 
the image of him who created him” (Col. 3: 10).’1128 Nonetheless, we do not study 
theology if we are not interested in it. What, then, does loving God, whom we do not 
see ‘face to face (1 Cor. 13.12)’1129, mean? (The scriptural passage, quoted by 
Augustine, implies that we do not yet possess full knowledge of God.) Or, what is it that 
we love in loving God, whom we do not know fully?1130 
 
We cannot desire what we do not know. We have an innate yearning for God (or the 
‘happy life’) 1131 and the yearning itself is the evidence that we have already had certain, 
‘implicit’1132 knowledge (notitia) of God in our memory. Consequently, love of God 
means desiring to render the ‘implicit’ knowledge of God ‘explicit’. Therefore, Holte’s 
argument that ‘the direction of the intellect is wholly dependent on the direction of the 
will’ can be accepted only on the grounds that the will’s activity depends on what we 
remember, or what reason sees in the memory, albeit vaguely. In a similar manner, we 
can criticise Caputo’s insistence that ‘we usually think that we first have to get to know 
something or someone in order subsequently to get to love them. But one of the great 
lessons of St. Augustine’s writings is that it is love that drives our search to know. 
Caught up in the grips of what is loved, love is driven to understand what it loves’1133. 
This means that for Augustine, ‘we first have to get to know something or someone in 
order subsequently to get to love them, but our knowledge of it/him/her does not have 
be ‘explicit’. As Chadwick correctly maintains, ‘lying deeper than knowing and willing, 
memory is “the stomach of the mind” (Confessiones x.21), a storehouse only potentially 
in the consciousness.’1134 
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Having clarified the will’s relationship with memory and reason, I shall now focus 
on Augustine’s concept of the will. Augustine first of all draws an analogy between the 
‘role’ of love and that of ‘weight’, taken from Greek physics, in the Confessions 
13.9.10: 1135  
 
Our true place is where we find rest. We are borne toward it by love … In 
goodness of will is our peace. A body gravitates to its proper place by its own 
weight. This weight does not necessarily drag it downward, but pulls it to the 
place proper to it: thus fire tends upward, a stone downward. Drawn by their 
weight, things seek their rightful places. … They are not at rest as long as they 
are disordered, but once brought to order they find their rest. Now, my weight is 
my love, and wherever I am carried, it is this weight that carries me.1136 
 
Each material thing has its ‘own place (locus suus)’, where it can find rest (quiescere). 
Whenever a thing is displaced, that thing – by its weight – tends to move towards that 
‘place’. Similarly, the soul has its ‘own place’, where we can find ‘rest (requies)’, and 
we are constantly driven to that ‘place’ by love.1137 God is our ‘place’, to which our 
heart is always driven by love. In other words, God is our teleological1138 goal: ‘our 
heart is restless until it rests in you’1139. Thus, due to our innate love of Truth/God, we 
yearn for joy derived from Truth, hating to be deceived.1140 Whenever we stray from 
Truth/God, God stirs us, with ‘inward goads’, to move back to Him, to whom we belong 
and the ‘inward goads’ are the causes of our ‘agitation’ or ‘restlessness’.1141  
 
Regarding Augustine’s term ‘heart (cors)’, Cayré maintains that ‘le coeur, pour saint 
Augustin, n’est pas une pure faculté affective … Il désigne l’ensemble des activités 
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 Cf., Isabelle Bochet, Saint Augustin et le	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 Confessiones 13.9.10 (Boulding’s translation): ‘Requies nostra locus noster. Amor illuc attollit nos … 
Corpus pondere suo nititur ad locum suum. Pondus non ad ima tantum est, sed ad locum suum. Ignis 
sursum tendit, deorsum lapis. Ponderibus suis aguntur, loca sua petunt. … Minus ordinata inquieta sunt: 
ordinantur et quiescunt. Pondus meum amor meus; eo feror, quocumque feror.’  
1137
 Cf., Bochet, Saint Augustin et le	, 105-109. 
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 See the beginning of chapter 1 ‘The Hortensius’ in Part I. Also, see Bochet, 106-107. 
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 Confessiones 1.1.1: ‘inquietum est cor nostrum, donec requiescat in te’. 
1140
 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33 
1141
 Confessiones 7.8.12: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘it has pleased you to restore my deformities in your 
sight (Ps. 18: 15). By inward goads you stirred me to make me find it unendurable until, through my 
inward perception, you were a certainty to me. (stimulis internis agitabas me, ut impatiens essem, donec 
mihi per interiorem aspectum certus esses.)’ Also, see Bochet, 122-123. 
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spirituelles supérieures de l’âme, et si l’amour en est le terme, la vérité en est la pièce 
centrale, d’autant que c’est par elle que se réalise pour l’âme la présence de Dieu. Un 
mot très net des Confessions le dit bien : « Ecce ubi est Deus : ubi sapit veritas : intimus 
cordi est. Voici où Dieu se trouve : là où se perçoit la vérité ! il est au fond du coeur ! » 
(Conf., l. IV, 12, 8.)’ 1142 I interpret ‘intimus cordi est’ as a metaphorical expression, 
meaning that we have the desire for God deep down in our heart. (Knowledge of) God, 
on the other hand, is in the memory, not in the heart. Thus, the subsequent text ‘(Look 
where he is wherever there is a taste of truth. He is very close to the heart;) but the heart 
has wandered from him. “Return, sinners, to your heart” (Isa. 46: 8 LXX)’1143 is an 
admonition that we must try hard to understand why and what makes us restless when 
we pursue things other than God.  
 
Straying from God does not mean ‘loving wrong things’1144. There is no ‘wrong 
thing’ among creatures; since all of them, having derived their existence from the Good 
God, are good.1145 Yet, the degrees of their goodness differ from God’s. Hence, we must 
love creatures in the light of our relationship with God: 
 
sin is committed for the sake of all these things and others of this kind when, in 
consequence of an immoderate urge towards those things which are at the bottom 
end of the scale of good, we abandon the higher and supreme goods, that is you, 
Lord God.1146 
 
In De doctrina Christiana (396-426) Augustine explains the same thing in terms of 
‘enjoyment (fructus)’ and ‘use (usus)’.1147 An ‘enjoyment’ of a thing is ‘to rest with 
satisfaction in it for its own sake’1148 (in short, to ‘rest’1149 in it). ‘Using’ things 
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 Fulbert Cayré, ‘Dieu présent au coeur’, L’Année Théologique 11 (1951), 120. 
1143
 Cf., Confessiones 4.12.18 (Chadwick’s translation). 
1144
 Cf., Gervase Corcoran, ‘A Guide to the Confessions of St. Augustine’, Living Flame Series, vol. 17 
(1981), 21. 
1145
 Cf., Confessiones 7.5.7. 
1146
 Confessiones 2.5.10 (Chadwick’s translation): ‘peccatum admittitur, dum immoderata in ista 
inclinatione, cum extrema bona sint, meliora et summa deseruntur, tu, Domine Deus noster’. 
1147
 Cf., De doctrina Christiana 1.3.3. 
1148
 De doctrina Christiana 1.4.4: ‘Frui est enim amore inhaerere alicui rei propter seipsam.’ 
1149
 Cf., Confessiones 1.1.1. 
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means treating them as a means to attain what we wish to ‘enjoy’. Consequently, we 
are to ‘enjoy’ God by/through ‘using’ His creation.1150  
 
i) The will and faith 
 
Since the irrationality of our mind causes us to love God’s creation in a ‘wrong 
way’1151, our ‘mind’s eye (acies mentis)’ needs to be ‘purified (purgare)’ through 
faith.1152 Recall that, when the young Augustine mentioned faith in reference to the will, 
his emphasis on having faith was based on the inseparability between theory and 
practice. The Augustine of the Confessions too stressed that our views of reality – which 
are largely comprised of what we believe – shape our ways of life. For instance, he 
entered into a parent-child relationship with Monica and Patricius because he firmly 
believed that he was born from them: 
 
I considered the innumerable things I believed which I had not seen, events 
which occurred when I was not present, such as many incidents in the history of 
the nations, many facts concerning places and cities which I had never seen, 
many things accepted on the word of friends, many from physicians, many from 
other people. Unless we believed what we were told, we would do nothing at all 
in this life. Finally, I realized how immovably sure I was about the identity of my 
parents from whom I came, which I could not know unless I believed what I had 
heard.1153  
 
Pay attention to the passage ‘unless we believed what we were told, we would do 
nothing at all in this life’. It means in a general sense that we cannot do what has never 
crossed our minds in the form of belief. Such an insistence of Augustine is a repetition 
of what he had already mentioned in De utilitate credendi, in which he held that mutual 
trust between two people is the only way for them to enter into a relationship with one 
another. The reason is because we cannot know each other’s mind and heart:  
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 Cf., De doctrina Christiana 1.7.7 & 1.22.20. 
1151
 Corcoran, ‘A Guide to the Confessions of St. Augustine’, 21. 
1152
 Cf., Confessiones 6.4.6. 
1153
 Confessiones 6.5.7 (Chadwick’s translation). 
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You will say with your own good conscience that there is no deceit in you, and 
you will assert this with what words you can, but still with words. For as a man 
you would not be able to reveal to a man the inner recesses of your soul so as to 
be completely known.1154 
 
(There is a similar insistence in the Confessions 10.3.3: ‘when they hear me talking 
about myself, how can l they know if I am telling the truth, when no one ‘knows what is 
going on in a person except the human spirit which is within’ (1 Cor. 2 : 11)?’1155 
Augustine also expatiates on the same thing in De Trinitate 9.6.9 and 12.10.15.) In other 
words, what cannot be known is always an object of either belief or scepticism1156 and 
one’s inner world (i.e., the mind and the heart) is cognitively inaccessible to another. 
Hence, the way that we relate to each other, for instance, as friends1157, parents and 
children1158, a master and stewards1159, a doctor and a patient1160, or a preacher and his 
audience1161 is founded upon what/who we believe each other to be. Otherwise, the 
relationship cannot be established or sustained.  
 
Due to the inaccessibility of each other’s mind and heart, Augustinian interiority is 
epistemologically a lone journey to God. Regarding Augustine’s description of what he 
and Monica underwent in Ostia in the Confessions 9.10.24, Louth says, ‘It is at once an 
account of a personal experience, and yet not a purely solitary one. The experience 
grows out of his conversation with his mother. This makes one wonder to what extent 
friendship, companionship, communion with other human beings, is important for 
Augustine in his ascent to God, or whether - as with Plotinus - it is a flight of the “alone 
to the Alone”. I do not think one can be clear on this as far as Augustine is concerned, 
but there is a strand - and an important strand - in Augustine’s thought that stresses the 
social nature of final beatitude. … it is important for us as growing out of the 
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 De utilitate credendi 10.23. 
1155
 Chadwick’s translation. 
1156
 Cf., De utilitate credendi 12.26: ‘if what is not known need not be believed, how… .’ 
1157
 Cf., De utilitate credendi 10.24: ‘For there is also no friendship at all unless something is believed 
which cannot be demonstrated by positive reasoning.’ 
1158
 Cf., De utilitate credendi 12.26. 
1159
 Cf., De utilitate credendi 10.24. 
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 Cf., De utilitate credendi 13.29. 
1161
 Cf., De utilitate credendi 10.24. 
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observation that the vision was not a solitary experience.’1162 Louth also says, 
‘Augustine’s estimate of the importance of companionship is complex; it perplexed 
Augustine, and he perplexes his readers. He is ambivalent, drawn both to the Plotinian 
aloneness and to the importance and indeed necessity of companionship. It is an 
unresolved tension.’1163 However, we have seen Augustine insisting that we cannot 
know whether a person is truthful with what that person says and does. Thus, the sharing 
of ideas and feelings between Augustine and Monica is entirely founded on mutual 
trust. Epistemologically, they were two completely isolated souls.  
 
In Confessions 10.21.30 Augustine explains and emphasizes one soul’s 
inaccessibility to another – from the perspective of experience – by means of a 
comparison between eloquence and the ‘happy life’1164. A competent rhetorician can 
give aspirants of eloquence an experience of his rhetorical skill through words and 
gestures. Augustine here points out that the rhetorical skill is the object of sense 
perceptions, so that the aspirants learn it through listening to and watching the 
rhetorician’s performance. Augustine, on the other hand, insists that joy – or the ‘joy in 
Truth/God’, which is the happy life (beata vita) – cannot be seen, heard, smelled, tasted, 
or touched: the experience of joy pertains to the soul only. Henceforth, Augustine 
concludes that no one can give us an experience of the happy life, which he/she has 
attained and possesses within himself/herself: 
 
we do not experience the happy life in other people through any kind of bodily 
sense.1165 
 
In short, Augustine argues that we can experience a good rhetorical skill by watching 
and listening to a reputable rhetorician’s performance. However, we cannot make others 
experience the joy that we currently have, though we can express it in many visible and 
audible ways. Consequently, what are in one’s soul are not only cognitively, but also 
empirically, inaccessible to another. 
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 Andrew Louth, The Origin of the Christian Mystical Tradition : From Plato to Denys (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), 136-137. 
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 Louth, The Origin of the Christian Mystical Tradition, p 140-141. 
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 and also between ‘knowledge of eloquence’ and ‘knowledge of the “happy life”’. 
1165
 Confessiones 10.21.30 (Boulding’s translation): ‘beatam vero vitam nullo sensu corporis in aliis 
experimur.’ 
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Unlike another soul, God on the other hand is not entirely impenetrable; since, 
although our ‘mind’s eye’1166 cannot see God ‘face to face’1167, we still have the 
memory of God1168, however vague it is. Thus, not everything about God is a matter of 
belief. God is, to a certain extent, knowable dialectically/inferentially. Consequently, 
although Augustine held that some of Neoplatonic ideas concerning what God is and the 
God of the Christian faith (e.g., the Trinity1169 and the existence of divine 
providence1170) are mutually coherent, he epistemologically distinguished one from the 
other in terms of ‘believe (credere)’ and ‘know (noscere)’1171.  
 
We can know God through ‘reasoning (ratiocinari)’1172; for instance, His 
incorporeity, incorruptibility, immutability, immanence, omnipresence, and 
transcendence. Nonetheless, since the majority of us have almost forgotten God, let 
alone making an effort to see the intelligible aspect of God; we must above all ‘cling 
(inhaerere)’1173 to God by means of faith, and love it, so that we can enter into a 
relationship with God:  
 
‘We walk by faith, not by sight.’ Now faith will totter if the authority of Scripture 
begins to shake. And then, if faith totters, love itself will grow cold. For if a man 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1166
 Confessiones 7.10.16 (‘oculus animae’) & 6.4.6. 
1167
 Confessiones 10.5.7: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘I nevertheless know something of you which I do not 
know about myself. Without question “we see now through a mirror in an enigma”, not yet “face to face” 
(1 Cor. 13:12) (tamen aliquid de te scio, quod de me nescio. Et certe videmus nunc per speculum in 
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 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33: (Boulding’s translation) ‘Why are they not happy? Because they are more 
immediately engrossed in other things which more surely make them miserable than that other reality, so 
faintly remembered, can make them happy.’ (Cur non beati sunt? Quia fortius occupantur in aliis, quae 
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 Cf., Confessiones 13.5.6: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘Here in an enigmatic image (1 Cor. 13:12) I 
discern the Trinity, which you are, my God. (Ecce apparet mihi in aenigmate Trinitas).’ De Trinitate 
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1170
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workings of your will, as I believe (credo).’ Also, see Ibid., 9.12.32: after the death of Monica, Augustine 
says, ‘in my mental turmoil I begged you (i.e., God) as best I could to heal my hurt. You did not, and this 
because, as I believe (credo), you were reminding me that any sort of habit is bondage, even to a mind no 
longer feeding on deceitful words.’ (All are Boulding’s translations.) 
1171
 Confessiones 10.20.29: ‘how they came to know (noverunt) it (i.e., the happy life) I do not know.’ 
1172
 Confessiones 7.17.23. 
1173
 De utilitate credendi 16.34. 
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has fallen from faith, he must necessarily also fall from love, for he cannot love 
what he does not believe to exist.1174 
 
Only upon establishing a relationship with God, can we then correct our irrational love 
affair with God’s creation: 
 
If physical objects give you pleasure, praise God for them and return love to their 
Maker lest, in the things that please you, you displease him. If souls please you, 
they are being loved in God; for they also are mutable and acquire stability by 
being established in him. Otherwise they go their way and perish. In him 
therefore they are loved.1175 
 
Note that we retain, in our memory, both Christian beliefs and the ‘implicit’ 
knowledge (notitia) of God, which can be rendered ‘explicit’, or into a vision of God. 
But they each take a distinct path of entry into memory. We gained the knowledge 
through direct ‘experience (experiri)’1176 of God, whereas the beliefs come to us 
through ‘preachers’ and the historical Jesus: 
 
how can they believe without a preacher (praedicante)? … Let me seek you, 
then, Lord, even while I am calling upon you, and call upon you even as I believe 
in you; for to us you have indeed been preached. My faith calls upon you, Lord, 
this faith which is your gift to me, which you have breathed into me through the 
humanity of your Son and the ministry of your preacher.1177 
 
Thus, we cannot know about the Christian God any more than what we have been 
taught.1178 
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Faith, apart from being the ‘basis for moral purification’, has another important role 
in Augustinian interiority: faith is also the basis for ‘philosophical enquiry’1179. This is 
to say that, regardless of whether Augustine is a mystic or not, reaching conclusions 
about God in a Neoplatonic way is not the objective of his turning back to God. 
Augustine’s Neoplatonic enlightenment put an end to his materialism, but was also a 
new beginning in his ascent to God through faith. For this reason Augustine undertook a 
philosophical/theological investigation of Genesis 1.1-2 in Books 11-13, after giving a 
biographical description of his journey to God chiefly from the perspective of 
Neoplatonism in the preceding Books, and simultaneously arguing that some of 
Neoplatonic ideas are consistent with Christian theology. Thus, when Augustine says in 
De Trinitate 1.8.17 that eternal life is knowing God and His Son Jesus Christ,1180 he was 
reaffirming that understanding the Scriptures is the goal of his intellectual ascent to 
God. 
 
In summary, only by entrusting ourselves to the Christian faith can we ‘enjoy’ the 
Creator and ‘use’ His creation: also, we will be able to ‘see’ the aspect of God that a 
few Neoplatonists have already ‘seen’ (i.e., His incorporeity, immutability, 
omnipresence and transcendence).1181 Yet, we must continually endeavour to 
understand revealed truth, though it is impossible to comprehend it fully in this life. 
 
ii) The will and divine grace 
 
Augustine’s ethical conversion did not follow immediately after his intellectual 
conversion.1182 From this experience Augustine insists that not only our ‘mind’s eye’ 
must be ‘purified’ through faith,1183 but also that our will must be made ‘whole 
(plenus)’1184 by divine grace. Note that, after his Neoplatonic enlightenment, Augustine 
started to read the Scriptures1185 and attend the Catholic Church1186. Hence, as 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1179
 Cf., Ragnar Holte, ‘Faith and Interiority in S. Augustine’s Confessions’, 71. 
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 De Trinitate 1.8.17. 
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Bernasconi maintains, the eighth book is not about Augustine’s conversion to 
Christianity, but about his ethical transformation, about his liberation ‘from the fetters 
of desire for concubinage ... and from the slavery of worldly concerns’1187. 
 
Augustine associated sin primarily with the will: ‘iniquity is perversity of the 
will’1188. In his own case his will was not ‘whole’; it was ‘divided’1189, ‘split 
(dissipare)’1190, or ‘half-wounded (semisauciam)’:1191 in other words, his will was in a 
state of indecision, or ‘hesitation (or delay, cunctatio)’1192, in choosing the good. In 
Book 8 of the Confessions Augustine gives an analysis of the ‘half-wounded’ will1193. 
Bernasconi interprets this as meaning that there exist two conflicting wills in 
Augustine’s system:  
 
Augustine’s explanation is that the will half-maimed by habit (VIII.viii.19), as an 
incomplete will, be interpreted as in fact two wills in conflict. Habit is understood 
to constitute a carnal will (VIII.v.10) … The will appears as a faculty distinct 
from the intellect and from desire only when in conflict with itself. That is to say, 
it shows itself only when it is split. Hence when Augustine “discovers the will”, 
he has the impression that he finds not one will but two wills. The split will is not 
an indecisive will, if that were to mean the will was faced with a choice between 
rival alternatives. Nor can one say exactly that the split will is a hesitant will, 
where the will hesitates to will itself. It is precisely because one’s mind is already 
made up, that it is a question of the will. One has resolved the issue and yet one 
lacks resolution. This is what Augustine meant when he in this case said that “the 
very act of willing is actually to do the deed.” But even as he willed to will, he 
encountered a counter-will. (Augustine’s conflict between two wills is very 
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different from the situation that Paul presented as a conflict between two laws, 
one good and one evil.)1194 
 
Augustine, indeed, says ‘two wills’; for instance, 
 
So my two wills (duae voluntates), one old, the other new, one carnal, the other 
spiritual, were in conflict with one another, and their discord robbed my soul of 
all concentration.1195 
 
We are dealing with a morbid condition of the mind which, when it is lifted up 
by the truth, does not unreservedly rise to it but is weighed down by habit. So 
there are two wills (duae voluntates). Neither of them is complete, and what is 
present in the one is lacking to the other.1196 
 
However, we also need to pay attention to Augustine’s criticism against Manichaean 
dualism, which holds that the soul has two wills:1197 
 
‘Let them perish from your presence’ O God, as do ‘empty talkers and seducers’ 
of the mind who from the dividing of the will into two (duas voluntates) in the 
process of deliberation, deduce that there are two minds with two distinct natures, 
one good, the other bad. … In my own case, as I deliberated about serving my 
Lord God which I had long been disposed to do, the self which willed to serve 
was identical with the self which was unwilling. It was I. I was neither wholly 
willing nor wholly unwilling. So I was in conflict with myself and was 
dissociated from myself. The dissociation came about against my will. Yet this 
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was not a manifestation of the nature of an alien mind but the punishment 
suffered in my own mind.1198 
 
In short, a will can be split into two, but the ‘divided’ will does not suggest the 
existences of ‘two minds with two distinct natures’ within the self: the human person 
has only one soul with one will.  
 
Consequently, rendering the will ‘whole’ means making it love God steadily: 
 
the will was strong and unqualified, not the turning and twisting first this way, 
then that, of a will half-wounded, struggling with one part rising up and the other 
part falling down.1199 
 
Yet, no one, but only God, can heal our ‘half-wounded’ will:  
 
I believed continence to be achieved by personal resources which I was not 
aware of possessing. I was so stupid as not to know that, as it is written (Wisd. 
8.21), ‘no one can be continent unless you grant it.’ 1200  
 
Our will can turn away from God, but can return to Him only by means of divine grace:  
 
My good points are instilled by you and are your gifts. My bad points are my 
faults and your judgements on them.1201  
  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1198
 Confessiones 8.10.22 (Chadwick’s translation): ‘Pereant a facie tua, Deus, sicuti pereunt, vaniloqui et 
mentis seductores, qui cum duas voluntates in deliberando animadverterint, duas naturas duarum 
mentium esse asseverant, unam bonam, alteram malam. … .’ Augustine’s view on the ‘divided’ will in 
De duabus animabus 10.14 is slightly different: ‘one mind may be at the same time unwilling and willing, 
but it cannot be at the same time unwilling and willing with reference to one and the same thing’. It 
means that the will is always ‘whole’ in wanting or not wanting. 
1199
 Confessiones 8.8.19 (Chadwick’s translation): ‘velle fortiter et integre, non semisauciam hac atque 
hac versare et iactare voluntatem parte adsurgente cum alia parte cadente luctantem’. 
1200
 Confessiones 6.11.20 (Chadwick’s translation). Also, see De vera religione 12.24. 
1201
 Confessiones 10.4.5 (Chadwick’s translation).!See De vera religione 9.17. 
! "*#
IV. De Trinitate 
  
Memory, reason, the will, faith, and divine grace continue to be the integral elements of 
Augustinian interiority in De Trinitate. However, there is an unprecedented 
development with respect to the psychological aspect of interiority. That is Augustine’s 
insistence that memory, reason (understanding) and the will form a trinity, which can 
become the image of the Triune God. Augustine, in fact, introduced numerous trinities 
in his previous works, for instance, the trinity of ‘being, knowing and willing’ in the 
Confessions 13.11.12.1202 However, as Sullivan insists, despite many similarities 
between the trinity appearing in the Confessions and the other trinities mentioned in De 
Trinitate, the Augustine of the Confessions did not maintain that the human person is 
capable of imaging the Trinity,1203 whereas the Augustine of the De Trinitate does.1204 
Similarly, Fleteren argues as follows: 
 
Though Augustine’s thought is triadic, if not at all times trinitarian, from the 
beginning (i.e., of De Trinitate), he does not in the early works see as many triads 
in the soul and consequently does not see the soul’s image of God to consist in its 
triadic nature. The profundity of memoria Dei, intelligentia Dei, amor Dei as an 
image of God is a much later development. Yet the understanding of the De 
trinitate is but a fuller explication in greater detail of the original insight of the 
early works.1205  
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 ‘I wish that men would think about three things to be found in themselves. These three are very 
different from the Trinity, but I mention them that men may exercise their minds and test and see how far 
different they are. The three things of which I speak are existing, knowing, willing. For I am, and I know, 
and I will. I am a being that knows and wills: I know that I am and that I will; I will to be and to know. In 
these three how inseparable is life, the one life, one mind, one essence; how inseparable the distinction, 
yet the three are distinct. Let him see this who can. Certainly the fact is in himself’: quoted in John 
Edward Sullivan, The image of God: the doctrine of St. Augustine and its influence (Dubuque: Priory 
Press, 1963), 115. Also, see Letter 11 (389 AD.).  
1203
 Sullivan, The image of God, 115-116. 
1204
 Cf., De Trinitate 12.6.7: ‘For God said “Let us make man to our image and likeness”; but a little later 
it is said, “And God made man to the image of God” (Gen. 1:26-27). The term “our” certainly would not 
have been correctly used, being plural in number, if man had been made to the image of one person, 
whether of the Father, or of the Son, or of the Holy Spirit; but because he was made to the image of the 
Trinity, therefore it was said, “to our image.” But, on the other hand, lest we think that three Gods were to 
be believed in the Trinity, since the same Trinity is one God, it is said, “And God made man to the image 
of God”; instead of this, “to His own image”’ quoted in Sullivan, The image of God, 116: ‘In the De 
Trinitate Augustine clearly perceives that man is not only an image of the one God, but of the Trinity, for 
the Trinity is the one God.’ 
1205
 Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Thematic Reflections on the De Trinitate’, in Proceedings of the PMR 
Conference, 12/13 (1987-1988), 224. Also, see Lewis Ayres, ‘“‘It’s not for eatin’ – it’s for lookin’ 
through”: memoria, intellegentia, voluntas and the argument of Augustine’s De Trinitate IX-X’, in D. 
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The Augustine of De Trinitate uses the word ‘image (of the Trinity)’ in two different 
senses as before: one is ontological and the other is teleological, and both of them 
constitute his theory of deification. Ontologically, being endowed with the ‘capacity for 
God (capax Dei)’ – that is, the potential to become like God through remembering, 
understanding, and loving God –, the soul is created as the image of the Trinity and the 
image, though mutable, cannot be obliterated:1206 
 
we have come to the point of discussing the chief capacity of the human mind, 
with which it knows God or can know him, and we have undertaken to consider 
it in order to discover in it the image of God. For although the human mind is not 
of the same nature as God, still the image of that nature than which no nature is 
better is to be sought and found in that part of us than which our nature also has 
nothing better. But first of all the mind must be considered in itself, and God’s 
image discovered in it before it participates in him (antequam sit particeps Dei). 
For we have said that even when it has lost its participation (participatione 
obsoletam) in him it still remains the image of God, even though worn out and 
distorted. It is his image insofar as it is capable of him and can participate in him; 
indeed it cannot achieve so great a good except by being his image. Here we are 
then with the mind remembering itself, understanding itself, loving itself. If we 
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Vincent Twomey, Lewis Ayres (eds.), The Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church: The 
Proceedings of the Fourth Patristic Conference, Maynooth, 1999 (Dublin: Fourth Courts Press, 2007), 
37-38: ‘My point of departure will be to note that the extensive and developed use of this triad (i.e., 
memoria, intellegentia and voluntas) is a feature only of this one work. … At the beginning of our 
investigation it may help to note in a little more detail the evidence for my claim that the triad memoria, 
intellegentia and voluntas has a remarkably close connection with the De Trinitate. Including some 
variations on the third term found in Book XV of the De Trinitate, Augustine uses the triads memoria, 
intellegentia, voluntas and memoria, intellectus, voluntas around 35 times in his corpus. This rather vague 
figure stems from the difficulty of assessing passages where the triad and its constituent terms are 
discussed over a number of complex sentences. Even with such imprecise figures it is striking that over 
20 of these uses occur in the De Trinitate. Indeed, the triad is used in directly Trinitarian contexts outside 
this work in just three texts.2 And so, from all the homilies on John’s Gospel and First Letter where 
Trinitarian topics frequently occur, from the Confessions, from his extensive expositions of the Psalms, as 
well as from the vast majority of his sermons and letters this triad it is simply absent as a basic tool for 
illustrating Trinitarian doctrine. The triad is not then a standard feature of Augustine’s Trinitarian 
theology. Equally importantly, the triad is not a standard feature of Augustine’s description of the human 
soul. Its absence from Augustine’s discussions of the soul in his early works being only one important 
indicator. Reflection on the will and on memory is of course a central thread in Augustine’s corpus, but 
this particular triad is not.’ 
1206
 Cf., Walter H. Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian 
Image in the Human Person’, Studia Patristica 17 (Part 3), 1295 & 1297, footnote no. 26. Also, see 
chapter 2 ‘The image of the Triune God’. 
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see this we see a trinity, not yet God of course, but already the image of God (De 
Trinitate 14.8.11),1207 
 
For although it (i.e., homo) is a great nature, yet it could be corrupted because it 
is not the highest, and although it could be corrupted because it is not the highest, 
yet because it is capable of the highest nature and can be a sharer (particeps) in 
it, it is a great nature.1208  
 
In these excerpts ‘partake/sharer (particeps)’ (or ‘participation [participatione]’), which 
is a deificatory language, is applied in a teleological sense. This is to say that ‘before it 
participates in him’ means ‘before the soul starts to remember, understand, and love 
God’. Similarly, ‘it has lost its participation in him’ means ‘the soul no longer 
endeavours to recall, know, and desire Him (by virtue of its own sin)’. When we ‘lose 
the participation’, our image of God becomes ‘deformed’ and does not mirror 
Justice/Truth any more: 
 
‘Be renewed in the spirit of your minds, and put on the new man who was 
created according to God in justice and the holiness of truth’ (Eph 4:23). … by 
sinning man lost justice and the holiness of truth, and thus the image became 
deformed and discolored; he gets those qualities back again when he is reformed 
and renovated,1209 
 
Teleologically, only when we remember, understand, and love God (or Justice/Truth), 
our soul images the Trinity:  
 
Anyone who has a lively intuition of these three (i.e., memory, understanding 
and the will), as divinely established in the nature of his mind, and of how great a 
thing it is that his mind has that by which even the eternal and unchanging nature 
can be recalled, beheld and desired - it is recalled by memory, beheld by 
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1207
 (Hill’s translation) ‘… Eo quippe ipso imago eius est, quo eius capax est, eiusque particeps esse 
potest … .’ 
1208
 De Trinitate 14.4.6 (McKenna’s translation): ‘Quamquam enim magna natura sit, tamen vitiari potuit, 
quia summa non est: et quamquam vitiari potuerit, quia summa non est, tamen quia summae naturae 
capax est, et esse particeps potest, magna natura est.’  
1209
 De Trinitate 14.5.22 (Hill’s translation). 
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intelligence, embraced by love - has thereby found the image of that supreme 
trinity.1210  
 
Imaging the Trinity is, in other words, deifying the soul: 
 
we are like God inasmuch as we know Him,1211 
 
he who knows justice (i.e., the Trinitarian God) perfectly and loves it perfectly is 
already just.1212  
 
In addition to Augustine’s trinitarian approach to the image of God, there is another 
thing unique about De Trinitate in reference to interiority. Augustine previously held 
that we must know God’s creation – especially the soul – in order to understand Him, 
whom we do not see ‘face to face’1213. Yet, in De Trinitate Augustine reverses the 
order: he attempts to understand first of all the Trinity in order to find the trinitarian 
nature of the soul, since Genesis 1:26-27 says, ‘Let us make man to our image and 
likeness … And God made man to the image of God.’1214 There are, however, two 
contrasting views regarding the precedence between knowledge of the soul and that of 
God in De Trinitate. Sullivan holds that Augustine’s analyses of psychological trinities 
are chiefly to use them to ‘exemplify’ the divine Trinity.1215 Louth, on the other hand, 
maintains that ‘Augustine is less concerned to illustrate the doctrine of the Trinity from 
his understanding of man, than to discover the true nature of man by means of the 
doctrine of the Trinity that he believes by faith.’1216 As for me, both views are 
complementary.  
 
At the beginning of De Trinitate Augustine attempts to understand the Triune God, 
not on the basis of self-knowledge, but on the premise that the three Persons1217 must be 
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1210
 De Trinitate 15.20.39 (Hill’s translation). 
1211
 De Trinitate 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation).  
1212
 De Trinitate 9.9.14 (McKenna’s translation). 
1213
 Cf., De Trinitate 1.8.16. 
1214
 Cf., De Trinitate 12.6.7 (McKenna’s translation) & Soliloquia 1.1.4. 
1215
 Cf., Sullivan, The image of God, 148. 
1216
 Andrew Louth, The Origins of the Christian Mystical Tradition: From Plato to Denys (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1981), 148. 
1217
 i.e., the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit. 
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‘equal (aequalis)’1218 with each other in every respect (cf., Book 1, 2, 3 & 4): the 
premise is a part of the ‘Trinitarian logic’ that the Father, the Son, and the Holy Spirit 
are three and simultaneously one.1219 Augustine, then, expatiates – in terms of 
‘according to the substance1220 (secundum substantiam [dicitur])’1221 (or ‘in reference to 
self [quidquid ad se dicitur]’1222), and ‘in reference to something else (quod autem ad 
aliquid [dicitur])’1223 – why the Scriptures often describe each Person as different from 
the other two (cf., Book 5, 6, 7 & 8): I shall explain what he means by these terms in 
chapter (1). In Book 9 and 10 Augustine attempts to discover in what ways we are the 
image of the Trinity.1224 This is to say that without some understanding about the 
Trinity, there can be no discovery of the Trinitarian image in the soul either. Yet, as 
Sullivan observes, in Book 15 Augustine endeavours to ‘illustrate’ the Trinity by 
comparing ‘the Father and memory’ (cf., 15.12. 22-14.23)’, ‘the Son and the mental 
word’ (cf., 15.10.19-11.21), and ‘the Spirit and love or will’ (cf., 15.18.32-21.41).1225 
Theses eventually lead to the conclusion that knowledge of God and that of the soul are 
interdependent.1226  
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1218
 De Trinitate 15.3.5. 
1219
 Cf., Lewis Ayres, ‘“‘It’s not for eatin’ – it’s for lookin’ through”: memoria, intellegentia, voluntas 
and the argument of Augustine’s De Trinitate IX-X’, in D. Vincent Twomey, Lewis Ayres (eds.), The 
Mystery of the Holy Trinity in the Fathers of the Church: The Proceedings of the Fourth Patristic 
Conference, Maynooth, 1999 (Dublin: Fourth Courts Press, 2007), 41. The ‘logic of a doctrine’ generally 
means ‘the things the doctrine says and how they hang together’: see Philip Cary, 
‘The Logic of Trinitarian Doctrine’, in Religious and Theological Studies Fellowship Bulletin, Sept/Oct 
1995, 1, http://www.scribd.com/doc/2385278/The-Logic-of-Trinitarian-Doctrine-by-Phillip-Cary (1 Nov 
2009). 
1220
 ‘The notion of a divine “essence” did not come from exegesis at all, but from the hellenization of the 
gospel through Greek ontology’:!Jaroslav Pelikan, ‘Canonica regula: The Trinitarian Hermeneutics of 
Augustine’, in Joseph C. Schnaubelt & Frederick Van Fleteren (ed.), Collectanea Augustiniana: 
Augustine – Second Founder of the Faith (New York: Peter Lang, 1990), 336. And ‘Augustine’s use of 
the terminology of essentia and substantia is a complicated affair’: see Lewis Ayres, ‘Augustine, the 
Trinity and Modernity,’ Augustinian Studies 26, 2 (1995), 130; and also, refer to George Stead, Divine 
Substance (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1977), 157-166.  
1221
 De Trinitate 5.6.7.  
1222
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
1223
 De Trinitate 5.8.9: ‘what is said in reference to something does not refer to a substance but to a 
relationship.’ (McKenna’s translation) 
1224
 Ayres argues that, endeavouring to find the image of the Trinity through the use of the Trinitarian 
logic, Augustine at the same time strives to ‘render more comprehensible that logic itself’: see Ayres 
‘“‘It’s not for eatin’ – it’s for lookin’ through”’, 40: also, see ibid., 38-39. 
1225
 Cf., Sullivan, The image of God, 146 & footnote no. 104 in 161. 
1226
 Accordingly, Taylor says, ‘I can only understand myself in the light of a perfection that goes far 
beyond my powers’: see Charles Taylor, Sources of the Self: the Making of the Modern Identity 
(Cambridge/Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1989), 141: also, see ibid., 140. And Blanchard 
says, ‘La connaissance de soi est médiatrice pour la connaissance de Dieu. La connaissance de Dieu est 
médiatrice pour la connaissance de soi’ : Blanchard, P, L’espace intérieur chez saint Augustin d’après le 
livre X des « Confessions », Augustinus Magister, I, p 537. 
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Nonetheless, since in De Trinitate Augustine’s analysis of the Trinity precedes his 
attempt to find the Trinitarian image in the soul, I shall first of all investigate how 
Augustine interprets the doctrine of the Triune God in chapter (1), next how he 
perceived the soul to be the image of the Trinity in chapter (2).  
 
Now, following his previous ‘methodological principle’ of interiority (i.e., ‘ab 
exterioribus ad interiora, ab inferioribus ad superiora’), Augustine again stresses 
inwardness as essential for our teleological journey to God. 1227 That is to say that, 
turning away from material things to the soul, we must realise that we are an image of 
God, which is (teleologically) deformed. Yet, we are (ontologically) still ‘capax Dei’. 
Thus, through remembering, understanding, and loving God, we must endeavour to 
ascend to God. Such an ascent of the soul is, in other words, deification or renewal of 
the image of God. Thus, in chapter (3), I shall examine how Augustine explains that we 
can move closer to God in terms of the image (or deification). 
 
1) Augustine’s understanding of the Trinity 1228 
 
Regarding the doctrine of the Trinity, the aim of De Trinitate is not to prove that ‘Father 
and Son and Holy Spirit in the inseparable equality of one substance present a divine 
unity … although … he who is the Father is not the Son … the Holy Spirit is neither the 
Father nor the Son’1229, but to understand it.1230 Thus, in his approaches to the Trinity, 
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1227
 Cf., Sullivan, 94: also, see ibid., footnote no. 33: ‘In Book 8 of the De Trinitate Augustine begins to 
seek for “an understanding of what has been believed,” that is the doctrine of the Trinity, and in a method 
characteristic of himself and Plotinus, by a “more inward way.” … His purpose then is to see in the mind 
of man, the site of the image, something of the divine Trinity. But after addressing himself to various 
features in the mind reflecting the Trinity, he descends to the lower, and corporeal in man as being “more 
familiar,” and less of a strain on his readers. Then he rises again to the mind of man, and probes more 
deeply into the trinitarian aspect of the image there.’ Also, see Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Thematic 
Reflections on the De Trinitate’, in Proceedings of the PMR Conference, 12/13 (1987-1988), 224-225: 
‘Books VIII-XV of the De trinitate contain an ascent of the mind to God. Starting in Book VIII, 
Augustine mentions eight triads, the last of which is the true image in man of the triune God. There is a 
progressive hierarchization among these triads. The first image (amans, amatus, amor), found in De 
trinitate VIII, x,14, locates the milieu wherein the final image will be found. Later, Augustine mentions a 
triad on the sense level: res visa, visio exterior, intentio. From that point, there is progressive 
interiorization and ascension in Augustine’s images until the final trinity (memoria Dei, intelligentia Dei, 
amor Dei) is reached.’ 
1228
 Lewis Ayres argues in his article ‘“Remember that you are Catholic” (serm. 52, 2): Augustine on the 
Unity of the Triune God’ that the ‘fundamental background to the De trinitate’ can be found in a range of 
Augustine’s earlier texts, and discusses what that is: see Journal of Early Christian Studies 8 (2000), 39-
63. 
1229
 De Trinitate 1.4.7 (Hill’s translation): ‘Pater et Filius et Spiritus Sanctus unius eiusdemque 
substantiae inseparabili aequalitate divinam insinuent unitatem’. 
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and to the psychological trinity of the human person as the image of God, Augustine has 
a double task. He has to understand how the constituents of each trinity are one and the 
same, yet differ from each other.1231 Augustine attempts to tackle the problem in terms 
of ‘in reference to something else (ad aliquid)’1232 and ‘in reference to self (ad se)’1233. 
These two expressions are Augustine’s own for classifying linguistic expressions. He 
holds that all statements, not only about God but also about everything else, fall into 
either one of the two categories. Hereafter, analyzing the characteristics of each of the 
two categories, Augustine attempts to explain linguistically how the three Persons of the 
Trinity are both ‘equal’ and ‘united’, and, at the same time, different. Notice that Lewis 
Ayres has made clear two principles underlying in Augustine’s interpretation of the 
Trinity in chapter ‘The Grammar of Augustine’s Trinitarian Theology’ in his book 
Nicaea and its Legacy.1234 One is that God is ontologically ‘simple’: similarly, I 
explained what Augustine means by ‘simple’ in Part I.1235 The other is Augustine’s 
linguistic approach in terms of ‘according to substance’ and ‘according to relation’. 1236 
Ayres dedicated the above chapter to demonstrate how the principle ‘divine 
simplicity’1237 played the key role. Thus, I shall concentrate on explaining the linguistic 
principle.  
 
a) ‘In reference to something else’1238 
 
Augustine maintains that ‘friend’ and ‘neighbour’1239 are the instances of relational 
terms, which refer to more than one person/thing simultaneously, and classifies them 
into the category ‘in reference to something else’. Augustine hereafter argues that the 
three Persons of the Trinity are mutually distinct only from the perspective of 
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 Cf., Geoffrey Bromiley, Historical Theology (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1978), 88. 
1231
 Cf., De Trinitate 1.4.7-1.5.8. 
1232
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
1233
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
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 Cf., Lewis Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy: An Approach to Fourth-Century Trinitarian Theology 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 364-383. 
1235
 See section ‘God’s transcendence’ in chapter 4 ‘Neoplatonism’ in Part I. Also, see section 
‘Divisibility’ in chapter 1 ‘Augustine’s View of Reality’ in Part II. 
1236
 Cf., Ayres, Nicaea and its Legacy, 377. 
1237
 Ayres, 365. 
1238
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
1239
 De Trinitate 5.6.7: ‘a friend is so called in relation to a friend … Neighbour is likewise so called in 
relation to a neighbour, and since they are equally neighbours to each other (for as the first is neighbour to 
the second, so is the second neighbour to the first), there is the same neighbourhood in both of them.’ 
(McKenna’s translation) 
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relationality: similarly, the constituents of the psychological trinity of the human person 
are also mutually distinguishable from the same perspective. (Note that ‘much of our 
traditional understanding of this Trinitarian life of God comes from Gregory of 
Nazianzus.’1240) Thus, ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are used to in reference to one another:  
 
the Father is only called the Father because He has a Son, the Son must, 
therefore, be only called the Son because He has a Father, and so these terms are 
not said according to the substance.1241  
 
Likewise, both ‘begotten (genitus)’ and ‘unbegotten (ingenitus)’1242, too, represent a 
relationship. This is Augustine’s argument against the Arians, who maintained that 
‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ are not relational terms, though ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are:  
 
the Father is called the Father in relation to the Son, and the Son is called the Son 
in relation to the Father, but unbegotten refers to the Unbegotten One Himself, and 
begotten to the Begotten One Himself, and consequently, if whatever is said in 
reference to the subject Himself is said according to the substance, then to be 
unbegotten is different from begotten, and consequently their substance is 
different.1243  
 
Here, Augustine stresses that what matters in dealing with a linguistic expression in 
search for truth is only its meaning, not its usage.1244 ‘Son’ and ‘begotten’ are 
semantically identical with one another; thus, like ‘son’, ‘begotten’ is also a relational 
term. As for ‘unbegotten’, it means ‘not a son’: 
 
We must first take note that the expression begotten has the same meaning as son. 
Therefore, anyone is a son because he was begotten, and because he is a son, he 
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 Brian Daley, Gregory of Nazianzus (London: Routledge, 2006), 46. 
1241
 De Trinitate 5.5.6. (Hill’s translation) 
1242
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.7.8: ‘Begotten and unbegotten are terms that are currently in use (genitus et 
ingenitus commode dicuntur).’ (McKenna’s translation) 
1243
 De Trinitate 5.6.7. (McKenna’s translation) 
1244
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.7.8: ‘one ought not to consider in things what the usage of our language permits, 
but only the meaning that is clearly apparent from the things themselves (Quamobrem non est in rebus 
considerandum quid vel sinat vel non sinat dici usus sermonis nostri, sed quis rerum ipsarum intellectus 
eluceat).’ (McKenna’s translation) 
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was certainly begotten. When anyone, therefore, is called unbegotten, it signifies 
that he is not a son.1245  
 
‘Unbegotten’ (i.e., ‘not a son’) is an expression contradicting one’s place in a 
relationship, but semantically can only be used in a relational context. Therefore, like 
‘begotten’, ‘unbegotten’ is also a relational term.  
 
Augustine endeavours to strengthen the above argument by highlighting an important 
characteristic of relational terms. That is that each of the terms has a semantically 
complementary counterpart from a specific perspective:  
 
genitus et ingenitus commode dicuntur1246.  
 
I interpret ‘commode’ as ‘semantically complementary’ or ‘correlative’. I shall explain 
how Augustine holds that a pair of correlative terms is formed. 
 
The most typical way is that one of them is formed with the combination of the other 
term and a negative prefix, such as ‘unbegotten (ingenitus)’ (i.e., ‘in’ + ‘genitus’), 
which is semantically complementary to ‘begotten (genitus)’. On the other hand, there 
are many other relational terms, which have no complementary counterparts in the form 
of a single word with a negative prefix; for instance, ‘son’, ‘neighbour’ and ‘friend’:  
 
while in Latin the word filius is employed, custom does not authorize the word 
infilius. … Neighbour and friend are relative terms, but still you cannot say 
invicinus as you can say inimicus.1247  
 
However, Augustine maintains that the semantic counterpart of any relational term can 
be created in the form of a phrase that is comprised of ‘not (non)’ and the same term:  
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!
1245
 De Trinitate 5.7.8 (McKenna’s translation). 
1246
 De Trinitate 5.7.8: ‘begotten and unbegotten are terms that are currently in use’ (McKenna’s 
translation) 
1247
 De Trinitate 5.7.8. 
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the meaning remains the same if we use the phrase, not the son, just as the 
meaning remains the same if, instead of unbegotten, we say, not begotten.1248  
 
Therefore, ‘son’ and ‘not son’ (‘neighbour’ and ‘not neighbour’) are semantically 
interrelated and complementary to one another.  
 
In summary, each relational term has a semantic counterpart, which is expressed 
either as a word with a negative prefix, or as a phrase with ‘not’ added to the term. 
Hence, as long as we can make an affirmative statement about anything, we can also 
make a semantically negative statement about it and both of them are complementary. 
 
Next, Augustine holds that a pair of correlative expressions are formed together 
always ‘according to (secundum)’1249 a specific perspective. For instance, the statements 
‘He is the Father’ and ‘They are neighbours’ are made ‘according to’ relationality. 
Some other instances are substance, quality, relation, and position:  
 
As it, therefore, refers to (secundum) a substance when I say, He is a man, so it 
also refers to a substance when I say, He is not a man. … If I say, He is white, I 
am affirming according to (secundum) quality; but if I say, He is not white, I am 
denying according to quality. …1250  
 
Eventually, Augustine concludes that ‘there is no kind of predicament, where to any 
positive statement we are pleased to make, a denial in the same predicament cannot be 
made by simply prefixing a negative particle to the subject’1251. If Augustine had 
‘perspective’ in his vocabulary, he would have added the phrase ‘according to a specific 
perspective’ to the passage: he did not formulate a single, general term, which can 
denote all the words coming after ‘according to’.  
 
Based on the above linguistic analyses of his, Augustine insists that ‘begotten’ and 
‘unbegotten’ are semantically correlative from the perspective of relationality. 
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 De Trinitate 5.7.8. 
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 De Trinitate 5.7.8. 
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 De Trinitate 5.7.8. (McKenna’s translation) 
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 De Trinitate 5.7.8. (McKenna’s translation) 
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Therefore, both ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’ must be interpreted in a relational sense. 
The Holy Spirit, on the other hand, is the ‘Gift of God’1252: ‘”He (i.e., the Holy Spirit) is 
the gift of the Father and the Son, since He ‘proceeds from the Father” (John 
15.26)’1253. Since the phrases ‘gift of a giver’ and ‘giver of a gift’ speak for 
themselves,1254 a ‘gift’ refers to a ‘giver’ and vice versa. Hence, the term ‘Holy Spirit’ 
can be used only in relation to the ‘Father’ and the ‘Son’ simultaneously. In summary, 
each of ‘Father’, ‘Son’ and ‘Holy Spirit’ connotes a relationship between two/three 
Persons of the Trinity: 
 
only the Father is the Father, and indeed He is not the Father of the other two, but 
only of the one Son. And the three are not sons, since neither the Father nor the 
Holy Spirit is the Son. And they are not three holy spirits, because the Holy Spirit 
is neither the Father nor the Son when this term is used as a proper name, by 
which He is also called the Gift of God.1255 
 
b) ‘In reference to self’1256 
 
Regarding the other category of linguistic expressions (i.e., ‘in reference to self’1257), 
Augustine says,  
 
quidquid ad se dicitur praestantissima illa et divina sublimitas substantialiter dici; 
(quod autem ad aliquid non substantialiter, sed relative).1258 
 
‘Ad se dici’ and ‘substantialiter dici’ are tricky phrases to translate. McKenna’s 
translation is ‘whatever that divine and exalted sublimity is said in reference to Himself 
is said according to the substance; (but what is said in reference to something does not 
refer to a substance but to a relationship)’, while Hill’s is ‘whatever that supreme and 
divine majesty is called with reference to itself is said substance-wise; (whatever it is 
called with reference to another is said not substance – but relationship-wise)’. Perhaps, 
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1252
 De Trinitate 5.11.12. 
1253
 De Trinitate 5.11.12. (McKenna’s translation) 
1254
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.11.12. 
1255
 De Trinitate 7.4.7. (McKenna’s translation) 
1256
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
1257
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
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the easiest way to render the phrases intelligible is to say that all linguistic expressions 
which do not fall into the category ‘in reference to something else’ pertain to the 
category ‘in reference to self’. Thus, a statement made about a thing ‘ad se’ does not 
contain any relational term, does not concern how that thing is related to another, and 
does not refer to two things simultaneously: rather, such a statement informs what the 
nature of that thing (i.e., ‘substantialiter’) is, or what really it is. (Note that ‘ad se dici’ 
and ‘substantialiter dici’ are identical with one another.)  
 
In support of the above argument, Augustine gives the following instances: 
 
(1) ‘as the Father is God, the Son is God, and the Holy Spirit is God, and no one 
doubts that these words are spoken according to the substance’1259 (in other 
words, each of the Persons is really God),  
(2) ‘He is called the great greatness and the powerful power, certainly in reference 
to Himself’1260,  
(3) ‘according to substance He is said to be good and great’1261,  
(4) ‘far be it from us to say that God is spirit according to substance, and good 
according to quality; but both are said according to substance’1262 (in other 
words, God, whose nature is immaterial, is really the Good Itself). 
 
Eventually, when we speak of each Person of the Trinity ‘in reference to Himself’, we 
discover that they are indistinguishable from each other because they are altogether one 
power, one wisdom, one essence, and one God: 
 
the God who begot the Son is not only the Father of His own power and wisdom, 
but is Himself also power and wisdom, and so, too, the Holy Spirit; but yet that 
they are not together three powers or three wisdoms, but one power and one 
wisdom, as one God and one essence.1263 
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 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
1259
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. (McKenna’s translation) 
1260
 De Trinitate 7.1.2 (McKenna’s translation): ‘dicitur magnitudo magna et virtus potens utique ad se 
ipsum’. 
1261
 De Trinitate 15.3.5. (McKenna’s translation) 
1262
 De Trinitate 15.3.8. (McKenna’s translation) 
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Unfortunately, Augustine’s distinction between the two categories of linguistic 
expressions is not convincing. Both of them actually share the same characteristics. I 
shall explain this by analyzing the four examples above, which Augustine argues to be 
statements about God ‘in reference to Himself’, and the conclusion will be that we can 
know what a being is only in reference to another being.  
 
c) We cannot make a statement about a thing without referring to other things 
 
The four statements just cited in reference to God also refer to His creation. We might 
rephrase them as follows;  
 
(1) ‘The Son is God’1264 means the same as ‘The Son is not created’. 
(‘God’/’Creator’ and ‘not created’ refer to one another.) 
(2) ‘He is called the great greatness and the powerful power’1265 is semantically 
identical with ‘Unlike a creature, He is not great/powerful by another’s 
greatness/power’.  
(3&4) Finally, ‘far be it from us to say that God is spirit according to substance, 
and good according to quality; but both are said according to substance’1266 
means that – unlike human souls, all of whom are spirits, though not all of 
them are good – for God to be a spirit and to be good are not two different 
things.1267 
 
In addition, all the above examples are studded with relational terms. As explained, 
the most important characteristic of such terms is that each of them has a semantically 
complementary counterpart, such as ‘begotten’ and ‘unbegotten’,1268 and ‘white’ and 
‘not white’:  
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1263
 De Trinitate 15.3.5. (McKenna’s translation) 
1264
 De Trinitate 5.8.9. 
1265
 De Trinitate 7.1.2. 
1266
 De Trinitate 15.3.8. 
1267
 Cf., De Trinitate 6.4.6: ‘How much more so, then, is this true of that unchangeable and eternal 
substance, incomparably more simple than the human soul. For in the human soul to be is not the same as 
to be strong, or prudent, or just, or temperate, for there can be a soul without any of these virtues. But for 
God to be is the same as to be strong, or to be just, or to be wise, and to be whatever else you may say of 
that simple multiplicity, or that multiple simplicity, whereby His substance is signified.’ (McKenna’s 
translation) 
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If I say, He is white, I am affirming according to quality; but if I say, He is not 
white, I am denying according to quality.1269 (De Trinitate 5.7.8) 
 
Similarly, ‘God’/’uncreated’/’Creator’ and ‘not God’/’created’/’creature’1270 are 
linguistically interdependent on one another. Also, both ‘substance’ and ‘not substance’ 
– that is, ‘nothing (nihil)’1271 – are mutually complementary. ‘Good’ and ‘not good’ 
(i.e., ‘nothing’1272, ‘not substance’1273, or ‘evil’) are correlative to one another.1274  
 
Consequently, ‘substance’/‘reality’1275, ‘God’ and ‘Beauty’ are relational terms 
referring to ‘nothing’, ‘not God’ and ‘no Beauty’ respectively, like ‘father’ and ‘son’. 
That is to say that, if there is no ‘father’, then there cannot be ‘son’, and vice versa: if 
there is no ‘substance’, then there cannot be ‘nothing’, and vice versa: if there is no 
‘God’/’Creator’, then there cannot be ‘not God’/‘creature’, and vice versa.  
 
In summary, what Augustine holds to be statements made about God ‘according to 
the substance’ refer to His creation. Therefore, all linguistic expressions intrinsically 
pertain to the category ‘in reference to something else’.1276 This has a twofold 
significance. One is that knowledge of God and knowledge of the soul are 
interdependent. Hence, arguing for a precedence between them is meaningless: 
Augustine enhanced his understanding of the soul in the light of Christian theology, and 
vice versa. The other is that Augustine’s dialectical approach to knowledge of God is 
intrinsically a search for right pairs of correlative terms in reference to His creation.1277 
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 Cf., De Trinitate 5.7.8. 
1269
 McKenna’s translation. 
1270
 i.e., ‘creature’. 
1271
 Cf., De magistro 2.3-4.  
1272
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2: ‘evil is nothing (Deus … ostendis malum nihil esse).’  
1273
 Cf., Confessiones 7.12.18: (Chadwick’s translation) ‘the evil into whose origins I was inquiring is not 
a substance’. 
1274
 If we substitute ‘substance’ for ‘white’, and ‘ontology’ for ‘quality’ in the passage cited from De 
Trinitate 5.7.8, the whole passage still makes sense: ‘If I say, He is a substance (white), I am affirming 
according to ontology (quality); but if I say, He is not a substance (not white), I am denying according to 
ontology (quality).’ (McKenna’s translation) 
1275
 De magistro 2.3 & De Trinitate 9.12.18: ‘res’. 
1276
 For this reason, we can endeavour to know God through His creation: (McKenna’s translation) ‘the 
invisible things of him (i.e., God), from the creation of the world are clearly seen, being understood 
through those things that are made. (Cf. Rom. 1.20)’ (De Trinitate 15.2.3).  
1277
 Richard La Croix draws a similar conclusion as mine, that all our statements about God refer to His 
creation, in his article ‘Augustine on the Simplicity of God,’ The New Scholasticism 51 (1977), 468-69, 
especially 464-469: ‘The result is that Augustine’s distinction between relative properties and nonrelative 
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d) Summary 
 
Summarizing Augustine’s interpretation of the Trinity; the Triune God is, on the one 
hand, one1278 ‘according to the substance’ (or ‘in reference to Himself’). However, the 
three Persons of the Trinity are not three parts of one divisible substance. Thus, two of 
them together are not, in any sense, greater than the remaining one, as it is in the 
material world.1279 Also, the three Persons are not together ‘three powers or three 
wisdoms, but one power and one wisdom, as one God and one essence.’1280 In short, 
they are completely in union with each other.1281 On the other hand, the Persons of the 
Trinity are three1282 ‘in reference to each other’. ‘Father’ and ‘Son’ are a pair of 
correlative terms.1283 Since nothing accidental can happen to God,1284  
 
one is always the Father and another is always the Son, not indeed in the sense 
that the Father, from whom the Son is born, never ceases to be the Father because 
the Son never ceases to be the Son, but in the sense that the Son was always born 
and never began to be the Son.1285  
 
The Holy Spirit is the ‘gift of the Father and the Son’1286. Since ‘gift of a giver’ and 
‘giver of a gift’ are semantically complementary to one another,1287 ‘Holy Spirit’ is a 
relational term referring to the ‘Father’ and the ‘Son’ simultaneously. Therefore, God is 
one substance and three persons.1288 
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properties is incoherent.’ (pp. 468-469) Also, see Alvin Plantinga, God and Other Minds: A Study of the 
Rational Justification of Belief in God (Cornell University: New York, 1967), 173-180. 
1278
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.12.18: ‘one and one substance’. 
1279
 De Trinitate 15.3.5: (McKenna’s translation) ‘not only is the Father not greater than the Son in the 
substance of truth, but neither are both together something greater than the Holy Spirit alone’. Also see, 
De Trinitate 5.6.7. 
1280
 De Trinitate 15.3.5. (McKenna’s translation) 
1281
 Cf., De Trinitate 6.4.6 & 6.8.9. 
1282
 De Trinitate 5.5.6: (McKenna’s translation) ‘although to be the Father and to be the Son are two 
different things, still there is no difference in their substance, because the names, Father and Son, do not 
refer to the substance but to the relation (Quamobrem quamvis diversum sit Patrem esse et Filium esse, 
non est tamen diversa substantia, quia hoc non secundum substantiam dicuntur, sed secundum relativum; 
quod tamen relativum non est accidens quia non est mutabile.)’ 
1283
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.6.7. 
1284
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.5.6. 
1285
 De Trinitate 5.5.6 (McKenna’s translation): ‘…semper natus est Filius, nec coepit umquam esse 
Filius’. 
1286
 De Trinitate 5.11.12. 
1287
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.11.12. 
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There is, however, a problem with the linguistic approach to the Trinity. That is that 
Augustine is unable to interpret what ‘persona’ should mean:  
 
one essence or substance and three persons … Yet, when the question is asked, 
What three? … The answer, however, is given, three “persons,” not that it might 
be [completely] spoken, but that it might not be left [wholly] unspoken.1289  
 
(‘Persona’ is the Latin translation of the Greek word ‘hypostasis’, which Augustine 
argues to be semantically closer to ‘substantia’ than ‘persona’1290.) He attempts to make 
‘persona’ meaningful in terms of genus and species, but not successfully:  
 
When it is, therefore, asked what the three or who the three are, we seek to find a 
generic or a specific name which may include the three together. But we come 
across none.1291  
 
Nevertheless, Augustine begins to look ‘within the human persons to “show that there 
are three somethings which can both be separately presented and also operate 
inseparably.”’ 1292  
 
2) The image of the Triune God 
 
Augustine first of all finds a resemblance to (not the image of) the Trinity in the act of 
loving oneself. In this act there are three things involved; namely the mind, its self-
knowledge1293, which is the ‘offspring (proles)’1294 of the mind, and finally love. These 
are hierarchically on a par with each other.1295 Here, Augustine explains in what sense 
they are one and simultaneously three in terms of ‘according to the substance 
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1288
 Cf., De Trinitate 15.3.5. 
1289
 De Trinitate 5.9.10. (McKenna’s translation) 
1290
 Cf., De Trinitate 5.8.10-9.10: ‘…mian ousian, treis hypostaseis, quod est latine: unam essentiam, tres 
substantias …’  
1291
 De Trinitate 7.4.7. (McKenna’s translation) 
1292
 Mary T. Clark, ‘De Trinitate’, in Eleonore Stump and Norman Kretzmann (eds.), The 
Cambridge Companion to Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 96. 
1293
 For ‘we do not love anything unknown’ (De Trinitate 10.2.4). (McKenna’s translation) 
1294
 De Trinitate 9.12.18. 
1295
 De Trinitate 9.12.18: ‘the offspring is not less, while the mind knows itself as much as it is; nor is the 
love less, while the mind loves itself as much as it knows and as much as it is.’ (McKenna’s translation) 
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(secundum substantiam or ad se)’1296 and ‘in reference to something else (ad 
aliquid)’1297. ‘In reference to each other’, the identities and the roles of the mind, its 
self-knowledge, and love are mutually distinct: 
 
in relation to its knowledge it (i.e., the mind) is spoken of as knowing, as being 
known, or as knowable; and when referring to the love by which it loves itself, it 
is also spoken of as loving, as being loved, or as lovable. … knowledge, although 
it is referred to a mind that either knows or is known, yet in respect to itself it is 
also spoken of both as known and as knowing, for the knowledge by which the 
mind itself knows itself is not unknown to itself. … when referring to the love by 
which it loves itself, it is also spoken of as loving, as being loved, or as lovable. 
… love, although it is referred to the mind that loves, of which it is the love, yet 
it is likewise love in respect to itself, so that it also exists in itself. For love is also 
loved, nor can it be loved with anything else except with love, that is, with itself. 
And so each exists in itself.1298 
 
‘According to the substance (or itself)’, the mind, its self-knowledge, and love are each 
‘a substance’, yet all of them are together ‘one substance or essence’.1299 Hence, we call 
the mind a mind ‘in reference to itself’.1300 Therefore, like the Triune God, the 
constituents of the trinity found in the act of self-love are distinct from each another, but 
are simultaneously ‘one substance.’1301  
 
Next, Augustine explains how memory, understanding, and the will reflect the 
Trinity.1302 Here, again, Augustine’s argument for why they are a trinity is based on the 
same distinction between ‘ad se’ and ‘ad aliquid’. Each of the three is called ‘memory’, 
‘understanding’ or ‘will’ ‘with relation to each other (ad aliquid relative [dicitur])’.1303 
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 De Trinitate 5.6.7.  
1297
 De Trinitate 5.8.9: ‘what is said in reference to something does not refer to a substance but to a 
relationship.’ (McKenna’s translation) 
1298
 De Trinitate 9.5.8. (McKenna’s translation) 
1299
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.5.8. 
1300
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.5.8: ‘mens est utique in se ipsa quoniam ad se ipsam mens dicitur’. 
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 De Trinitate 9.12.18. 
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 Cf., De Trinitate 10.11.17. 
1303
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.11.18. 
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However, they are collectively one life, one mind, and one substance; for each of them 
‘in respect to itself (ad se ipsam)’ is life, mind, and essence.1304  
 
There is, however, an issue to bear in mind regarding precisely what Augustine 
means by the ‘equality’1305 between memory, reason, and the will. Since the three 
Persons of the Trinity are mutually ‘equal’, and since the soul is the image of the 
Trinity; Augustine is bound to argue that there are three ‘somethings’1306, which are 
‘equal’ to each other, and they are memory, reason, and the will. Yet, such an argument 
of his must be interpreted as referring to the souls of the living only. That is because, as 
explained in the Introduction,1307 when we see God ‘face to face’1308, memory becomes 
no longer necessary and, so, is ultimately inferior to reason and the will.  
 
Now, Augustine’s use of the term ‘image of God’1309 in De Trinitate is twofold in the 
same way as before, that is, ontological and teleological: this is similar to the twofold 
manner in which he maintains the soul to be good (bonus). Ontologically, not only the 
soul but also all other creatures are good, since whatever the Good God has created is 
good. Teleologically, only the soul, whose will is orientated to God, is good.1310 
Likewise, ontologically, all souls are made ‘to (ad)’1311 the image of God:  
 
this imperfect image, which is an image nevertheless, that is, of man;1312  
 
even though it (i.e., the image of God) has become impaired and disfigured by 
the loss of its (i.e., the mind’s) participation in God, it remains nonetheless an 
image of God. For it is His image by the very fact that it is capable of Him, and 
can be a partaker of Him; and it cannot be so great a good except that it is His 
image.1313 (De Trinitate 14.8.11)  
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 Cf., De Trinitate 10.11.18. 
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 De Trinitate 10.11.18. 
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 Clark, ‘De Trinitate’, 96. 
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 See the section (5-1-1). 
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 Confessiones 10.5.7 & De Trinitate 1.8.16.!Also, see Soliloquia 1.6.12-1.7.14: Augustine mentions 
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 Cf., De Trinitate 12.7.12. 
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 De Trinitate 8.3.4. 
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 De Trinitate 12.7.12.  
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 De Trinitate 9.2.2 (McKenna’s translation): ‘hac impari imagine, attamen imagine, id est homine’. 
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Yet, only the trinity of memory, reason and the will, engaged in contemplation of 
eternal things, images the Trinity: 
  
only in that part which is concerned with the contemplation of eternal things can 
one find something that is not only a trinity but also the image of God; while in 
the part that is drawn off for temporal activity one may perhaps find a trinity, but 
certainly not the image of God.1314  
 
In other words, only when the three psychic ‘faculties’1315 are centred on knowledge of 
God, can they become the image of the Trinity: 
 
this trinity of the mind is not on that account the image of God because the mind 
remembers itself, understands itself, and loves itself, but because it can also 
remember, understand, and love Him by whom it was made. And when it does 
so, it becomes wise; but if it does not, even though it remembers itself, knows 
itself, and loves itself, it is foolish.1316  
 
It is noteworthy that Principe approaches Augustine’s twofold interpretation of ‘image 
of God’ in terms of ‘capacity’/’power’ and ‘activity’: 
 
We have met a few texts where Augustine speaks of this highest image as a 
power or capacity to remember, know, and love God.26 But in these cases it is a 
power or capacity to act, and Augustine clearly intends and indeed exhorts the 
person to be as active as possible so as to be more perfectly an image of the 
Trinity. In this, he says, consists the person’s renovation or re-formation unto the 
image and likeness of the Trinity. 1317 
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 McKenna’s translation. 
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 De Trinitate 12.4.4. (Hill’s translation) 
1315
 De Trinitate 10.12.19. 
1316
 (McKenna’s translation) De Trinitate 14.12.15. Also, see De Trinitate 12.4.4: (McKenna’s 
translation) ‘that part alone, to which belongs the contemplation of eternal things, there is not only a 
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 Walter H. Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in 
the Human Person’, Studia Patristica 17 (Part 3), 1294. 
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(Note that Principe accepts the Augustinian term ‘capax Dei’ as a ‘noun-form’ of ‘can 
[posse] remember, understand/know, and love God’.) 1318 This is compatible with my 
interpretation. Since all of us are endowed with the ‘power’ to remember, know, and 
love God, we are undeniably the image of God in an ontological sense. Nonetheless, we 
can truly image God only if we are ‘actively’ remembering, knowing, and loving Him. 
Principe quotes the following Augustinian text in order to substantiate his argument: 
 
Yet not all are with (cum) Him in the way in which it was said by God, “I am 
always with you”. Nor is He with all in the way in which we say, “May the Lord 
be with you”. And so it is a great misery for man not to be with Him without 
Whom he cannot be... . No doubt [man] does not exist without [God], and yet if 
he does not remember Him, and does not understand or love Him (si eius non 
meminit, eumque non intellegit nec diligit), he is not with Him.1319 
 
Here, again, Augustine’s interpretation of ‘with Him/God’ is twofold. Ontologically we 
are always with God, otherwise we would not exist; but, from the perspective of 
teleology, only those of us, who remember, know/understand, and love God, can be said 
to be ‘with Him’. 
 
Although only the trinity involving knowledge of God is the image of the Trinity, our 
self-knowledge has its own role in ‘reforming’1320 the image, because it is essential in 
establishing a right relationship between ourselves and God: 
 
Why, then, was it (i.e., the mind) commanded to know itself? It was, I believe, 
that it might consider itself and live according to its nature, that is, that it might 
desire to be ruled according to its nature, namely, under Him to whom it must be 
brought into subjection, and above those to whom it must be preferred; under 
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 Cf., Principe, ‘Dynamism of Augustine’s Terms for Describing the Highest Trinitarian Image in the 
Human Person’, 1295 & 1297, footnote no. 26: ‘26 See above, 1292 (De Trinitate 14.12.15; 442, 1. 3: 
quia potent etiam meminisse), 1293 (14.8.11; 435-36: nouit Deum uel potest nosse), 1293 (ibid. 14.4.6; 
428, 11. 9-10: uti ratione atque intellectu ad intellegendum et conspiciendum Deum potest), 1293 (ibid. 
14.14.20; 448, 1. 84: ualeat inhaerere), 1294 (ibid. 15.20.39; 517, 11. 53-54: quam magnum sit in ea unde 
potest etiam sempiterna immutabilisque natura recoli, conspici, consupisci).’ 
1319
 De Trinitate 14.12.16 quoted in Principe, 1292. 
1320
 De Trinitate 14.16.22. 
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Him by whom it must be governed, above those whom it must govern. For it 
does many things through evil desires, as though it had forgotten itself.1321 
 
(Note that, as the above text clearly indicates, knowledge of God and that of the soul are 
inseparably interconnected.)  
 
3) Reforming the image of the Trinity 
 
Reforming the Trinitarian image is, in other words, transforming ‘bad and 
irrational’1322, ‘outer’1323, or ‘wicked (impius)’1324 people into ‘rational’1325, ‘wise’1326 or 
‘inner’1327 people. The most important factor for the renewal of the image is gaining 
knowledge of God, because we cannot love what we do not know.1328 Also, the more 
we know God, the more we become like God: ‘We are like God inasmuch as we know 
Him’1329. On what grounds does Augustine insist that knowledge of God transforms us 
to be ontologically ‘similar’1330 to Him? The answer lies in Augustine’s ideas on what 
the nature of knowledge is, and I shall explain this in the first section of this chapter. 
Afterwards, I shall investigate how Augustine holds that we can get to know God: 
Augustine’s arguments in this regard are traditional, that is, through reason and faith.  
 
a) The nature of knowledge  
 
i) Knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of that thing 
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 (McKenna’s translation) De Trinitate 10.5.7. Also, see Ibid., 9.8.13: ‘Since the creature, therefore, is 
either equal or inferior to us, we must use the inferior for God and enjoy the equal, but in God. For just as 
you ought to enjoy yourself, but not in yourself but in Him who made you, so you ought also to enjoy him 
whom you love as yourself. And, therefore, let us enjoy ourselves and our brethren in the Lord’. 
(McKenna’s translation) 
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 De Trinitate 3.3.8: ‘malis et irrationalibus’. 
1323
 De Trinitate 11.1.1. 
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 De Trinitate 14.15.21. 
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 De Trinitate 2.17.28. 
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 De Trinitate 3.3.8: ‘sapientem’. 
1327
 De Trinitate 11.1.1. 
1328
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.1: ‘no one can in any way love a thing that is wholly unknown’. (McKenna’s 
translation) 
1329
 De Trinitate 9.11.16. Also, Ibid., 9.9.14: ‘he who knows justice perfectly and loves it perfectly is 
already just’. (McKenna’s translation) 
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There are two important texts in this respect as follows: 
 
all knowledge according to the species is similar to that which it (i.e., the mind) 
knows,1331 
 
The mind, therefore, possesses a certain likeness of the species known to it.1332 
 
I shall explain what ‘species’ means in the next paragraph. For the moment we can just 
ignore the word ‘species’, and treat ‘knowledge according to the species’ and ‘the 
species known’ as synonymous expressions of ‘knowledge’. Consequently, the two 
texts cited above can be rendered as follows: 
 
knowledge is similar to that which it knows, 
 
The mind, therefore, possesses a certain likeness of the knowledge that it has. 
 
The Oxford Latin Dictionary defines ‘species’ as ‘a subdivision of any class or kind, 
a sort, species, etc.’, and ‘genus’ as ‘a class containing in itself a number of subordinate 
kinds or variety’. Augustine’s uses of ‘species’ and ‘genus’ in De Trinitate 7.4.7 and 
7.6.11 are consistent with the above definitions: they are collective nouns and are 
mutually correlative, like ‘left’ and ‘right’, ‘high’ and ‘low’. For instance, ‘(human) 
person’ is a species of the generic term ‘animal’, but is simultaneously a genus with 
respect to ‘man’ and ‘woman’.1333 Consequently, Augustine stresses that we define what 
a genus is in terms of species: 
 
!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!!! !!!!!!!!!!
1330
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16. For more discussion on Augustine’s uses of ‘imago’ and ‘similitudo’, see 
Lewis Ayres, ‘“Remember that you are Catholic” (serm. 52, 2): Augustine on the Unity of the Triune 
God’, 61-62. 
1331
 De Trinitate 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation): ‘omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei 
quam novit.’ 
1332
 De Trinitate 9.11.16 (McKenna’s translation): ‘Habet ergo animus nonnullam speciei notae 
similitudinem’ 
1333
 Cf., De Trinitate 7.4.7: ‘whatever things are designated specifically by one name in the plural number 
can also be designated generically by one name. But not everything that we can call generically by one 
name can also be called specifically by one name. For three horses, which is a specific name, are also 
called three animals; however, we only call a horse, an ox, or a dog three animals or three substances, 
which are generic names, or anything else that can be spoken about them generically. But we cannot say 
three horses, or three oxen, or three dogs, because these are specific names.’ (McKenna’s translation) 
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no species goes beyond the definition of its own genus. For when I define 
animal, since a horse is a species of this genus, every horse is an animal.1334  
 
Hence, ‘knowledge according to the species’1335 means ‘knowledge about a thing – or 
definition of a generic term – according to the species of that thing’. 
 
For the Augustine of De Trinitate ‘knowledge’ often means a definition of that thing 
in terms of genus and species. Yet, Augustine holds that we cannot define revealed 
truths about God – for instance, the meaning of ‘persona’ of the Trinity – in such a way, 
due to God’s transcendence: 
 
When it is, therefore, asked what the three or who the three are, we seek to find a 
generic or a specific name which may include the three together. But we come 
across none, because the super eminent excellence of the divinity transcends all 
the limits of our wonted manner of speaking. For what is thought of God is truer 
than what is said, and His being is truer than what is thought.1336  
 
ii) Knowledge is a substance 
 
In addition to his insistence that the knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of that 
thing, Augustine maintains that ‘knowledge is a substance’1337 and is also ‘a kind of life 
in the understanding of one who knows’1338. Due to the ontological nature of 
knowledge, Augustine holds that knowledge also constitutes the hierarchy of reality: 
this was implicit in the earlier works, but now becomes explicit in De Trinitate. For 
instance, knowledge about a material thing is higher than that thing itself because the 
former is in the soul, which is superior to the body:  
 
the knowledge of the body is greater than the body itself, which is known by that 
knowledge. For knowledge is a kind of life in the understanding of one who 
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1334
 De Trinitate 7.6.11. (McKenna’s translation) 
1335
 De Trinitate 9.11.16: ‘omnis secundum speciem notitia, similis est ei rei quam novit.’ 
1336
 (McKenna’s translation) De Trinitate 7.4.7. Also, see Ibid., 7.3.6-7.6.12. 
1337
 De Trinitate 9.4.6: ‘substantia sit scientia’. 
1338
 De Trinitate 9.4.4 (McKenna’s translation): ‘Illa (i.e., notitia) enim vita quaedam est in ratione 
cognoscentis’. 
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knows; but the body is not life. And any life is greater than any body, not in bulk 
but in power.1339  
 
However, knowledge about the soul is hierarchically equal to the soul itself:  
 
From this we can gather that when the mind knows and approves itself, this 
knowledge is its word in such a way that it matches it exactly and is equal to it 
and identical, since it is neither knowledge of an inferior thing like body nor of a 
superior one like God. And while any knowledge has a likeness to the thing it 
knows, that is to the thing it is the knowledge of, this knowledge by which the 
knowing mind is known has a perfect and equal likeness.1340  
 
Knowledge about God is higher than the soul:  
 
I confess rather that its sublime knowledge has been too great for me, and that I 
am unable to reach to it.1341  
 
Yet, knowledge about God is inferior to God Himself:  
 
that knowledge (i.e., of God) is less than He, because it is in a lower nature; for 
the mind is creature, but God is Creator.1342  
 
Eventually, Augustine’s hierarchy, in ascending order, is material things; knowledge 
about them; the soul, which is on the par with self-knowledge; knowledge of God; and 
finally God himself. Therefore, the soul’s intellectual ‘ascent’1343 is the ‘reforming’1344 
the image of God, otherwise the ‘deforming’ of the image: ‘we are like God inasmuch 
as we know Him’1345. 
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1339
 De Trinitate 9.4.4. (McKenna’s translation) 
1340
 De Trinitate 9.11.16. (Hill’s translation) 
1341
 De Trinitate 15.27.50. (McKenna’s translation) 
1342
 De Trinitate 9.11.16. (McKenna’s translation) 
1343
 De Trinitate 10.12.19 
1344
 Cf., De Trinitate 14.16.22. 
1345
 De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
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How, then, are we to gain knowledge of God? Augustine’s answer is traditional, that 
is, through reason and faith. 
 
b) Through reason 
 
There is an aspect of God that we can ‘see’ or know through our reason alone,1346 for 
instance, the Good:  
 
This good and that good; take away this and that, and see good itself if you can; 
so you will see (videbis) God who is good not by another good, but is the good of 
every good.1347  
 
Furthermore, because we ‘see’ the Good, which eternal1348, omnipresent1349, and most 
importantly epistemologically immanent1350 in our soul, we are able to judge whether a 
thing is good or not: 
 
in all these good things, either those which I have enumerated, or any others 
which are seen or thought, we would be unable to call one better than the other, if 
we judge in accordance with the truth, if the idea of good itself had not been 
impressed upon us (nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni), according to 
which we approve of something as good, and also prefer one good to another.1351 
 
Augustine puts the above argument in a different way: God is the ‘Light’ that always 
‘touches (tangere)’ our reason and enables us to make judgments concerning, for 
instance, what is just or unjust:  
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1346
 De Trinitate 12.5.5: ‘Let him so accustom himself to find traces of spiritual things in material things 
that, when he shall begin to ascend upwards from them under the guidance of reason, he may arrive at 
that unchangeable truth itself through which all things have been made’. (McKenna’s translation) 
1347
 De Trinitate 8.3.4. (McKenna’s translation) 
1348
 See the following footnote. 
1349
 ‘The mind does however remember its God. He always is; it is not the case that he was and is not, or 
is and was not, but just as he never will not be, so he never was not. And he is all of him everywhere, and 
therefore the mind lives and moves and is in him, and for this reason is able to remember him.’ (De 
Trinitate 14.15.21: Hill’s translation) 
1350
 Cf., De Trinitate 12.7.12: ‘the rational mind where the knowledge of God can reside.’ (McKenna’s 
translation) 
1351
 De Trinitate 8.3.4. (McKenna’s translation) 
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the man who does not do justice and yet sees what should be done, he is the one 
who turns away from that light, and yet is still touched by it.1352  
 
Note that our memory is the source of our knowledge,1353 thus a theory of reminiscence.  
 
c) Through faith 
 
Together with reason, faith is also essential for reforming the image of God: Augustine 
argument for the roles of faith with respect to our deification is the same as before. 
 
Firstly, faith purifies the soul from sin.1354 (Again, theory precedes practice.) 
 
Secondly, faith prepares the soul for contemplation of God.1355 In other words, faith 
strengthens ‘the weak eye of the mind’1356, which cannot see or steadily hold its gaze on 
divine, intelligible things, such as the supreme good. Hence, ‘outer men’ (or ‘irrational 
people’) must believe that the Good exists since they do not understand the existence of 
the Good and, consequently, do not love the Good itself.1357 (Note that Augustine still 
holds that ‘reason (ratio)’1358 – ‘the eye of the mind (mentis acies)’1359 – is the agent of 
one’s teleological journey1360, as the only partaker of immutable Wisdom.1361)  
 
Finally, we must endeavour to deepen both our knowledge of God, and our love of 
Him, through believing revealed truths.1362 Faith is only the beginning, not the end, of a 
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1352
 De Trinitate 14.15.21 (Hill’s translation): ‘Qui vero non operatur, et tamen videt quid operandum sit, 
ipse est qui ab illa luce avertitur, a qua tamen tangitur.’ Also, see Ibid., 8.6.9. 
1353
 Cf., De Trinitate 15.21.40: ‘attributing to the memory everything that we know (memoriae tribuens 
omne quod scimus)’. 
1354
 Cf., De Trinitate 4.2.4 & 1.8.17 (‘our hearts are purified by faith’). 
1355
 Cf., De Trinitate 1.8.17. 
1356
 De Trinitate 1.2.4: ‘mentis humanae acies invalida’. 
1357
 Cf., De Trinitate 1.2.4: ‘the supreme good exists, which can only be discerned by minds that are 
wholly purified, and that they themselves are unable to see or to comprehend it for this reason, because 
the weak eye of the human mind cannot be fixed on a light so dazzling, unless it has been nourished and 
become stronger by the justice of faith.’ (McKenna’s translation) 
1358
 De Trinitate 1.1.1. 
1359
 De Trinitate 12.14.23. 
1360
 Cf., De Trinitate 4.20.28: ‘when it is advancing towards God …’. 
1361
 Cf., De Trinitate 3.2.8 & 12.14.23. Ibid., 12.7.12: ‘rational mind where the knowledge of God can 
reside.’ (McKenna’s translation) 
1362
 Cf., De Trinitate 7.6.12: ‘if this (i.e., the mystery of the Trinity) cannot be grasped by our reason, let it 
be held fast by our faith, until He shall shine in our hearts who said through the Prophet: “Unless you 
believe, you shall not understand.”’ (McKenna’s translation) 
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teleological journey. As Augustine insisted in De Vera Religione 8.15 that the ‘carnal 
Catholic’ must be transformed into a ‘spiritual Catholic’, the Augustine of De Trinitate 
also expresses the same idea in terms of ‘renewal’ of the image of God, making a 
distinction between ‘cure (curatio)’ and ‘healing (sanare)’:  
 
This renewal, of course, is not brought about in the one moment of the 
conversion itself, as in Baptism that renewal is brought about in one moment by 
the remission of all sins, for there does not remain even one sin … But just as it 
is one thing to be free from fevers, and another thing to recover from the 
weakness which has resulted from the fevers; and, similarly, … so the first step 
in a cure is to remove the cause of the disease, which is done through the 
remission of all sins; the second is to heal the disease itself, which is done 
gradually by making progress in the renewal of this image (of God).1363  
 
‘Curing’ means purification, whereas ‘healing’ signifies understanding revealed truths. 
Hence, if we are to rephrase the above passage in the language of De Vera Religione 
8.15, then we can say that all ‘Catholics’ are ‘cured’ of the disease, but only the 
‘spiritual Catholics’ are in the course of being ‘healed’, whereas ‘carnal Catholics’ are 
those ‘who, though they profess the Catholic faith, do not carefully consider them (i.e., 
biblical expressions)’1364: ‘curing’ pertains to the ontological part of Augustinian 
deification, whereas ‘healing’ to the teleological part. (In De Trinitate 13.20.26 
Augustine speaks of the same thing in terms of the ‘trinity of the inner man’1365 and the 
‘trinity of the outer man’1366.) However, our soul cannot be ‘healed’ completely in this 
life:  
 
a certain faith is in some way the beginning of knowledge, but a certain 
knowledge will only be perfected after this life when we shall see face to face.1367 
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1363
 De Trinitate 14.17.23. (McKenna’s translation) 
1364
 De Trinitate 12.6.7 (McKenna’s translation): ‘nonnulli, etiamsi catholicam fidem asserunt, non tamen 
diligenter advertunt’. 
1365
 ‘Trinitatem interioris hominis’. 
1366
 ‘(Trinitatem) exterioris (hominis)’. 
1367
 De Trinitate 9.1.1. (McKenna’s translation) 
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In summary, our soul is eternally the ‘image of God’, which is ‘disfigured’ due to the 
lack/loss of our teleological ‘participation’ in God.1368 We are therefore called to restore 
the image (or become deified) by increasing our knowledge of God (through divine 
grace), for the knowledge is ‘similar’ to God.1369 Yet, since for most of us reason is too 
‘weak’ to see God,1370 we must endeavour to ascent to God by means of faith, that is, 
believing and striving to understand revealed truths: nonetheless, the ‘perfection of the 
image’ can be achieved only afterlife.1371 
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1368
 De Trinitate 14.8.11. 
1369
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
1370
 Cf., De Trinitate 1.2.4 
1371
 Cf., De Trinitate 15.11.20. 
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Conclusions 
 
‘Participation’ and ‘adoption’ are deificatory terms of the Church Fathers and 
Augustine’s uses of them in De vera religione, Confessiones, and De Trinitate make 
clear that deification is an important part of his thought.1372 Moreover, while 
demonstrating that Augustine discussed human ‘participation’ in God in the terms of, 
for example, ‘image of God’, rationality, and ‘capax Dei’1373 in his late as well as early 
works; I have argued that becoming ‘like (similis)’1374 God is not just one of many parts 
– but the central part – of his thought. 
 
Augustine employed ‘participation’ in ontological and teleological senses: by virtue 
of Christ’s incarnation, death, and resurrection we are ontologically the imperishable 
image of God,1375 yet teleologically the image is in a state of deformity due to our 
(original) sin. In other words, we – as the image of Wisdom/Reason1376/the 
Good/Happiness1377 – are permanently endowed with the ‘capacity’ to become 
wise/rational1378/good/happy like God; yet many of us are ignorant of the ‘capacity’, let 
alone cultivating it, due to lack of interiority.1379 Similarly, although God has brought us 
‘salvation’ (or adopted us as His children) through Christ, it is yet to be completed 
through our teleological ‘participation’ in God.1380  
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1372
 For ‘participation’ see De vera religione 6.10 & 30.54; Confessiones 4.15.25, 7.9.14 & 7.19.25; De 
Trinitate 4.2.4, 5.10.11, 6.5.7, 7.1.2, 8.3.5, 14.8.11 & 14.12.15: the term does not seem to appear in De 
ordine, Soliloquia, and De quantitate animae. For ‘adoption’ refer to De vera religione 17.34; 
Confessiones 9.3.6 & 11.2.4; De Trinitate 5.11.12 & 5.14.15. 
1373
 Cf. De Trinitate 14.8.11 & 15.20.39. Also, see Confessiones 9.11.28. 
1374
 De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
1375
 Cf., De vera religione 3.4; Confessiones 10.43.68 & 7.21.27; and De Trinitate 2.17.29, 4.1, 4.3.5, 
4.3.6, 4.7.11 & many more: in De Trinitate Augustine mentions our ontological ‘participation’ in God 
frequently in the language of salvation. 
1376
 Cf., De ordine 1.8.25 & Confessiones 11.8.10. 
1377
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.2 & Confessiones 10.21.30. 
1378
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.1.5 & Confessiones 13.32.47 
1379
 Cf., Confessiones 10.8.15: ‘People are moved to wonder by mountain peaks, by vast waves of the sea, 
by broad waterfalls on rivers, by the all-embracing extent of the ocean, by the revolutions of the stars. But 
in themselves they are uninterested.’ 
1380
 Cf., De ordine 1.8.22 (‘O God of hosts, convert us, and show Thy face; and we shall be saved. [Deus 
virtutum, converte nos, et ostende faciem tuam, et salvi erimus (Ps 79, 8)]’: salvation is mentioned in a 
teleological sense); Soliloquia 1.1.4 ; De quantitate animae 33.76; De vera religione 3.3; Confessiones 
1.5.5 & 5.7.13; De Trinitate 4.7.11 (‘the one who was to come and be the saviour of all who needed to be 
restored from death [unum futurum in quo esset salus universorum a morte reparandorum]’ [Hill’s 
translation]: salvation is mentioned in an ontological sense) & 4.3.5-6 (‘Need I produce many examples to 
show the difference between the soul’s death and the body’s, when they can easily be told apart by 
anyone in that one sentence of the Lord’s in the gospel: Leave the dead to bury their dead (Mt 8:22; Lk 
9:60)? It was a dead body, of course, that had to be buried, but its buriers he meant us to understand as 
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How, then, are we to restore the image of God (or become wise/rational/good/happy 
like God)? In a nutshell, we must endeavour to remember, know, and love God through 
faith and reason with God’s help. Knowing God is recalling the knowledge of God 
innate in our memory (or remembering God, who is epistemologically immanent in our 
soul), thus a theory of reminiscence. However, due to our preoccupation with material 
and worldly things, we have difficulty in recollecting our memory of God. Also, we 
often think about God in a materialistic way. God is indeed incorporeal and this is of 
paramount importance. We can perceive God’s incorporeity inferentially through 
understanding the soul’s immateriality: this is an inward turn. Yet, God is not only 
immanent in the soul, but also transcends it in terms of nature. Therefore, we must turn 
inwards and, then, upwards in order to become deified: this is what Augustinian 
interiority is about.  
 
In summary, Augustine understood the Christian salvation in a deificatory sense, 1381 
and his theory of interiority is a way to complete our salvation.  
 
I have argued that there is no substantial change in reference to interiority between 
the young Augustine and the mature Augustine, and some of the key points are as 
follows. Firstly, the soul is created in the image of God and is conditioned to 
‘participate’ ontologically in Him. Consequently, the soul is made immortal like God. 
Yet, precisely due to our created nature, we are not immutable or self-sufficient like 
God and, so, divine grace is essential for our deification. Secondly, the will is always 
drawn to ‘delight’1382: thus, our teleological ‘participation’ in God in terms of memory, 
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dead in soul through godless unbelief; the sort of dead who are roused up in the text, Awake, you who 
sleep and rise from the dead, and Christ will enlighten you (Eph 5:14). Again, the apostle reprobates a 
death of this kind when he says of one sort of widow, If she spends her time in pleasure, she is dead while 
she lives (1 Tm 5:6). So the godly soul which had been godless is said to have returned to life from death 
and to live, thanks to the justice of faith (Rom 4:13). … This life arises out of faith, since the just man 
lives out of faith (Rom 1:17). But how does he go on? If the Spirit of him who raised up Jesus from the 
dead dwells in you, he who raised up Jesus from the dead will also bring to life your mortal bodies 
through his Spirit dwelling in you (Rom 8:11). To balance this double death of ours the savior paid in his 
single one, and to achieve each resurrection of ours he pre-enacted and presented his one and only one by 
way of sacrament and by way of model’ [Hill’s translation]: salvation is mentioned in both ontological 
and teleological senses.) 
1381
 Vincent  Meconi says, the ‘heart of Augustine’s soteriology – humanity’s becoming gods’: see his 
article ‘St. Augustine’s Early Theory of Participation’, Augustinian Studies 27,2 (1996), 63.  
‘Becoming Gods by Becoming God’s: Augustine’s Mystagogy of Identification,’ Augustinian Studies 
39:1 (2008) 61–74. 
1382
 De musica 6.11.29. 
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reason and the will is always ‘triadic’1383, if not always trinitarian. Thirdly, seeing God 
‘face to face’ in this life is impossible.1384 Fourthly, Augustine’s intellectual ascent to 
God is fundamentally dialectical (or inferential), whether it be through reason or 
through faith. This is to say that he always attempted to perceive God in comparison 
with what is not God,1385 searching for right pairs of correlative terms: through 
Neoplatonism he learned to see things in terms of material-or-immaterial and mutable-
or-immutable, and as a Christian in terms of Creator-or-creature. Finally, I shall turn to 
De Trinitate 10.1.1-10.2.4, where Augustine carefully examines how one learns a new 
word, for example, ‘temetum’1386; for this text reveals a great deal of his self-
understanding concerning his own spiritual journey to God. There are, in fact, both 
similarities and differences between Augustine’s intellectual pursuit of Wisdom/God 
and our search for the meaning of a word unknown to us; and I have already explained 
this partially, in the Introduction, as a way to argue for reason’s precedence over the 
will and also as a starting point of this thesis. However, I shall go through it again in 
order to summarize the whole of Augustine’s theory of interiority: clarifying where the 
differences stem from will explain why Augustine described his theological journey in 
terms of ‘ascent’1387 and deification1388. 
 
Augustine, first of all, emphasized that we cannot search for what we do not 
know.1389 Thus, by the time we try to find the definition of ‘temetum’, we must have 
already known something about it, namely, its pronunciation, its letters, and the 
fact/conviction that it is a meaningful ‘word’/‘sign (signum)’.1390 (Note that, regarding 
forgetting and recalling in general, Solignac holds that recognizing forgetfulness itself is 
possible because what we have forgotten is situated in a ‘context’, and we still 
remember the ‘context’: if we forget the ‘context’, then we cannot ‘remember the 
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1383
 Cf., Frederick van Fleteren, ‘Thematic Reflections on the De Trinitate’, in Proceedings of the PMR 
Conference, vol. 12/13 (1987-1988), 224. See the introductory section of Part IV ‘De Trinitate’. 
1384
 Cf., Soliloquia 1.7.14 (‘the soul, after this life, unites itself wholly to God’) & De Trinitate 9.1.1. 
1385
 Cf., De ordine 2.16.44 (‘God, who is better known by knowing what He is not’), De vera religione 
52.101, Confessiones 7.17.23 & De Trinitate 15.2.3 (‘“the invisible things of God from the creation of the 
world are clearly seen, being understood by the things that are made, even his eternal power and 
Godhead” [Rom. 1:20].’ [McKenna’s translation])  
1386
 It means ‘wine’: see De Trinitate 10.1.2. 
1387
 De ordine 1.10.29, De vera religione 29.52, Confessiones 9.4.9, and De Trinitate 10.12.19. 
1388
 Cf., Epistula 10.2 & De Trinitate 9.11.16 (‘we are like God inasmuch as we know Him’). 
1389
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.1. 
1390
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2. 
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forgetfulness’1391 itself either. 1392 Therefore, the ‘context’ provides the clues to what we 
want to recollect. Likewise, the ‘context’, in which we have encountered ‘temetum’, 
makes us realize that we have come across a new word rather than a meaningless 
scribble.) Similarly, by the time Augustine was determined to seek, after reading the 
Hortensius, what the Ciceronian term ‘Wisdom’ might mean, he had already realized 
that the term is a ‘sign’ that signifies something. 
 
Secondly, both our quest for the meaning of ‘temetum’ and Augustine’s for that of 
‘Wisdom’ are based on the love of ‘knowing the unknown’, not knowing the known.1393 
 
Finally, we can be enthusiastic about finding the definition of ‘temetum’ only if we 
have already known about, have been ‘touched (tangere)’ by, and currently love ‘the 
beauty of learning, wherein the knowledge of all the signs is contained’1394, and the 
usefulness of having a linguistic skill.1395 Also, the enthusiasm can be sustained only if 
we persistently ‘hope’ to gain fluency in language.1396 Similarly, Augustine’s passionate 
search for the meaning of ‘Wisdom’/’God’ was sustained by his hope of finding true 
happiness.1397  
 
In summary, the intellectual dimension of Augustinian interiority is similar to our 
search for the meaning of an unknown word.  
 
Despite the similarities, there are also differences between them. An important one is 
that a considerable part of learning a language demands understanding the conventional 
usage of words in terms of syntax and semantics, whereas the meaning of the 
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1391
 Confessiones 10.16.24: ‘Ergo cum memoriam memini, per se ipsam sibi praesto est ipsa memoria; 
cum vero memini oblivionem, et memoria praesto est et oblivio, memoria, qua meminerim, oblivio, quam 
meminerim.’ 
1392
 Aimé Solignac, ‘La notion de « memoria » chez Augustin’, in Dictionnaire de Spiritualité 
(Paris: Beauchesne, 1980), vol. 10, 996: ‘l’objet ou l’événement oubliés sont situés dans un contexte qui 
apparaît déjà comme tel à la mémoire. C’est en éclairant ce contexte, et donc dans la mémoire et par elle 
que l’oubli pourra être dissipé. L’objet oublié est donc cherché par une voie indirecte, par le détour du 
contexte, jusqu’à ce qu’il soit perçu lui-même.’ 
1393
 De Trinitate 10.1.3. 
1394
 De Trinitate 10.1.2 (McKenna’s translation): ‘pulchritudo doctrinae, qua continentur notitiae 
signorum omnium’: probably, Augustine means ‘beauty of training oneself in academic disciplines, in 
which the knowledge of all the signs is contained’. 
1395
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2. 
1396
 Cf., De Trinitate 10.1.2. 
1397
 Cf., Confessiones 3.4.7. 
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teleological term ‘Wisdom’ is disputable, and so is a matter of belief/conviction. This is 
why Augustine undertook a lengthy theological exploration through Manichaeism, 
Stoicism, Neoplatonism, and finally Christianity in search for a self-evident definition 
of ‘Wisdom’/’God’. Yet, Augustine did not think that he could find the definition in his 
lifetime. In other words, it is impossible in this life to render – to borrow the language 
of Verbeke – the ‘latent’ and ‘implicit’ notitia of God in memory fully ‘actual’ and 
‘explicit’.1398 (The Augustine of De Trinitate insists that that is because our language is 
too limited to describe the transcendent God.1399) 
 
Now, in linguistics, one definition is not valued or prized more than another. Also, 
no extraordinary experience, such as a mystical experience, is involved in finding and 
understanding a definition of a word. Why, then, did Augustine describe the cognitive 
act of becoming clear about what ‘God’/’Wisdom’ might mean (in other words, gaining 
knowledge of God) in terms of deification and ascent (and arriving at its final stage is 
attaining transcendence)? 
 
For Augustine, knowledge exists as a substance: ‘knowledge is a substance’1400. This 
is the core element of his epistemology that emerges both in his early and later works. 
For instance, dialectics (‘the laws of argumentation’) is Truth itself, which is an eternal, 
divine substance;1401 ‘liberal sciences (doctrinae liberales)’, to be recollected from the 
memory are collectively a ‘thing itself (res ipsa)’;1402 and knowledge about the mind is 
a substance, which is ontologically ‘identical’ with, and ‘equal’ to, the mind itself.1403 
 
Due to the ontological nature of knowledge, knowledge of God must exist 
somewhere and that is in memory:1404 the immateriality of knowledge and the soul is 
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1398
 Cf., Gérard Verbeke, ‘Connaissance de soi et connaissance de Dieu chez saint Augustin’, 
Augustiniana 4 (1954), 505-506. 
1399
 Cf., De Trinitate 7.4.7 quoted at the end of section ‘Knowledge of a thing is similar to the reality of 
that thing’ in chapter 3 in Part IV. Also, see Ibid., 7.3.6-7.6.12. 
1400
 De Trinitate 9.4.6. 
1401
 Cf., Soliloquia 2.11.21: ‘If that is the province of the science of argumentation, it is through itself that 
it is a true branch of learning. Who, then, will think it strange if that by which all things are true is 
through itself and in itself the true Truth. (At, si ad eam pertinet hoc officium, per seipsam disciplina vera 
est. Quisquamne igitur mirum putabit si ea qua vera sunt, omnia ab ipsa vera sunt, si et ipsa sit veritas.)’ 
Ibid., 2.2.2: ‘Truth, therefore, will exist, even if the world ceases to exist. … Truth, therefore, in no way 
will cease to exist.’ Ibid., 1.1.4: ‘You, the one God, the one, eternal, true substance (substantia)’. 
1402
 Cf., Confessiones 10.9.16-10.10.17. 
1403
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
1404
 Cf., Confessiones 10.23.33. 
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equally important for Augustine to argue that the former is immanent in the latter. Thus, 
we must turn away from a material world inwards to our memory in search for the 
definition of ‘Wisdom’/’God’ through faith and reason. Furthermore, since where 
knowledge of God exists is where God Himself is,1405 God is in the soul.  
 
Yet, knowledge of God is not only immanent in, but also transcendent to, the 
soul.1406 Note that, knowledge is a constituent of hierarchically structured reality: an 
optical image of a material thing in memory is better than that material thing itself;1407 
the mind and knowledge about itself are again completely ‘equal’ to one another; 
knowledge about God, which is superior to the soul,1408 is inferior to God Himself.1409  
 
Therefore, searching for what ‘Wisdom’/’God’ should mean is far worthier than 
seeking the definition of ‘temetum’. Also, the epistemological act of knowing God is an 
ontological act of ‘ascending’ to Him (or transcending ourselves). Finally, since 
knowledge is ontologically ‘similar’ to what it is knowledge of,1410 we become deified 
through remembering, understanding, and loving God. 
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1405
 Cf., De ordine 2.2.5: ‘what the wise man knows by understanding is with God’.  
1406
 Cf., De quantitate animae 27.53: ‘knowledge (of God) stands higher than reason’. De Trinitate 
15.27.50: ‘I confess rather that its sublime knowledge (of God) has been too great for me, and that I am 
unable to reach to it.’  
1407
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
1408
 Cf., De Trinitate 15.27.50 & De quantitate animae 27.53: see above. 
1409
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16: (MeKenna’s translation) ‘that knowledge (i.e., of God) is less than He, 
because it is in a lower nature (i.e., the mind); for the mind is creature, but God is Creator.’ 
1410
 Cf., De Trinitate 9.11.16. 
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